There are two main approaches to a theory of rationality: the positive one and the negative one. The latter, which has gained increasing acceptance, is primarily concerned with rejecting what is irrational, which usually is equated with what is inconsistent. The positive approach has a quite different purpose, that of studying reasoning and, insofar as possible, enhancing the patterns or standards of our reasoning practice.

La Ley de Extranjería de 2003 ha aumentado las atribuciones y potestades de la administración pública española y las obligaciones de los extranjeros. Colisiona con principios fundamentales de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico-constitucional. Frente a esa línea legislativa, proponemos una reforma sustancial por la que: (1) deje de ser infracción el encontrarse un extranjero en España sin autorización oficial; (2) se haga permanente un proceso de regularización por prescripción adquisitiva de la condición de residente; y (3) se incorporen los valores jurídicos de (...) la hermandad humana, los vínculos históricos, la misericordia, la hospitalidad, la libertad, la amistad y el amor así como los principios de una globalización con rostro humano, gratitud, arraigabilidad e interés nacional. (shrink)

This paper develops several insights put forward in the book Republican Studies. It goes into the difference between republicanism as a concept pertaining to legal theory, i.e. a system free from dynastic power, and the political-philosophy trend which currently goes by the same name, also known as `civicism', hinging upon the notion of freedom as non-domination. As against such a view, the value of a classical notion of liberty is maintained. Further grounds to choose a republic rather than a monarchy (...) are analyzed. A Parlamentarian Republic is shown to offer a reasonable balance of powers. International implications of this conception are also sketched out, opening the prospect of a universal republic. Reparations for past grievances are advanced as a means to approach a system of international relations oriented towards a just integration of Planet Earth. (shrink)

RésuméL'article examine la thèse leibnizienne de la tendance à l'existence de toutes les essences et de la réalisation de la série des êtres possibles qui, ensemble, ont le plus d'entité. Bien qu'elle offre une réponse à la question de savoir pourquoi il y a un monde – et pourquoi il s'agit du monde réel et non d'un autre –, la thèse se heurte à de nombreux obstacles. On tend actuellement àécarter les lectures nécessitaristes. L'article s'inscrit en faux contre cette tendance; (...) il vise à montrer les difficultés qui entourent l'interprétation de la nécessité fondée en théorie de la preuve, non seulement en général mais aussi en particulier par rapport à Leibniz. Une issue aux difficultés pourrait consister à développer la notion leibnizienne des degrés de réalité, en concevant aussi des degrés d'existence. Cela permettrait d'éviter la rupture entre l'ordre des possibles et celui des existants. Alors que Leibniz reconnaît des variations dans le degré d'entité des possibles, il est mené par son attachement à la logique aristotélicienne à faire du passage de la possibilitéà l'existence un bond métaphysique, l'actualitéétant ainsi rque comme une question de tout ou rien. Une approche gradualiste permettrait de concilier une partie des motivations métaphysiques de Leibniz avec un réalisme modal apparentéà celui de David Lewis, mais dûment nuancé. (shrink)

Castañeda’s most significant insights iie in his awareness of serious ontologicaI problems, which beset usual treatments. Among this outstandlng proposals are these about the structure of relational facts, guise theory and the bundle view of individuals, the I, and practitions. Castañeda’s metaphysics Is one of the most remarkable achievements in anaytical philosophy.

Three (apparent ) deontic antinomies are discussed: the paradoxes of the watchman and the praiser, as weIl as deontic dilemmas. A paraconsistent deontic logic, Ad, is put forward whose underlying 1st-order calculus is an infinite-valued tensorial logic. Several arguments are offered bearing out be existence of deontic contradictions, while two ways of dealing with conditional obligation paradoxes within the framework of Ad are canvassed. While the aggregation rule and the ought-implies-can principle are upheld, sundry schemata are shown not to obtain (...) which involve iterated deontic operators (most conspicuously: that whatever ought to be obligatory is obligatory; and that it is obligatory that whatever ought to be the case should in fact be the case). (shrink)

En este trabajo estudio algunas de las convergencias y divergencias entre dos concepciones filosóficas que coinciden en reconocer la contradictorialidad de lo real, o sea: que coinciden en ser dialécticas. Trátase de la filosofía de Hegel y de la concepción que en muy diversos trabajos y desde hace años vengo denominando ontofántica, concepción cuya aceptación de la contradictorialidad de lo real se sitúa más en la línea de Platón que en la de Hegel.

The main claim of this paper is that the boundary between scientific and non scientific knowledge does exist -- which means several things. First, it's not the case that anything goes: some irrationalists have been mistaken into acceptance of that wrong conclusion because they have remarked that, however the boundary might be drawn, some important scientific developments would fall afoul of the standards entitling a research practice to count as scientific. Second, the boundary is not an imaginary one, that is (...) to say besides what is scientific and what is unscientific there also is what lies at the boundary, certain research practices which are neither wholly scientific nor fully unscientific. Third, studying what is science is itself a kind of research belonging to the boundary, since the methods available in that research are not as strictly rigorous as those used in science proper; in fact, all of philosophy is included in the boundary in question. Fourth, the boundary (and in fact science itself) displays a characteristic structure pertaining to what are by now usually called «non wellfounded sets» -- sets, that is, which are somehow or other involved in themselves, whether as members, or as members of members or so on; the significance of the last thesis is that the best way of approaching philosophy of science is not standard set theory, but theories allowing non wellfounded sets are preferable. Fifth, and last, admission of the boundary's existence compels us to go beyond standard classical logic and to look for a more suitable logic, as for instance some kind of fuzzy paraconsistent logic. (shrink)

It is widely known that Plato seems to be committed in a number of dialogues to the view that all perfections are “united” — whether such unity is construed as identity, which doesn’t lack textual evidence, or, more probably, as some kind of mutual “supervenience”. (See for instance Laches 199e3-4, Alcib. I 114d-116d, Protag. 329c-333d & 349a-c. Whatever the solution to those interpretive problems is, what anyway can be ascertained is that, when writing the Statesman, our philosopher is keen on (...) maintaining that not only is it not the case that all perfections are identical, but, moreover, some perfections do in fact clash with others, which means that a thing can possess one of them only to the extent it lacks the opposite perfection. However, as we’re going to see straight away, the Statesman’s main purpose and thrust is likely to be that of emphasizing the necessity of some unity among opposite qualities. The significance of such a contention can be set off against what will become the Aristotelian (and in effect the commonly received) view on the topic. In the Statesman Plato recognizes that in each case there is some desirable mean between the extremes, but where it lies changes according to circumstances. Trying to secure that convenient mean doesn’t debar us from loking upon the extremes under consideration as virtues or perfections themselves. Thus, when the Statesman is drawing towards its conclusion, the Foreigner abruptly brings up the issue of υπερβολην και την ελλειψιν (283c3-4), and thereby that of the art of measuring (η µετρητικη). Immediately the problem arises of the relations between the opposite extremes. In Theaet. 152d, 157a, 160b-c, it appears that Plato distinguishes relative from non-relative properties or determinations in the same way as he does between empirical, earthly, changeable things and the Forms. Yet in his later dialogues Plato is clearly committed to holding the view that the Forms themselves enter a number of relations, and even that some Forms partake of others. Since very early onwards he seems to have been concerned about some reciprocal relativity of opposite qualities (there are many places where such relativity is stressed, as Charm. 168b5-169a5, Phaed.. (shrink)

La filosofía analítica ha contribuido a esclarecer la cuestión de los dilemas morales, sobre todo gracias a la utilización de la lógica deóntica. Vienen aquí examinados los debates recientes en el seno de dicha corriente filosófica sobre los conflictos de obligaciones.. Se pone de manifiesto cuán difícil es admitir conflictos- morales sin pagar el precio de aceptar contradicciones verdaderas. Pero, a la inversa de lo habitual en quienes sostienen esa tesis, el artículo, en vez de pronunciarse en contra de que (...) haya conflictos morales, trata de mostrar que sí los hay y, a tenor de ello, aboga por el reconocimiento de contradicciones verdaderas en la vida moral. Tales contradicciones pueden entenderse en el marco de una metafísica a la vez gradualista y aspectualista. (shrink)

Arthur Lovejoy's masterful, highly influential interpretation of Leibniz's philosophy has been almost neglected for decades now. This paper tries to rehabilitate Lovejoy's construal (with a number of adaptations) by delving into the underlying logical links connecting Leibniz's principles of order and gradation (the latter also called `law of continuity', `principle of transition' or `principle of the jumpless change': natura non facit saltus ) with other fundamental principles of his mature philosophy.

In his 1686 essay GI Leibniz undertook to reduce sentences to noun-phrases, truth to being. Such a reduction arose from his equating proof with conceptual analysis. Within limits Leibniz’s logical calculus provides a reasonable way of surmounting the dichotomy, thus allowing a reduction of hypothetical to categorical statements. However it yields the disastrous result that, whenever A is possible and so is B, there can be an entity being both A and B. Yet, Leibniz was in the GI the forerunner (...) of 20th century combinatory logic, which (successfully!) practices - sometimes for reasons not entirely unlike Leibniz’s own grounds - reductions of the same kinds he tried to carry out. (shrink)

Recent work of Gustav Bergmann develops an ontological framework within which an account of relations has been sketched out. The approach is a kind of new logical atomism which has some of the features of an Aristotelian hylomorphism (of sorts). It recognizes a number of categories and groups of a hylomorphic kind, chiefly “determinates” and “subdeterminates”--the latter only indirectly or implicitly. Winsome though it is, the approach is flawed by certain difficulties it gives rise to, among them inability to speak (...) of subdeterminates and failure of a relation to be had by a referent towards a relatum. Instead of having a sense, a relation is conceived of as a determinate which enters an arrangement whose existence and nature are not properly accounted for. Finally, Bergmann’s Ideal Language is assayed and shown not to be as useful philosophically in itself as he takes it to be. (shrink)

Within Nicholas de Cusa's philosophical approach, there is bound to be a level of unity lower than the one pertaining to God as such but higher than those of common creatures. The intermediate level belongs to the Intellect and is characterized by an affirmative coincidence of opposites hinging around universal equality. Such intellectual equality among all things, as they are in the Intellect, constitutes the root of number and multiplicity.

Phonemes are minimal segments within the spoken message whose presence is relevant for distinguishing one message from a different one with another meaning. Each phoneme underlies different phonetic realizations. What sets a phoneme from another is fuzzy cluster of the fuzzy features. Thus the study of phonemic structures is likely to have much to gain from a gradualistic approach. Through a gradualistic treatment synchronic phonology could tally with the diachronic study in a simpler way than is customary. In this connection, (...) an obstacle to be overcome is a widespread adherence to classical logic. (shrink)