There is a chasm in current analytic philosophy of perception between disjunctivists (and naïve realists), on the one hand, and ‘conjunctivists’ (intentionalists), on the other. For more than a decade, scholars of phenomenology have debated how classical phenomenologists such as Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty are to be located vis‐à‐vis this chasm. While there seems to be an emerging consensus that Merleau‐Ponty was a disjunctivist avant la lettre, how to interpret Husserl remains contested.

_Husserl and Other Phenomenologists_ addresses a fundamental question: what is it in the thinking of the founding father of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, that on the one hand enables the huge variety in the phenomenological discourse and, at the same time, necessitates relying on his phenomenology as a point of departure and an object before which philosophizing is conducted. The contributors to this volume, each with his or her own focus on a specific figure in the phenomenological school vis-à-vis Husserl's thinking, (...) demonstrate that every reference to Husserl is necessarily bound up with modifying his ideas and crossing the boundaries of his phenomenology. In this sense, and given the insight that Husserlian phenomenology is already imbued with the potential modifications and revisions, the post-Husserlian phenomenologies may be included together with Husserl in one so-called ‘Phenomenological Movement’. The discussions in the book open for philosophers and intellectuals a window upon phenomenology, which has been one of the richest and most influential cultural phenomena since its very appearance at the beginning of the twentieth century. The book also conveys the complex interpretive dynamic within which a given framework of ideas becomes a sort of magnetic field, with attracting and repelling forces acting on its participants, and thanks to which the great ideas of modernity maintain their vitality and relevance a hundred years after their first appearance. This book was originally published as a special issue of _The European Legacy: Towards New Paradigms. _. (shrink)

This edited volume examines women's voices in phenomenology, many of which had a formative impact on the movement but have be kept relatively silent for many years. It features papers that truly extend the canonical scope of phenomenological research. Readers will discover the rich philosophical output of such scholars as Edith Stein, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and Gerda Walther. They will also come to see how the phenomenological movement allowed its female proponents to achieve a position in the academic world few women (...) could enjoy at the time. The book explores the intersection of social ontology, phenomenology, and women scholars in phenomenology. The papers offer a fresh look at such topics as the nature of communities, shared values, feelings, and other mental content. In addition, coverage examines the contributions of Jewish women to the science, who were present at the beginning of the phenomenological movement. This remarkable anthology also features a paper on Gerda Walther written by Linda Lopez McAlister, former editor of the feminist journal Hypatia, who had met Walther in 1976. This book features work from the conference “Women Phenomenologists on Social Ontology,” held at the University of Paderborn. Overall, it collects profiles and analysis that unveil a hidden history of phenomenology. (shrink)

Kierkegaard has undoubtedly influenced phenomenological thinking, but he has rarely if ever been read as a phenomenologist himself.

The Poet as Phenomenologist: Rilke and the New Poems opens up new perspectives on the relation between Rilke's poetry and phenomenological philosophy, illustrating the ways in which poetry can offer an exceptional response to the philosophical problem of dualism. Drawing on the work of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Luke Fischer makes a new contribution to the tradition of phenomenological poetics and expands the debate among Germanists concerning the phenomenological status of Rilke's poetry, which has been severely limited to comparisons of (...) Rilke and Husserl. Fischer explicates an implicit phenomenology of perception in Rilke's writings from his middle period (1902-1910). He argues that Rilke cultivated an artistic perception that, in a philosophically significant manner, overcomes the opposition between the sensuous and the intelligible while simultaneously transcending the boundaries of philosophy. Fischer offers novel interpretations of central poems from Rilke's Neue Gedichte (1907) and Der neuen Gedichte anderer Teil (1908) and frames them as the ultimate articulation of Rilke's non-dualistic vision. He thus demonstrates the continuity between Rilke and phenomenology while arguing that poetry, in this case, provides the most adequate response to a philosophical problem. (shrink)

Alexandru Dragomir became widely known in Romania as a philosopher 2 years after his death, in 2004. He had no prior publications and only a few of his close acquaintances were even aware of his work as a thinker. The editors of the five volumes of his posthumous papers have from the onset tried to present Dragomir, a former doctoral student of Heidegger, as a phenomenologist, while this interpretation is today well-established. The following paper tries to submit this interpretation to (...) a closer scrutiny, on the one hand, by addressing the history of Dragomir’s publication and reception in Romania and abroad, and on the other hand, by analyzing several aspects of his oeuvre which do indeed hold close resemblance to aspects of the phenomenological method, even though they actually have quite different motivations. (shrink)

Emotions are ”feelings of bodily changes’, according to William James. This definition was the starting point of a debate that has been going on for more than a century now. James’ approach soon seemed empirically falsified by experimental psychologists and it was seriously undermined by philosophers who called his views untenable, because he seemed to reduce emotions to non-cognitive sensations. But time and again James rose from his grave. Today we witness his revival in the work of ”neo-Jamesians’ like Jesse (...) Prinz and ”neo-phenomenologists’ like Matthew Ratcliffe. In this article the main reactions to James’ ”feelings of bodily changes’ are examined. My conclusion is that both his critics and his supporters have started from an incomplete interpretation of the theory. James’ pragmatically embedded psychology of emotion as the experience of a dynamic, bodily self has until today received insufficient philosophical attention. (shrink)

본고는 형이상학을 극복하고자 하는 하이데거의 시도가 지닌 의의를 인정하면서도 그 시도가 간과한 문제를 드러내고자 한다. 하이데거는 고정된 이론을 통해 존재를 대상화하려는 형이상학에 반대하여 세계에 대한 우리의 인식이 언제나 우리의 삶의 지평을 바탕으로 성립한다고 이야기한다. 그는 소위 ‘존재 사유(Seinsdenken)’를 통해 존재가 우리의 삶의 지평 속에서 얼마나 다양하고, 풍요롭고, 경이로운 방식으로 주어질 수 있는지를 보여주고자 한다. 그러나 하이데거가 과연 형이상학을 철저하게 극복하였는지는 다소 의문스럽다. 하이데거의 존재론은 역설적이게도 존재에 대한 대상화를 거부하는 과정에서 우리의 삶의 지평을 다시 대상화하는 것처럼 보이기 때문이다. 본고는 우선 하이데거의 (...) 전기 철학이 현존재를 중심으로 존재 사유를 전개하기 위해 현상학적 환원의 방법에 의존한다고 강조할 것이다(제2장). 또한 하이데거의 후기 철학 역시 시인의 언어 속에서 드러나는 존재의 생기에 주목하기 위해 현상학적 환원의 방법에 암묵적으로 호소한다고 지적할 것이다(제3장). 다음으로, 하이데거의 존재 사유를 관통하고 있는 현상학적 환원의 방법이 ‘신의 관점’이라고 일컬어질 수 있는 일종의 형이상학적 위치를 상정하고 있지는 않은지 논의할 것이다(제4장). 마지막으로, 우리의 삶의 지평에 대해 현상학적 기술을 제시하고자 하는 하이데거의 시도가 인식의 가능 조건에 대해 형이상학을 구성하고자 하는 ‘초월론적 사유’를 벗어나지 못한다고 비판할 것이다(제5장). (shrink)

The two names most closely associated with phenomenology in early twentieth century Russia are Gustav Špet and Aleksej Losev. However, is that judgment warranted with regard to Losev? In just what way can we look on him as a phenomenologist? Losev himself, in the mid-1920s, employed the expression “dialectical phenomenology,” seeing phenomenology as an initial descriptive method to ascertain essences. He was sharply critical of its self-limitation in disavowing all explanation as metaphysical. Yet, earlier that decade Losev approved of Husserl’s (...) opposition to reductionism and of his focus on essences and senses. In this way, the record is unclear: In the short span of a decade he moved from a position of qualified sympathy with phenomenology to an overtly unqualified insouciance. Looking at Losev’s criticisms, however, from the late 20s and early 30s, we find a logical anticipation of Husserl’s own move from a static to a genetic phenomenology. (shrink)

Almost from its origins, phenomenology has been modified in various ways by ‘phenomenologists’ who are inspired by Husserl but who deviate in significant ways from certain details of his approach. Jean-Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Levinas are two prime examples. While each is widely identified as a phenomenologist, each also departs from Husserl, the former by using phenomenology to pursue ontological questions and the latter by describing non-intentional modes of appearing. Here I argue that each is nevertheless rightly called a (...) phenomenologist for at least two reasons. First, each undertakes a careful study of the structure and contents of conscious experience in order to describe the foundations of the subject-object correlation and identify its conditions. Secondly, each accomplishes this by developing the notion of intentionality, focusing on the ways in which the intentional character of consciousness enables its lived encounter with what is transcendent to it. (shrink)

Many philosophers of science and technology who see themselves as coming “after” Husserl also claim that their phenomenology is hermeneutical. Yet they neither practice the same sort of phenomenology, nor do they all have the same understanding of hermeneutics. Moreover, their differences often seem to be more a function of different pre-selected substantive commitments—say, to take a “material” turn or to be resolutely “empirical”—than the product of any serious effort to clarify what it is be hermeneutical. In this essay, after (...) some discussion of Dilthey’s reception among post-Husserlians (especially Patrick Heelan and Don Ihde), I consider how aspiring hermeneuts might make their own pre-possession of substantive and methodological commitments a hermeneutical topic. This is, of course, is not just a scholarly question of how post-Husserlian phenomenologists might make themselves more phenomenological. Without thoughtful self-awareness of these commitments, one’s assumptions about the use of technology, design, the place of science in the larger culture and in relation to conceptions of human flourishing—all of these assumptions are likely to pass through into technoscientific practice with insufficient critical consideration. (shrink)

This paper reflects on certain working assumptions of Husserlian phenomenological practice, using an investigation of interkinaesthetic affectivity as an example. I suggest that in some cases, Husserl’s “stratificational” model should be replaced with the notion of the ongoing dynamic efficacy of mutually co-founding, interpenetrating, and interfunctioning moments-“through”-which experience proceeds. Finally, I relate the latter model to Patočka’s call for a genuine integration of the three movements of embodied human life.

In order to explore the question of whether artists are phenomenologists, I consider the negative and affirmative answers defended by Edith Landmann-Kalischer and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, respectively. Through this comparison, I bring to light reasons why phenomenologists take themselves to share a subject-matter with artists, viz., lived experience. However, with this comparison I also highlight the ways in which the answer to this question turns on how we conceive of what phenomenologists do. If one endorses a more scientific (...) conception of phenomenology, as Landmann-Kalischer does, then it seems that the phenomenologist does something fundamentally different from the artist. But if one endorses a more aesthetic conception of phenomenology, as Merleau-Ponty does, then the phenomenologist’s efforts appear to be of a piece with those of the artist. In the end, I will not defend one position over the other; rather, my aim is to show that in order to answer the question, are artists phenomenologists, we must also answer the question, how should a phenomenologist be. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that Berkeley is proto-phenomenologist. The term phenomenology will chiefly be understood in terms of the approach of Edmund Husserl. Berkeley is attentive to the correct use of significations in philosophical exposition, the subjective character of experience, the motility of the perceiver and the transcendence of things. Like the phenomenologists he rejects materialism, naturalism and scepticism. He seeks to preserve the evidences of ordinary perception, setting out an account of scientific theory that can cohere with (...) them. In the first part of this essay I go through some of the more clear-cut ways in which Berkeley anticipates Husserl and some of the latter’s successors. In the second part I lay out their criticisms of Berkeley, also indicating what they hold in common. In the third and final part I consider some of the ways in which Berkeley can meet these criticisms, either readily or through certain qualifications, and I bring out his most significant contributions as a proto-phenomenologist. My aim is to show there are more than traces of the phenomenological attitude in Berkeley. In his efforts to save the appearances, he goes back to that world in which we live and breathe, if not quite have our being. (shrink)

The paper aims to contribute to the ongoing conversation on critical phenomenology with reflections on its method. The key argument is that critical phenomenology should be understood as a form of historico-transcendental inquiry and therefore it cannot forgo the phenomenological reduction. Rather, this methodological step should be centered in critical phenomenology, and appropriated in problematized and rethought forms. The methodological assessment of critical phenomenology has implications also for how we read its canon. The paper shows that while Simone de Beauvoir (...) did not adopt the phenomenological reduction in its full Husserlian meaning, her analyses of experience did not remain on the level of personal or experiential description either. The contention is that if we want to read her as a critical phenomenologist, we should focus on her seminal modification of the historico-transcendental method of phenomenology. (shrink)

This article addresses a basic question: what elements in Husserl’s phenomenology can account for the variety of post-Husserlian phenomenologies? The answer, I suggest, is that Husserl’s idea of reality, particularly his notion of givenness vis-à-vis self-givenness, facilitated the work of his followers by offering them at once a firm ground and a point of departure for their inquiries. However, adopting Husserl’s phenomenology as their starting point did not prevent his followers from developing their own independent phenomenological theory. Moreover, despite the (...) elusive particulars that shape one’s individual experience of the world, so it transpires, Husserl’s thinking which was different and beyond their own observations and actual experiences, namely, transcendent, appears to have been a genuine guide along their path to achieve meaning. This interpretation thus gives precedence to a metaphysical point of departure, that is, to Husserl’s idea of reality as ‘givenness’, in launching phenomenol... (shrink)

Early work in child psychology -- Phenomenology, gestalt theory, and psychoanalysis -- Syncretic sociability and the birth of the self -- Contemporary research in psychology and phenomenology -- Exploration and learning -- Culture, development, and gender -- Conclusion: an incomparable childhood.

Insight into Lester Embree’s C.V. Recovery and recognition of his inner purpose with regard to his critical detachment from a particular orientation of phenomenology. Phenomenological theory only makes sense as prepa-ration for real practice. When did the view that we, the “soi disant” phenomenologists, are far from the genuine practice of phenomenology arise in Embree? And, who inspired him, apart from Husserl himself? These are key questions to understand unity and inner coherence in Embre’s C.V., and they meet two (...) aims. The first one is to find the link between his initial entry in phenomenology and his critical stance, particularly evident in the last two decades of his life. The second one is to identify who could have been his guide and model‒apart from Husserl‒from the beginning of his life as phenomenologist until his last two decades, when he wrote his comments on pseudophenomenology. In any case, Embree has been a critical voice who compels us to think about the orientation we are giving to the phenomenology inherited from Husserl. He is therefore a brave and honest philosopher, full of great humanity. In addititon to these qualities, it is worth noting both his creative intelligence and foresight to see‒earlier than others‒the evolution followed by phenomenology until now and his valuable multidisciplinary contribution. Praise to Lester Embree.Mirada hacia el interior del C.V. de Lester Embree. Recuperación y reconocimiento de su propósito interno con respecto a su distanciamiento crítico hacia cierta orientación de la fenomenología. La teoría fenomenológica únicamente tiene sentido como preparación para una real práctica. ¿Cuándo emerge en Embree su consideración de que los “soi disant” fenomenólogos estamos alejados del verdadero ejercicio de la fenomenología? Y, ¿en quién se inspira él además de en Husserl? Estas preguntas son importantes para entender la unidad y coherencia internas en el C.V. de Embree y sirven para satisfacer dos objetivos. El primero es hallar un vínculo entre su entrada inicial en la fenomenología y su posicionamiento crítico manifiesto especialmente en las últimas dos décadas de su vida. El segundo objetivo es determinar quién pudo actuar para él —además de Husserl— como guía y modelo desde el comienzo de su vida de fenomenólogo hasta esas dos últimas de su vida en las que escribe sus comentarios sobre la pseudofenomenología. En todo caso, Embree es una voz crítica que nos fuerza a pensar acerca de la trayectoria que nosotros estamos dando a la fenomenología heredada de Husserl. Él es, así, un filósofo valiente y honesto y de una gran humanidad. Se unen a estas cualidades su gran inteligencia creativa y su sorprendente perspicacia para ver —antes que otros— la evolución que ha seguido la fenomenología hasta hoy y la valiosa contribución multidisciplinar actual. Alabanza a Lester Embree. (shrink)

(1998). T.H. Green as a phenomenologist: linking British idealism and continental phenomenology. Angelaki: Vol. 3, Impurity, authenticity and humanity, pp. 77-88.

Gerda Walther[aut] Walther, Gerda has no developed account of empathyEmpathy; rather, she draws from the writings of early phenomenologists and psychologists on empathy. Generally, for Walther[aut]Walther, Gerda, empathy is an act of mind that permits the understanding of another’s consciousnessConsciousness and experienceExperience. Edith Stein[aut]Edith Stein, in many respects, lays the ground for a phenomenological account of empathy. Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s treatment of intersubjectivityIntersubjectivity and the nature of intersubjective acts such as empathy draws greatly from Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund. There exist three primary (...) sources for Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s analysis of empathy, all of which were written while Stein[aut]Stein, Edith was still in direct contact with Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund either as his student, assistant or as a private researcher attempting to habilitate. The primary and better known source is Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s doctoral dissertation published originally in 1917, titled On the Problem of Empathy\”On the Problem of Empathy”, by Stein, Edith. The text, which is the only extant portion of her doctoral dissertation, sets the stage for Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s later work on the subject. Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund was pleased by Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s selection of the topic, but he wanted her to give more of a historical overview, with special reference to Lipps[aut]Lipps, Hans’ work. Hence, the text is replete with discussions of notable philosophers like Scheler[aut]Scheler, Max, Dilthey[aut]Dilthey, Wilhelm, and Lipps[aut]Lipps, Hans. The second major work that addresses empathy is to be found in Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities\”Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities”, by Stein, Edith. This work was published in Volume V of Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund’s Jahrbuch and consists of two principal texts: PsychicCausalityCausalityPsychic and Individual and Community. This text comes from Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s period during and after her assistantship with Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund. The text is largely, but not exclusively, based on her work on Husserl[aut]Husserl, Edmund’s Ideen II. The last source is Stein[aut]Stein, Edith’s research manuscript titled, Einführung in die Philosophie. (shrink)

How are we to understand Agamben’s philosophical anthropology and his frequent invocations of the relation between bios and zoe? In Remnants of Auschwitz Agamben evokes a quasi-phenomenological account of shame in order to elucidate this question thus implying that the phenomenon of shame carries an ontological significance. That shame has an ontological significance is also a belief held in current debates on moral emotions and the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, but despite this common philosophical intuition phenomenologists have criticized Agamben’s account (...) of shame. In this paper, I will try to show how these criticisms often rely on misreadings of Agamben’s terminology. Once Agamben’s analysis of shame have been properly placed in the broader context if his work, I will outline how Agamben’s analysis of shame and his ontology of life feeds into a rethinking of community and belonging. (shrink)