Est-il aujourd’hui possible d’expliquer le mental à partir du cerveau? Où est le problème, diront les uns, puisque la mécanique neuronale est celle qui le crée? Comment seulement espérer, rétorqueront les autres, que la complexité de l’esprit puisse être fondée sur le seul fonctionnement cérébral? S’appuyant sur des siècles d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences, et surtout sur un examen des données expérimentales récentes, Pierre Buser établit ici une sorte de bilan, dégageant plusieurs problématiques distinctes et bien actuelles (...) : comment définir la conscience, ce site supposé abriter notre vécu subjectif, à nouveau reconnu comme instance fondamentale de l’esprit chez l’homme et aussi chez l’animal? Que sait-on aujourd’hui de l’inconscient, ce domaine où se trouvent amassés tant d’acquis de notre intellect, de notre vie cognitive et affective? Et que nous apprennent, par exemple, l’hypnose ou la méditation sur le fonctionnement de notre esprit? Pierre Buser est professeur émérite de neurosciences de l’université Pierre-et-Marie-Curie de Paris. Il est membre de l’Académie des sciences. Il a notamment publié Cerveau de soi, cerveau de l’autre, L’Inconscient aux mille visages et Le Temps, instant et durée (en collaboration avec Claude Debru). (shrink)

La philosophie est comme un casse-noix : certaines personnes ne réussissent qu'à se pincer les doigts avec, les professionnels le retournent dans tous les sens, et puis - quand même - il se trouve des gens qui s'en servent pour ouvrir ces merveilleuses noix qu'on appelle les pensées. Philosopher, c'est bien ; philosopher soi-même, c'est mieux. Philosopher soi-même chaque jour sur le quotidien, sur du banal, c'est le mieux, quand on ne compte plus sur la religion ou l'idéologie politique. Le (...) maître à penser, c'est toi. A quoi ressemble un petit-déjeuner? As-tu assez de courage pour te reconnaître dans le miroir et te reconnaître sur le " trône "? Que se passe-t-il quand tu es tenté au bureau? Une fois réveillé, vas-tu interpréter et utiliser tes rêves? Finalement, rien de tel qu'un simplissime " Où, quand, comment, pourquoi? " devant un gros problème. Chaque jour est un beau jour pour philosopher... (shrink)

Comment devient-on philosophe? Par quel sursaut un Aristoclès se fait-il Platon, jusqu'à s'imposer dans la liste des " auteurs philo " Il faut enquêter, non pas sur la vie privée, mais sur la vie intime : rumination intellectuelle, ton sur lequel on parle, motivations amoureuses... Ce qui fait un philosophe, c'est un immense travail sur soi, et la rencontre d'autres philosophes, vivants, de leurs problématiques. Mémoire sémantique + obsession métaphysique, voilà le code génétique du philosophe. Il débute par un attentat (...) religieux, puisqu'il commence sa carrière en niant tel ou tel sacré. Bien sûr, il vaut mieux être mâle, communiquer par les livres adopter la langue dominante, écrire quand on est célibataire. Comment gagner sa vie? Pas forcément en étant enseignant, comme c'est le cas aujourd'hui. Le profil du philosophe nous le révèle orphelin, vivant à l'étranger, souvent laid, jamais fou, et serial thinker, prêt à changer de philosophie pourvu qu'il reste, lui, à menacer le monde donnera ou donnera pas du sens à notre vie? Le philosophe est l'être inquiet qui pense inquiéter l'Être par deux trois mots bien aiguisés. (shrink)

Les grands paradigmes des sciences humaines ont été constitués, au fil de l’histoire, par l’éviction progressive de la dimension affective des objets et méthodes scientifiques. Après un long désintérêt, pour partie dû à la préoccupation de l’objectivation des phénomènes retenus par l’analyse sociologique, mais aussi à l’hypostase du social, qui a trouvé notamment chez Durkheim un accomplissement encore plus accentué que dans la plupart des conceptions holistes, la question des émotions est l’...

Since the 1980s, society's wealthiest members have claimed an ever-expanding share of income and property. It has been a true counterrevolution, says Pierre Rosanvallon--the end of the age of growing equality launched by the American and French revolutions. And just as significant as the social and economic factors driving this contemporary inequality has been a loss of faith in the ideal of equality itself. An ambitious transatlantic history of the struggles that, for two centuries, put political and economic equality (...) at their heart, The Society of Equals calls for a new philosophy of social relations to reenergize egalitarian politics. For eighteenth-century revolutionaries, equality meant understanding human beings as fundamentally alike and then creating universal political and economic rights. Rosanvallon sees the roots of today's crisis in the period 1830-1900, when industrialized capitalism threatened to quash these aspirations. By the early twentieth century, progressive forces had begun to rectify some imbalances of the Gilded Age, and the modern welfare state gradually emerged from Depression-era reforms. But new economic shocks in the 1970s began a slide toward inequality that has only gained momentum in the decades since. There is no returning to the days of the redistributive welfare state, Rosanvallon says. Rather than resort to outdated notions of social solidarity, we must instead revitalize the idea of equality according to principles of singularity, reciprocity, and communality that more accurately reflect today's realities. (shrink)

We study one way in which stable phenomena can exist in an NIP theory. We start by defining a notion of ‘pure instability’ that we call ‘distality’ in which no such phenomenon occurs. O-minimal theories and the p-adics for example are distal. Next, we try to understand what happens when distality fails. Given a type p over a sufficiently saturated model, we extract, in some sense, the stable part of p and define a notion of stable independence which is implied (...) by non-forking and has bounded weight. (shrink)

We show basic facts about dp-minimal ordered structures. The main results are: dp-minimal groups are abelian-by-finite-exponent, in a divisible ordered dp-minimal group, any infinite set has non-empty interior, and any theory of pure tree is dp-minimal.

The term “social cognition” can be construed in different ways. On the one hand, it can refer to the cognitive faculties involved in social activities, defined simply as situations where two or more individuals interact. On this view, social systems would consist of interactions between autonomous individuals; these interactions form higher-level autonomous domains not reducible to individual actions. A contrasting, alternative view is based on a much stronger theoretical definition of a truly social domain, which is always defined by a (...) set of structural norms; moreover, these social structures are not only a set of constraints, but actually constitute the possibility of enacting worlds that would just not exist without them. This view emphasises the heteronomy of individuals who abide by norms that are impersonal, culturally inherited and to a large extent independent of the individuals. Human beings are socialised through and through; consequently, all human cognition is social cognition. The article argues for this second position. Finally, it appears that fully blown autonomy actually requires heteronomy. It is the acceptance of the constraints of social structures that enables individuals to enter new realms of common meaningfulness. The emergence of social life marks a crucial step in the evolution of cognition; so that at some evolutionary point human cognition cannot but be social cognition. (shrink)

Widespread expression of the transcription factor, nuclear factor (erythroid‐derived 2)‐like 2 (NRF2), which maintains redox homeostasis, has recently been identified in the hair follicle (HF). Small molecule activators of NRF2 may therefore be useful in the management of HF pathologies associated with redox imbalance, ranging from HF greying and HF ageing via androgenetic alopecia and alopecia areata to chemotherapy‐induced hair loss. Indeed, NRF2 activation has been shown to prevent peroxide‐induced hair growth inhibition. Multiple parameters can increase the levels of reactive (...) oxygen species in the HF, for example melanogenesis, depilation‐induced trauma, neurogenic and autoimmune inflammation, toxic drugs, environmental stressors such as UV irradiation, genetic defects and aging‐associated mitochondrial dysfunction. In this review, the potential mechanisms whereby NRF2 activation could prove beneficial in treatment of redox‐associated HF disorders are therefore discussed. (shrink)

I propose a systematic survey of the various attitudes proponents of enaction (or enactivism) entertained or are entertaining towards representationalism and towards the use of the concept “mental representation” in cognitive science. For the sake of clarity, a set of distinctions between different varieties of representationalism and anti-representationalism are presented. I also recapitulate and discuss some anti-representationalist trends and strategies one can find the enactive literature, before focusing on some possible limitations of eliminativist versions of enactive anti-representationalism. These limitations are (...) here taken as opportunities for reflecting on the fate of enactivism in its relations with representationalism and anti-representationalism. (shrink)

Enactivism does not have its primary philosophical roots in pragmatism: phenomenology (from Husserl to Jonas) is its first source of inspiration (with the exception of Hutto & Myin’s radical enactivism). That does not exclude the benefits of pragmatist readings of enactivism, and of enactivist readings of pragmatism. After having sketched those readings, this paper focuses on the philosophical concept of intentionality. I show that whereas enactivists endorse the idea that intentionality is a base-level property of cognition, pragmatism offer(ed) us some (...) reasons not to proceed this way. It is therefore doubtful to hold that pragmatists and enactivists would converge in the defence of a common, non-representational conception of intentionality. (shrink)

The welfare state has come under severe pressure internationally, partly for the well-known reasons of slowing economic growth and declining confidence in the public sector. According to the influential social theorist Pierre Rosanvallon, however, there is also a deeper and less familiar reason for the crisis of the welfare state. He shows here that a fundamental practical and philosophical justification for traditional welfare policies--that all citizens share equal risks--has been undermined by social and intellectual change. If we wish to (...) achieve the goals of social solidarity and civic equality for which the welfare state was founded, Rosanvallon argues, we must radically rethink social programs. Rosanvallon begins by tracing the history of the welfare state and its founding premise that risks, especially the risks of illness and unemployment, are equally distributed and unpredictable. He shows that this idea has become untenable because of economic diversification and advances in statistical and risk analysis. It is truer than ever before--and far more susceptible to analysis--that some individuals will face much greater risks than others because of their jobs and lifestyle choices. Rosanvallon argues that social policies must be more narrowly targeted. And he draws on evidence from around the world, in particular France and the United States, to show that such programs as unemployment insurance and workfare could better reflect individual needs by, for example, making more explicit use of contracts between the providers and receivers of benefits. His arguments have broad implications for welfare programs everywhere and for our understanding of citizenship in modern democracies and economies. "For more than two decades Pierre Rosanvallon has been analyzing the development and the crisis of the 'welfare state,' combining precise, specific knowledge with philosophical and historical depth in a way that is rare among social policy analysts.... [A] subtle and informed book."--From the foreword by Nathan Glazer. (shrink)

Pierre Macherey est philosophe, professeur honoraire à l’université de Lille. Rattaché à l’UMR « Savoirs Textes Langage » du CNRS, il continue d’animer un blog « La philosophie au sens large » dont les travaux sont publiés sur le net ( https://philolarge.hypotheses.org/ ). Il a écrit de nombreux ouvrages, aussi bien en philosophie (sur Spinoza, Hegel, Marx, Comte, Canguilhem, Foucault) qu’en littérature et sur la manière de philosopher avec la littérature ( Philosopher avec la littérature est la reprise de (...) sa thèse soutenue en 1991 ; mais il y a aussi, par exemple : Proust. Entre littérature et philosophie ; En lisant Jules Verne ). Son dernier ouvrage s’intitule À l’essai (Paris, Kimé, 2019). Sur l’utopie, il a notamment écrit : De l’utopie! (Le Havre, De l’incidence éditeur, 2011) ainsi que « Utopie et quotidien : les deux faces d’une même réalité? », article publié dans Peggy Avez, Louis Carré et Sébastien Laoureux (dir.), Utopie et quotidien. Autour de Pierre Macherey (Bruxelles, Presses de l’Université Saint Louis, 2016). (shrink)

In this article, we develop tame topology over dp-minimal structures equipped with definable uniformities satisfying certain assumptions. Our assumptions are enough to ensure that definable sets are tame: there is a good notion of dimension on definable sets, definable functions are almost everywhere continuous, and definable sets are finite unions of graphs of definable continuous “multivalued functions.” This generalizes known statements about weakly o-minimal, C-minimal, and P-minimal theories.

The relational interpretation of quantum mechanics (RQM) has received a growing interest since its first formulation in 1996. Usually presented as an interpretational layer over the usual quantum mechanics formalism, it appears as a philosophical perspective without proper mathematical counterparts. This state of affairs has direct consequences on the scientific debate on RQM which still suffers from misunderstandings and imprecise statements. In an attempt to clarify those debates, the present paper proposes a radical reformulation of the mathematical framework of quantum (...) mechanics which is relational from the start: fact-nets. The core idea is that all statements about the world, facts, are binary entities involving two systems that can be symmetrically thought of as observed and observer. We initiate a study of the fact-nets formalism and outline how it can shed new relational light on some familiar quantum features. (shrink)

Signature-based model-independent searches for new physics form an explorative component of High Energy Physics experiments that aims at avoiding biases toward beyond-the-standard-model theo...

We study invariant types in NIP theories. Amongst other things: we prove a definable version of the [Formula: see text]-theorem in theories of small or medium directionality; we construct a canonical retraction from the space of [Formula: see text]-invariant types to that of [Formula: see text]-finitely satisfiable types; we show some amalgamation results for invariant types and list a number of open questions.

This paper has two parts. In the first one, we prove that an invariant dp-minimal type is either finitely satisfiable or definable. We also prove that a definable version of the -theorem holds in dp-minimal theories of small or medium directionality.In the second part, we study dp-rank in dp-minimal theories and show that it enjoys many nice properties. It is continuous, definable in families and it can be characterised geometrically with no mention of indiscernible sequences. In particular, if the structure (...) expands a divisible ordered abelian group, then dp-rank coincides with the dimension coming from the order. (shrink)

Radical views on cognition are generally defined by a cluster of features including non-representationalism and vehicle-externalism. In this paper, I concentrate on the way radical views on cognition define themselves as revolutionary theories in cognitive science. These theories often use the Kuhnian concepts of “paradigm” and “paradigm shift” for describing their ambitions and the current situation in cognitive science. I examine whether the use of Kuhn’s theory of science is appropriate here. There might be good reasons to think that cognitive (...) science is in a situation of foundational crisis, but that does not entail that the classical paradigm is currently displaced to the benefit of a new paradigm. Larry Laudan’s theory of research traditions is more enlightening than Kuhn’s theory for describing the scope and ambitions of radical views on cognition, and their relations with an anti-intellectualist tradition in philosophy. (shrink)

Enactivism does not have its primary philosophical roots in pragmatism: phenomenology (from Husserl to Jonas) is its first source of inspiration (with the exception of Hutto & Myin’s radical enactivism). That does not exclude the benefits of pragmatist readings of enactivism, and of enactivist readings of pragmatism. After having sketched those readings, this paper focuses on the philosophical concept of intentionality. I show that whereas enactivists endorse the idea that intentionality is a base-level property of cognition, pragmatism offer(ed) us some (...) reasons not to proceed this way. It is therefore doubtful to hold that pragmatists and enactivists would converge in the defence of a common, non-representational conception of intentionality. (shrink)

We prove in particular that, in a large class of dp-minimal theories including the p-adics, definable types are dense amongst nonforking types.

I present and defend here a thesis named vehicleless externalism for conceptual mental episodes. According to it, the constitutive relations there are between the production of conceptual mental episodes by an individual and the inclusion of this individual in social discursive practices make it non-necessary to equate, even partially, conceptual mental episodes with the occurrence of physical events inside of that individual. Conceptual mental episodes do not have subpersonal vehicles; they have owners: persons in interpretational practices. That thesis is grounded (...) on inferentialism and on the endorsement of the idea that "meaning is normative". After having recapitulated this heritage and after having presented that thesis, the paper especially attempts to articulate how, in that framework, we may then positively conceive the relations there are between conceptual mental episodes, intracranial events and inferential behaviour. (shrink)

La philosophie de Bolzano est a la source d'une tradition de pensee dont l'importance et l'originalite n'ont pas encore ete appreciees a leur juste mesure. En 1997, 160 ans apres la publication de son chef d'oeuvre, la Wissenschaftslehre, a eu lieu, a Cerisy-la-Salle, un colloque destine a examiner l'interet historique actuel de cette tradition qui s'etend jusqu'a Musil et a la seconde guerre mondiale. Ce volume est destine a offrir une vision panoramique, enrichie de plusieurs etudes de detail, des idees (...) et des oeuvres qui, de Bolzano a Musil, ont renouvele le champ intellectuel et philosophique europeen. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates the innovative character of the approach to metaethics underlying John Dewey’s pragmatism. Dewey's theory of evaluation is contrasted with one of the most dominant contemporary metaethical theses: constructivism. I show that the insistence placed by metaethical constructivists on the actor’s practical point of view, on the rejection of the subjective preferences model, and on a specific form of ethical antirealism and naturalism echoes some of the most crucial claims made by Dewey. This argumentation leads to my main (...) hypothesis: an analysis of Dewey's conception of evaluation allows us to highlight the groundbreaking character of its metaethical approach—an approach that will be characterized as fairly constructivist. (shrink)

Etrange personnage que Pierre Nicole. La postérité l'a rangé parmi les deuxièmes rôles de Port-Royal, une sorte de permanent du parti janséniste. Il a secondé le grand Arnauld, instruit Racine dans les Petites Ecoles, aidé Pascal et traduit en latin ses Provinciales. Fidèle entre les fidèles, et en même temps mal à l'aise dans cette atmosphère de fronde et de résistance que représente le milieu de Port-Royal, au sein de la France du XVII e siècle, ce latiniste timoré ne (...) songeait qu'aux Moyens de conserver la paix avec les hommes - titre de l'un de ses essais les plus célèbres. Dès que les tensions semblent s'apaiser, pendant la trêve appelée "la Paix de l'Eglise", Nicole peut enfin laisser libre cours à sa vocation de moraliste et de psychologue. Il publie, volume après volume ses Essais de morale : le succès sera tel que le libraire, après la mort de Pierre Nicole, s'ingéniera à en augmenter la série jusqu'à atteindre vingt-cinq volumes. Depuis la fin du XVIII e siècle, ce classique de la littérature morale était devenu pour ainsi dire inaccessible. On en publie parfois quelques pages choisies, défigurées par les coupures et les corrections. Il est proposé ici au lecteur moderne de redécouvrir dix essais de Nicole, donnés dans leur intégralité. Certains nous replongent dans les principes moraux d'un autre âge (et tirent de cet exotisme une part de leur valeur). D'autres présentent les qualités de finesse, le piquant, le goût du paradoxe qui ont longtemps fait juger Nicole comme un des grands représentants, à côté de Pascal et de La Rochefoucauld, de la littérature morale classique. L'oeuvre morale de Nicole s'avère ainsi demeurer passionnante pour un lecteur moderne, au moins à trois égards : 1/ ses considérations sur l'amour-propre, qui constituent les premiers jalons d'un utilitarisme économique ; 2/ ses réflexions sur la sociabilité et une approche originale de la civilité ; 3/ ses observations pédagogiques, émanant d'un des principaux maîtres des Petites Ecoles de Port-Royal. (shrink)

This work builds on previous papers by Hrushovski, Pillay and the author where Keisler measures over NIP theories are studied. We discuss two constructions for obtaining generically stable measures in this context. First, we show how to symmetrize an arbitrary invariant measure to obtain a generically stable one from it. Next, we show that suitable sigma-additive probability measures give rise to generically stable Keisler measures. Also included is a proof that generically stable measures over o-minimal theories and the p-adics are (...) smooth. (shrink)

L'omniprésence des images dans la société mass-médiatique est corrélative de leur évanescence et du constant renouvellement qui conditionne le processus de leur consommation. Leur omnipotence se réduit ainsi à celle de stimuli destinés à induire des comportements. Or, il convient d'autant plus de revenir d'une telle exténuation de l'image que cette dernière constitue l'une des dimensions essentielles du déploiement de la vie humaine. L'image est traditionnellement rapportée à l'activité imaginante d'un sujet. Mais, s'il est vrai que l'étoffe des hommes et (...) des choses qui se donnent à voir dans le paraître sensible d'une image n'existe pas coupée d'un tel paraître, l'esthétique relève aussi de l'ontologie et sa tâche est de nous ré-apprendre à contempler les images. Au regard de la clarté et de la distinction conférées par la théorie à notre appréhension des choses, la détermination positive des images ne tient-elle pas en effet au fait que c'est dans leur dimension qu'il nous est donné de faire l'expérience vive du paraître de ces choses, jusqu'à l'extrême de l'horreur, du merveilleux et du sacré? (shrink)

The notion of “intentionality” is much invoked in various foundational theories of meaning, being very often equated with “meaning”, “content” and “reference”. In this paper, I propose and develop a basic distinction between two concepts and, more fundamentally, properties of intentionality: intentionality-T and intentionality-C. Representationalism is then defined as the position according to which intentionality-T can be reduced to intentionality-C, in the form of representational states. Nonrepresentationalism is rejecting this reduction, and argues that intentionality-T is more fundamental than intentionality-C. Non-representationalism (...) allows for a new layered view of the relations between cognitive intentionality and linguistic intentionality; this view is presented at the end of the paper. (shrink)

ExcerptIn France for several years now, the universities, including the top ranking ones [grandes écoles], have been subjected to increasing pressure by active minorities, who can be characterized as “woke” or Islamo-leftist and who are able to exert, here and there, a genuine ideological dictatorship. On a number of questions, starting with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict or the Islamist menace, freedom of expression and freedom of debate are de facto forbidden. A pluralism of opinion has been replaced by the imposition of (...) the ideological convictions of a politicized minority who share the same hatred of Israel and same admiration for “armed resistance” as an Islamist organization like Hamas. This is the case of Sciences Po Paris, which under the cover of virtuous calls for diversity and inclusion has fallen into a culture of suspicion, intolerance, denunciation, and sidelining of “those who don’t toe the line.” As at other institutions of higher learning, small sectarian far-left groups, in the name of the defense of “minorities” and of “victims”—those whom they value—impose their law, in the face of administrative authorities whose main concern is not to “make waves” and who, as a consequence, are willing to accept everything, to tolerate everything, closing their eyes as much as possible to the actions of the activists, who show off and impose the reign of their intellectual terrorism. This is the spectacle produced by the policy of tolerance toward the intolerant. (shrink)

Pierre Mathieu L’analyse des publications et des textes de conférences du cistercien québécois Yves Girard permet de dégager un thème majeur de sa théologie spirituelle : le désir de l’être, interprété par lui comme un désir de rencontre avec Dieu. C’est un désir inconscient, inscrit dans la structure de l’être par le Créateur qui désire être en relation avec ses créatures. Selon l’auteur, nous possédons déjà ce que nous désirons, une richesse intérieure à laquelle le silence nous donne accès.