The essays in this volume share an ambitious interest in investigating death as an individual, social, and metaphorical phenomenon that may be exemplified by themes involving burial rituals, identity, and commemoration. The disciplines represented are as diverse as art history, classics, history, music, languages and literatures, and the approaches taken reflect various aspects of contemporary death studies.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Solitude: A Philosophical EncounterRobert D. CottrellSolitude: A Philosophical Encounter, by Philip Koch; xiv & 375 pp. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1994, $39.95 cloth, $17.95 paper.A professor of philosophy at the University of Prince Edward Island (an attractively solitary spot, I should imagine), Philip Koch divides his book into two parts, asking in Part I: what is solitude? and in Part II: what role does solitude (...) play in our lives? At the beginning of his inquiry, Koch identifies two primary modes of human experience: solitude, the core definition of which is social disengagement, and encounter, that is to say, interaction with others. Both are essential for human completion; indeed, the inescapable link between solitude and encounter is illustrated in the book’s full title, which contains both words. Still, in today’s society solitude is probably less understood and appreciated than encounter, for we tend to stress the supposed primacy of relationships and bonds. Calling himself a partisan of solitude, Koch sets out to correct the imbalance he discerns between solitude and encounter by focusing on how solitude (different, he insists, from loneliness, isolation, privacy, or alienation) contributes to our physical, moral, and emotional well-being.Koch is a philosopher; he defines his terms and then, as he moves along, makes subtle distinctions in his original definitions, rendering each term ever more precise and accurate. Conscious of the slippage of meaning that often occurs in language and of the mischief that can be caused by using terms improperly, Koch points out how Tillich (p. 164) and Mijuskovic (p. 173) go astray by gliding confusedly from one term to another, the result being that their arguments drift into muddle. Koch’s own thinking is pellucidly clear. The major part of his book is a discussion of the value of solitude. He identifies five primary virtues linked to solitude: freedom, attunement to self, attunement to nature, reflective perspective, and creativity. After discussing each of the virtues, Koch answers the objections that have been raised throughout the centuries to the claims he has made for the positive tole of solitude in our lives.Ranging over the whole history of human thought, Koch draws on a vast array of writers, including Tao Tze, Plotinus, Seneca, Augustine, Petrarch, Saint Teresa of Avila, Meister Eckhart, Montaigne, Descartes (always a key figure in any discussion of the evolution of Western thought), Goethe, Wordsworth, Hugo, Emerson, Thoreau, Dickinson, Whitman, Proust, Lawrence, Rilke, Sartre, Eiseley, Woolf, and Sarton. A meticulously learned book, Solitude is also a deeply meditative and an intensely personal one. In this, it resembles the work of Montaigne and of Loren Eiseley, where philosophical or (in the case of Eiseley) scientific knowledge is inseparable from imaginative vision; inseparable, too, from the distinctive voice of the author, for Koch, like Montaigne and Eiseley, moves easily from meditation to recollection, recounting moments of joy or sorrow in his own life. Even Koch’s prose bears some resemblance to that of Montaigne or Eiseley for, like theirs, it vibrates with the peculiarly poetic [End Page 155] intensity that a great writer can find in plain, unadorned speech. Indeed, what remains with the reader of this book, beyond the philosophical arguments and the erudite explanations, relegated wisely to the footnotes at the back of the volume where they are available to serious students without intimidating casual readers, is the seductive charm of the author’s voice, the sense of being addressed directly and intimately. To encounter this marvelous book, written in solitude, read in solitude, is to move beyond solitude and to experience, in the strange way that only a good book can provide, intimacy with another mind, another spirit that is engaged—it, too—in the process of encountering other minds, other spirits.Robert D. CottrellOhio State UniversityCopyright © 1995 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

If connectionism is to be an adequate theory of mind, we must have a theory of representation for neural networks that allows for individual differences in weighting and architecture while preserving sameness, or at least similarity, of content. In this paper we propose a procedure for measuring sameness of content of neural representations. We argue that the correct way to compare neural representations is through analysis of the distances between neural activations, and we present a method for doing so. We (...) then use the technique to demonstrate empirically that different artificial neural networks trained by backpropagation on the same categorization task, even with different representational encodings of the input patterns and different numbers of hidden units, reach states in which representations at the hidden units are similar. We discuss how this work provides a rebuttal to Fodor and Lepore's critique of Paul Churchland's state space semantics. (shrink)

Only in recent years have developmental psychologists begun advocating and exploring dual-process theories and their applicability to cognitive development. In this paper, a dual-process model of developments in two processing systems—an “analytic” and an “experiential” system—is discussed. We emphasise the importance of “metacognitive intercession” and developments in this ability to override experiential processing. In each of two studies of sunk cost decisions, age-related developments in normative decisions were observed, as were declines in the use of a “waste not” heuristic. In (...) the second study, children and adolescents were presented with arguments for normative and non-normative sunk cost decisions. Following argument evaluation, participants were re-presented the original problems and a set of novel, transfer problems. Results indicated that post-argument improvements were most apparent during adolescence. Age-related improvements were most noticeable on the transfer problems. In general, the findings suggest that the ability to metacognitively intercede (i.e., reflect on arguments; inhibit experientially produced responses) emerges towards middle adolescence. However, even by the end of adolescence, in the absence of significant contextual cues and motivation, this ability is infrequently utilised. (shrink)

I delight in sharing Cathleen Going’s cloistered imaging, “singer at the heart of the universe,” an image teeming with reachings: who is the singer, the sung, the song, what is the heart of the universe? So I am led to weave into my response a context for such reachings, three poems out of 43 centuries of feminine reaching that divide the reply, that subtly call us to tune into the dark womb of being that is history’s unfinished symphony. There is (...) the scavenging Spirit, there is the Jasmine Lord, there is the Singer axially named the Father, breathing all inward. (shrink)

Phenomenal consciousness and social cognition are interlocking capacities, but the relations between them have yet to be systematically investigated. In this paper, I begin to develop a theoretical and empirical framework for such an investigation. I begin by describing the phenomenon known as social pain: the affect associated with the perception of actual or potential damage to one’s interpersonal relations. I then adduce a related phenomenon known as affective contagion: the tendency for emotions, moods, and other affective states to spread (...) from person to person in social contexts. Experimental studies of these two phenomena suggest that affective consciousness depends on perception of the social world in much the same way that it depends on perception of the body – in short, that consciousness is ‘socially embodied’. In the second part of the paper I argue that the distinctive sociality of our species, especially its moral dimension, rests heavily on our ability to represent the conscious states of others. In closing, I put these ideas together and show how they point to a circular causal-mechanistic nexus between consciousness and social mindedness. (shrink)

What have truth and utopia to do with each other? Should we not speak rather only of the truth of dystopia—even and especially in the context of the highest levels of prosperity and freedom ever achieved? For if dystopia is invisible to many, it is not, for all that, any less real, whether in the present or the immediate future. For once the Malthusian predicament of economic globalization is demonstrated in the clash between economic growth and ecological finitude, specifically in (...) the form of oil and natural gas depletion, then dystopia will soon be upon us all.1 In the brief…. (shrink)

One of the most original thinkers of the century, Karl Popper has inspired generations of philosophers, historians, and politicians. This collection of papers, specially written for this volume, offers fresh philosophical examination of key themes in Popper's philosophy, including philosophy of knowledge, science and political philosophy. Drawing from some of Popper's most important works, contributors address his solution to the problem of induction, his views on conventionalism and criticism in an open society, and his unique position in 20th century philosophy. (...) They also examine the current relevance of Popper to understanding liberal democracy, his critique of tribalism and his relationship with analytic philosophy in general - and with Wittgenstein in particular - as well as drawing on the studies of Isaac Newton and Albert Einstein to assess Popper's conception of science. (shrink)

When one first encounters Nietzsche’s or Wittgenstein’s writings, one is generally surprised by their style of writing which seems to depart from the philosophical norm of structured argumentation. And when one attempts to compare Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, their styles seem to be an important common feature. But is this claim only superficial or does it have deeper philosophical roots? This chapter aims to show that Nietzsche and Wittgenstein share a common concern with style that is rooted in core philosophical issues, (...) especially their critique of metaphysics and their revaluation of the relation between philosophy and poetry. The argument is divided into three parts: the first part focuses on style as a tool for criticism in order to show how Nietzsche and Wittgenstein use stylistic criticism against traditional (systematic) philosophy; the second part shows how this criticism leads to a revaluation of the relation between philosophy and poetry; the third and final part argues that the aphoristic writing they each practise is a way of finding a philosophical style that embraces the poetic rather than rejects it. (shrink)

Within Rousseau scholarship there is serious disagreement concerning the correct way to understand Rousseau's social and political thought. For many, Rousseau does not allow for individual liberty, and also, for many, he is a muddled, confused, and inconsistent thinker. I would like to argue that Rousseau does allow for individual liberty and that his major social and political doctrines are much more consistent than is usually thought to be the case. In my view, Rousseau is a very careful thinker, but (...) his thought is difficult to understand and it is often misunderstood. (shrink)

This concise biography tells the story of John Dewey, a pioneer of pragmatism and the first original school of philosophy created in America. The school was born out of a specific historical context, in the wake of a country at war with itself, and in response to the rapid changes of industrialization. Dewey's pragmatism celebrated human intelligence and agency and the promise that tomorrow could be better than today. For Dewey, pragmatism was the philosophy of democracy. Dewey lived from just (...) before the Civil War to just before school integration. As such, the book touches on many key moments in American history, from social reform in turn of the century Chicago, to censorship during world war one, and to the government's responsibilities in the Great Depression. It covers all this in the context of the life of a man whose ideas helped shape American culture and intellectual life. John Dewey: Prophet of an Educated Democracy will appeal to students, scholars, and all those interested in American philosophy and history of the 19th and 20th centuries. It will also compliment humanities courses on American philosophy, history, and intellectual traditions. (shrink)

The central view of this dissertation is that a more comprehensive theory of scientific learning must incorporate insights from the disciplines of methodology and sociology. The standards of methodology play an indispensible role in learning by providing some of the principles necessary for theoretical evaluation. But such principles are not sufficient for socially embedded learning and they do not exclude the operation of social interests within science. It is the institutional structure of science that helps make up what abstract standards (...) alone lack: the material means with which to affect the advancement of learning. Institutions add something of their own dynamic to learning by helping to realize the abstract principles of methodology--they are never simply neutral husks. ;The views of a number of methodologists and sociologists are examined to demonstrate that this view of learning has not always been appreciated. Some methodologists have thought that by developing a theory of scientific method they were ensuring science's insulation from society at large. Such projects expect too much of methodology and the best methodology we have--fallibilism--leaves science open to social influence. Some sociologists have seen the role of a social theory as cutting across that of methodology--as if a social account of learning could only be at the expense of methodology. This had led some to deny methodology any explanatory power and others to limit sociology to accounting for merely the external aspects of scientific development. ;I throughout try to suggest how learning may be best accounted for by a fallibilist methodology combined with an institutional social theory. Such a dual view of learning is helpful because the advancement of learning is at times as dependent on its material constraints as on its intellectual ones. Thus, a comprehensive theory of learning can help science be a more critical enterprise and so contribute to its advancement. (shrink)

We live in a complex world, made more complex for us by the difficulty of distinguishing between our cultural expectations for how things work and the physical systems we interact with. The environmental systems of nature and the economy are often hard to recognize and constantly change, having behaviors independent of what people think about them. So our rules for systems we come to trust can become highly misleading without notice. That seems to have happened to us, evident in how (...) people still project models of economic growth into the future, and already missing the turning point of timely response to erupting strains, fairly clearly around a century ago. That makes it valuable to know how the laws of physics provide some simple boundary conditions for responding to change in environmental systems, and knowing when you should.Learning to identify natural systems change and how to respond starts with learning to distinguish between physical systems, as one of our independent realities, and our worlds of information and belief as another. Once you can distinguish our information from its physical subjects you can compare the difference, and plan for change. Telling them apart can be a challenge, however, requiring attention to their distinctly different kinds of energy use, organization and natural limits. Environmental systems often change with their actively learning parts too, for another reason watching them change is more important than having theories of how they worked in the past.A useful way to find and track change in physical systems is found in how the conservation laws require energy flow and energy transfer processes to begin and end. They need a continuity that can be identified in recorded measures, made useful by raising key questions about irreversible changes precipitated by regular changes in scale. It builds a new bridge of methodology between theoretical and physical systems, introducing a new kind of empirical research. (shrink)