This study of the patterns of the keeping of herpetofauna animals and associated animal welfare issues among secondary school pupils in the United Kingdom suggests that a large proportion of the animals kept as companion animals by this group are indigenous species. In comparison with purchased species, these captured animals, even those normally long-lived, appear to suffer a high rate of mortality. Relatively large numbers of escape- and food-related deaths among these animals imply that many are not furnished with (...) suitable vivaria or adequate care. Traded reptile and amphibian species were reported to have been kept by nearly 40% of the students who said they had kept herpetofauna, and the proportions of most taxa reflected their availability in shops. Data concerning students' opinions about their own care-knowledge appeared to support the general conclusion that students have much to learn about keeping reptiles and amphibians. These findings are considered in relation to issues of animnl welfare and herpetofauna conservation. Their ramifications for school-based education about reptiles and amphibians are also discussed. (shrink)

Perhaps the commonest reasons for the keeping of pets are companionship and as a conduit for affection. Pets are, therefore, being “used” for human ends in much the same way as laboratory or farm animals. So shouldn’t the same arguments apply to the use of pets as to those used in other ways? In accepting the “rights” of farm animals to fully express their natural behavior, one must also accept the “right” of pets to express their intrinsic natural behavior. (...) Dogs kept in houses for most of the day are being kept in an unnatural environment. So are rabbits kept in hutches, and guinea-pigs or birds in cages. These conditions infringe the animals’ telos. Dogs are naturally pack animals, so is a dog in isolation being denied its telos? Other actions more deliberately infringe telos and autonomy. Enforced shampooing – or even exercise; hair-cutting of poodles; putting animals in clothes; and tail-docking. If de-beaking of chickens is considered wrong, then the same must be true for tail-docking of dogs. One should also question the ethics of specialist breeding – especially when that results in physiological disadvantages (boxers with breathing troubles). There would appear to be no advantage to the animals in having such health problems and when these are the direct result of the breeders’ desire for specific cosmetic traits, we should question the ethics of the practice at least as much as when animals are bred for specific agricultural traits. (shrink)

This article argues that the relations of social and political power that obtain between humans and pets are illegitimate. We begin by showing that pets, a largely neglected population in political philosophy, are subject to socially and politically organised power, which stands in need of justification. We then argue that pets have three moral complaints against the relations of power to which they are subject. First, our power over pets disrespects their moral independence: the fact that they are not simply (...) available to be used to serve the interests or projects of others. Second, our power over pets systematically sets back their interests in exercising control over their own body, actions, and environment. Third, in subjecting pets to asymmetric relations of power in which they are heavily dependent on humans for the satisfaction of their interests, we subject them to objectionable risks of harm. Together, these complaints support our thesis that the power relations central to the institution of pet keeping are illegitimate. The practical upshot is that we have a strong moral reason to abolish this institution. (shrink)

In her book Run, Spot, Run: The Ethics of Keeping Pets, bioethicist Jessica Pierce attempts to explore a narrower field of Animal Ethics, the ethics of keeping pets, as the title indicates. Τhere has not been much research in this field, although contemporary literature has dealt with certain issues within its context, such as the issue of euthanasia. The author states that her main aim is to lead the reader, by the time he reaches the last page of (...) the book, to no longer be sure if the very practice of keeping pets is moral. Although the author proposes the use of a kinder language for discussing about pet keeping, she uses the accepted language throughout her book. (shrink)

Perhaps the commonest reasons for the keeping of pets are companionship and as a conduit for affection. Pets are, therefore, being “used” for human ends in much the same way as laboratory or farm animals. So shouldn’t the same arguments apply to the use of pets as to those used in other ways? In accepting the “rights” of farm animals to fully express their natural behavior, one must also accept the “right” of pets to express their intrinsic natural behavior. (...) Dogs kept in houses for most of the day are being kept in an unnatural environment. So are rabbits kept in hutches, and guinea-pigs or birds in cages. These conditions infringe the animals’ telos. Dogs are naturally pack animals, so is a dog in isolation being denied its telos? Other actions more deliberately infringe telos and autonomy. Enforced shampooing – or even exercise; hair-cutting of poodles; putting animals in clothes; and tail-docking. If de-beaking of chickens is considered wrong, then the same must be true for tail-docking of dogs. One should also question the ethics of specialist breeding – especially when that results in physiological disadvantages (boxers with breathing troubles). There would appear to be no advantage to the animals in having such health problems and when these are the direct result of the breeders’ desire for specific cosmetic traits, we should question the ethics of the practice at least as much as when animals are bred for specific agricultural traits. (shrink)

Bender, Robert Review of: Run, spot, run: The ethics of keeping pets, by Jessica Pierce, Uni of Chicago Press, 2016, 264 pages.

This study explores ethnic variations in animal companion attachment among 133 students enrolled in a school of veterinary medicine. The 57 White and 76 African American participants completed surveys that included background information, several questions about their animal companions, and a pet attachment questionnaire .White students had significantly higher PAQ scores than did African American students . White students also had significantly more pets and more kinds of pets and were more likely to allow pets to sleep on their beds (...) . Although keeping pets is a universal cultural phenomenon, how that attachment is expressed may vary from culture-to-culture. This study explores possible explanations and implications for these variations. (shrink)

A nationwide survey that included personal interviews in 1,021 households studied the incidence, species, and numbers of nonhuman animals kept in Costa Rican households. A total of 71% of households keep animals.The proportion of households keeping dogs is 3.6 higher than the proportion of households keeping cats . In addition to the usual domestic or companion animals kept in 66% of the households, 24% of households keep wild species as pets. Although parrots are the bulk of wild species (...) kept as pets, there is vast species diversity, including other birds, reptiles, mammals, amphibians, fishes, and invertebrates - typically caught in their natural habitat to satisfy the pet market. The extraction from the wild and the keeping of such animals is by-and-large illegal and often involves endangered species. Costa Ricans, in a conservative estimate, keep about 151,288 parrots as pets. More than half the respondents have kept a psittacid at some point in their lives. Pet keeping is a common practice in Costa Rican society, and its incidence is high by international standards. (shrink)

An overview and critical discussion of Christine Overall’s Pets and People: The Ethics of Our Relationships With Companion Animals. Argues that the book contains important contributions to many of the major ethical issues associated with the keeping of “pets” but is lacking in discussion of the most fundamental issue—namely, whether it is ethical to keep “pets” at all.

In this article, I consider the question of whether having pets is morally permissible. However, I do so indirectly by considering three objections to the practice of having pets — what I shall call the ‘restriction of freedom objection’, the ‘property objection’, and the ‘dependency objection’. The restriction of freedom objection is dismissed relatively easily. The property objection also fails to show that having pets is morally impermissible. However, my consideration of this second objection does lead to the conclusion that (...) we ought to aim at changing existing legal systems and the majority of people's attitudes towards pets such that they are no longer considered to be the personal property of the humans in whose homes they are kept. But, while it is clear that we ought to aim at ending the practice of owning pets, it is not clear whether we ought to aim at ending the practice of keeping pets. Indeed, I do not to reach a definitive conclusion about the cogency of the dependency objection. However, I argue that this lack of clarity is of little concern at this time as our present moral obligations to pets are quite clear. (shrink)

Pet animal management is subject to varied husbandry practices and the resulting consequences often impact negatively on animal welfare. The perceptions held by someone who proposes to keep an animal regarding the ease or difficulty with which its biological needs can be provided for in captivity are key factors in whether that animal is acquired and how well or poorly it does. We propose a system to ‘score’ animals and assign them to categories indicating the ease or difficulty with which (...) they can be kept as pets in accordance with welfare and public health and safety considerations. The ‘EMODE’ (‘Easy’, ‘Moderate’, ‘Difficult’, ‘Extreme’) system has two fundamental components: animal welfare—which considers the ‘five freedoms’ principles; and public health and safety—which considers management associated with risks from disease or injury to the keeper and to others. EMODE incorporates two tiers of assessment and guidance, and may offer a reasonable guide for the majority of relevant animals. EMODE Tier 1 provides a primary and general assessment of animals by class or group, and EMODE Tier 2 provides a secondary refined assessment of animals by species or breed. EMODE offers a user-friendly and versatile foundation concept for the future development of guidance for the layperson who may be considering acquiring a pet or for certain personnel when considering assigning species to restrictive lists of suitable animals, for example, ‘positive lists’ as used by governments to control animals in trade and keeping. (shrink)

In this article, I consider the question of whether having pets is morally permissible. However, I do so indirectly by considering three objections to the practice of having pets — what I shall call the ‘restriction of freedom objection’, the ‘property objection’, and the ‘dependency objection’. The restriction of freedom objection is dismissed relatively easily. The property objection also fails to show that having pets is morally impermissible. However, my consideration of this second objection does lead to the conclusion that (...) we ought to aim at changing existing legal systems and the majority of people's attitudes towards pets such that they (pets) are no longer considered to be the personal property of the humans in whose homes they are kept. But, while it is clear that we ought to aim at ending the practice of owning pets, it is not clear whether we ought to aim at ending the practice of keeping pets. Indeed, I do not to reach a definitive conclusion about the cogency of the dependency objection. However, I argue that this lack of clarity is of little concern at this time as our present moral obligations to pets are quite clear. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to extend and replicate previously published results from a random probability sample of university faculty. The sample assessed reasons given for companion-animal guardianship and for belief in the beneficial health effects of owning pets. In this replication and extension design, these two non-random samples responded to the same questionnaire items as those addressed to university faculty. Results indicated that avoidance of loneliness was the most frequent reason for owning pets among both students and middle-aged (...) community members. This result is consistent with the view that animals provide social support and companionship to humans at various stages of the life cycle. Suggesting an emergent feature of the human-nonhuman animal bond, both groups selected, “the pet helps keep me active” as the second-most common reason. Older women reported a greater belief in the health-giving benefits of pet ownership than did younger persons or men. This belief may contribute to human benefits of pet ownership and requires further research. (shrink)

When asked about humanity’s future relationship with computers, Marvin Minsky famously replied “If we’re lucky, they might decide to keep us as pets”. A number of eminent authorities continue to argue that there is a real danger that “super-intelligent” machines will enslave—perhaps even destroy—humanity. One might think that it would swiftly follow that we should abandon the pursuit of AI. Instead, most of those who purport to be concerned about the existential threat posed by AI default to worrying about what (...) they call the “Friendly AI problem”. Roughly speaking this is the question of how we might ensure that the AI that will develop from the first AI that we create will remain sympathetic to humanity and continue to serve, or at least take account of, our interests. In this paper I draw on the “neo-republican” philosophy of Philip Pettit to argue that solving the Friendly AI problem would not change the fact that the advent of super-intelligent AI would be disastrous for humanity by virtue of rendering us the slaves of machines. A key insight of the republican tradition is that freedom requires equality of a certain sort, which is clearly lacking between pets and their owners. Benevolence is not enough. As long as AI has the power to interfere in humanity’s choices, and the capacity to do so without reference to our interests, then it will dominate us and thereby render us unfree. The pets of kind owners are still pets, which is not a status which humanity should embrace. If we really think that there is a risk that research on AI will lead to the emergence of a superintelligence, then we need to think again about the wisdom of researching AI at all. (shrink)

The trade in, and private keeping of, reptiles as "pets" raises several ethical concerns regarding animal welfare (associated with handling, storage, transportation, intensive captive breeding, captivity stress, injury, disease, and high premature mortality); public health and safety (associated with zoonotic disease and animal-linked injuries); species conservation and environmental degradation (associated with wild capture); and ecological alteration (associated with invasive alien species). Also, many captive reptiles are fed other animals, raising broader ethical questions. Misperceptions about reptiles by proponents of their (...) captivity mean that these animals are subject to conditions that would likely be considered unacceptable for dogs or cats. (shrink)

The institution of owning pets has been subjected to compelling criticism on moral grounds. Yet advocates of a reformed, guardian/dependent model may yet face an abolitionist conclusion. We argue that treating companion animals as dependents entails an indefensible moral priority for them in the face of their guardians’ competing moral demands. An abolitionist dilemma arises as a result: if the property and reformed models fail, a morally acceptable characterization of the moral relationship between humans and their companion animals has yet (...) to be articulated. We close by inviting others to develop plausible alternatives to the ownership and reformed models. (shrink)

In 1864, the first living Mexican axolotls were brought from Mexico to Paris. On arrival, the 34 animals were divided up between the two zoos in Paris, the Ménagerie of the Muséum d'Histoire naturelle and the Jardin d'acclimatation. From there, the animals and their descendants spread around the world as zoo and laboratory specimens, as well as pets. Today, a population of hundreds of thousands of axolotls live in aquariums, zoos, and laboratories around the globe. The fate of the axolotls (...) in the Ménagerie and their subsequent proliferation open a unique window into the culture and practices of keeping unknown animals in Europe in the 19th century, and their relation to experimental zoology. During the early years, the challenges were to keep the axolotls alive and to bring them to reproduction. The surprising transformation of some of these normally aquatic animals into a land-dwelling form prompted further investigations of their living conditions and mode of reproduction. The example of the axolotl offers a detailed look into the practices of handling unknown species, the ways in which this handling became research, and the kinds of knowledge produced in this context. I pay particular attention to the role of the animal keepers and the infrastructures, and the ways in which practical knowledge about the animals' living conditions triggered experimental research. (shrink)

This review considers three recent films that focus on the lives of captive exotic animals and the people who keep them: Water for Elephants , a fictional Hollywood feature, and the documentaries One Lucky Elephant and The Elephant in the Living Room . Despite their different motivations and target audiences, all three productions tell the stories of well-meaning people who take wild animals captive—most prominently elephants and lions—believing that only they can keep the animals safe and fulfilled. In each context, (...) these people have profound, if self-interested, emotional attachments to their nonhuman captives. These three films, then, offer captive wild animals as ambivalent figures and cinematic loci for stories of human hubris and redemption. (shrink)

This article explores the origin and evolutionary implications of anthropomorphism in the context of our relationships with animal companions. On the human side, anthropomorphic thinking enables animal companions' social behavior to be construed in human terms, thereby allowing these nonhuman animals to function for their human owners or guardians as providers of nonhuman social support. Absence of social support is known to be detrimental to human health and well being. Therefore, anthropomorphism and its corollary, pet keeping, have obvious biological (...) fitness implications. On the animal side, anthropomorphism constitutes a unique evolutionary selection pressure, analogous to sexual selection, which has molded the appearance, anatomy, and behavior of companion animal species so as to adapt them to their unusual ecological niche as social support providers. Although such species undoubtedly have benefited numerically from the effects of this process, the consequences of anthropomorphism are less benign when viewed from the perspective of individual animals. Indeed, anthropomorphic selection probably is responsible for some of the more severe welfare problems currently found in companion animals. (shrink)

Alasdair Cochrane introduces an entirely new theory of animal rights grounded in their interests as sentient beings. He then applies this theory to different and underexplored policy areas, such as genetic engineering, pet-keeping, indigenous hunting, and religious slaughter. In contrast to other proponents of animal rights, Cochrane claims that because most sentient animals are not autonomous agents, they have no intrinsic interest in liberty. As such, he argues that our obligations to animals lie in ending practices that cause their (...) suffering and death and do not require the liberation of animals. Cochrane's "interest-based rights approach" weighs the interests of animals to determine which is sufficient to impose strict duties on humans. In so doing, Cochrane acknowledges that sentient animals have a clear and discernable right not to be made to suffer and not to be killed, but he argues that they do not have a prima facie right to liberty. Because most animals possess no interest in leading freely chosen lives, humans have no moral obligation to liberate them. Moving beyond theory to the practical aspects of applied ethics, this pragmatic volume provides much-needed perspective on the realities and responsibilities of the human-animal relationship. (shrink)

Many nonhuman animals have the emotional capacities to form caring relationships that matter to them, and for their immediate welfare. Drawing from care ethics, we argue that these relationships also matter as objectively valuable states of affairs. They are part of what is good in this world. However, the value of care is precarious in human-animal interactions. Be it in farming, research, wildlife ‘management’, zoos, or pet-keeping, the prevention, disruption, manipulation, and instrumentalization of care in animals by humans is (...) ubiquitous. We criticize a narrow conception of welfare that, in practice, tends to overlook non-experiential forms of harm that occur when we interfere with caring animals. Additionally, we point out wrongs against caring animals that are not just unaccounted for but denied by even an expansive welfare perspective: The instrumentalization of care and caring animals in systems of use can occur as a harmless wrong that an approach purely focused on welfare may, in fact, condone. We should therefore adopt an ethical perspective that goes beyond welfare in our dealings with caring animals. (shrink)

Between 1820 and 1870, middle-class Americans became convinced of the role nonhuman animals could play in socializing children. Companion animals in and around the household were the medium for training children into self-consciousness about, and abhorrence of, causing pain to other creatures including, ultimately, other people. In an age where the formation of character was perceived as an act of conscious choice and self-control, middle-class Americans understood cruelty to animals as a problem both of individual or familial deficiency and of (...) good and evil. Training children to be self-conscious about kindness became an important task of parenting. Domestic advisors also argued that learning kindness was critical for boys who were developmentally prone to cruelty and whose youthful cruelty had implications both for the future of family life and for the body politic. The practice of pet keeping, where children became stewards of companion animals who were then able to teach young humans such virtues as gratitude and fidelity, became a socially meaningful act. (shrink)

This paper challenges a widespread, if tacit, assumption of animal ethics, namely, that the only properties of entities that matter to their moral status are intrinsic, cross‐specific properties—typically psychological capacities. According to moral individualism (Rachels 1990; McMahan 2002; 2005), the moral status of an individual, and how to treat him or her, should only be a function of his or her individual properties. I focus on the fundamental assumption of moral individualism, which I call intrinsicalism. On the challenged view, pigs, (...) puppies and babies, insofar as they are intrinsically similar in morally relevant respects are equally deserving of having their interests satisfied (Norcross 2004). Moreover, relationships—merely agent-relative—are assumed to be irrelevant to moral status. I argue that, while some intrinsic properties are indeed fundamentally relevant, the principled exclusion of extrinsic properties (in virtue of extrinsicness) is unwarranted. From uncontroversial assumptions about supervenience, final value, and moral status, I argue for the relevance of extrinsic properties to moral status based on vulnerability and “reasonable partiality”, as illustrated by pet-keeping. (shrink)

From pets to strays to wildlife, sometimes animals need our help! Who keeps animals safe from human harm and other dangers? Community heroes do! Community heroes may work in humane societies, rescue groups, law enforcement, or many other settings. In this book, readers learn all about these real-life heroes and the important work they do. Readers also learn age-appropriate ways that they can help animals too! The high-interest material is paired with brightly colored photographs that bring the text to life, (...) communicating educational information in an appealing, easy-to-understand way. (shrink)

In this paper we make an argument for limiting veterinary expenditure on companion animals. The argument combines two principles: the obligation to give and the self-consciousness requirement. In line with the former, we ought to give money to organisations helping to alleviate preventable suffering and death in developing countries; the latter states that it is only intrinsically wrong to painlessly kill an individual that is self-conscious. Combined, the two principles inform an argument along the following lines: rather than spending inordinate (...) amounts of money on veterinary care when a companion animal is sick or injured, it is better to give the money to an aid organisation and painlessly kill the animal. (shrink)

Christine M. Korsgaard presents a compelling new view of our moral relationships to the other animals. She offers challenging answers to such questions as: Are people superior to animals, and does it matter morally if we are? Is it all right for us to eat animals, experiment on them, make them work for us, and keep them as pets?

While philosophers have, for centuries, pondered upon the relation between mind and brain, neuroscientists have only recently been able to explore the connection analytically — to peer inside the black box. This ability stems from recent advances in technology and emerging neuroimaging modalities. It is now possible not only to produce remarkably detailed images of the brain’s structure (i.e. anatomical imaging) but also to capture images of the physiology associated with mental processes (i.e. functional imaging). We are able to see (...) how specific regions of the brain ‘light up’ when activities such as reading this book are performed, and how our neurons and their elaborate cast of supporting cells organize and coordinate their tasks. As demonstrated in the other chapters of this book, the mapping of the human mind (mostly by measuring regional changes in blood flow, initially by positron emission tomography (PET) and recently by functional magnetic resonance imaging or (fMRI)) has provided insight into the functional neuroanatomy of neuropsychiatric diseases. Amazingly, the idea that regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) is related intimately to brain function goes back more than a century. As is often the case in science, this idea was initially the result of unexpected observations. The Italian physiologist Angelo Mosso first expressed the idea while studying pulsations of the living human brain that keep pace with the heartbeat (Mosso, 1881). These brain pulsations can be observed on the surface of the fontanelles in newborn children. Mosso believed that they reflected blood flow to the brain. He observed similar pulsations in an adult with a post-traumatic skull defect over the frontal lobes. While studying this subject, a peasant named Bertino, Mosso observed a sudden increase in the magnitude of the ‘brain’s heart-beats’ when the church bells signalled 12 o’clock, the time for a required prayer. The changes in brain pulsations occurred independently of any change in pulsations in the forearm.. (shrink)

Perhaps the commonest reasons for the keeping of pets are companionship and as a conduit for affection. Pets are, therefore, being “used” for human ends in much the same way as laboratory or farm animals. So shouldn’t the same arguments apply to the use of pets as to those used in other ways? In accepting the “rights” of farm animals to fully express their natural behavior, one must also accept the “right” of pets to express their intrinsic natural behavior. (...) Dogs kept in houses for most of the day are being kept in an unnatural environment. So are rabbits kept in hutches, and guinea-pigs or birds in cages. These conditions infringe the animals’ telos. Dogs are naturally pack animals, so is a dog in isolation being denied its telos? Other actions more deliberately infringe telos and autonomy. Enforced shampooing – or even exercise; hair-cutting of poodles; putting animals in clothes; and tail-docking. If de-beaking of chickens is considered wrong, then the same must be true for tail-docking of dogs. One should also question the ethics of specialist breeding – especially when that results in physiological disadvantages. There would appear to be no advantage to the animals in having such health problems and when these are the direct result of the breeders’ desire for specific cosmetic traits, we should question the ethics of the practice at least as much as when animals are bred for specific agricultural traits. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Synod on Synodality in Light of Pope Francis's Theology of MissionKeith LemnaThe Church's Synod on Synodality is a troubling prospect for many because the concept of "synodality" at its basis seems characterized by protean vagueness. The synod appears to be easy interpretive prey for those who wish to transform Christian life and practice in accordance with the norms of contemporary society and the ethos of modern democracy rather (...) than in deepening conformity to the sacramental and Trinitarian basis of the Church. The promulgators of the German "synodal way" and of similar paths suggested by like-minded cardinals, bishops, and theologians throughout the world are currently making good use of the synodal "process" for their pet causes on social media, in the press, and at academic conferences worldwide, including in Rome. These episcopal leaders and theologians often claim to speak for the mind of Pope Francis, but it is contestable whether this claim is completely true, especially given that he has himself placed the emphasis of the synod on mission and evangelization rather than on ad intra ecclesial reorganization in the manner of the secularizing camp. Against some of his critics and supporters, I shall spell out in the present essay key aspects of the missionary focus in Pope Francis's concept of synodality and suggest its metaphysical basis. Instead of arguing, as is sometimes done, that mission is for the sake of synodality, I shall demonstrate that Pope Francis keeps the reverse in view: that synodality is for the sake of mission. 1 Synodality has to do for Pope [End Page 509] Francis first and foremost with evangelization, with enabling the Church to communicate more effectively and pervasively the Word of God to people who have either fallen away from the Church or not yet received the liberating message of the Gospel. At the same time, I shall urge, his understanding of mission is rooted in a well-considered Trinitarian ontology in line with Tradition that renders his overarching vision an uneasy fit, ultimately, with the historicizing or democratizing reductionisms so prevalent today.2I shall base my case in this essay on exploration of some of the fundamental keys of Pope Francis's thought that come from his theological background, and that he articulates especially in his papal exhortation Evangelii Gaudium. I shall proceed in three sections: in the first, exploring, with reference to polarization in the Church, the theology of mission in Evangelii Gaudium, which illuminates Pope Francis's understanding of synodality; in the second, suggesting that this theology of mission is reflected in the fuller, more explicit theological treatment of synodality presented in the International Theological Commission (ITC) document Synodality in the Life and Mission of the Church; in the third, suggesting that Pope Francis's papal magisterium and synodal vision is a continuator of sometimes-neglected aspects of the theology of the Second Vatican Council, which bear profound congruence with nineteenth- and twentieth-century developments in Trinitarian ontology that are manipulable by questionable interpretations but are also quite defensible, and may even be essential to grasp the meaning of the Council and its papal interpretation for the good of the future of the Church and the world.A Theology of Mission in Evangelii Gaudium and the Theology of the PeopleOne of the most interesting and important contributions to the current discussion on synodality is Michael Hanby's recent article "Synodality, [End Page 510] Sociologism, and the Judgment of History," because, in it, Hanby gets at the root of the division in the Church that sets the context for possible meanings of the very concept of synodality. 3 Hanby discusses in this piece what he calls "The Unresolved Crisis of Catholic Modernisms,"4 drawing heavily on the work of the Italian philosopher Augusto Del Noce.5 The crisis indicated has to do with the relationship between metaphysics and history. Hanby urges that the internal conflict that the Church has faced between opposed poles of Catholic thought, left and right, is not—as it has often been urged—a methodological division between those who give priority to metaphysics and those who base their approach, in supposedly a-metaphysical manner, on historical considerations... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:1 & 2 Thessalonians by Douglas FarrowAnna Silvas1 & 2 Thessalonians by Douglas Farrow (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2020), xx + 336 pp.1 and 2 Thessalonians are probably the very first written testimonies of early Christianity. When Paul wrote 1 Thessalonians in AD 50, Our Lord Jesus Christ had "accomplished his exodus in Jerusalem" (see Luke 9:31) not twenty years before. Here we find the paradosis of the (...) Mystery of Christ among the Gentiles, the first articulations of Trinitarian faith (see 1 Thess 1:2-5), expressions of longing for the coming Parousia of Christ, warnings of a strange lawlessness already at work ripening towards a great apostasy and the coming of the "man of lawlessness."Douglas Farrow has pondered 1 and 2 Thessalonians for many years, attested by his numerous expositions and essays over three decades. He brings to his task a ready command of Greek, Hebrew, and Latin, and a vast reading of historical commentary and controversy, an intense personal and ecclesial faith, and a sense of historical, prophetic, and pastoral urgency.Throughout the book are excurses on themes opened up by the words and phrases of St Paul's text: Satan (82-86); the sexual body and virtue in sex, divorce, and remarriage (95-114); the remedial pains of purgatory (beginning in this life); the reality of final retribution, the finality of hell; the untenability of so-called "universalism" (131-41,178-84,192-96); the imminency and the delay of the Parousia (199-204); the apostasy / man of lawlessness / Antichrist; the temple in which the Antichrist seats himself (205-42); the mystery of lawlessness at work, especially in undermining the Church (245-61).In studying Paul's eschatological themes, Farrow necessarily ponders other scriptural texts leading in the same direction: Dani 7-12; Jesus's Olivet Discourse in its most extensive form at Matt 24:1-25:46 (though it really begins at 23:23); 2 Pet 2:1-5, 3:3-15; much of the Rev 6:1 through 19:21; [End Page 398] Deut 32:1-43 (Farrow says the Song of Moses encapsulates the whole of human history); Psalms 97 (LXX 96); 110 (LXX 109); Wis 4-5, 10-19; Sirach 50; Joel; Zech 8-14; Mai 3-4; 2 Mace 5-9; Isa 66:5,14-16; and so on. Farrow holds that Paul worked from knowledge of Jesus's apocalyptic teachings in aversion closest to Matthew's (138,142,184, 189, 205).Farrow takes companions in his exegesis: Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Cyril of Jerusalem, John Chrysostom, Augustine, Haimo, Anselm, Aquinas, and others. He knows Luther's hermeneutics and Calvinist disputes about supra- and infra-sessionism and double predestinationism. He consults more recent prophets, quoting at length from Newman's amazingly prescient 1838 discourses on the last times, Solovyovin 1899, and Fulton Sheen in 1948 and 1958. Another exegete is an artist: Luca Signorelli, whose Disputation of the Antichrist in Orvieto Cathedral Farrow refers to several times.Farrow shows his affinity with Irenaeus. That means cleaving to the visible and invisible truths of the Incarnation of God the Word, respecting concrete and embodied realities, keeping in view the transcendent goal ("The glory of God is a living man—and the life of man is in the vision of God"), instinctively flinching at gnosticizing tendencies—sophisticated re-interpretations of Scripture that elide the rule of faith and dissolve truth. It means a ruling sense of the Kingdom of God as an intervention from heaven rather than generating from man or from the earth. It means a spirit of obedience to the commandments, to the paradosis that descends to us from above in Christ, effected by the Spirit in the ecclesia, the company of brethren destined to "gather to Christ" at his coming (1 Thess 2:1), who practice that final gathering to Christ by participating in the Eucharist on the "Eighth Day," the Lord's Day.Farrow deplores the patchy reading of 1 and 2 Thessalonians in the lectionaries: "While 1 Thessalonians fares a little better, barely half of 2 Thessalonians is read in the Churches" (11). Missing is the eschatologically pivotal 2 Thess 2:3-15, where Paul, distinguishing... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bringing Cancer Care to Those who Don't Have ItLawrence N. ShulmanI have been treating cancer patients in the Harvard Medical School hospitals since 1977, and in those 35 years we have made tremendous progress. Though work still needs to be done, and far too many patients still die of cancer, many are cured. In particular, children and young adults have a high rate of cure from such diseases as (...) Hodgkin's lymphoma, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, acute lymphoblastic leukemia, and childhood sarcoma. Patients with breast cancer in the US have a greater than 80% chance for long-term survival. The death rate from cervical cancer in the US is very low. These results have been achieved by making diagnoses earlier, in many cases surgical excision, and often systemic therapies such as chemotherapy, hormonal therapy, radiation therapy, and more recently by using so-called "targeted" therapies—those directed at particular molecular characteristics of the cancer cells.Princess Dina Mired has said that the opportunity to survive cancer should not be an accident of geography. In cases where we already have effective and inexpensive tools to cure cancer, these treatments should be considered a basic human right, a life-saving medical service.I met Patty, a young woman living in the U.S. during November of her senior year in high school, after she discovered a small lump above her left collar bone. Though she felt entirely well, she called her primary care doctor who saw her the next day, felt the enlarged lymph node, and referred her to a surgeon, who did a biopsy later that week. Her primary care doctor also called me, and we scheduled a visit when the pathology results were available. The following week the pathologist notified Patty's pediatrician that the biopsy showed Hodgkin's lymphoma. When I met Patty, she was a bright and focused young woman, waiting to hear about her college applications and enjoying her senior year. Her cancer diagnosis was completely out of context with her life as she planned it, but with the support of her family and boyfriend, she seemed prepared to take things one step at a time. A PET CT scan demonstrated a modest mass in the mediastinum (chest), but no other disease. She was in an early stage of the disease with an excellent prognosis. We recommended and administered six months of chemotherapy with doxorubicin, bleomycin, vinblastine, and dacarbazine—four chemotherapy agents that are off-patent, and relatively inexpensive. She lost her hair, not a trivial issue for her, but otherwise felt reasonably well during the treatment. She was determined to graduate with her classmates, and was able continue to attend school and keep up with her work. In June, seven months into her cancer diagnosis and treatment, she graduated with honors, and was on track to enroll in college in September.Like other 18-year-old women with Hodgkin's lymphoma, Patty had an over 80% chance for cure with the potential for a long and productive life ahead of her because we could perform a biopsy, make a diagnosis, and safely and effectively treat her with four inexpensive, off-patent, chemotherapy drugs. She had nearly the same likelihood of living a long and fruitful life as her classmates, and had the same chances for childbearing. In my line of work, with the knowledge we now possess, to allow someone like Patty to die without a chance of curative care is simply unacceptable. Treatment of curable cancers should be considered on par with the right to clean water, adequate nutrition, treatment for infectious disease, and access to maternal and child healthcare services.But in many places in the world, people with cancers we could easily eradicate in Boston have no access to cancer services, and do die unnecessarily. The local healthcare infrastructure has no [End Page E10] capacity to evaluate a patient, perform or process a biopsy, make a diagnosis, or treat the patient with potentially curative surgery, chemotherapy and radiation. I have rounded on the wards of hospitals in developing countries, stopping to talk with numerous patients like Patty: young women, some of whom might have had Hodgkin's lymphoma, but no... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:418 Feminist Studies 43, no. 2. © 2017 by the estate of tatiana de la tierra. Ode to Unsavory Lesbians i love an ugly lesbian one who walks with a limp talks with a lisp leaves her dentures out overnight by the bathroom sink wears polyester pants and men’s cologne, the cheap kind has a beard so long she steps on it sprouts warts on her toes, all twelve (...) of them carries a spittoon in her breast pocket chortles at church people i dream of a lesbian who’s always broke she doesn’t own a car, walks streets barefoot, near and far washes all her clothes by hand steals from walmart scams the business-suited man lights matches on her wooden leg barbeques freshly plucked birds on her shopping cart seasons them with salt, that’s all licks her fingers in the moonlight i crave a lesbian who’s fat and fleshy so big she can’t fit through the door at starbucks and they set up an outdoor café just for her so fat she wears bangles on her fingers her belly is a boom box her stretch marks are hieroglyphic etchings she’s so heavy, tectonic plates shift beneath her feet so huge, lake erie is her bathtub tatiana de la tierra tatiana de la tierra   419 i lust after an unsavory lesbian she blows away my lackluster day leads me in a lambada, lights lantern between my legs lays my head down on lace pillows humps me like a lamppost lacerates me with leather lust lacquers my body with blue latex paint logs the forest for prime wood builds me lakeside throne sets me there and worships me —goddess in blue— lines my path with lady slippers ravishes me with sex words pets me like a little lamb wins me by a landslide To My Kidneys i had no inkling of your existence those summers when i swam in waters at the turkey point nuclear power plant a mile from home was proud of the organic salad tomatoes and the steaming peppermint tea that came from backyard garden a block from the rex chemicals plant life at 29822 SW 147th avenue in leisure city was anything but leisurely 420 tatiana de la tierra it was all screaming and fighting and cursing hijueputa this and hijueputa that poverty pissed me off i drank too much high fructose corn syrup not enough purified water snorted cocaine smoked dope lived all toughed out while you worked silently on my behalf filtering purifying regulating i was an angry girl but i blew up no buildings killed no one i was all hot air exploding inside letting carnage settle harden at twenty-nine something was wrong the damage was done your tubules were atrophying glomeruli were dead and dying you were inflamed and irate i had twenty-four grams of protein in the urine all swollen and freakishly feverish pouring my fluids into vials and beakers tried to recollect every sun burn those little red dots on my childhood skin tatiana de la tierra   421 i was a medical mystery for months until the day doctors made a diagnosis: lupus-mediated membranous glomerulonephritis now, eighteen years later you’re all i’ve got my future is in the capillaries of your glomeruli i’ve taken pills done prayers of all kinds even injected myself with german baby’s umbilical cord to keep you going yet you falter healers put the blame on all kinds of things deep-seated fears petrochemicals lead cadmium karma white flour self-hatred seriousness we’re in this together, you and i let’s go get sunshine drink green tea grow tall and strong wade in waters up to our knees like the cypress in the florida swamps gracing riverbanks and wetlands roots filtering flowing waters branches stretching to the skies with their durable and eternal woods 422 tatiana de la tierra Topanga Canyon i had forgotten trees how they claim earth and sky a herd of elephants standing in place reaching up with their trunks carrying torches of green leaves that breathe after death crushed at my feet trees splayed out like spent lovers legs open... (shrink)

The following text explores how neoliberalism is deeply rooted in problems related to bodies, showing that, instead of promoting the freedom it proclaims, its dynamics perpetuate rules that keep bodies in a state of abjection. In this context, contemporary thought in this area establishes a relevant dialogue with the philosophy of Michel Foucault and Wendy Brown. Therefore, this article analyzes the impact of right-wing discourse in the contemporary context, highlighting how it shapes taboos, censorship, and a "moral panic" associated with (...) the myth of "gender ideology." These discourses promote fear of an alleged breakdown of values. The far-right uses morality as a tool to justify authoritarian neoliberal policies that benefit economic elites while attacking egalitarian rights. The fusion of neoliberalism with local cultures allows for the preservation of patriarchal and conservative structures. Neoliberalism, by prioritizing fiscal austerity, promotes the dismantling of the welfare state and strengthens the penal state, intensifying repression against those living on the margins of society. In this way, necropolitics reinforces this context, justifying state violence in the name of order. Racism, in turn, adapts to new capitalist dynamics, perpetuating the exploitation and control of Black bodies, emphasizing their instrumentalization in the productive process. Finally, this article examines, from a Foucauldian perspective, how the police function as an instrument of the state to discipline marginalized bodies and reaffirm social inequalities. It critiques the notions of racial democracy and meritocracy, which mask inequalities by suggesting that individual effort is sufficient to overcome racial barriers. In practice, however, these concepts only serve to perpetuate exclusion, reinforcing the subordinate position of Black people in society. The media actively contribute to this narrative by portraying Black individuals in a stereotypical manner and limiting their social representation. (shrink)

Recently much attention has been paid to the concept of expression in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and its role in his theories of language, art, history, and truth. However, most authors have considered expression only as a mode of language. This paper attempts to show that a full understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of expression, and in particular the problem of how new meanings can be created out of existing language, is possible only by considering the role of emotional gesture in expression. It (...) does so by interpreting Merleau-Ponty’s writings on emotion and expression through a phenomenology of a particular emotion, specifically joy. (shrink)

A cooperação equitativa é um conceito central da filosofia de John Rawls e possui uma estreita relação com as noções de racionalidade, razoabilidade e tolerância. Portanto, faz-se necessário ressaltar que tais temas são fundamentais para uma adequada compreensão da teoria rawlsiana de justiça. Rawls elege a justiça como virtude primária e princípio norteador na construção da sua teoria. Em virtude disso, a preocupação de Rawls é a resolução das desigualdades sociais que ocorrem nos sistemas políticos democráticos. A noção de justiça (...) como equidade faz-se indispensável frente à necessidade de eleger a liberdade enquanto preocupação com o justo equilíbrio e ao “consenso nas sociedades plurais”. É a partir da concepção de cooperação equitativa que Rawls tenta resolver o impasse contemporâneo da convivência de diferentes doutrinas abrangentes razoáveis sejam elas, religiosas, filosóficas ou morais. Dessa forma, a teoria rawlsiana de justiça tem como proposta a “coexistência pacifica” ante essa pluralidade de doutrinas compreensivas. Assim posto, a justiça como equidade, pode plausivelmente, ser a forma mais viável de coexistência pacífica que agrupamentos sociais poderiam seguir ou se pautar. Sob essa ótica, acredita-se que a noção de cooperação equitativa rawlsiana será uma via de justiça que enfatiza os direitos individuais sem desmerecer aquilo que é próprio do coletivo. Abstrac t: Fair cooperation is a central concept of J. Rawls´s philosophy and keeps a close relationship with the the notions of rationality, reasonability, and tolerance. Thus it is important to claim that these notions are necessary for a correct comprehension of rawlsian theory of justice. Rawls claims justice as the primary virtue and main principle of his theory. The aim of Rawls is to solve the social inequalities that occur in democratic political systems. The concept of justice as fairness is essential before the need of electing the liberty as concerning to the just balance and to the “consensus in the plural societies”. By starting from the conception of fair cooperation Rawls tries to solve the contemporary problem of different comprehensive doctrines sharing the same political and social space, no matter they are religious, philosophical or moral ones. The rawlsian theory of justice claims to propose as “pacific cohabitation” among that plurality of comprehensive doctrines. In this way, justice as fairness may plausibility be the most viable form of pacific cohabitation that social groups can follow or be ruled. Under this perspective, we believe that the rawlsian concept of fair cooperation will be a way of justice that focus on individual rights without deprive the significance of collective. Keywords : Rawls, fair cooperation, original position, rationality, reasonability. (shrink)

This dissertation is a phenomenology of emotion, situated within the school of the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. As such, it is concerned not only with the philosophy of emotion, but also with continuing the project commenced by Merleau-Ponty, the articulation of our primary and mute bodily contact with the world. ;Of the three chapters, the first introduces the theoretical background, describes the methodology used, and examines the existing phenomenological work on emotion. The remaining chapters present the phenomenological research and the (...) theoretical conclusions drawn from it. Chapter two introduces a psychotherapeutic technique called "Focusing" and shows that it can be a useful "tool" to aid us in doing phenomenology. This chapter is concerned largely with attempting to understand the body's role in constructing an emotional situation and applies Merleau-Ponty's concept of habit to emotion. Chapter three is devoted to the phenomenological analyses of four emotions: anger, fear, sadness and happiness. Here both Focusing and emotionally valent artworks are employed as aids in framing the emotions for phenomenological analysis. ;On the basis of this research, the dissertation concludes that emotions are best understood as organizational structures that inform our movement, perception, and thought. These structures consist in the adopting of a certain whole-bodily attitude to a situation, which organizes it in terms of a meaning specific to the emotion itself, such as "threat" or "betrayal." This meaning is not a cognitive or conceptual meaning, however, and need not be present in consciousness in any clear or articulate way. Rather, it consists in a certain "style" informing our gestures and the way we perceive and think of the situation. Emotions are centred in the affective region of the body and possess its "logic," which consists in a global sense of "how we are doing" with respect to our interests and values. Emotions are distinguished by a mobilization of the body as a whole, and a pressing toward action of a form very loosely specified by the emotion itself. (shrink)

Though codes of ethics exist in many businesses, employees still view less than truthful behaviors to be a significant ethical problem. The current study examines the related and somewhat counterintuitive issue of less than truthful behaviors intended to further organizational priorities. Such behaviors risk violating one organizational priority (e. g., adhering to a code of ethics) to achieve another. Data indicated four unique though non-mutually exclusive motivations: (1) to avoid confrontation or conflict; (2) to ensure quality in the delivery of (...) a product or service; (3) to buy time for an organization's strategy to play out; and (4) for self-protection or self-enhancement. The evidence further suggests that enhanced managerial training, particularly in handling confrontation and conflicts, could reduce the contradiction between stated codes of ethics and actual behaviors. (shrink)

Nietzsche's critical stance toward morality appears to support some version of moral relativism. Yet he praises some actions and attributes while condemning others. Are these evaluations expressions of his moral prejudices, or is there a basis for them in his thought? Through a close reading of key passages from ThusSpokeZarathustra, I attempt to demonstrate that morality for Nietzsche is the historically situated working-out of will to power and therefore subject to critique on that basis.