Les sociologues donnent souvent l’amour comme simple idéalisation. Pourtant si la croyance en l’autre s’appuie dans le temps sur l’imagination, elle requiert aussi la reconnaissance et la narration, c’est la complémentarité de ses trois modes d’entretien de la croyance qui la distingue d’un masquage délibéré ou d’un aveuglement subi.

Marx says of alienated labor that it does not “belong” to the worker, that it issues in a product that does not belong to her, and that it is unfulfilling, unfree, egoistically motivated, and inhuman. He seems to think, moreover, that the first of these features grounds all the others. All of these features seem quite independent, however: they can come apart; they share no obvious common cause or explanation; and if they often occur together, this seems accidental. It is (...) not clear, then, how Marx’s concept of alienated labor could possess the strong unity that he takes it to have. This article defends a reinterpretation of the concept that explains this unity. The various features of alienated labor, the article argues, all follow from a single, hitherto underappreciated feature of its formal motivational structure: the fact that such labor is motivated not by its product but by an incentive. (shrink)

Destiné à l'étudiant en philosophie, ou aux personnes disposant déjà d'une solide culture philosophique, cet ouvrage se présente sous la forme d'une introduction à la métaphysique. Inscrit dans la tradition thomiste, mais ouvert au dialogue avec d'autres traditions de pensée - et notamment les écrits de Maurice Blondel - il tente une défense et un essai de synthèse de sa discipline. Après une introduction discutant de la définition, des sources, de la méthode et des présupposés théologiques de la métaphysique, il (...) s'occupe, dans une première partie, de la saisie intellectuelle de l'« être » quant à ses pôles objectif et subjectif. Il approfondit ensuite la question de la possibilité d'une connaissance métaphysique et engage la discussion entre réalisme et anti-réalisme. Dans une seconde partie, il traite de l'approche rationnelle de Dieu. Il tente, à nouveaux frais, un essai de démonstration de l'existence de Dieu, avant d'approfondir la question du statut analogique de la connaissance de Dieu à laquelle l'homme peut parvenir. Il poursuit et conclut avec les questions traditionnelles de la nature divine, de l'acte créateur, du statut de la créature et de l'éventuelle prémonition rationnelle d'une pluralité en Dieu."-- Back cover. (shrink)

This article identifies power, subjectivity, and practices of freedom as neglected but significant elements for understanding the ethics of social entrepreneurship. While the ethics of social entrepreneurship is typically conceptualized in conjunction with innate properties or moral commitments of the individual, we problematize this view based on its presupposition of an essentialist conception of the authentic subject. We offer, based on Foucault’s ethical oeuvre, a practice-based alternative which sees ethics as being exercised through a critical and creative dealing with the (...) limits imposed by power, notably as they pertain to the conditioning of the neoliberal subject. To this end, we first draw on prior research which looks at how practitioners of social enterprises engage with government policies that demand that they should act and think more like prototypical entrepreneurs. Instead of simply endorsing the kind of entrepreneurial subjectivity implied in prevailing policies, our results indicate that practitioners are mostly reluctant to identify themselves with the invocation of governmental power, often rejecting the subjectivity offered to them by discourse. Conceiving these acts of resistance as emblematic of how social entrepreneurs practice ethics by retaining a skeptical attitude toward attempts that seek to determine who they should be and how they should live, we introduce three vignettes that illustrate how practices of freedom relate to critique, the care for others, and reflected choice. We conclude that a practice-based approach of ethics can advance our understanding of how social entrepreneurs actively produce conditions of freedom for themselves as well as for others without supposing a ‘true self’ or a utopian space of liberty beyond power. (shrink)

The identity theory of truth, according to which true thoughts are identical with facts, is very hard to formulate. It oscillates between substantive versions, which are implausible, and a merely truistic version, which is difficult to distinguish from deflationism about truth. This tension is present in the form of identity theory that one can attribute to McDowell from his views on perception, and in the conception defended by Hornsby under that name.

From Physiology to Psychology After 1860 psychology began to emancipate itself from philosophy and to bond with natural science, especially physiology. But there was no direct translation of the rhythm concept from the latter to the former. This can be exemplified by looking at the contributions of the physiologist and psychologist Karl von Vierordt. Vierordt was educated as a medical doctor and began studying breath in the 1840s. Then his interest - Psychologie – Nouvel article.

I discuss Ruth Marcus' conception of beliefs as dispositional states related to possible states of affaires. While I agree with Marcus that this conception accounts for the necessary distinction between belief and linguistic assent, I argue that the relationship between dispositional beliefs and our assent attitudes is more complex, and should include other mental states, such as acceptances, which, although they contain voluntary elements, are further layers of dispositional doxastic attitudes.

Previous chapter The first objective of this book was to examine the most ancient roots of Western rhythmology and clarify the various concepts on which it rests. Our investigation has shown that three different theoretical paradigms surfaced between the 5th and the 4th centuries BC. We then followed, over a period of more than thousand years, their complex relations, their respective fates, and the final global shift that occurred between the 3rd and the 6th centuries BC. The overall - Sur (...) le concept de rythme – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Previous chapter In the first volume of this series, we followed the emergence and the conflicting development in Antiquity of three rhythmic paradigms which have been active in Western thought ever since: the Democritean physical, the Platonic metric, and the Aristotelian poetic paradigms. We observed how the two rhuthmic models disappeared in the last centuries before the Current Era and how the Platonic model, with its metric and idealistic dimensions, subsequently acquired complete - Philosophie – Nouvel article.

C. Bouton, Le Temps de l'urgence, Paris, Le Bord de l'eau, 2013, 303 p. L'essai de Christophe Bouton s'inscrit dans un ensemble de recherches déjà bien fourni. Depuis quelques années, on observe une inflation d'essais sur la vitesse, l'accélération, l'agitation de la vie quotidienne ou la frénésie au travail. Mais le point de vue qui y est exposé tranche sur la plus grande partie de ces travaux et cela pour un nombre non négligeable de raisons. L'urgence comme norme temporelle de (...) l'action La première (...) - Recensions. (shrink)

Ce texte est l'avant-propos d'un ouvrage en cours. Der Rhythmus ist ein Versuch zur Individuation. Damit Rhythmus da sein könne, muß Vielheit und Werden da sein. Hier zeigt sich die Sucht zum Schönen als Motiv der Individuation. F. Nietzsche, Rhythmische Untersuchungen, KGW II 3, S. 338. Depuis une bonne trentaine d'années, il existe dans les sciences sociales et humaines, mais aussi en philosophie, un courant multiforme qui essaie de surmonter les nombreux dualismes qui les grèvent, que (...) - Philosophie – (...) Nouvel article. (shrink)

Previous chapter Rhuthmology as Deconstruction? How to assess the larger meaning of this philological critique of the modern metric and this reconstruction of the Greek rhythmic? The energy and time Nietzsche spent studying the Greek rhythmic simultaneously with his studies on pre-Socratic thinkers and on the origin of Tragedy suggest that all these subjects were in his mind closely related to each other and, therefore, that Heidegger's interpretation missed an important point: the - Sur le concept de rythme – Nouvel (...) article. (shrink)

Previous chapter In the 1900s emerged a new way to address the fluidization of the world which was based on a quite different rhythmological ground. Unlike the economists, who were—at least most of them—using a naturalistic paradigm of rhythm partly derived from life science and medicine and greatly indebted to Plato, the sociologists and anthropologists rejected any continuity between nature and society and therefore developed a concept of rhythm that was and still is of a much greater - Anthropologie – (...) Nouvel article. (shrink)

Previous chapter From Society to State Rhythms Mauss and Evans-Pritchard provided also a few hints concerning the transition from societies in which politics was immanent in trade and conflict rhythms to more complex ones in which an embryo of state power had already emerged. During this intermediary stage, the latter still partly followed the rhythms of society. Mauss noted that when, in archaic societies, authority was embodied in the form of chieftaincy or kingship, it was not always - Etudes chinoises (...) – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Previous chapter During the first two centuries of the current era, the Roman Empire was under the rule of the Principate. The tremendous civil violence that marred the end of the Republic disappeared. The whole Mediterranean was unified and the exchange between the Greek Eastern and the Latin Western worlds flourished. The Roman aristocracy was entirely “domesticated” but benefited from this period of peace, growth and intercultural exchange to develop new behaviors and interests. - Médecine – Nouvel article.

This article examines Keith Lehrer's distinction between belief and acceptance and how it differs from other accounts of belief and of the family of doxastic attitudes. I sketch a different taxonomy of doxastic attitudes. Lehrer's notion of acceptance is mostly epistemic and at the service of his account of the "loop of reason", whereas for other writers acceptance is mostly a pragmatic attitude. I argue, however, that his account of acceptance underdetermines the role that the attitude of trust plays in (...) his analysis of reason. (shrink)

I argue that the normative dimension in mental content does not figure in the content as a direct feature of this content. But I do not take is as an extrinsic feature due to the properties of our ascriptions either. I suggest that the normativity has to do with the possibility of self attribution of mental states. The views of Robert Brandom are examined in this respect.

Paul Ricœur made a lot to introduce analytic philosophy in France during the 70s and 80s, and he engaged in a dialogue with a number of authors from this tradition, such as Austin, Strawson, Davidson or Parfit. This dialogue, though, was one-sided, since there was no discussion of his views by analytic philosophers. Moreover, Ricœur often misunderstood or misprepresented the analytic views that he was discussing. So in many ways the Ricœur’s encounter with analytic philosophy was unsuccessful, which does not (...) mean that Ricœur’s discussions where unfruitful for his own work. Résumé Paul Ricœur a fait beaucoup pour introduire la philosophie analytique en France pendant les années 1970 et 1980, et il a entrepris un dialogue avec les auteurs de cette tradition, comme Austin, Strawson, Davidson ou Parfit. Mais ce dialogue est cependant resté unilatéral, car il n’y a pas eu de discussion des thèses de Ricœur au sein de la tradition analytique. De plus Ricœur a souvent mécompris les vues analytiques qu’il discutait. En ce sens il n’y a pas eu de rencontre entre Ricœur et les philosophes analytiques, ce qui ne veut pas dire que les discussions par Ricœur des philosophes anaytiques n’aient pas été fructueuses pour son œuvre propre. (shrink)

In ethology, and more generally in the study of animal behavior, observations are _theory-laden_. A review of theories of animal behavior reveals that the animal is a variable _object_, shaped by variable levels of causality. This approach to animal behavior, which differs radically from the way psychology studies human behavior, is a consequence of the difficulty of treating animals as _subjects_ in ethology, where they are most often studied _in the third person_. However, there is a subjectivist tradition in the (...) study of animal behavior, influenced by a phenomenological background. Our aim to promote a _at first person_ approach has led us to propose an etho-phenomenology based on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, Francisco Varela’s enaction theory and constructivist psychology. However, in order to legitimize this approach to animal behavior, we apply it here to behaviors that seem abnormal according to traditional explanatory frameworks, such as actospatiality, tail carrying in mice or expressing ambivalence displayed through color in octopuses. Furthermore, to explore issues such as human-animal communication, the etho-phenomenological perspective is combined with the notion of participatory sense-making, leading us to propose a theory of emotional hybridization. (shrink)

Ageing brings together biological, personal, and social horizons. Attempts to reduce it or to privilege one of these dimensions over the others fail to fully capture the phenomenon. The temporality of ageing presents an irreducible complexity. It is the inextricable intertwinement of three temporalities, three rhythms on different scales: biological time, personal-narrative time, and historical time. In all these dimensions something is of crucial concern: time and temporality. Yet, many philosophers who have thought about time (even those who take seriously (...) the lived experience of temporality) have paid little attention to ageing. Drawing from Heidegger, Scheler, and Schutz, this paper argues that ageing is an irreducible complex of different temporalities where one encounters the historicity of the world through a process of losing touch with it. (shrink)

What is the difference between analytic and Continental philosophy? That the former has not withdrawn norms of justification and truth, whereas the latter has bred suspicion about them.

Presumption is often discussed in law, less often in epistemology. Is it an attitude? If so where can we locate it within the taxonomy of epistemic attitudes? Is it a kind of belief, a judgment, an assumption or a supposition? Or is it a species of inference? There are two basic models of presumption: judgmental, as a kind of judgment, and legal, taken from the use of presumptions in law. The legal model suggests that presumption is a practical inference, whereas (...) the judgmental model suggests that presumption is an epistemic attitude. I argue that presumption is neither a practical inference nor a merely epistemic attitude: it involves both, within the category of what we may call the inquiring attitudes. (shrink)

Dans le cadre d’une recherche-action conduite dans une cité populaire de l’agglomération de Dunkerque, un habitant très actif dans la vie du quartier, en réaction contre les démarches participatives souvent très artificielles, a écrit : « Ils veulent la parole des habitants. Venez dans les quartiers, vous l’aurez », « Viens, on discute. Le conseil citoyen, c’est ici qu’il se tient. Pas là-bas », « Ils veulent nous parler, alors qu’ils acceptent qu’on leur dise… ». Cet article restitue une expérience (...) de démocratie située, vécue au beau milieu du quartier, à l’initiative des habitant·es, une « démocratie éprouvée », à entendre dans la double acception du terme : à l’épreuve des situations (une « preuve » par l’expérience vécue) et à l’écoute des émotions. (shrink)

P. Michon, Marcel Mauss retrouvé. Origines de l'anthropologie du rythme, Paris, Rhuthmos, coll. « Rythmologies », 2015, 130 p. Si vous désirez le livre SOUS SA FORME IMPRIMÉE, envoyez-nous un mail à [email protected]. Vous pouvez également le commander sur Amazon.fr ou sur tout autre site plus accessible pour vous. Marcel Mauss est l'un de ceux qui ont le plus fait pour la théorie du rythme au XXe siècle. Pourtant, parmi ses héritiers directs, seul Gurvitch a prolongé sa - Anthropologie – (...) Nouvel article. (shrink)

This chapter evaluates Davidson's influence on contemporary philosophy. Although a number of his views on meaning, truth, interpretation, action, and mind have often been rejected within contemporary philosophy, most of most his central themes and basic concepts are still with us and have had a lasting influence. The heritage of Davidson's philosophy lies in the capacity of contemporary philosophers to modify his views and to expand them in new directions.

A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of views according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations, Davidson’s triangulation argument, and Brandom’s inferential pragmatics, and criticises each. It is argued that (...) there are objective conceptual norms constitutive of mental content, but that these are not essentially social. (shrink)

«Neither with you nor without you»Francois Truffaut, La femme d’à coté No one can deny that there is a problem between Wittgenstein and analytic philosophers. To put it mildly, there are tensions between Wittgenstein’s and Wittgensteinian styled reflections and the views and practice of a lot of contemporary analytic philosophers, such that they often seem to be strange bedfellows, when they are bedfellows at all. Of course we know that Wittgenstein did not get along very well with Russell, t...

The current literature on environmental sustainability acknowledges that habits are often shaped in private life and that experiences with environmental activities in a non-work setting positively influence environmental behaviors in the work domain. However, the conditions that lead individuals to behave responsibly at work based on their environmental commitment outside the workplace remain poorly understood. We address this issue by pursuing two objectives. First, we outline archetypes of environmental behavior on and off the job and classify individuals into four profiles: (...) Apathetic, Conformist, Citizen and Enthusiast. Second, we examine a set of organizational and psychological variables that explain the likelihood of behaving in accordance with the principles of an archetype in terms of pro-environmental behavior at work. Our findings show that supervisory support, job self-efficacy and affective commitment increase the likelihood of being green at work but that environmental management practices do not. The results differ according to the profiles identified, allowing a better understanding of employees’ commitment to environmental sustainability. We conclude the paper by discussing the theoretical and managerial implications of our findings. (shrink)

These replies to commentators on my work focus on the nature of epistemic norms, on the nature of truth and on the nature and value of knowledge. A normative account of belief and knowledge is committed to substantial and objective epistemic norms. But not everyone agrees on their form. I try here to reply to some doubts raised by my critics.

This paper examines the “pluralist” conception of truth defended by Crispin Wright, and stresses its difficulties and its dangerous flirtation with relativsm. A solution to these difficulties, which Wright himself contemplates, consists in embracing a functionalist theory of truth, according to which truth is a kind of formal property “realised” differently in various domains. But this view, it is argued, does not get rid of the difficulties of pluralism. It is then argued that we have to accept that truth is (...) one, not many, and a kind of realism about truth, on an epistemological basis. (shrink)

The master argument posits a metaphysical thesis: Diodorus does away with Aristotle’s dunamis understood as a power simultaneously oriented toward being and non-being and proclaims that possibilities that fail to actualize are simply nothing. My contention is that this claim is not a mere application of Diodorus’ contribution to modal logic. Rather, Diodorus creates an ontologico-temporal concept of possibility and impossibility. Diodorus envisions the future as the past that the future will become. Since what will have been can never be (...) the accomplishment of a possibility that did not obtain, and since the future is destined to become past, any futural possibility that doesn’t actualize is neither futural nor even possible. (shrink)

Philibert Secretan compose ici une manière de portrait de Pascal par le choix de quelques "Pensées" où se dessine sa vision de la condition humaine ; il en commente certains thèmes et donne la voix à des pages riches de résonances poétiques : plus qu'il ne le lit, il écoute Pascal. Enfin, associant sa lecture à celle de trois autres grands lecteurs du philosophe Ludwig Wittgenstein, Edgar Morin et Pierre Bourdieu, il s'arrête sur deux aspects particuliers du philosophe (...) : Pascal, critique, précurseur de Kant ; Pascal, architecte d'une pensée qui s'organise autour de la hiérarchie des ordres. A rebours d'une tradition de lecture par aphorismes, Philibert Secretan privilégie une systématique pascalienne qui en fait ressortir les fulgurances et les abîmes. (shrink)