This article deals with the links between the enaction paradigm and artificial intelligence. Enaction is considered a metaphor for artificial intelligence, as a number of the notions which it deals with are deemed incompatible with the phenomenal field of the virtual. After explaining this stance, we shall review previous works regarding this issue in terms of artificial life and robotics. We shall focus on the lack of recognition of co-evolution at the heart of these approaches. We propose to explicitly integrate (...) the evolution of the environment into our approach in order to refine the ontogenesis of the artificial system, and to compare it with the enaction paradigm. The growing complexity of the ontogenetic mechanisms to be activated can therefore be compensated by an interactive guidance system emanating from the environment. This proposition does not however, resolve that of the relevance of the meaning created by the machine (sense-making). Such reflections lead us to integrate human interaction into this environment in order to construct relevant meaning in terms of participative artificial intelligence. This raises a number of questions with regards to setting up an enactive interaction. The article concludes by exploring a number of issues, thereby enabling us to associate current approaches with the principles of morphogenesis, guidance, the phenomenology of interactions and the use of minimal enactive interfaces in setting up experiments which will deal with the problem of artificial intelligence in a variety of enaction-based ways. (shrink)

This article deals with the links between the enaction paradigm and artificial intelligence. Enaction is considered a metaphor for artificial intelligence, as a number of the notions which it deals with are deemed incompatible with the phenomenal field of the virtual. After explaining this stance, we shall review previous works regarding this issue in terms of artificial life and robotics. We shall focus on the lack of recognition of co-evolution at the heart of these approaches. We propose to explicitly integrate (...) the evolution of the environment into our approach in order to refine the ontogenesis of the artificial system, and to compare it with the enaction paradigm. The growing complexity of the ontogenetic mechanisms to be activated can therefore be compensated by an interactive guidance system emanating from the environment. This proposition does not however, resolve that of the relevance of the meaning created by the machine (sense-making). Such reflections lead us to integrate human interaction into this environment in order to construct relevant meaning in terms of participative artificial intelligence. This raises a number of questions with regards to setting up an enactive interaction. The article concludes by exploring a number of issues, thereby enabling us to associate current approaches with the principles of morphogenesis, guidance, the phenomenology of interactions and the use of minimal enactive interfaces in setting up experiments which will deal with the problem of artificial intelligence in a variety of enaction-based ways. (shrink)

Highlighting the social tensions that confront the liberal tradition, Pierre Manent draws a portrait of what we, citizens of modern liberal democracies, have become. For Manent, a discussion of liberalism encompasses the foundations of modern society, its secularism, its individualism, and its conception of rights. The frequent incapacity of the morally neutral, democratic state to further social causes, he argues, derives from the liberal stance that political life does not serve a higher purpose. Through quick-moving, highly synthetic essays, he (...) explores the development of liberal thinking in terms of a single theme: the decline of theological politics. The author traces the liberal stance to Machiavelli, who, in seeking to divorce everyday life from the pervasive influence of the Catholic church, separated politics from all notions of a cosmological order. What followed, as Manent demonstrates in his analyses of Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, Guizot, and Constant, was the evolving concept of an individual with no goals outside the confines of the self and a state with no purpose but to prevent individuals from dominating one another. Weighing both the positive and negative effects of such a political arrangement, Manent raises important questions about the fundamental political issues of the day, among them the possibility of individual rights being reconciled with the necessary demands of political organization, and the desirability of a government system neutral about religion but not about public morals. (shrink)

A magisterial mappa mundi of the terrain that Pierre Hadot has so productively worked for decades, this ambitious work revises our view of ancient philosophy- ...

« La métaphysique d’Aristote n’est, au sens aristotélicien, dialectique et par là incapable de tout achèvement déductif, que parce qu’elle est une métaphysique du mouvement, c’est-à-dire de la scission. » Le propos de l’auteur est simple : sans vouloir rajouter et apporter du nouveau sur Aristote, il tente au contraire de désapprendre tout ce que la tradition a ajouté à l’aristotélisme primitif. Car l’aristotélisme que nous connaissons est surtout celui des commentateurs grecs. L’image ainsi révélée est celle d’un Aristote aporétique, (...) mais « cette voix qui parle est celle plus fraternelle qui continue de chercher en nous ce qu’est l’être et de se taire parfois ». (shrink)

The aim of this work is to study complex ecological models exhibiting simple dynamics. We consider large scale systems which can be decomposed into weakly coupled subsystems. Perturbation Theory is used in order to get a reduced set of differential equations governing slow time varying global variables. As examples, we study the influence of the individual behaviour of animals in competition and predator-prey models. The animals are assumed to do many activities all day long such as searching for food of (...) different types. The degree of competition as well as the predation pressure are dependent upon these activities. Preys are more vulnerable when doing some activities during which they are very exposed to predators attacks rather than for others during which they are hidden. We study the effect of a change in the average individual behaviour of the animals on interspecific relationships. Computer simulations of the whole sets of equations are compared to simulations of the reduced sets of equations. (shrink)

Gaining momentum during the last third of the twentieth century, the philosophy of biology is now a distinct field with its own debates, journals, audiences, and professional societies. This professionalization came along with the forging of an intellectual identity based on the existence of disciplinary frontiers that demarcated philosophy of biology from neighboring disciplines such as philosophy of medicine, history of biology, or general philosophy of science. Here, I argue that the identity of this emerging philosophy of biology also excluded (...) Continental traditions often called “biological philosophy” or “historical epistemology of the life sciences”. Going back to the 60s and 70s, I explore the emergence of the philosophy of biology at a time when its identity was still in flux and its analytic orientation debated. To do so, I focus primarily on the works of David Hull and Marjorie Grene, and I draw on their unpublished correspondence. Although Grene’s intellectual contribution to the philosophy of biology has been widely acknowledged, her coming from a different philosophical universe created tensions with the identity Hull and others sought to establish. Overall, this chapter raises a question about the historical conditions that make fields such as the philosophy of biology possible, and calls attention to the exclusions that permeated the philosophy of biology from its inception and what this involves in terms of the proper relation between philosophy and science, especially biology. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that distinguishing ‘evolutionary’ from ‘Darwinian’ medicine will help us assess the variety of roles that evolutionary explanations can play in a number of medical contexts. Because the boundaries of evolutionary and Darwinian medicine overlap to some extent, however, they are best described as distinct ‘research traditions’ rather than as competing paradigms. But while evolu- tionary medicine does not stand out as a new scientific field of its own, Darwinian medicine is united by a number of (...) distinctive theoretical and methodological claims. For example, evolutionary medicine and Darwinian medicine can be distinguished with respect to the styles of evolutionary explanations they employ. While the former primarily involves ‘forward looking’ explanations, the latter depends mostly on ‘backward looking’ explanations. A forward looking explanation tries to predict the effects of ongoing evolutionary processes on human health and disease in contem- porary environments (e.g., hospitals). In contrast, a backward looking explanation typically applies evolutionary principles from the vantage point of humans’ distant biological past in order to assess present states of health and disease. Both approaches, however, are concerned with the prevention and control of human diseases. In con- clusion, I raise some concerns about the claim that ‘nothing in medicine makes sense except in the light of evolution’. (shrink)

Frederick Griffith was an English bacteriologist at the Pathological Laboratory of the Ministry of Health in London who believed that progress in the epidemiology and control of infectious diseases would come only with more precise knowledge of the identity of the causative microorganisms. Over the years, Griffith developed and expanded a serological technique for identifying pathogenic microorganisms, which allowed the tracing of the sources of infectious disease outbreaks: slide agglutination. Yet Griffith is not remembered for his contributions to the biology (...) and epidemiology of infectious diseases so much as for discovering the phenomenon known as ‘transformation’. Griffith’s discovery, for many, was a pure case of serendipity whose biological relevance had also largely escaped him. In this paper, I argue that the key to understanding the significance of bacterial transformation – and the scientific legacy of Fred Griffith – rests not only on it initiating a cascade of events leading to molecular genetics but also on its implications for epidemiology based on the biology of host–parasite interactions. Looking at Griffith’s entire career, instead of focusing only on the transformation study, we can better appreciate the place of the latter within Griffith’s overall contributions. Presented in this way, Griffith’s experiment on bacterial transformation also ceases to appear as an anomaly, which in turn leads us to rethink some of the most prevalent historical conceptions about his work. (shrink)

In teasing out the diverse origins of our “modern, ecological understanding of epidemic disease” Greater than the parts: holism in biomedicine, 1920–1950, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998), historians have downplayed the importance of parasitology in the development of a natural history perspective on disease. The present article reassesses the significance of parasitology for the “invention” of medical ecology in post-war France. Focussing on the works of microbiologist Charles Nicolle and on that of physician and zoologist Hervé Harant, I argue that (...) French “medical ecology” was not professionally insulated from some major trends in parasitology, especially in Tunis where disciplinary borders in the medical sciences collapsed. This argument supports the claim that ecological perspectives of disease developed in colonial context but I show that parasitologists such as Harant built on the works of medical geographers who had called attention to the dynamic and complex biological relations between health and environment in fashioning the field of medical ecology in the mid-1950s. As the network of scientists who contributed to the global emergence of “disease ecology” is widening, both medical geography and parasitology stand out as relevant sites of inquiries for a broader historical understanding of the multiple “ecological visions” in twentieth-century biomedical sciences. (shrink)

In a recently published paper, we argued that theories of cultural evolution can gain explanatory power by being more pluralistic. In his reply to it, Dennett agreed that more pluralism is needed. Our paper’s main point was to urge cultural evolutionists to get their hands dirty by describing the fine details of cultural products and by striving to offer detailed and, when explanatory, varied algorithms or mechanisms to account for them. While Dennett’s latest work on cultural evolution does marvelously well (...) on the first point, it has only whet our appetite on the second. Accordingly, the present paper aims to show what an evolutionary explanation of culture that takes the variety of cultural evolution mechanisms seriously would look like. We will focus on the cultural evolution of social epistemic mechanisms and we will propose that Darwinian algorithms should be complemented with a cultural analogue of the error reduction mechanism proposed to account for human cognition, with a particular emphasis on the necessity to build independencies between different sub-systems in charge of tracking states of the world. To illustrate our point, we will present how the evolution of the legal system as epistemic systems can be understood as a process of building increasingly better independencies and how various criticisms of the actual legal system calls for building even more of them. (shrink)

In multicellular organisms, cells are frequently programmed to die. This makes good sense: cells that fail to, or are no longer playing important roles are eliminated. From the cell’s perspective, this also makes sense, since somatic cells in multicellular organisms require the cooperation of clonal relatives. In unicellular organisms, however, programmed cell death poses a difficult and unresolved evolutionary problem. The empirical evidence for PCD in diverse microbial taxa has spurred debates about what precisely PCD means in the case of (...) unicellular organisms. In this article, we survey the concepts of PCD in the literature and the selective pressures associated with its evolution. We show that definitions of PCD have been almost entirely mechanistic and fail to separate questions concerning what PCD fundamentally is from questions about the kinds of mechanisms that realize PCD. We conclude that an evolutionary definition is best able to distinguish PCD from closely related phenomena. Specifically, we define “true” PCD as an adaptation for death triggered by abiotic or biotic environmental stresses. True PCD is thus not only an evolutionary product but must also have been a target of selection. Apparent PCD resulting from pleiotropy, genetic drift, or trade-offs is not true PCD. We call this “ersatz PCD.”. (shrink)

I present and defend here a thesis named vehicleless externalism for conceptual mental episodes. According to it, the constitutive relations there are between the production of conceptual mental episodes by an individual and the inclusion of this individual in social discursive practices make it non-necessary to equate, even partially, conceptual mental episodes with the occurrence of physical events inside of that individual. Conceptual mental episodes do not have subpersonal vehicles; they have owners: persons in interpretational practices. That thesis is grounded (...) on inferentialism and on the endorsement of the idea that "meaning is normative". After having recapitulated this heritage and after having presented that thesis, the paper especially attempts to articulate how, in that framework, we may then positively conceive the relations there are between conceptual mental episodes, intracranial events and inferential behaviour. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Montaigne and the Coherence of EclecticismPierre ForceSince the publication of Pierre Hadot's essays on ancient philosophy by Arnold Davidson in 1995,2 Michel Foucault's late work on "the care of the self"3 has appeared in a new light. We now know that Hadot's work was familiar to Foucault as early as the 1950s.4 It is also clear that Foucault's notion of "techniques of the self" is very close to (...) what Hadot calls "spiritual exercises." At the same time, there are important differences between the views of these two philosophers, and Hadot has often expressed his regret that Foucault's untimely death prevented them from exploring these differences.5 One important point of disagreement was the status of eclecticism. In Foucault's interpretation of ancient philosophy, the "constitution of the self" implied a personal choice among disparate philosophical references: "Writing as a personal exercise done by the self and for the self, is an art of disparate truth."6 In a 1989 article Hadot argued from a historical point of view that, so far as Stoicism and Epicureanism were concerned, [End Page 523] eclecticism had no place in a mature practice of philosophy. Foucault's favorite example, Seneca's Letters to Lucilius, in which Stoic arguments were invoked along with Epicurean arguments, was a work for beginners. In a mature practice of Stoicism, one would stick to the arguments of the Stoic school, choose them for their coherence, and instead of trying to forge a spiritual identity for oneself through writing, one would "liberate oneself from one's individuality in order to raise oneself up to universality."7 Hadot added that "it is only in the New Academy—in the person of Cicero, for instance—that a personal choice is made according to what reason considers as most likely at a given moment."8 This discussion of Foucault may give the impression that Hadot was somewhat dismissive of eclecticism. Yet in a 2001 interview Hadot claimed that he had always admired Cicero's intellectual independence, and he proposed a reappraisal "of an attitude that has always had a bad reputation: eclecticism."9Something very similar is a stake in the work of Alexander Nehamas, as Lanier Anderson and Joshua Landy showed in their study of his Art of Living. In the conception of philosophy as a "way of life" (Hadot) or "care of the self" (Foucault) or "self-fashioning" (Nehamas), a central issue is the relationship between theoretical coherence and the coherence of the person who theorizes. Elaborating on Nehamas's chapter on Montaigne, Anderson and Landy argue that there is a move in Montaigne away from doctrinal coherence and towards a coherence of the self. As they put it, "the harmonious whole Montaigne commends [... ] is not a coherent body of fact or theory; it is the unified self of the theorizer."10 Anderson and Landy show that this brings up all kinds of difficulties: can this unified self be other than a fiction? If that is the case, how can philosophy be a way of life? Nehamas's answer is very much in the spirit of the late Foucault: there is a coherence of the self in Montaigne, and this coherence is the product of writing as a philosophical activity. The self is fashioned through writing.Because Montaigne writes in the ancient tradition of philosophy as a way of life, one may recall Hadot's suggestion that Foucault's notion of [End Page 524] "writing the self" is an intriguing but historically inaccurate description of ancient philosophical practice. But perhaps Hadot agrees with Foucault after all, since in his most recent interviews, he speaks favorably of eclecticism, a notion that is central to Foucault's analysis of self-fashioning through writing. The case of Montaigne is particularly interesting for these purposes, not only because the Essays seem to be the prototypical example of "writing the self," but also because eclecticism is both discussed and practiced throughout the Essays. I propose to take a fresh look at this issue by investigating the status of eclecticism in Montaigne's Essays. This must start with an examination of the philosophical tradition most closely associated with... (shrink)

Pierre Duhem , Physicien-Théoricien, Philosophe et Historien des Sciences, auteur de La Théorie Physique, son objet, sa structure et d’ouvrages d’histoire de la physique, est le promoteur de recherches originales et qui s’avèrent fécondes dans le domaine de la Thermodynamique. Duhem affirme des positions originales en matière philosophique, et Sozein ta Phainomena, écrit en 1908, demeure un témoignage brillant d’un courant ignoré, méconnu, voire méprisé. Les questions sur l’objet de la physique abordées dans ce petit ouvrage restent cependant d’une (...) actualité brûlante à une période où la science et les techniques prennent une place toujours plus importante dans la civilisation et la vie quotidienne. (shrink)

Criticisms and rejections of representationalism are increasingly popular in 4E cognitive science, and especially in radical enactivism. But by overfocusing our attention on the debate between radical enactivism and classical representationalism, we might miss the woods for the trees, in at least two respects: first, by neglecting the relevance of other theoretical alternatives about representationalism in cognitive science; and second by not seeing how much REC and classical representationalism are in agreement concerning basic and problematic issues dealing with mental content (...) and intentionality. In order to expand and exemplify these ideas, this paper presents two heterodox positions on intentionality and on the relations between content and representation. Special attention is paid to the way REC is rejecting these positions: I argue that this rejection reveals common assumptions with classical representationalism, but also undermines the coherence of REC’s conception of intentionality. (shrink)

1. — Delphes : Les bases campaniformes des Deïnoménides ne portaient pas directement de trépied, comme les cavités du lit d'attente et les textes l'avaient fait croire, mais une colonne de bronze sur laquelle se dressaient le trépied et la statue. Publication d'autres bases campaniformes analogues, que leur profil amène à rapprocher des bases de colonnes des palais perses. Étude d'un type apparenté, trois bases campaniformes tronquées, qui portaient des colonnes. Réexamen du socle attribué au trépied de Platées. Si les (...) blocs des deux assises circulaires et certains blocs des assises carrées avec des crampons en double-gamma, appartiennent bien à un même monument, la disparition de la 3e assise circulaire nous prive de tout élément pour savoir si et comment la colonne serpentine était fixée sur ce socle. Socle d'un trépied anonyme qui peut correspondre aux « morceaux importants d'un monument rond » du Journal de la grande fouille, trouvé entre le temple et l'autel. Autres trépieds. Le cippe des Tyrrhéniens ne portait pas de trépied. 2. — Péloponnèse : La seule base importante de trépied dans le Péloponnèse se trouve à Messène, au sommet de l'Ithôme. (shrink)

We present a dynamical model of a multi-site fishery. The fish stock is located on a discrete set of fish habitats where it is catched by the fishing fleet. We assume that fishes remain on fishing habitats while the fishing vessels can move at a fast time scale to visit the different fishing sites. We use the existence of two time scales to reduce the dimension of the model : we build an aggregated model considering the habitat fish densities and (...) the total fishing effort. We explore a regulation procedure, which imposes an average residence time in patches. Several equilibria exist, a Fishery Free Equilibria as well as a Sustainable Fishery Equilibria . We show that the dynamics depends on a threshold which is similar to a basic reproduction ratio for the fishery. When the basic reproduction ratio is less or equal to 1, one of the FFEs is globally asymptotically stable , otherwise one of the SFEs is GAS. (shrink)

La présente étude propose une interprétation de EN, V, 10, en défendant deux thèses: premièrement que la notion centrale de la variabilité du droit naturel signifie la diversité des interprétations que l'on peut donner d'un sentiment communément partagé du juste ou de l'injuste (cf. Rhét., I, 13); deuxièmement que, pour échapper au relativisme de type protagoréen, Aristote défend l'idée d'un régime parfait qui seul peut fournir la meilleure interprétation de ce sentiment.

Στον οπισθόδομο του ναού του Απόλλωνος στους Δελφούς, ένα μνημείο έχει αφήσει τα ίχνη του πάνω στην πλακόστρωση. Η ίδρυση του είναι σύγχρονη με την οικοδόμηση του ναού. Η παρουσία ενός μνημείου στο τμήμα αυτό ενός ναού είναι μοναδικό παράδειγμα * θα πρέπει να εξηγείται από κάποια τοπική ιδιομορφία. Αντιμετωπίζονται δύο υποθέσεις : πρόκειται είτε για ένα άγαλμα του Απόλλωνος αφιερωμένο από τους Αμφικτιονες ως αποζημίωση για την ιεροσυλία των Φωκαέων, είτε για τον ομφαλό. Η δεύτερη υπόθεση θα συμφωνούσε με (...) την πορεία του Παυσανία και, επιπλέον, δεν διαψεύδεται από τους λογαριασμούς οικοδόμησης του ναού. (shrink)

Editor’s Introduction The following text was prepared by Pierre Bourdieu for delivery at a conference on his work held at Duke University, April 21–23, 1995. Entitled “Pierre Bourdieu: Fieldwork in Culture,” the conference was sponsored by the Duke Graduate Program in Literature and included such well‐known literary scholars as Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Jonathan Culler, and Fredric Jameson. Bourdieu, of course, was the invited guest of honor, but was uncertain as to whether he should make the effort of attending, (...) particularly since he was recovering from a short period of poor health. As I too had been invited , Bourdieu discussed the question with me in Paris.He was rather concerned about wrongheaded, trendy applications of his theories by American literary scholars, who often misunderstand his work because they simply do not know the intellectual landscape to which it relates. Reading such conference paper titles as “Cross‐Dressing for Success: The Scramble for Symbolic Power in Tabitha Sweeney’s Female Quixotism,” Bourdieu confessed his fear of being taken as simply the French intellectual flavor of the month, one whose theory is used simply as grist for the American academy’s industrious mills of literary interpretation.He ultimately decided to send the following text to be read at the conference in his absence. It treats, with polite frankness, his worries about being misinterpreted through importation into the American theoretical field with its peculiar conception of French philosophy; Bourdieu’s paper situates these particular worries within a more general account of “allodoxic”distortions caused by the international travel of theory; but it also tries to prevent further misunderstanding by offering a brief contextualization of his theory and a brief summary of his method of analysis through fields. The translation of Bourdieu’s text was prepared by Loïc Wacquant, and is presented here with only minor adjustments. (shrink)

“We had a great conference!” was a comment generally shared by the participants at the last Conference of the International Association for the Psychology of Religion (IAPR) which took place in Gdansk, Poland from 31 August through 3 September 2019. This recent event and the publication, in this issue, of several keynote addresses from this conference, afford an excellent occasion to share some thoughts about IAPR conferences, the G’dansk conference in particular, the state of the IAPR in general, and some (...) considerations and challenges for the future of our organization. (shrink)

Il s’agit en somme, dans cet ouvrage, de montrer qu’un vieux problème continue de résister à ceux qui prétendent l’avoir résolu. Ce vieux problème, c’est celui qui est sous-jacent aux paradoxes zénoniens de la Dichotomie et de l’Achille, rassemblés par l’auteur en une même « aporie du passage ». Ceux qui prétendent l’avoir résolu, ce sont principalement des philosophes d’obédience analytique qui s’appuient sur certains développements contemporains des mathématiques infinitaires et sur une cri...

Un aphorisme hante la philosophie occidentale. celui d'Héraclite, qui veut que " la Nature aime à se voiler ". Près de vingt-cinq siècles durant, ces quelques petits mots ont successivement signifié: que tout ce qui naît tend à mourir; que la Nature s'enveloppe dans des formes sensibles et dans des mythes; qu'elle cache en elle des vertus occultes ; mais également que l'Etre est originellement dans un état de contraction et de non-déploiement ; ou bien encore qu'il se dévoile en (...) se voilant. Ainsi cet aphorisme aura-t-il servi à expliquer les difficultés de la science de la nature, à justifier l'exégèse allégorique des textes bibliques ou à défendre le paganisme, à critiquer la violence faite à la nature par la technique et la mécanisation du monde, à expliquer enfin l'angoisse qu'inspire à l'homme moderne son être-au-monde. La même formule, illustrée par l'image du voile d'Isis et déployée par Pierre Hadot dans l'histoire de l'Occident, aura justifié, par suite de contresens créateurs, l'attitude prométhéenne - l'homme doit se rendre maître et possesseur de la Nature - comme l'attitude orphique - nul ne peut soulever le voile des mystères de la Nature, sinon le poète et l'artiste. Elle n'aura jamais cessé de tracer des perspectives nouvelles sur la réalité et de révéler les attitudes les plus diverses à l'égard de la Nature. Par là, elle confirme le propos de Nietzsche : " Une bonne sentence est trop dure à la dent du temps et tous les millénaires n'arrivent pas à la consommer, bien qu'elle serve à tout moment de nourriture. ". (shrink)

L'assise où se dressaient des statues devant le mur Sud du trésor des Athéniens est couramment appelée « socle marathonien » parce qu'elle porte une dédicace où figure le nom de Marathon. Pour les uns, cette dédicace est celle du trésor lui-même ; pour d'autres, le socle a été accolé à un monument bâti avant 490. La dédicace a été regravée, probablement au IIIe s. av. J.C. ; le texte regravé est en tout point identique à celui de la première (...) inscription, qui a laissé quelques traces, difficiles à dater. On s'est mépris sur la fonction du mot akrothinia dans la dédicace ; le socle ne portait pas un trophée constitué par des pièces du butin, mais des statues. Les fondations du trésor et la terrasse portant le socle ont été bâties en même temps, ce qui confirme que le trésor a été construit après 490. Il ne s'ensuit pas nécessairement que la dédicace du socle soit aussi celle du trésor ; il n'est pas sûr que Pausanias l'ait lue. (shrink)

The academic path of Jean Gayon (1949–2018) follows in the wake of the “French style” in epistemologyEpistemology, but he is also one of the first representatives of philosophy of biology in France. In the light of this double philosophical heritage, this chapter re-examines the relations between the works of Gayon, the tradition in which he first studied, and the one he later adopted, but not without reservations. Tracing his intellectual journey, this article explores why he naturally appears as a Canguilhemian, (...) a view against which he defends himself. Attending to the connexions that he established with the philosophers of biology will bring to light the growing tension that inhabits him, from the middle of the 1980s onwards, and which led him to identify some of the limits inherent to theHistorical epistemology matrix of historical epistemologyGayon, JeanOn historical epistemology, without disowning his first philosophical tradition. Finally, in an attempt to reconcile two approaches, I will underline the emergence in the thought of Jean Gayon of a third way seeking to overcome the opposition between a “unitarian” style that seeks to make a clear break with the history of scienceHistory of science and its philosophical past, and the “dualist” style which tends to stay above scientific debates, and which accepts a clear distinction between the work of science and the work of philosophy. Reuniting the history and the philosophy of the sciences, privileging the long durée and depths of history, where the problems of biology unfold, while also recognizing the value of analysing the conceptual puzzles which structure the contemporary life sciences, the oeuvre of Jean Gayon illustrates the complementary character of these disciplines. (shrink)

Professor of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Paris 1–Panthéon-Sorbonne since 2000, former director of the Institute of History and Philosophy of Science and Technology (IHPST) of the CNRS, Jean Gayon (1949–2018) died on April 28th 2018 following a long illness that he faced with determination and courage.

Découvrant, à Argos, le texte d’une donation de princes lagides (monnaies et objets en or) et de cités chypriotes (sommes transcrites en drachmes et oboles), sans nul doute pour un sanctuaire local, l’auteur s’est interrogé (BCH 1982) sur les montants originels envoyés par les cités, la mention d’oboles, inexistantes matériellement, montrant qu’il s’agissait d’une traduction comptable. Il était parvenu à un taux de change minimal, proche du rapport entre les poids des monnaies, taux imaginé beaucoup plus fort par O. Picard, (...) dans un codicille à son article. De fait, il n’y a pas eu de change du tout : objets princiers et numéraire chypriote sont rentrés tels quels dans le trésor du temple, comme nous le montrent les inventaires de trésors religieux, déliens notamment. Les transcriptions en monnaie locale sont simplement destinées à donner aux fidèles du sanctuaire argien une idée de la valeur des dons, et le rapport de 1,44 entre les monnaies est exactement le taux d’équivalence fiduciaire entre le monnayage lagide et celui d’Argos, celui à partir duquel on peut mesurer à leur juste valeur les déformations que lui apportent les taux commerciaux. (shrink)