In its treatment of the role of emotion in ethics the argument of the book outlines a new way of packing motivational force into moral meaning that allows for a ...

Whether and how music is involved in evoking emotions is a matter of considerable debate. In the target article, Juslin & Vll (J&V) argue that music induces a wide range of both basic and complex emotions that are shared with other stimuli. If such a link exists, it would provide a common basis for considering the interactions among music, emotion, timing, and time perception.

After experiments with various economic systems, we appear to have conceded, to misquote Winston Churchill that "free enterprise is the worst economic system, except all the others that have been tried." Affirming that conclusion, I shall argue that in today's expanding global economy, we need to revisit our mind-sets about corporate governance and leadership to fit what will be new kinds of free enterprise. The aim is to develop a values-based model for corporate governance in this age of globalization that (...) will be appropriate in a variety of challenging cultural and economic settings. I shall present an analysis of mental models from a social constructivist perspective. I shall then develop the notion of moral imagination as one way to revisit traditional mind-sets about values-based corporate governance and outline what I mean by systems thinking. I shall conclude with examples for modeling corporate governance in multi-cultural settings and draw tentative conclusions about globalization. (shrink)

Despite the fact that a number of economists and philosophers of late defend insider trading both as a viable and useful practice in a free market and as not immoral, I shall question the value of insider trading both from a moral and an economic point of view. I shall argue that insider trading both in its present illegal form and as a legalized market mechanism undermines the efficient and proper functioning of a free market, thereby bringing into question its (...) own raison d'etre. It does so and is economically inefficient for the very reason that it is immoral. Thus this practice cannot be justified either from an economic or a moral point of view. Insider trading is the reverse of speculation. It is reward without risk, wealth generated — and injury done to others — by an unfair advantage in information ... [T]he core principle is clear: no one should profit from exploitation of important information not available to the public. (shrink)

How does Kant understand the representation of an empirical self? For Kant, the sources of the representation must be both a priori and a posteriori. Several scholars claim that the a priori part of the ‘self’ representation is supplied by the category of ‘substance,’ either a regular substance (Andrew Chignell), a minimal substance (Karl Ameriks) or a substance analog (Katharina Kraus). However, Kant opens the Paralogisms chapter by announcing that there is a thirteenth ‘transcendental’ concept or category: “We now come (...) to a concept that was not entered in the above general list of transcendental concepts, and that must yet be classed with them … This is the concept – or, if one prefers, the judgment – I think.” (A341/B399). I argue that it is the ‘I think’ that provides the a priori framework for the representation of the empirical self. (shrink)

There is a well-known scene from The Adventures of Tom Sawyer that illustrates what might be considered benign manipulation: Tom has the job of whitewashing a fence but would rather spend the time with friends. By feigning enthusiasm for the job he manages to get his friends to hang around and do it for him. They even pay to do it - with various little items that he later trades for..

One’s philosophical points of view, which form the bases for assumptions that we bring to management theory and practice matter, and matter deeply, to management thinking and corporate behavior. In this paper I outline three related threads of philosophical conversations and explain how they are important in management theory and practice: the “linguistic turn” in philosophy, deriving from the later writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, a social constructionist perspective: a set of theories at least implicitly derived from the linguistic turn in (...) philosophy, and the notion of the impartial spectator. I then use these three theories to analyze the idea of the corporation, corporate cultures and corporate mission statements, stakeholder theories and their differences, and the limitations of the popular notion of “corporate social responsibility.” I conclude that how one frames these management ideas makes a difference, a difference in theory and in practice. (shrink)

Ruth Marcus has offered an account of moral dilemmas in which the presence of dilemmas acts as a motivating force, pushing us to try to minimize predicaments of moral conflict. In this paper, I defend a Marcus-style account of dilemmas against two objections: first, that if dilemmas are real, we are forced to blame those who have done their best, and second, that in some cases, even a stripped down version of blame seems inappropriate. My account highlights the importance of (...) collective responsibility in understanding dilemmas, and I suggest that it sheds light on understanding moral progress. (shrink)

The author extends theory on the relationship between workplace spirituality and business ethics by integrating the "yamas" from yoga, a venerable Eastern spiritual tradition, with existing literature. The yamas are five practices for harmonizing and deepening social connections that can be applied in the workplace. A theoretical framework is developed and two sets of propositions are forwarded. One set emanates from the yamas and another one conjectures relationships between spirituality and business ethics surfaced by the application of these spiritual practices (...) from yoga. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I argue that Heidegger offers a philosophy of science by explicating that philosophy of science. The following chapter presents Heidegger's early analysis of modern science, from 1916 to the mid-1930s. During these years Heidegger maintains two theses: that the essence of science is the mathematical projection of nature; and that metaphysics is the science of being. As the latter thesis becomes more problematic, Heidegger turns from metaphysics as a science, to the sciences. ;The pivot for this turn (...) is the experiment. Chapter 3 is an analysis of three specific issues surrounding the experiment. I raise the question of whether a single experimental result is enough to overturn a theory, the problem of the theory-loadedness of observation, and the question of representation. ;These issues serve to explicate Heidegger's claim that the essence of science is research, and to show that Heidegger's philosophy of science shares issues with contemporary analytic philosophy of science. Further, I take Heidegger's claim that the essence of science is the ground from out of which the essence of the modern epoch can be shown, as proof that his consideration of science is not secondary in his thinking but rather is the basis from which his critique of the modern epoch is made. ;Chapter 4 is an account of Heidegger's view of the role of science in the university. Heidegger's vision is that the German university can serve to guide historical destiny. His complete disillusionment with that vision comes with his realization that, whereas he calls for a renewal of science for the sake of the sciences in their service of the people, the Nazi call for a renewal of the sciences is toward their own political ends. What little I have to say about Heidegger's involvement with the Nazis is found in this chapter. ;Chapter 5 considers Heidegger's view of ancient science. It lays out Aristotle's distinction between physis and techne under Heidegger's reading. In Chapter 6, I argue that the ancient distinction between physis and techne is not sustained in the modern epoch under Heidegger's account. ;I close with a brief account of Heidegger on quantum theory. (shrink)

Consciousness, self-consciousness, mental unity, and the necessary conditions for cognition are issues of paramount importance for two prima facie distinct intellectual endeavors: contemporary cognitive science and interpretations of Kant. The goal of Andrew Brook’s timely and useful book is to contribute to both of these projects by showing how a better understanding of Kant’s views can also illuminate current controversies about how to model the mind.

On an expressivist view, ethical claims are not fact stating; instead they serve the alternative function of expressing our feelings, attitudes and values. On a deflationary view, truth is not a property with a nature to be analyzed, but merely a grammatical device to aid us in endorsing sentences. Views on the relationship between expressivism and deflationism vary widely: they are compatible; they are incompatible; they are a natural pair; they doom one another. Here I explain some of these views, (...) extract some necessary distinctions, and put these to use for understanding expressivism. I argue that contrary to the opinions of some, deflationism doesn’t help with problems of objectivity, knowledge and reasoning in ethics. I suggest alternative expressivist treatments of these problems, and show how expressivism as a metaethical view must have consequences for our ethical lives and beliefs. In particular it must affect the way we deal with ethical consistency—when norms or beliefs conflict—and ethical incompleteness—when ethical questions have no right answer. (shrink)

The East/West divide seems to be as old as history itself, the roots of Orientalism and anti-Semitism lying far beyond the origins of modern Western imperialism. The very project of Western classical republicanism had its darker side: to purloin the legacy of the Greeks, distancing them from Eastern systems deemed 'despotic' and 'other'. Western Republicanism and the Oriental Prince is a thoroughly revisionist book, challenging not only the comfortable view the West has of its own political evolution, but the negative (...) stereotypes of non-Western systems. Not only did these images serve to legitimate early modern European nation states struggling for an identity, but they also served to justify slavery and other forms of domination over subject peoples. Drawing upon archaeological and epigraphic evidence, Springborg discusses the Mesopotamian and ancient Egyptian contribution of political forms and cultic institutions to classical Graeco-Roman civilization, an Eastern legacy to the West long obscured for political reasons. A different reading of the foundation myths of Athens and Rome, certain texts of Plato, Aristotle, and the writings of Herodotus, Isocrates, Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus, permits us to restore possible lines of filtration. Renaissance thought, long believed to have ushered in the Western classical republican tradition, demonstrates a curious ambivalence towards powerful Eastern system, objects of fascination as much as fear. We do not yet find sedimented the divide between Western Democracy and oriental despotism, in which post-Reformation thought as been set in stone. This major new study will be of interest to students of political history, political theory, comparative politics and political archaeology. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of what value pluralism tells us about the pursuit of moral coherence as a method of moral reasoning. I focus on the status of the norm of ‘systematicity,’ or the demand that our principles be as few and as simple as possible. I argue that, given certain descriptive facts about the pluralistic ways we value, epistemic ways of supporting a systematicity norm do not succeed. Because it is sometimes suggested that coherence functions in moral reasoning (...) as it does in scientific reasoning, my argument considers analogies and disanalogies between moral reasoning and scientific reasoning. (shrink)

Ein zentrales Ziel von Transparency and Reflection ist es zu erklären, wie Selbstwissen möglich ist, während zugleich daran festgehalten wird, dass Wissen um Bewusstseinszustände ‚transparent‘ ist mit Blick auf unser Weltwissen. Ich möchte zeigen, dass die von Matthew Boyle bemühten Ressourcen – insbesondere „Bewusstsein als Subjekt“ und „Arten des Gegebenseins“ – nicht ausreichen, um die Einführung der Vorstellung eines Selbsts zu erklären, das vielfältige Zustände hat. Dagegen möchte ich vorschlagen, dass Boyle erfolgreicher gewesen wäre, wenn er bei seiner früheren Kantischen (...) Annahme geblieben wäre, nach der die Beherrschung der Vorstellung der Ersten-Person ein Bewusstsein der Aktivität des Denkens benötigt, das Subjekte dazu befähigt, Warum-Fragen zu beantworten. (shrink)

Models of content-sharing behavior on online social media platforms typically represent content spread as a diffusion process modeled on contagious diseases; users’ behavior is modeled with single-agent decision theory. However, social media platforms are interactive spaces where users care about reactions to, and further spread of, the content they post. Thus, social media interaction falls under the intended use cases for game theory. In contrast to existing models leaving strategic reasoning out, we capture agents’ social media decisions within a cognitive (...) hierarchy framework, which can be interpreted as making formally precise how agents make strategic choices based on mutual expectations of rationality. Analytically, we identify limit cases in which a platform can be swamped with content that no agents personally like but all expect to elicit reactions (think obvious fake-news). We then use agent-based simulations to show that a range of more realistic cases give rise to similar outcomes. (shrink)

Desde una hermenéutica ontológica política se hacen visibles y audibles prácticas singulares a partir del punto de vista de los estudios latinoamericanos, los cuales apelan por una perspectiva de afirmación como propone Arturo Escobar respecto a una mirada sobre la diversidad y singularidad de accio..

In his later writings, Wittgenstein is generally taken as committed to anti-realism. In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken. Although he is committed to ontic anti-realism, this does not preclude his acceptance of epistemic realism. I argue that the possibility of using practices to fix meanings and to provide aframework for conceptual differentiation of our experiences rests upon a version of realism, which I call "praxial realism", which does not presuppose anything like a Kantian noumenal world.

E. Levinas et M. Henry reconnaissent tous deux l’importance pour la philosophie occidentale de la pensée de Husserl, mais ils s’en démarquent car ils la trouvent trop intellectualiste. C’est pourquoi ils vont chercher respectivement dans l’autre et dans la vie auto-affective une issue radicale à toute représentation ou discours théorique. L’auteur de cette étude met dès lors en évidence le fait que la critique, par ces deux phénoménologues, des philosophies de la conscience les amène à décrire, dans le cadre de (...) ce qu’elle propose d’appeler une « méta-phénoménologie », des « attitudes » telles que le désir, la douleur et la fatigue. Il sera question dès lors de tâcher de répondre aux questions portant sur la possibilité d’une refondation de la phénoménologie qui irait « au-delà » ou « en deçà » de ce que cette démarche philosophique s’est donné elle-même comme horizon. (shrink)

The Passive Hand: Absence d’œuvre, Resistance and Désœuvrement. I question the rapport between the hand as an aesthetic notion and the value of passivity, in order to define the dynamic of the relationship between passivity and creation. I, first, examine the Blanchot’s metaphor regarding the act of creation as being a privative intervention of the left hand, passive, on the right hand, active, under the light of a critical reading of the Nietzschean concepts of active force—reactive force; then, I analyse (...) the passivity of the discourse under three types of rapport: the inspiration and the absence of the œuvre, the resistance and the œuvre, the disobedience and the désœuvrement. From the absence of the œuvre of the inspired artist to the resistance at the œuvre, which creates the œuvre, and lastly, to the reactive force which affirms the refusal of the œuvre and produces the absence of the œuvre, passivity makes a circular movement from the impossibility of the oeuvre towards the désœuvrement, from from its genesis to its heterogenesis. (shrink)

Two very different insights motivate characterizing the brain as a computer. One depends on mathematical theory that defines computability in a highly abstract sense. Here the foundational idea is that of a Turing machine. Not an actual machine, the Turing machine is really a conceptual way of making the point that any well-defined function could be executed, step by step, according to simple 'if-you-are-in-state-P-and-have-input-Q-then-do-R' rules, given enough time (maybe infinite time) [see COMPUTATION]. Insofar as the brain is a device whose (...) input and output can be characterized in terms of some mathematical function -- however complicated -- then in that very abstract sense, it can be mimicked by a Turning machine. Given what is known so far brains do seem to depend on cause-effect operations, and hence brains appear to be, in some formal sense, equivalent to a Turing machine [see CHURCH-TURING THESIS]. On its own, however, this reveals nothing at all of how the mind-brain actually works. The second insight depends on looking at the brain as a biological device that processes information from the environment to build complex representations that enable the brain to make predictions and select advantageous behaviors. Where necessary to avoid ambiguity, we will refer to the first notion of computation as algorithmic computation, and the second as information processing computation. (shrink)

In their article, Murayama and Jach contend that a mental computational model demonstrates that high-level motivations are emergent properties from underlying cognitive processes rather than instigators of behaviors. Despite points of agreement with the authors' critiques of the motivation literature, I argue that their claim of dismantling the black box of the human mind has been constructed on shaking grounds.

Aproximem-se um pouco, filhas de Júpiter! Vou demonstrar que o único acesso a essa sabedoria perfeita, a que chamamos a cidadela da felicidade, é através da loucura. Erasmo, Êloge de la folie. Resumo: Sócrates, no Fedro, se diz louco por discursos (228b), nos diz também que o vulgo vê o filósofo como louco (parakínon 249d) justamente por não reconhecer que ele está divinamente inspirado. Assim, no Fedro, os maiores bens nos são transmitidos através da loucura (manía), quando são enviados como (...) uma dádiva dos deuses (244a). Contudo, há um tipo de loucura como doença e outro proveniente da liberação divina do comportamento habitualmente aceito (265a). E é esse segundo tipo de loucura que a filosofia promove, uma conexão noética. Há uma quebra de convenções que ocorre por meio do um desvio criativo, que pode ser facilmente confundido com um desvio patológico, mas na realidade é um processo que envolve o conhecimento de si e, por conseguinte, o cuidado de si, portanto uma perspectiva filosófica e terapêutica. Palavras-chave: Fedro; Mania Divina; Inspiração; Filosofia. Divine ManiaAbstract: Socrates, in Phaedrus, says he is crazy for speeches (228b), and he tells us as well that common folk see the philosopher as a mad person (parakínon 249d), precisely for not recognizing that he is divinely inspired. Thus, in Phaedrus, the greatest goods are transmited to us through madness (mania), when sent as a gift from the gods (244a). However, there is a kind of madness as a disease and another one that comes from divine liberation from usually accepted behavior (265a). It is the second kind of madness that philosophy promotes, a noetic connection. There is a breach in convention that occurs through a creative deviation, which could be easily mistaken for pathological deviation, but rather is a process involving knowledge of oneself and, therefore, selfcare, hence a philosophical and therapeutic perspective. Keywords: Phaedrus; Divine Mania; Inspiration; Philosophy. Manie Divine Résumé: Socrate, dans Phèdre, se dit fou de discours (228b), et il nous dit aussi que les gens ordinaires voient le philosophe comme un fou (parakínon 249d), précisément pour ne pas reconnaître qu'il est divinement inspiré. Donc, dans Phèdre, les plus grands biens nous sont transmis par la folie (manie), lorsque ils sont envoyés comme un cadeau des dieux (244a). Pourtant, il y a une sorte de folie comme une maladie et une autre qui vient de la libération divine du comportement socialement acceptable (265a). C'est le deuxième genre de folie que la philosophie promeut, une connexion noétique. Il y a une rupture de convenance qui se produit par une déviation créative, qui peut être facilement confondue avec une déviation pathologique, mais qui est plutôt un phénomène qui implique la connaissance de soi, et donc le soin de soi, par suite une perspective philosophique et thérapeutique. Mots-Clés: Phèdre; Manie Divine; Inspiration; Philosophie. Data de registro: 02/08/2023 Data de aceite: 18/10/2023. (shrink)

Nossa pesquisa resgata a identidade aprendiz da criança portadora de paralisia cerebral frente à urgência da sua construção motora e busca estabelecer os fatores que participam desta construção motora reconhecendo a criança não apenas pela falta dos movimentos, mas, como um sujeito singular e subjetivo. Assim investigamos a história clínica da paralisia cerebral e a colocamos diante das histórias de vida relatadas por portadores de paralisia cerebral e por suas mães, pois, entendemos que o processo de construção motora mescla-se a (...) uma série de fatores que vem a inferir no desempenho motor da criança. Realizamos uma pesquisa de campo com seis crianças portadoras de paralisia cerebral e com suas mães, Nossa metodologia foi de caráter qualitativo com enfoque no trabalho terapêutico e nas entrevistas com as mães. Desta forma foi possível traçar uma relação entre desempenho motor, cognição, afetividade, aspectos clínicos, sociais e históricos da deficiência. (shrink)

As tecnologias da informação e da comunicação têm interferido nas diversas dimensões da vida humana. Com as redes sociais, oportunizou-se aos indivíduos a experiência de serem também produtores de conteúdo, afetando diretamente no relacionamento com as organizações. Assim, este artigo olha para o que Braga (2006) identificou como o sistema de resposta social, aplicado às inter-relações estabelecidas entre os públicos e as organizações, observando os comentários de uma postagem do Magazine Luiza sobre o dia do Orgulho LGBTQIAPN+. Entre apoios e (...) críticas, os conteúdos demonstram o quanto o posicionamento dos públicos está permeado pela realidade social, ao mesmo tempo em que explicita a importância do posicionamento das empresas sobre temas polêmicos, levando a sociedade a discussões que instiguem a mudança social. (shrink)

The papers in this volume question how perceptions of space influenced understandings of the body and its functions, illness and treatment, and the surrounding natural and built environments in relation to health in the classical and ...

My discussion below is an highly abbreviated version of a paper in preparation for a conference on innateness . I allow for both types of influence but suggest that more attention should be paid to mechanisms of social transfer of emotions, as a possible innate source of plasticity in moral learning via emotions - and hence of cultural variation in moral codes.

• But this rests on the debatable view that understanding a moral reason implies being motivated to conform to it. Psychopaths do seem to have at least a “rote” or emotionally shallow understanding that their acts are wrong.

Like many people, I was initially attracted to free will issues – at first embracing hard determinism, as part of a general rejection of doctrines associated with religion, though exposure to Kant’s views in my first philosophy course made me begin to consider nonreligious grounds for an indeterminist conception of free action. Of course, Kant also takes belief in God and immortality as presupposed by moral agency, but I was never much moved by those arguments. On free will, though, I (...) thought seeing my acts as determined would give me a reason to expend less effort on them. (shrink)