Le manuscrit decouvert a la Bibliotheque de la Sorbonne est la seule source en francais du cours d'esthetique de Hegel. Le cahier ne mentionne aucun nom, mais les traces de l'ecriture de Victor Cousin atteste que celui-ci en etait le possesseur et le destinataire. La comparaison avec les autres sources manuscrites montre que se texte se rapporte au cours donne a Berlin pendant le semestre d'ete 1823, prenant la forme d'un abrege. L'accent est mis sur la structuration du discours et (...) la dimension systematique, distinguant cette version condensee de l'edition traditionnelle de l'Esthetique. Le texte constitue egalement l'exemple exceptionnel d'une traduction hegelienne realisee du vivant du philosophe. L'enseignement de Hegel, inedit en son temps, se trouve ainsi restitue pour la premiere fois au public francophone sous sa forme originale. (shrink)

Consider the following sentences: The neighbouring sentence is not true. The neighbouring sentence is not true. Call these the no-no sentences. Symmetry considerations dictate that the no-no sentences must both possess the same truth-value. Suppose they are both true. Given Tarski’s truth-schema—if a sentence S says that p then S is true iff p—and given what they say, they are both not true. Contradiction! Conclude: they are not both true. Suppose they are both false. Given Tarski’s falsity-schema—if a sentence S (...) says that p then S is false iff not-p—and given what they say, they are both true, and so not false. Contradiction! Conclude: they are not both false. Thus, despite their symmetry, the no-no sentences must differ in truth-value. Such is the no-no paradox.[1] Sorensen (2001, 2005a, 2005b) has argued that: (1) The no-no paradox is not a version of the liar but rather a cousin of the truth-teller paradox. (2) Even so, the no-no paradox is more paradoxical than the truth-teller. (3) The no-no and truth-teller sentences have groundless truthvalues—they are bivalent but give rise to “truthmaker gaps”. (4) It is metaphysically impossible to know these truth-values. (5) A truthmaker gap response to the no-no paradox provides reason to accept a version of epistemicism. In this paper it is shown that a truthmaker gap solution to the no-no and truth-teller paradoxes runs afoul of the dunno-dunno paradox, the strengthened no-no paradox, and the strengthened truth-teller paradox. In consequence, the no-no paradox is best seen as a form of the liar paradox. As such, it cannot provide a case for epistemicism. (shrink)

Que reste-t-il de l'esprit du 11 janvier? Y a-t-il une alternative à la peur et aux logiques sécuritaires? La réponse est venue des manifestations qui se sont levées partout dans le monde après les attentats meurtriers. Une autre voie est possible et porte un nom bien connu mais que nous feignons d'oublier : la Fraternité. Il est temps de redonner à l'oubliée de la République toute sa force. Non, la fraternité n'est pas cette vieille cousine que, selon l'expression de Régis (...) Debrav, nul ne songe à inviter à danser. Elle est plutôt cette jeune femme passionnée et passionnante qui nous permet de construire une alternative aux logiques de guerre et de repli identitaire. Entrons dans la danse avec elle. (shrink)

Confirmation is commonly identified with positive relevance, E being said to confirm H if and only if E increases the probability of H. Today, analyses of this general kind are usually Bayesian ones that take the relevant probabilities to be subjective. I argue that these subjective Bayesian analyses are irremediably flawed. In their place I propose a relevance analysis that makes confirmation objective and which, I show, avoids the flaws of the subjective analyses. What I am proposing is in some (...) ways a return to Carnap's conception of confirmation, though there are also important differences between my analysis and his. My analysis includes new accounts of what evidence is and of the indexicality of confirmation claims. Finally, I defend my analysis against Achinstein's criticisms of the relevance concept of confirmation. (shrink)

James Joyce's 'Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism' gives a new argument for the conclusion that a person's credences ought to satisfy the laws of probability. The premises of Joyce's argument include six axioms about what counts as an adequate measure of the distance of a credence function from the truth. This paper shows that (a) Joyce's argument for one of these axioms is invalid, (b) his argument for another axiom has a false premise, (c) neither axiom is plausible, and (d) without (...) these implausible axioms Joyce's vindication of probabilism fails. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article defends the following argument: what makes you and I valuable so that it is wrong to kill us now is what we are (essentially). But we are essentially physical organisms, who, embryology reveals, came to be at conception/fertilisation. I reply to the objection to this argument (as found in Dean Stretton, Judith Thomson, and Jeffrey Reiman), which holds that we came to be at one time, but became valuable as a subject of rights only some time later, (...) in virtue of an acquired characteristic. I argue against this position that the difference between a basic, natural capacity and some degree of development of such a capacity is a mere difference in degree, that this position logically implies the denial of equal personal dignity, and that the selection of the required degree of development of a capacity is necessarily arbitrary. (shrink)

The problem of free will lies at the heart of modern scientific studies of consciousness. An influential series of experiments by Libet has suggested that conscious intentions arise as a result of brain activity. This contrasts with traditional concepts of free will, in which the mind controls the body. A more recent study by Haggard and Eimer has further examined the relation between intention and brain processes, concluding that conscious awareness of intention is linked to the choice or selection of (...) a specific action, and not to the earliest initiation of action processes. The exchange of views in this paper further explores the relation between conscious intention and brain activity. (shrink)

We model scientific theories as Bayesian networks. Nodes carry credences and function as abstract representations of propositions within the structure. Directed links carry conditional probabilities and represent connections between those propositions. Updating is Bayesian across the network as a whole. The impact of evidence at one point within a scientific theory can have a very different impact on the network than does evidence of the same strength at a different point. A Bayesian model allows us to envisage and analyze the (...) differential impact of evidence and credence change at different points within a single network and across different theoretical structures. (shrink)

We argue that all human beings have a special type ofdignitywhich is the basis for (1) the obligation all of us have not to kill them, (2) the obligation to take their well‐being into account when we act, and (3) even the obligation to treat them as we would have them treat us, and indeed, that all human beings areequalin fundamental dignity. We give reasons to oppose the position that only some human beings, because of their possession of certain characteristics (...) in addition to their humanity (for example, an immediately exercisable capacity for self‐consciousness, or for rational deliberation), have full moral worth. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, what makes human beingspersonsrather thanthings, is their rational nature, and human beings are rational creatures by virtue of possessing natural capacities for conceptual thought, deliberation, and free choice, that is, the natural capacity to shape their own lives. (shrink)

Husserl argues in the Crisis that the prevalent tradition of positive science in his time had a philosophical core, called by him "Galilean science", that mistook the quest for objective theory with the quest for truth. Husserl is here referring to Gottingen science of the Golden Years. For Husserl, theory "grows" out of the "soil" of the prescientific, that is, pretheoretical, life-world. Scientific truth finally is to be sought not in theory but rather in the pragmatic-perceptual praxes of measurement. Husserl (...) is faulted for taking measuring processes to be "infinitely perfectible". The dependence of new scientific phenomena on the existence of prior "prescientific" inductive praxis is analyzed, also Husserl's residual objectivism and failure to appreciate the hermeneutic character of measurement. Though not a scientific (theory-)realist, neither was he an instrumentalist, but he was a scientific (phenomena-)realist. (shrink)

Though my ultimate concern is with issues in epistemology and metaphysics, let me phrase the central question I will pursue in terms evocative of philosophy of religion: What are the implications of our logic-in particular, of Cantor and G6del-for the possibility of omniscience?

Recently a number of authors have tried to avoid the failures of traditional Dutch book arguments by separating them from pragmatic concerns of avoiding a sure loss. In this paper I examine defenses of this kind by Howson and Urbach, Hellman, and Christensen. I construct rigorous explications of their arguments and show that they are not cogent. I advocate abandoning Dutch book arguments in favor of a representation theorem.

A small consortium of philosophers has begun work on the implications of epistemic networks (Zollman 2008 and forthcoming; Grim 2006, 2007; Weisberg and Muldoon forthcoming), building on theoretical work in economics, computer science, and engineering (Bala and Goyal 1998, Kleinberg 2001; Amaral et. al., 2004) and on some experimental work in social psychology (Mason, Jones, and Goldstone, 2008). This paper outlines core philosophical results and extends those results to the specific question of thresholds. Epistemic maximization of certain types does show (...) clear threshold effects. Intriguingly, however, those effects appear to be importantly independent from more familiar threshold effects in networks. (shrink)

Cet article étudie le renouvellement de sens que Nietzsche fait subir à la notion de scepticisme. Il part de la double appréciation déroutante du scepticisme grec, loué pour la probité intellectuelle de son ephexis et critiqué simultanément comme une forme de nihilisme de type bouddhiste préservant les valeurs ascétiques, pour montrer que le scepticisme évoqué par la formule « les grands esprits sont des sceptiques. Zarathoustra est un sceptique » renvoie au « frédéricisme » ( Par-delà bien et mal ), (...) c ’ est-à-dire à une expérimentation pratique – audacieuse et dangereuse – menée sur les valeurs. (shrink)

Social media is full of dead people. Untold millions of dead users haunt the online world where we increasingly live our lives. What do we do with all these digital souls? Can we simply delete them, or do they have a right to persist? Philosophers have been almost entirely silent on the topic, despite their perennial focus on death as a unique dimension of human existence. Until now. -/- Drawing on ongoing philosophical debates, Digital Souls claims that the digital dead (...) are objects that should be treated with loving regard and that we have a moral duty towards. Modern technology helps them to persist in various ways, while also making them vulnerable to new forms of exploitation and abuse. This provocative book explores a range of questions about the nature of death, identity, grief, the moral status of digital remains and the threat posed by AI-driven avatars of dead people. In the digital era, it seems we must all re-learn how to live with the dead. (shrink)

For more than 20 years, research has proven the beneficial effect of natural frequencies when it comes to solving Bayesian reasoning tasks (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). In a recent meta-analysis, McDowell & Jacobs (2017) showed that presenting a task in natural frequency format increases performance rates to 24% compared to only 4% when the same task is presented in probability format. Nevertheless, on average three quarters of participants in their meta-analysis failed to obtain the correct solution for such a task (...) in frequency format. In this paper, we present an empirical study on what participants typically do wrong when confronted with natural frequencies. We found that many of them did not actually use natural frequencies for their calculations, but translated them back into complicated probabilities instead. This switch from the intuitive presentation format to a less intuitive calculation format will be discussed within the framework of psychological theories (e.g., the Einstellung effect). (shrink)

A structural analogy is pointed out between a check hermeneutically developed phenomenological description, based on Husserl, of the process of perceptual cognition on the one hand and quantum mechanical measurement on the other hand. In Husserl's analytic phase of the cognition process, the 'intentionality-structure' of the subject/object union prior to predication of a local object is an entangled symmetry-making state, and this entanglement is broken in the synthetic phase when the particular local object is constituted under the influence of an (...) iota ('inner horizon') and the 'facticity' of the local world ('outer horizon'). Replacing 'perceptual cognition' by 'measurement' and 'subject' by 'expert subject using a measuring device' the analogy of a formal quantum structure is extended to the conscious structure of all empirical cognition. This is laid out in three theses: about perception, about classical measurement, and about quantum measurement. The results point to the need for research into the quantum structure of the physical embodiment of human cognition. (shrink)

The central role of corporate leaders in setting the ethical tone for their organization is widely accepted. Four well known former CEOs are profiled to illustrate how their managerial ethical leadership not only influenced their firms but also the practice of business. Insights are drawn from their writings and speeches as well as other sources which examine demonstrated leadership abilities. Their behavior not only provides examples of leadership but also is exemplary from an ethical point of view. The article concludes (...) with five common themes that describe these individuals and the essence of managerial ethical leadership. (shrink)

The iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma has become the standard model for the evolution of cooperative behavior within a community of egoistic agents, frequently cited for implications in both sociology and biology. Due primarily to the work of Axelrod (1980a, 198Ob, 1984, 1985), a strategy of tit for tat (TFT) has established a reputation as being particularly robust. Nowak and Sigmund (1992) have shown, however, that in a world of stochastic error or imperfect communication, it is not TFT that finally triumphs in (...) an ecological model based on population percentages (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981), but ‘generous tit for tat’ (GTFT), which repays cooperation with a probability of cooperation approaching 1 but forgives defection with a probability of l/3. In this paper, we consider a spatialized instantiation of the stochastic Prisoner’s Dilemma, using two-dimensional cellular automata (Wolfram, 1984, 1986; Gutowitz, 1990) to model the spatial dynamics of populations of competing strategies. The surprising result is that in the spatial model it is not GIFT but still more generous strategies that are favored. The optimal strategy within this spatial ecology appears to be a form of ‘bending over backwards’, which returns cooperation for defection with a probability of 2/3 - a rate twice as generous as GTFT. (shrink)

Social entrepreneurship activity continues to surge tremendously in market and economic systems around the world. Yet, social entrepreneurship theory and understanding lag far behind its practice. For instance, the nature of the entrepreneurial discovery phenomenon, a critical area of inquiry in general entrepreneurship theory, receives no attention in the specific context of social entrepreneurship. To address the gap, we conceptualize social entrepreneurial discovery based on an extension of corporate social responsibility into social entrepreneurship contexts. We develop a model that emphasizes (...) mobilization and timing as underpinnings of social entrepreneurial discovery and offer distinct conceptual aspects and theoretic propositions instrumental to future social entrepreneurship research. (shrink)

Tschacher and Haken have recently applied a systems-based approach to modeling psychotherapy process in terms of potentially beneficial tendencies toward deterministic as well as chaotic forms of change in the client’s behavioral, cognitive and affective experience during the course of therapy. A chaotic change process refers to a greater exploration of the states that a client can be in, and it may have a potential positive role to play in their development. A distinction is made between on the one hand, (...) specific instances of instability which are due to techniques employed by the therapist, and on the other, a more general instability which is due to the therapeutic relationship, and a key, necessary result of a successful therapeutic alliance. Drawing on Friston’s systems-based model of free energy minimization and predictive coding, it is proposed here that the increase in the instability of a client’s functioning due to therapy can be conceptualized as a reduction in the precisions with which the client’s prior beliefs about themselves and their world, are held. It is shown how a good therapeutic alliance results in the emergence of a new hierarchical level in the client’s generative model of themselves and their relationship with the world. The emergence of this new level of functioning permits the reduction of the precisions of the client’s priors, which allows the client to ‘open up’: to experience thoughts, emotions and experiences they did not have before. It is proposed that this process is a necessary precursor to change due to psychotherapy. A good consilience can be found between this approach to understanding the role of the therapeutic alliance, and the role of epistemic trust in psychotherapy as described by Fonagy and Allison. It is suggested that beneficial forms of instability in clients are an underappreciated influence on psychotherapy process, and thoughts about the implications, as well as situations in which instability may not be beneficial for therapy, are considered. (shrink)

In a series of formal studies and less formal applications, Hong and Page offer a ‘diversity trumps ability’ result on the basis of a computational experiment accompanied by a mathematical theorem as explanatory background (Hong & Page 2004, 2009; Page 2007, 2011). “[W]e find that a random collection of agents drawn from a large set of limited-ability agents typically outperforms a collection of the very best agents from that same set” (2004, p. 16386). The result has been extremely influential as (...) an epistemic justification for diversity policy initiatives. Here we show that the ‘diversity trumps ability’ result is tied to the particular random landscape used in Hong and Page’s simulation. We argue against interpreting results on that random landscape in terms of ‘ability’ or ‘expertise.’ These concepts are better modeled on smother and more realistic landscapes, but keeping other parameters the same those are landscapes on which it is groups of the best performing that do better. Smoother landscapes seem to vindicate both the concept and the value of expertise. Change in other parameters, however, also vindicates diversity. With an increase in the pool of available heuristics, diverse groups again do better. Group dynamics makes a difference as well; simultaneous ‘tournament’ deliberation in a group in place of the ‘relay’ deliberation in Hong and Page’s original model further emphasizes an advantage for diversity. ‘Tournament’ 2 dynamics particularly shows the advantage of mixed groups that include both experts and non-experts. As a whole, our modeling results suggest that relative to problem characteristics and conceptual resources, the wisdom of crowds and the wisdom of the few each have a place. We regard ours as a step toward attempting to calibrate their relative virtues in different modelled contexts of intellectual exploration. (shrink)

L’analyse menée par Nietzsche dans le second traité des Éléments pour la généalogie de la morale ne se heurte-t-elle pas à une sourde contradiction? Bien qu’il rejette l’idée de contrat comme modèle pour comprendre la genèse de l’État, c’est en effet sur cette notion que semble reposer toute la logique argumentative du traité. C’est sur cette tension interne que se penche le présent article, qui s’efforce de la résoudre en réexaminant le statut exact que Nietzsche prête au schéma contractuel.

Cette étude part du privilège accordé par Nietzsche au problème de la hiérarchie, et à l'idée de commandment, qui peuvent sembler de préjugés. Elle en interroge la significations et montre qu'ils se justifient pas ni par la condamnation de la croyance, ni par la valorisation du philosophe comme esprit libre, mais par la logiqu de la vie pulsionnelle, qui repose intégralement sur la relation de commandment et d'obéissance. Cette dernière est par conséquent reconnue pour la logique qui structure la réalité (...) tout entière.Die Studie geht vom Vorrang des Problems der Rangordnung bei Nietzsche und des Gedankens des Befehlens aus, die als bloße vorurteile seinerseits erscheinen können. Sie fragt nach ihrer bedeutung und zeigt, dass sie sich weder durch die Verurteilung des Glaubens noch durch die Hochschätzung des Philsophen als freien Geistes, sondern durch die Logik des Trieblebens rechtfertigen, die völlig auf dem Verhälnis von Befehl und Gehorsam beruht. Nietzsche erkennt in ihm die Logik, die Realität im ganzen strukturiert.This paper starts from the priority Nietzsche attaches to the problem of hierarchy and to the idea of command, which may seem to be prejudices. it analyzes tehir meanings, and shows their justifications are not based on the ruling out of belief, nor on the praise of the philosopher as a free spirit, but on the logic of drives, which rests wholly on the command/obedience relationship. The latter should therefore be recognized as the logic organizing the whole of reality. (shrink)

Le propos de cet article est d’interroger l’usage déroutant de la première personne chez Nietzsche, qui semble tout à la fois, en introduisant des notations biographiques, constituer une entorse à l’analyse philosophique et entrer en contradiction avec son rejet de la réalité du moi. À l’examen, il s’avère que ces textes n’ont pas pour fonction de renvoyer à une unité empirique, mais doivent se comprendre comme le signe d’un problème que la philosophie bien entendue doit affronter, à savoir le défi (...) constitué par l’aptitude à évaluer les valeurs. Sous cet angle, l’écriture à la première personne ne vise pas la mise en avant d’un modèle qu’il s’agirait pour les penseurs d’imiter, mais a pour objet, tout au contraire, de révéler la situation atypique qui confère à Nietzsche un privilège quant à l’entreprise philosophique : l’étendue du spectre pulsionnel qui le caractérise, lui permettant de connaître et d’apprécier une vaste série de conditions d’existence, de la maladie à la santé. (shrink)

Sur quelles raisons Nietzsche fonde-t-il sa critique de la vérité et quelles en sont les retombées pour la caractérisation de la pratique philosophique? La découverte d'un antagonisme entre pensée et verité établit que l'irréfutable n'est pas assimilable au vrai, et en quoi la vérité est interprétation. Se révèle alors son statut de valeur, ainsi que la logique d'incorporation dont elle relève, qui en fait un genre d'erreur devenu pour nous indispensable. À titre de conséquence, la philosophie ne peut plus se (...) comprendre comme recherche de la vérité, mais bien plutôt comme interrogation sur la valeur de cette valeur et création de « vérités » nouvelles. Le philosophe authentique, esprit libre, est alors à penser comme amateur d' énigmes, sur un modèle épicurien et non plus platonicien. What are Nietzsche's reasons for criticizing truth, and how does he understand the consequences of his position for the philosophical praxis? The discovery of the opposition of truth and thought shows that being irrefutable cannot be assimilated to being true, and that truth is interpretation. It appears therefore to be a value, a type of error which has become essential for us, linked to a process of physical-psychological absorption. As a consequence, philosophy cannot be equated with the pursuit of truth any longer ; its aim is to investigate the value of this particular value, and to create new « truths ». Being a free spirit, the genuine philosopher is to be thought of as a lover of riddles, shaped on Epicure's pattern rather than on Plato's. (shrink)

Complexe, énigmatique car radicalement novatrice, la pensée nietzschéenne donne le sentiment d'être trop dispersée pour pouvoir être saisissable. Du reste, y a-t-il un ou plusieurs Nietzsche? Celui de L'Antéchris et d'Ecce Homo est-il le même que celui de La Naissance de la tragédie? Mais complexe ne signifie pas chaotique, et l'incertitude se dissipe si l'on repère les moments où se constituent ses positions fondamentales: quand la notion de pulsion se met-elle en place? Avec quel ouvrage la théorie des valeurs apparaît-elle? (...) À quel moment la logique du sentiment de puissance est-elle identifiée? Quand la philosophie est-elle comprise comme un dire-oui? Dans quel livre la tentative de lire la réalité tout entière comme volonté de puissance se fait-elle jour? Cet ouvrage apporte une réponse à ces questions. Il caractérise l'apport des principaux textes de Nietzsche, et montre que l'évolution de sa réflexion n'est pas faite de revirements ni d'abandons de thèses au profit de thèses nouvelles, mais d'un affinement progressif au sein d'une problématique invariante: conquête d'un mode de pensée réformé dont les grandes lignes sont dessinées dès son premier livre, La Naissance de la tragédie"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Humean instrumentalism is the view that all of one’s reasons for action are ultimately grounded in one’s antecedent desires, whatever those happen to be. According to this view, what determines which actions are rational is ultimately what the agent wants or desires, while the role of rational deliberation is to inform the agent about how to best gratify these desires. In this paper I aim to weaken commitment to Humean instrumentalism by showing that (a) the main supporting argument for HI (...) fails and that (b) Humean instrumentalism conflicts with a very plausible principle of practical rationality. (shrink)

The status of risk factors and disease remains a disputed question in the theory and practice of medicine and healthcare, and so does the related question of delineating disease boundaries. I present a framework based on Bernard Lonergan’s account of emergent probability for differentiating (1) generically distinct levels of systematic function within organisms and between organisms and their environments and (2) the methods of functional, genetic, and statistical investigation. I then argue on this basis that it is possible to understand (...) disease in terms of biological or higher intra-level dysfunction, risk factors—including genetic risk factors—in terms of statistical inter-level conditioning of a given stage or developmental sequence of systematic functioning, and the empirical boundaries of disease in terms of the limits of both functional categorization (from an epistemic standpoint) and upper-level integration of lower-level processes and events (from an ontological standpoint). (shrink)

The Law of Non-Contradiction holds that both sides of a contradiction cannot be true. Dialetheism is the view that there are contradictions both sides of which are true. Crucial to the dispute, then, is the central notion of contradiction. My first step here is to work toward clarification of that simple and central notion: Just what is a contradiction?

Many of the formalisms used in Attribute Value grammar are notational variants of languages of propositional modal logic, and testing whether two Attribute Value Structures unify amounts to testing for modal satisfiability. In this paper we put this observation to work. We study the complexity of the satisfiability problem for nine modal languages which mirror different aspects of AVS description formalisms, including the ability to express re-entrancy, the ability to express generalisations, and the ability to express recursive constraints. Two main (...) techniques are used: either Kripke models with desirable properties are constructed, or modalities are used to simulate fragments of Propositional Dynamic Logic. Further possibilities for the application of modal logic in computational linguistics are noted. (shrink)

Patrick Gardiner; XII—Error, Faith and Self-Deception, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 221–244, https://doi.org/.