It is often said that the advent of the Freudian talking cure around 1900 revolutionised the psychiatric setting by giving patients a voice. Less known is that for decades prior to the popularisation of this technique, several researchers had been experimenting with another, written practice aimed at probing the mind. This was particularly the case in France. Alongside neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot’s spectacular staging of hypnotised bodies, ‘automatic writing’ became widely used in fin-de-siècle clinics and laboratories, with French psychologists regularly asking (...) entranced patients to scribble down words to validate their nascent theories on the divided self. This article traces the emergence of automatic writing in French psychological discourse at the close of the 19th century. By focusing on the early work of Dr Pierre Janet and some of his contemporaries, it re-examines the role played by this practice in what Henri Ellenberger famously called ‘The Discovery of the Unconscious’. It also considers the various levels of reconstruction at play in recent historical accounts. What does it mean to give subjects a (written) voice? How does automatic writing differ from the Freudian talking cure as respective expressions of the unspeakable? And how might these questions inform future historical practice? (shrink)

This article follows the discussion begun by Pierre-Marie Beaude on the distinction between singularity and intention in aesthetics, considered in its relation to theology. If it is admitted that an author really has an intention, this may be perceivably different than a particular expression of singularity. Also, the concept of intention can be considered from an analytical perspective based on linguistic criteria, with intention becoming an intentional state and the substantival proposition an intentional object. Propositional attitudes, particularly the attitude (...) of belief, play a primary role in this perspective. This allows for the consideration of theological discourse as a collection of sentences meant to incite to a transfer of belief. (shrink)

La définition platonicienne du philosophe; la philosophie comme mode de vie; rupture et continuité, le Moyen Age et les temps modernes. [SDM].

Ce livre révisionniste (sans connotation péjorative) s’inscrit dans la littérature historienne nous parlant des guerres qui ont ensanglanté le Viêt-nam pendant trente ans (1945-1975). L’intention première de son auteur est de rompre avec une historiographie dominante, héroïsante et partisane qui donne le beau rôle au Nord Viêt-nam qui faisait une « guerre juste » contre l’impérialisme étranger « et ses valets sud vietnamiens », pour accomplir un noble dessein, celui de la libération puis celu...

La notion d’intérêt général est, aujourd’hui, autant un concept du droit qu’un topos rhétorique. Elle est censée désigner l’ordre public, l’intérêt du peuple ou bien la priorité des décisions administratives sur les intérêts privés, sectoriels, les droits individuels et les contrats entre particuliers (à travers des mécanismes juridiques comme la préemption, l’expropriation pour des motifs d’intérêt général ou d’utilité publique ou le travail d’intérêt général…). Pourtant cette notion a une d...

Alva Noë’s version of the enactive conception in _Action in Perception_ is an important contribution to the study of visual perception. First, I argue, however, that it is unclear (at best) whether, as the enactivists claim, work on change blindness supports the denial of the existence of detailed visual representations. Second, I elaborate on what Noë calls the ‘puzzle of perceptual presence’. Thirdly, I question the enactivist account of perceptual constancy. Finally, I draw attention to the tensions between enactivism and (...) two trends in cognitive neuroscience: the two-visual systems model of human vision and the theory of internal forward models of action. (shrink)

Les émotions ont un rôle important dans nos interactions sociales. Sans émotions, nous avons du mal à faire des choix. Quand notre environnement déçoit nos attentes de manière répétée, nos émotions nous signalent qu'il serait rationnel de changer nos attentes, c'est-à-dire de procéder à des révisions. Le partage des émotions, qui est la clé de notre sentiment d'appartenance à une communauté, nous amène à révéler nos valeurs, parce qu'il permet de résister face à un monde décevant. Si même une fois (...) révisées nos croyances, nos émotions se maintiennent, elles manifestent alors des attentes bien enracinées, qui sont nos valeurs réelles. Pour étudier les valeurs collectives, il faut donc étudier les émotions, la manière dont elles incitent à des révisions, et comment leur partage collectif renforce nos résistances. La rationalité morale s'appuie sur les émotions. Celles-ci sont sensibles aux détails des situations, et cette rationalité dépend des contextes, si bien qu'elle propose des arguments qui restent révisables quand le contexte change. Ne résistent à toute révision que nos sentiments d'injustice. L'originalité de ce livre est donc d'étudier les émotions et les valeurs, individuelles et collectives, dans la dynamique de leurs changements, de leurs révisions et de leurs résistances, et d'utiliser ce lien entre émotions et révisions pour mieux définir la spécificité d'une rationalité morale. (shrink)

Drawing on various resources and requirements (as expressed by Dewey, Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Brandom), this paper proposes an externalist view of conceptual mental episodes that does not equate them, even partially, with vehicles of any sort, whether the vehicles be located in the environment or in the head. The social and pragmatic nature of the use of concepts and conceptual content makes it unnecessary and indeed impossible to locate the entities that realize conceptual mental episodes in non-personal or subpersonal contentful (...) entities (vehicles). Persons, who engage in social practices of deontic scorekeeping (Brandom), and who are thus able to produce appropriate inferential behaviour, enact conceptual mental episodes and the basis of their supervenience. (shrink)

Chacun croit savoir, pour l'avoir appris à l'école, ce qu'était la philosophie antique : la naissance de la Raison, avec la critique du mythe et de la religion ; l'invention de l'éthique, avec le " souci de soi " et les " exercices spirituels " ; et bien sûr une galerie de bustes blancs vénérables : Socrate, Platon, Aristote, etc. Pierre Vesperini propose de mettre en suspens ce " grand récit ", et d'aller directement aux sources, en leur posant (...) une question simple : qu'appelait-on philosophia dans l'Antiquité? Tout d'un coup, le musée laisse place à un territoire luxuriant de couleurs et d'histoires, où le familier retrouve son étrangeté, où l'inconnu fait son entrée.0L'histoire ici, loin de s'opposer à la philosophie, la déplace. Car en proposant une reconstitution de l'expérience antique de la philosophia, du " temps des sages " à la christianisation, l'auteur invite aussi à prendre conscience de ce qui a été perdu, pour inventer d'autres façons de concevoir le savoir et la pensée. (shrink)

Les sociologues n'ont jamais cessé d'exprimer leur intérêt pour le problème dit de « la nature de la réalité sociale ». Pour nombre d'entre eux, le projet de clarifier ce problème n'est rien de moins que le programme complet de leur discipline. Mais la controverse autour de la nature de la réalité sociale est très loin d'être réglée. Des conceptions diamétralement opposées s'y affrontent, les unes « réalistes », les autres « anti-réalistes ». Ce genre de controverse, relatif à l'existence (...) ou à la non-existence de certaines entités (l'individu et la société, par exemple), et aux relations de dépendance ou de priorité entre elles, peut être dit « métaphysique ». Dans ce débat, certains des arguments requièrent une enquête sur la signification de termes centraux – « existence », « état de choses », « mental », « physique », « social », etc. –, et sur la détermination de leurs relations. On peut appeler « ontologiques » les recherches relatives à ces termes centraux. Elles contribuent à spécifier le mode d'existence des objets sociaux. C'est à la présentation de telles recherches qu'est consacré le présent volume. Son idée principale est qu'une enquête ontologique, ouverte à l'imagination et à l'invention, peut, en enrichissant l'ontologie mobilisée, sortir la querelle sur « la nature de la réalité sociale » de certaines de ses impasses. (shrink)

: According to Dewey inquiry proceeds from uncertainty to integration and control. Even if Dewey pays attention to the incompleteness of nature, to the modification and revision of primary generalizations by more elaborated conceptions, to the necessity of introducing changes in the world in order to carry an experimental inquiry, to the possibility of re-determine the interdependent constituents in a "transaction", he seems not to be aware of the instability that this process of revision implies: we do not know in (...) advance whether a newly undertaken revision is a progress or a waste of time. If we accept this consequence of pragmatism, how can we be confident in the truth of our beliefs, if we know in advance that most of them are to be revised, and that even if our belief is by chance a really true one, it could be reasonable some day to pay attention to some counter-argument that would induce us to revise it. How can be maintained the practical force of an obligation, if all norms are to be revised someday, and if we never know whether our favorite norms are really not been revised? The stability that pragmatism seems to aim at could be obtained by studying the relation between two opposite revisions, where some properties of symmetry and fairness can be required and defined, in a "transactional" fashion that is reminiscent of Dewey. When these properties are not satisfied, it will be true forever that we are and will be entitled to require a revision of the situation. But then, the core of pragmatism is the revolt against what is unfair, a negative content. On the contrary, Dewey has always insisted upon the positive effect of negative situations, seeing failure as learning and negation as positive determination.Key-words: pragmatism, Dewey, inquiry, revision, ethics, democracy, transaction.Resumo: Segundo Dewey, a investigação procede da incerteza à integração e ao controle. Mesmo Dewey prestando atenção à incompletude da natureza, à modificação e revisão das generalizações por concepções mais elaboradas, à necessidade de introduzir mudanças no mundo de forma que conduza a uma investigação experimental, à possibilidade de re-determinar os constituintes interdependentes em uma "transação", ele parece não estar consciente da instabilidade que esse processo de revisão implica: nós não sabemos de antemão se uma nova revisão realizada é um progresso ou uma perda de tempo. Se aceitarmos essa conseqüência do pragmatismo, como podemos estar confiantes na veracidade de nossas crenças, já que sabemos de antemão que a maior parte delas deverá ser revisada? E mesmo se nossa crença for efetivamente verdadeira, poderia ser razoável algum dia prestar atenção a algum contra-argumento que poderia induzir-nos a revisá-la. Como pode ser mantida a força prática de uma obrigação, se todas as normas deverão ser revisadas algum dia, e se nunca sabemos se nossas normas favoritas não estão efetivamente sendo revisadas? A estabilidade que o pragmatismo parece buscar poderia ser obtida estudando-se a relação entre duas revisões opostas, em que algumas propriedades de simetria e justiça podem ser requeridas e definidas, em uma maneira "transacional" ao modo de Dewey. Quando essas propriedades não são satisfeitas, será verdadeiro para sempre que nós estamos e seremos encarregados de requerer uma revisão da situação. Mas, então, o centro do pragmatismo é a revolta contra o que é injusto, um conteúdo negativo. Ao contrário, Dewey sempre insistiu sobre o efeito positivo das situações negativas, enxergando o erro como aprendizado e a negação como determinação positiva.Palavras-chave: pragmatismo, Dewey, inquirição, revisão, ética, democracia, transação. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that distinguishing ‘evolutionary’ from ‘Darwinian’ medicine will help us assess the variety of roles that evolutionary explanations can play in a number of medical contexts. Because the boundaries of evolutionary and Darwinian medicine overlap to some extent, however, they are best described as distinct ‘research traditions’ rather than as competing paradigms. But while evolu- tionary medicine does not stand out as a new scientific field of its own, Darwinian medicine is united by a number of (...) distinctive theoretical and methodological claims. For example, evolutionary medicine and Darwinian medicine can be distinguished with respect to the styles of evolutionary explanations they employ. While the former primarily involves ‘forward looking’ explanations, the latter depends mostly on ‘backward looking’ explanations. A forward looking explanation tries to predict the effects of ongoing evolutionary processes on human health and disease in contem- porary environments (e.g., hospitals). In contrast, a backward looking explanation typically applies evolutionary principles from the vantage point of humans’ distant biological past in order to assess present states of health and disease. Both approaches, however, are concerned with the prevention and control of human diseases. In con- clusion, I raise some concerns about the claim that ‘nothing in medicine makes sense except in the light of evolution’. (shrink)

Dans ce livre savant et moqueur, Pierre-André Taguieff passe au scalpel l'idéal moderne par excellence, celui d'émancipation, qui exalte, mobilise et aveugle depuis longtemps les Modernes. Le temps est venu de soumettre à un examen critique sans complaisance cette notion qui fait partie du prêt-à-penser dont se sont emparés les utopistes et les démagogues de toutes obédiences. Comment expliquer que cette notion banale ait pu devenir un thème philosophique et politique majeur depuis la fin du XVIIIe siècle, sous la (...) forme du projet universaliste de l'émancipation du genre humain comme sous celle de l'autonomie croissante de l'individu? Taguieff analyse la formation philosophique de l'idée d'émancipation, explore ses usages politiques et dissèque ce qu'il appelle "l'émancipationnisme ", produit de la corruption idéologique de cette idée-force. Car l'émancipation comme projet global appelle une critique fondamentale : ce qui est rejeté subrepticement, voire diabolisé, ce sont les attachements, les fidélités, les enracinements, les mémoires particulières, donc la transmission. Il s'agit d'un programme de refonte anthropologique, visant à créer l'" homme nouveau ", chimère d'une société mondiale d'individus également émancipés. La généalogie d'une idée floue, pour penser librement le monde de demain. (shrink)

The author explores with the leading scholars of today the way and extent to which many forms of oppression, such as racism, classism, capitalism, sexism, and linguicis, have affected the women, poor working-class people, queer people, students of color, female faculty and faculty of color. The leading scholars are: Richard Delgado, David Gillborn , Zeus Leonardo, Antonia Darder, Howard Winant, Christine Sleeter, Sonia Nieto, Carl Grant, Peter McLaren, Noam Chomsky, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Pedro Noguera, and Dave Stovall. Sometimes immensely personal, the (...) interviews unveil the how far America has come, and just how far we have to go, in the quest for equality for all its citizens. (shrink)

1 Analyse sociale de la connaissance et études de cas L’épistémologie sociale est un domaine de recherche en construction. L’usage généralisé de cette expression trouve son origine dans la philosophie analytique contemporaine, bien que des auteurs en sociologie des sciences puissent également l’utiliser. L’épistémologie sociale répond à une exigence d’utilité publique, à un souci d’application de la philosophie de la connaissance à des problèmes de société. Mais son développement répond égale...

(From Liberty Fund:) The topics of church and state, religious toleration, the legal enforcement of religious practices, and religiously motivated violence on the part of individuals have once again become burning issues. Pierre Bayle’s Philosophical Commentary was a major attempt to deal with very similar problems three centuries ago. His argument is that if the orthodox have the right and duty to persecute, then every sect will persecute, since every sect considers itself orthodox. The result will be mutual slaughter, (...) something God cannot have intended. -/- The Philosophical Commentary takes its starting point from the words attributed to Jesus Christ in Luke 14:23, “And the lord said unto the servant, Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in, that my house may be full.” Bayle contends that the word compel cannot mean “force.” From this perspective, he constructs his doctrine of toleration based on the singular importance of conscience. His point is not that coercion usually is ineffective in matters of faith but that, even when effective, it is wrong because it ignores the indispensability of the free conscience. (shrink)

H. Arendt asserts that "in the modern world authority has disappeared almost to the vanishing point." However, she attributes some kind of authority to the words of poets, in the case discussed here, to those of her friend W. H. Auden. The precious gift of the poets to write poems that have an "unconstraining" power, gives that authority to their voice.