This paper considers the justifiability of removing the right to vote from those convicted of crimes. Firstly, I consider the claim that the removal of the right to vote from prisoners is necessary as a practical matter to protect the democratic process from those who have shown themselves to be untrustworthy. Secondly, I look at the claim that offenders have broken the social contract and forfeited rights to participate in making law. And thirdly, I look at the claim that the (...) voting ban is essential part of the justified punishment of serious offenders. These arguments have in common the feature that they attempt to articulate the sense in which rights imply responsibilities, particularly that voting rights should be conditional on one’s having met one’s civic responsibilities. I argue that the only interpretation of this view that could justify prisoner disenfranchisement is that which thinks of disenfranchisement as fair and deserved retributive punishment for crime. Against widespread opposition to, and confusion about, the importance of retributive punishment, I offer a brief defence. However, I conclude that even if legitimate retributive purposes could in principle justify prisoner disenfranchisement, the significance of disenfranchisement is such that it should be reserved for the most serious crimes. (shrink)

This article discusses the removal of voting rights from those convicted of crimes. I focus on two recent defences of penal disenfranchisement: firstly, I question one justification of the view that voting rights are conditional on the fulfilment of certain responsibilities that offenders fail to meet. Secondly, I criticise an expressivist justification of disenfranchisement based on the idea that it is uniquely suited to express dissociation from serious wrongdoing. While embracing the expressivist perspective of the latter line (...) of argument, I argue that disenfranchisement also expresses attitudes that are incompatible with the commitment to equality. Disenfranchisement conveys the judgment that offenders are not fit to participate in the democratic process. In doing so, it violates the duty of the state to treat all its citizens with equal respect and undermines offenders’ equal status. Moreover, this policy fosters objectionable inequalities of esteem: other members of the community are very likely to internalise the judgment that offenders are second‐class citizens and to regard them as inferior, which in turn undermines their status in society. (shrink)

This paper questions the notion that states may be justified in denying certain prisoners the right to vote as a means of distancing themselves from particularly grave wrongs. Christopher Bennett has recently defended prisoner disenfranchisement as a fair and deserved retributive punishment for crimes, and Mary Sigler and Andrew Altman have argued in favor of prisoner disenfranchisement as a civil restriction. All three proponents agree that disenfranchisement should be reserved for those guilty of the most serious offenses. (...) I assert that it is inappropriate to treat citizens in this manner and will advocate for the right to vote, whether disenfranchisement is perceived as a form of punishment or as a civil measure. I will present two arguments against disenfranchisement as it impacts both citizens and political community at large. First, it excludes citizens from the democratic arena and restricts the opportunity to reintegrate offenders into the political community. While a criminal sentence is intended to be burdensome, the burden associated with disenfranchisement extends beyond the appropriate penal scope. (shrink)

In the United States, convicted offenders frequently lose the right to vote, at least temporarily. Drawing on the common observation that citizens of color lose democratic rights at disproportionately high rates, this chapter argues that this punishment is problematic in non-ideal societies because of the way in which it diminishes the political power of marginalized groups and threatens to reproduce patterns of domination and subordination, when they occur. This chapter then uses the case of penal disenfranchisement to illustrate (...) how idealized discussions of deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution often ignore the relationship between punishment and social/political power, and thus systematically obscure morally significant aspects of our broader penal practices. (shrink)

I shall argue that advocates of denunciatory forms of expressivism can make a good case for restricting the range of measures that can be an appropriate form of punishment. They can do so by focusing not on the conditions of uptake of the message conveyed by punishment, but by the content of that message. For it is plausible that part of that message should be that the offender is a responsible agent and a member of the political community. Forms of (...) punishment which do not treat the offender as such are, for that reason unacceptable. Among the forms of punishment which are thereby ruled out are the extended use of solitary confinement, since this undermines the capacity for moral agency – and permanent felon disenfranchisement. -/- I also address two objections to this line of argument. One focuses on penal practices involving those who are not members of the political community: resident aliens and minors. These two cases raise different issues, but they both appear to show that justifiable punishment does not need to communicate a message which has components affirming agency and membership of a political community. I argue that in both cases the justifiability of punishment piggy-backs on the kind of justification available in the standard case. A second objection suggests that the offender has excluded themselves from the political community, and that measures that recognize this are therefore acceptable: I argue that very few offences, if any, have this character. ---. (shrink)

This article based on a recent European study examines the subjective consequences of abuse against older women and their help seeking behavior. In 2010, survey data concerning experiences of abuse in domestic settings were collected from 2,880 older women across five European countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Lithuania, and Portugal). The results of the study indicated that overall 30.1% of older women reported at least one experience of abuse in the past year. Less than half of the victims talked about it (...) in the informal setting or reported it to any formal agency. An ecological framework is used to explain factors influencing women’s decisions to seek help. Some consequences of abuse (anger, tension, sleeping difficulties, and concentration difficulties), type of abuse (physical abuse and violation of personal rights), higher abuse intensity, and density are connected with positive help seeking behaviours. Victims abused by current partners or a spouse were more passive to seek help. (shrink)

Political theorists have long criticized policies that deny voting rights to convicted felons. However, some have recently turned to democratic theory to defend this practice, arguing that democratic self-determination justifies, or even requires, disenfranchising felons. I review these new arguments, acknowledge their force against existing criticism, and then offer a new critique of disenfranchisement that engages them on their own terms. Using democratic theory’s “all-subjected principle,” I argue that liberal democracies undermine their own legitimacy when they deny the vote (...) to felons and prisoners. I then show how this argument overcomes obstacles that cause problems for other critiques of disenfranchisement. (shrink)

This paper discusses an argument in defense of felon disenfranchisement originally proposed by Andrew Altman, which states that as a matter of democratic self-determination, members of a legitimate democratic community have a collective right to decide whether to disenfranchise felons. Although this argument—which is here referred to as the argument from democratic self-determination—is held to justify policies that are significantly broader in scope than many critics of existing disenfranchisement practices would allow for, it has received little attention from (...) philosophers and political theorists. One exception is Claudio López-Guerra, who recently raised several objections to the argument. In this paper, I argue that the argument from democratic self-determination can avoid López-Guerra’s objections. In responding to these, I explicate how and when it can be permissible for a legitimate democratic community to disenfranchise felons. I propose that this is the case only if the disenfranchisement of felons is not intended as a punishment, but as a way to express the view about citizenship one endorses as a democratic collective. I also discuss the implications of the argument in terms of offender reintegration. (shrink)

Standard accounts of democratic disenfranchisement either start from a presumption of universal inclusion and justify electoral exclusions as deviations from the norm, or attempt to draw a demarcation line between justifiable inclusion and exclusion relying on membership in the political community. Even when successfully employed, each strategy only provides a partial view of disenfranchisement, which is usually targeted at just one or two groups of agents. In this article, I develop a generally applicable account of disenfranchisement, grounded (...) in a respect-based understanding of the relational value of democracy. This account simultaneously provides the normative basis for widespread enfranchisement under equal terms and for justified electoral exclusions. (shrink)

In 1984, Arthur C. Danto wrote two essays, both with enormously provocative themes. One, “The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art,” chronicles aggressive strategies of philosophy to contain and control art, and calls for art's re‐enfranchisement. The second, “The End of Art,” offers a Hegelian model of art history in which art necessarily comes to an end with its own philosophical self‐consciousness. This chapter argues that “The End of Art” is an astonishing confirmation of Danto's thesis in “The Philosophical Disenfranchisement (...) of Art.” Plato's definition of art as mere appearance, then, is less a theory of art than it is a strategy for showing art to be metaphysically defective. Each artistic movement generated a theory of art as it explored art's nature in greater and greater depth. Danto's characterization of philosophy includes an assumption that only the elements form the appropriate methodology for the task of self‐understanding. (shrink)

Disagreement persists about when, if at all, disenfranchisement is a fitting response to criminal wrongdoing of type X. Positive retributivists endorse a permissive view of fittingness: on this view, disenfranchising a remarkably wide range of morally serious criminal wrongdoers is justified. But defining fittingness in the context of criminal disenfranchisement in such broad terms is implausible, since many crimes sanctioned via disenfranchisement have little to do with democratic participation in the first place: the link between the nature (...) of a criminal act X (the ‘desert basis’) and a fitting sanction Y is insufficiently direct in such cases. I define a new, much narrower account of the kind of criminal wrongdoing which is a more plausible desert basis for disenfranchisement: ‘political wrongdoing’, such as electioneering, corruption, or conspiracy with foreign powers. I conclude that widespread blanket and post-incarceration disenfranchisement policies are overinclusive, because they disenfranchise persons guilty of serious, but non-political, criminal wrongdoing. While such overinclusiveness is objectionable in any context, it is particularly objectionable in circumstances in which it has additional large-scale collateral consequences, for instance by perpetuating existing structures of racial injustice. At the same time, current policies are underinclusive, thus hindering the aim of holding political wrongdoers accountable. (shrink)

After discussing the interests that ground theright to democratic political participation,arguments for the disenfranchisement of thosewho commit serious criminal offenses areexamined. The arguments are divided into twogroups. The first group consists of argumentsthat are relatively independent of thejustifying aims of punishment. It is concededthat two of these arguments establish thatsome, though by no means all, serious offendersshould lose the vote for a period of time thatdoes not necessarily overlap with the durationof the other sanctions visited upon them. Thesearguments also (...) imply that the state isjustified in attempting to exclude theoffenders in question from all forms ofpolitical participation, a position thatarguably runs afoul of moral limits onpunishment. The second group of arguments makesexplicit reference to the justifying aims ofpunishment. None supports the blanketdisenfranchisement of felons, though some mayjustify it in relation to some seriousoffenders for certain periods of time. All ofthe arguments supporting the disenfranchisementof serious offenders are most persuasive on theassumption that they live in reasonably justsocieties that are genuinely democratic. Ifthat assumption is false or questionable, thenit is argued that the force of such argumentsmay be weakened considerably. (shrink)

Penal substitution in a theological context is the doctrine that God inflicted upon Christ the suffering which we deserved as the punishment for our sins, as a result of which we no longer deserve punishment. Ever since the time of Faustus Socinus, the doctrine has faced formidable, and some would say insuperable, philosophical challenges. Critics of penal substitution frequently assert that God’s punishing Christ in our place would be an injustice on God’s part. For it is an axiom (...) of retributive justice that it is unjust to punish an innocent person. But Christ was an innocent person. Since God is perfectly just, He cannot therefore have punished Christ. Virtually every premiss in this argument is challengeable. Not all penal substitution theories affirm that Christ was punished for our sins. The argument makes unwarranted assumptions about the ontological foundations of moral duty independent of God’s commands. It presupposes without warrant that God is by nature an unqualified negative retributivist. It overlooks the possibility that the prima facie demands of negative retributive justice might be overridden in Christ’s case by weightier moral considerations. And it takes it for granted that Christ was legally innocent, which is denied by the classic doctrine of imputation. It thus fails to show any injustice in God’s punishing Christ in our place. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a solution to the Capacity/Equality Puzzle. The puzzle holds that an account of the franchise may adequately capture at most two of the following: (1) a political equality-based account of the franchise, (2) a capacity-based account of disenfranchising children, and (3) universal adult enfranchisement. To resolve the puzzle, I provide a complex liberal egalitarian justification of a moral requirement to disenfranchise children. I show that disenfranchising children is permitted by both the proper political liberal and (...) the proper political egalitarian understandings of the relationship between cognitive capacity and the franchise. Further, I argue, disenfranchising children is required by a minimalistic, procedural principle of collective competence in political decision-making. At the same time, I show that political equality requires the enfranchisement of all adults, regardless of cognitive capacities, and that the collective competence principle does not ground adult disenfranchisement. This justifies the progressive legal trend that holds the capacity-based disenfranchisement of adults to be incompatible with liberal democratic principles. (shrink)

After discussing the interests that ground the right to democratic political participation, arguments for the disenfranchisement of those who commit serious criminal offenses are examined. The arguments are divided into two groups. The first group consists of arguments that are relatively independent of the justifying aims of punishment. It is conceded that two of these arguments establish that some, though by no means all, serious offenders should lose the vote for a period of time that does not necessarily overlap (...) with the duration of the other sanctions visited upon them. These arguments also imply that the state is justified in attempting to exclude the offenders in question from all forms of political participation, a position that arguably runs afoul of moral limits on punishment. The second group of arguments makes explicit reference to the justifying aims of punishment. None supports the blanket disenfranchisement of felons, though some may justify it in relation to some serious offenders for certain periods of time. All of the arguments supporting the disenfranchisement of serious offenders are most persuasive on the assumption that they live in reasonably just societies that are genuinely democratic. If that assumption is false or questionable, then it is argued that the force of such arguments may be weakened considerably. (shrink)

Beginning with the current discontent felt by prominent aesthetic theorists over the marginalization of their field within philosophy, this paper seeks to find an explanation for the discipline's apparent neglect. A meta-aesthetic examination of approaches to the study of art and of concurrent historical trends in the art world itself reveals that a methodological emphasis on the ontology of art objects and the conditions for their perception has created a gulf between art and human life that renders it unimportant to (...) central philosophical concerns. The disenfranchisement of the field, I argue, is thus due to factors internal to the discipline itself. (shrink)

The penal substitution account of the Atonement fails for conceptual reasons: punishment is expressive action, condemning the party punished, and so is not transferable from a guilty to an innocent party. But there is a relative to the penal substitution view, the vicarious punishment account, that is neither conceptually nor morally objectionable. On this view, the guilty person’s punishment consists in the suffering of an innocent to whom he or she bears a special relationship. Sinful humanity is punished (...) through the inglorious death of Jesus Christ; ill-desert is thus requited, and an obstacle to unity with God is overcome. (shrink)

This article advances a censure-based case against sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Our argument justifies a retributive “second look” assessment of long-term prison sentences. The article focuses on the censuring element of long-term prison sentences while reconceptualizing penal censure as a dynamic and responsive concept. By doing so, the article explores the significance of the prisoner’s life after sentencing (largely ignored by retributivists) and promotes a more nuanced approach to censure-based proportionality. Policy-makers may welcome this (...) approach as a way to control excessive prison sentences while remaining within a retributive penal framework. Although we are making a general argument about the need for responsive censure within a retributive sentencing regime, the case for this approach is particularly compelling at the present time. Almost all Western nations, and particularly the US, impose very lengthy, often life sentences of imprisonment for a wide range of offences, thereby affecting large numbers of prisoners. (shrink)

The denial of voting rights to certain types of persons continues to be a moral problem of practical significance. The disenfranchisement of persons with mental impairments, minors, noncitizen residents, nonresident citizens, and criminal offenders is a matter of controversy. This book makes a contribution to this largely neglected yet key topic.

El actual Derecho Penal de la seguridad que se expresa en el populismo punitivo tiene un sesgo orientado a la persecución penal de los delitos callejeros, violentos, mientras que los delitos del poder y los negocios discurre con mayor tolerancia de la sociedad y de los operadores jurídicos, porque se realizan en contextos normalizados. Para sustentar esta tesis, se analiza qué entiende mayoritariamente la sociedad por delincuencia grave, la visibilidad de los delitos y las estadísticas criminales, principalmente. Este (...) análisis nos lleva a la consideración de que la percepción del daño social, el miedo a ser víctimas de delitos, la tolerancia social hacia determinados comportamientos, los medios de comunicación que construyen estereotipos, la visibilidad que se muestra en las estadísticas, todo ello conjugado, da lugar a una construcción social del contenido material de delincuencia grave de manera selectiva, orientado hacia los delitos contra las personas, dejando fuera de foco los delitos socioeconómicos. (shrink)

This article begins with the assumption that criminal disenfranchisement is at least sometimes theoretically defensible, as a component of punishment. From this assumption, I argue that it is only legitimate in a constrained set of cases. These constraints include: implementing disenfranchisement only for serious crimes; tying disenfranchisement to both the electoral cycle and to the length of imprisonment imposed for an offence; and assessing a background condition of sufficient justice present within the state that wishes to disenfranchise. (...) Once these constraints are considered, I argue that there are very few instances in which disenfranchisement is defensible. To prove this, I examine both current disenfranchisement practices and the commonly present factors that undermine the constraints outlined above. (shrink)

The exploration of penal censure in this book is inspired by the fortieth anniversary in 2016 of the publication of Andreas von Hirsch's Doing Justice, which opened up a fresh set of issues in theorisation about punishment that eventually led von Hirsch to ground his proposed model of desert-based sentencing on the notion of penal censure. Von Hirsch's work thus provides an obvious starting-point for an exploration of the importance of censure for the justification of punishment, both within (...) von Hirsch's theory of just deserts and from the perspectives of other theoretical approaches. It also provides an opportunity for engaging with censure more broadly from philosophical, sociological-anthropological and individual-psychological perspectives. The essays in this collection map the conceptual territory of censure from these different perspectives, address issues for desert theory that arise from fuller understandings of censure, and consider afresh the role of censure within the jurisprudence of punishment. They show that analyses of censure from different vantage points can significantly enrich punishment theory, not least by providing a conceptual basis for perceiving common ground between and thus connecting different strands of penal theory. (shrink)

Felony disenfranchisement is best understood as a means of vote suppression. Quite apart from its significance as a form of criminal stigma, disenfranchisement is most properly characterized as one of the ways in which the American voting system reserves political participation for a privileged social and intellectual class. Thus understood, felony disenfranchisement reveals the theoretical underpinnings of an exclusionary version of American democracy in which more or less widespread disenfranchisement is an acceptable or necessary political tactic. (...) Felony disenfranchisement should not be characterized as a sanction for criminal conduct: It fits none of the usual justifications for punishment. Most commentators agree that felony disenfranchisement as a collateral sanction for criminal conduct stigmatizes alike a disparate collection of individuals convicted of crimes carrying a penalty of one year or more - everything from drug possession to murder - and extends, in many instances, long after former felons have completed their sentences. Justifications for refusing the vote to felons, and to former felons who are no longer incarcerated, are surprisingly weak and clearly related to larger issues of democratic participation. Accordingly, it is under the framework of democratic participation that the most persuasive justifications of disenfranchisement might be found. Under the framework of democratic participation, the disenfranchisement debate implicates competing theories of democracy, each of which has profound consequences for the constitution of the American polity. I contend that there are currently three models for the right to vote in American society: (1) a membership model premised upon popular participation in the democratic process as an expression of citizenship; (2) a deliberative model in which popular participation is conditioned upon the duty to be an informed and reflective citizen; and (3) an elite model entrenching political office in a political class that competes for votes among the electoral masses. The continuing vitality of these three models at the level of political debate and constitutional doctrine unsettles the dominant history of the franchise as one of progress from an exclusionary to an inclusionary extension of the mandate, and requires us to acknowledge felony disenfranchisement as part of a larger process of voter exclusion and suppression. (shrink)

SECCIÓN PRIMERAMétodo, Historia, FundamentosCAPÍTULO I. Un ejemplo literario de Derecho penal del enemigoI. El capítulo cervantino de los galeotes como fundamento epistemológicodel Derecho penal del enemigoII. Las enseñanzas penales del pasaje cervantino.

The contributions of the Anthropology could be significant for the Penal Law as long as some epistemological criteria could be settled down. Today we lack of these criteria or are simple outlined. This article tries to outline some of these epistemological axes that would allow a better use of th..

Tem-se como temática central a atuação do poder judiciário no Brasil, em especial, do Supremo Tribunal Federal em relação ao fenômeno da judicialização da política. Por meio do estudo de processo judicial, a Ação Penal 937 no Supremo Tribunal Federal, procura-se constatar o movimento ativista de juízes que ganha forçano Brasil e no mundo, desde o fim da segunda guerra mundial. Tal prática, que se justifica na efetivação de direitos humanos e utiliza a retórica neoconstitucionalista, fere a separação de (...) poderes e ganha contornos evidentemente políticos. (shrink)

“What characterizes the act of justice is not resort to a court and to judges; it is not the intervention of magistrates. What characterizes the juridical act, the process or the procedure in the broad sense, is the regulated development of a dispute. And the intervention of judges, their opinion or decision, is only ever an episode in this development. What defines the juridical order is the way in which one confronts one another, the way in which one struggles. The (...) rule and the struggle, the rule in the struggle, this is the juridical.” - Michel Foucault Penal Theories and Institutions is the title Michel Foucault gave to the lectures he delivered at the Collège de France from November 1971 to March 1972. In these lectures Michel Foucault presents for the first time his approach to the question of power that will be the focus of his research up to the writing of Discipline and Punish and beyond. His analysis starts with a detailed account of Richelieu’s repression of the Nu-pieds revolt and then goes on to show how the apparatus of power developed by the monarchy on this occasion breaks with the system of juridical and judicial institutions of the Middle Ages and opens out onto a “judicial State apparatus”, a “repressive system”, whose function is focused on the confinement of those who challenge its order. Michel Foucault systemizes the approach of a history of truth on the basis of the study of “juridico-political matrices” that he had begun in the previous year’s lectures and which is at the heart of the notion of “knowledge-power”. In these lectures Foucault develops his theory of justice and penal law. The appearance of this volume marks the end of the publication of the series Foucault’s courses at the Collège de France. (shrink)

Free online services have become an essential part of onlife experience in the digital society. And yet, such digital gifts can be argued to represent a modern-day Trojan horse. This paper advances the theory that, far from being “free”, the digital gift economy disempowers and disenfranchises users, eroding privacy and promoting inequality. It concludes that what is needed to improve the situation is better taxation and stricter regulation of the advertising industry.

A obra pretende indicar a bipolaridade que constitui o objeto central da abordagem; por um lado, a problematização da funcionalidade do sistema penal e da expansão, sem precedentes, que experimenta na era da globalização; de outro, o problema dos déficits do conceito e da dimensão da cidadania, que experimentam ímpar minimização.

This article addresses the theoretical difficulty of justifying the use of penal coercion in circumstances of marked, unjustified social inequality. The intuitive belief behind the text is that in such a context—that of an indecent State—justifying penal coercion becomes very problematic, particularly when directed against the most disfavored members of society.

Children are among the few social groups that are systematically and universally disenfranchised. Although children are citizens worthy of equal moral treatment and rights, their right to vote is restricted in almost all states, and this is seen as legitimate by most democratic theories. What is particular about childhood that justifies the restriction of their right to vote? How can democratic systems legitimise the exclusion of a section of their citizenry? This article provides a critical analysis of the principles that (...) ground child disenfranchisement, and of the allocative mechanisms proposed for restricting the right to vote. It shows that most arguments in favour of child disenfranchisement are unsatisfactory, as they are inconsistently used to target the child population (but not other groups) or are incompatible with a commitment to equality. Among the principles for child disenfranchisement, only those that appeal to political incompetence may be valid for excluding children. Regarding the allocative method of exclusion, this article shows that age thresholds cannot be justified to restrict franchise, and that, while competence tests fare better in theory, there may be issues of implementation. The article contributes by providing a clear and systematic analysis of the core arguments in favour of child disenfranchisement, and the conditions that must be met to justify such a practice. (shrink)

La médiation pénale fait partie des procédures qui peuvent être proposées comme alternatives aux poursuites. Elle permet aux personnes de se réapproprier la résolution des conflits qui les concernent, en suivant une procédure plus souple et en favorisant à la fois la réparation, la responsabilisation et la resocialisation. L’article vise à analyser le sens et la portée de cette pratique à partir de la théorie pénale républicaine tirée des travaux de Philip Pettit et John Braithwaite. Une telle approche permet de (...) saisir les effets de la médiation sur la domination en lien avec l’infraction ainsi que ses vertus restauratives. Mais elle met également en lumière des formes de soumission et de dépendance qui peuvent altérer le processus de médiation. Si, dans une perspective républicaine, la médiation s’avère plus juste que la répression, elle peut aussi, dans certains cas, reproduire des rapports de domination auxquels l’institution judiciaire doit accorder une vigilance particulière. (shrink)

La reflexión en materia penal ha sido centrada, específicamente, en ciertos discursos considerados “oficiales”, entre los que se consideran los pensamientos ilustrados. Desde ahí arrancan las concepciones modernas acerca del sistema penal europeo, y en gran parte, las legislaciones actuales sobre la materia en el mundo occidental. Sin embargo, no todo el pensamiento penal tiene por canónicas las consideraciones penales ilustradas ni las concepciones clásicas sobre el derecho penal. El presente artículo tiene por finalidad exponer un (...) pensamiento crítico del sistema penal europeo, tanto de sus raíces iluministas, como de su herencia en las sociedades occidentales contemporáneas. Este pensamiento es el del filósofo y psicólogo francés Michel Foucault. Las críticas, interpretaciones y sospechas que el autor arroja, bien pueden ser consideradas en el hoy, sobre todo si pensamos en la resurrección desde la década del 80 y 90 del siglo pasado, de concepciones que hacen resurgir los modelos ilustrados que en el derecho penal se han producido, reconociéndose la escuela del derecho penal mínimo como su máxima tributaria. Esto de algún modo ha incidido a su vez en el pensamiento penal en Chile y su derecho. (shrink)

In this acclaimed work, first published in 1986, world-renowned scholar Arthur C. Danto explored the inextricably linked but often misunderstood relationship between art and philosophy. In light of the book's impact -- especially the essay "The End of Art," which dramatically announced that art ended in the 1960s -- this enhanced edition includes a foreword by Jonathan Gilmore that discusses how scholarship has changed in response to it. Complete with a new bibliography of work on and influenced by Danto's ideas, (...) _The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art_ continues to be of interest to anyone who thinks seriously about art, as well as to philosophers, aestheticians, and art historians. (shrink)

RESUMEN: La agresión terrorista ha supuesto, a nivel nacional y internacional, el problema de la creación de un sistema penal de reacción a tal fenómeno. Sin embargo, la necesidad de una contestación urgente ha tenido como consecuencia una incertidumbre general que lleva en sí misma el riesgo de la negación del Estado de derecho para adoptar la lógica del derecho penal del enemigo. Este escrito -a través el análisis de la teoría de Gunther Jakobs, teórico del derecho (...) class='Hi'>penal del enemigo- describe las repercusiones, parafraseando a Ferrajoli, de una falta de “asimetría entre Estados de derecho y violencia extra legal”. ABSTRACT: The fear of terrorism has created, at national and international level, a criminal law system to react to this phenomenon. The need for a rapid answer to the problem has led to legal uncertainty that carries with it the risk of the negation of the legal state to adopt the logic of the enemy's criminal law. This writing, through the analysis of the theory by Gunther Jakobs, theorist of the enemy's criminal law, describes which are the negative repercussions of a lack of "asymmetry between legal state and extra legal violence” mentioning Luigi Ferrajoli. PALABRAS CLAVE: ciudadano,enemigo,pena,derecho penal,Estado de derecho. KEYWORDS: Citizen, enemy, punishment, criminal law, legal state. (shrink)

In The Culture of Control Garland describes the ‘policy predicament’ of late modern society as involving the normality of high crime rates and the acknowledged limitations of the criminal justice system. This combination has triggered a contradictory range of policy responses that Garland describes as adaptive and non‐adaptive, with the non‐adaptive responses characterised as ‘denial’ and ‘acting out’. Garland’s invocation of these Freudian constructs invites a more fully developed psychoanalytic reading of the contemporary landscape of penal policy. Drawing on (...) the writings of Jung and Freud as well as more recent psychoanalytic interpretations of punishment and punitiveness, we aim in this paper to put the Culture of Control ‘on the couch’. That is, we try to draw out some of the psychoanalytic themes that Garland so tantalisingly dangles before us, and begin to flesh out the implications of a full‐fledged psychoanalytic interpretation of Garland’s argument. (shrink)

La crise sanitaire et sociale provoquée par la Covid-19 a été surmontée par des dispositions qui relèvent autant d’une logique de précaution que de prévention. En effet, la certitude liée à l’existence de ce virus n’a pas suffi à lever toutes les zones d’ombre sur son traitement. Au moins au début de la crise, c’est l’existence même d’un risque qui pouvait être discutée. En conséquence, les dispositions adoptées, sous la menace de sanctions pénales, relèvent en partie d’une logique de précaution (...) dont l’analyse appelle des commentaires mitigés. Il en va a fortiori de même pour l’usage des qualifications de droit commun qui s’avèrent inadaptées. (shrink)

L’article aborde la problématique des actes normatifs de droit pénal adoptés en Pologne dans les années 1944–1956. L’auteur essaie de répondre à la question : comment le régime politique et l’idéologie stalinienne ont-ils influencé la manière de rédiger les textes juridiques de cette branche du droit lors des plus grandes répressions par le pouvoir d’après-guerre en Pologne? À partir de 1944, le droit pénal a été adapté aux besoins des autorités communistes, contrôlées par l’Union soviétique. Dans la période analysée, on (...) a introduit en Pologne plus de cent actes normatifs englobant des dispositions pénales. L’idéologisation du droit pénal est visible dans toutes les parties des actes normatifs : titres, préambules et dispositions juridiques. On retrouve dans leur contenu les valeurs politiques, économiques et sociales fondamentales pour l’idéologie du stalinisme, dont les thèses ont été mises en œuvre en Pologne après la fin de l’occupation allemande. (shrink)

La pregunta que exploro en este trabajo es si la injusticia social puede socavar la autoridad moral de la sociedad para castigar al que delinque. La respuesta a esta pregunta depende esencialmente de cuál sea la teoría justificatoria del castigo penal de la que se parte. Analizo diversas teorías de la pena, entre ellas la teoría consensual de Carlos Nino. Mi objetivo es explorar de qué modo las diferentes teorías de la pena enfrentan el desafío que plantea la pregunta (...) y extraer algunas conclusiones tentativas de ese recorrido. The question I address in this paper is whether social injustice can undermine the moral authority of society to punish criminals. The answer to this question crucially depends on the underlying justificatory theory of punishment. I consider several theories, among them the consensual theory proposed by Carlos Nino. My aim is to explore how different theories of punishment address the challenge and to draw some tentative conclusions. (shrink)

Companies that have joined the United Nations Global Compact are required to submit a Communication on Progress, which is an environmental, social, and governance report, to the UNGC every year. If they fail to do so, they are marked and listed as non-communicating on the UNGC website. Using the event study methodology, this study shows that a company that fails to report to the UNGC is penalized in the financial markets with an average cumulative abnormal return of −1.6% over a (...) period of 5 trading days around the event. Although a major critique against the UNGC is that the initiative’s voluntary nature and its lack of external monitoring and sanction mechanisms render it ineffective in terms of the business participants’ implementation of the UNGC principles into their operations, this result suggests that investors may be able to pressure UNGC business participants to increase their compliance with the UNGC requirements and to “walk the talk.”. (shrink)

Derecho penal parte especial - Libro de estudio.

Les rédacteurs du Code pénal, lorsqu'ils ont décrit l'élément matériel des crimes et des délits, ont pris grand soin de distinguer entre l'omission et la commission punissables, et les juges s'interdisent scrupuleusement de les confondre, même quand elles ont le même résultat dommageable. Pourtant, les personnes investies d'une autorité publique ou privée sont, par la jurisprudence, rendues responsables d'un grand nombre de délits commis sous leur autorité, par le seul motif qu'elles n'ont pas mis tout en oeuvre pour les empêcher. (...) Cet article explique l'origine historique de ce paradoxe. La responsabilité des décideurs était primitivement confinée à la matière des contraventions, conçues comme des violations de règles de police administrative, et sanctionnées de peines faibles précisément dites "de police". Les lois modernes ont peu à peu détruit la spécificité des contraventions et leur lien avec la police administrative. Le mode d'imputation jadis caractéristique des contraventions est passé dans la matière des délits et concerne tous ceux dont l'élément moral est fait d'une intention faiblement caractérisée ou d'une imprudence. (shrink)

If it is the tendency of technology, and especially of information and communication technology, particularly in the context of the smart city, not to empower the human person but rather to disenfranchise them by curtailing their capability to judge and choose, how can one counter this dynamic? Code, make, talk, and pray are suggested as possible modes of resistance.