I delight in sharing Cathleen Going’s cloistered imaging, “singer at the heart of the universe,” an image teeming with reachings: who is the singer, the sung, the song, what is the heart of the universe? So I am led to weave into my response a context for such reachings, three poems out of 43 centuries of feminine reaching that divide the reply, that subtly call us to tune into the dark womb of being that is history’s unfinished symphony. There is (...) the scavenging Spirit, there is the Jasmine Lord, there is the Singer axially named the Father, breathing all inward. (shrink)

What have truth and utopia to do with each other? Should we not speak rather only of the truth of dystopia—even and especially in the context of the highest levels of prosperity and freedom ever achieved? For if dystopia is invisible to many, it is not, for all that, any less real, whether in the present or the immediate future. For once the Malthusian predicament of economic globalization is demonstrated in the clash between economic growth and ecological finitude, specifically in (...) the form of oil and natural gas depletion, then dystopia will soon be upon us all.1 In the brief…. (shrink)

When one first encounters Nietzsche’s or Wittgenstein’s writings, one is generally surprised by their style of writing which seems to depart from the philosophical norm of structured argumentation. And when one attempts to compare Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, their styles seem to be an important common feature. But is this claim only superficial or does it have deeper philosophical roots? This chapter aims to show that Nietzsche and Wittgenstein share a common concern with style that is rooted in core philosophical issues, (...) especially their critique of metaphysics and their revaluation of the relation between philosophy and poetry. The argument is divided into three parts: the first part focuses on style as a tool for criticism in order to show how Nietzsche and Wittgenstein use stylistic criticism against traditional (systematic) philosophy; the second part shows how this criticism leads to a revaluation of the relation between philosophy and poetry; the third and final part argues that the aphoristic writing they each practise is a way of finding a philosophical style that embraces the poetic rather than rejects it. (shrink)

This concise biography tells the story of John Dewey, a pioneer of pragmatism and the first original school of philosophy created in America. The school was born out of a specific historical context, in the wake of a country at war with itself, and in response to the rapid changes of industrialization. Dewey's pragmatism celebrated human intelligence and agency and the promise that tomorrow could be better than today. For Dewey, pragmatism was the philosophy of democracy. Dewey lived from just (...) before the Civil War to just before school integration. As such, the book touches on many key moments in American history, from social reform in turn of the century Chicago, to censorship during world war one, and to the government's responsibilities in the Great Depression. It covers all this in the context of the life of a man whose ideas helped shape American culture and intellectual life. John Dewey: Prophet of an Educated Democracy will appeal to students, scholars, and all those interested in American philosophy and history of the 19th and 20th centuries. It will also compliment humanities courses on American philosophy, history, and intellectual traditions. (shrink)

Many studies directed at demonstrating perception without awareness have relied on the dissociation paradigm. Although the logic underlying this paradigm is relatively straightforward, definitive results have been elusive in the absence of any general consensus as to what constitutes an adequate measure of awareness. We propose an alternative approach that involves comparisons of the relative sensitivity of comparable direct and indirect indexes of perception. The only assumption required by the proposed approach is that the sensitivity of direct discriminations to relevant (...) conscious information is greater than or equal to the sensitivity of comparable indirect discriminations. The proposed approach is illustrated through an evaluation of Avant and Thieman’s recent claim that an indirect measure of perception based on judgments of apparent visual duration provides a more sensitive indicator of perception than does a direct measure based on forced-choice recognition. Contrary to this claim, when direct and indirect indexes are measured under comparable conditions, an indirect measure based on judgments of perceived duration provides a less sensitive index of perceptual processing than do comparable direct measures. The proposed approach provides a general conceptual/methodological framework for using the dissociation paradigm in studies directed at establishing unconscious processes. (shrink)

The idea that cognitive processes can be meaningfully classified as conscious or unconscious has a long history in philosophy and psychology. However, even though many experimental reports during the past 100 years claim to demonstrate perception, Ieaming, or memory without conscious awareness, the distinction between conscious and unconscious ’ processes remains highly controversial. For example, the same empirical findings that Holender 1986 concludes provide little or no evidence for unconscious perception are considered by other reviewers as conclusive and overwhelming documentation (...) of the validity of perception without awareness. (shrink)

There are hundreds of indications leading us to conclude that at every moment there is in us an infinity of perceptions, unaccompanied by awareness or reflection; that is, of alterations in the soul itself, of which we are unaware because the impressions are either too minute or too numerous, or else too unvarying, so that they are not sufficiently distinctive on their own. But when they are combined with others they do nevertheless have their effect and make themselves felt, at (...) least confusedly, within the whole. (Leibniz, 1704/1981, p. 53). (shrink)