Is a belief that one will succeed necessary for an intention? It is argued that the question has traditionally been badly posed, framed as it is in terms of all-out belief. We need instead to ask about the relation between intention and partial belief. An account of partial belief that is more psychologically realistic than the standard credence account is developed. A notion of partial intention is then developed, standing to all-out intention much as partial belief (...) stands to all-out belief. Various coherence constraints on the notion are explored. It is concluded that the primary relations between intention and belief should be understood as normative and not essential. (shrink)

Richard Holton has argued that the traditional account of intentions—which only posits the existence of all-out intentions—is inadequate because it fails to accommodate dual-plan cases; ones in which it is rationally permissible for an agent to adopt two competing plans to bring about the same end. Since the consistency norms governing all-out intentions prohibit the adoption of competing intentions, we can only preserve the idea that the agent in a dual-plan case is not being irrational if (...) we attribute to them a pair of partial intentions. I argue that, contrary to initial appearances, (i) Holton has yet to offer us an actual account of partial intentions, and (ii) that the traditional account of intentions already has the resources necessary to accommodate dual-plan cases. (shrink)

I investigate the structure of pro-tempore disjunctive intentions: intentions directed at two or more eventually incompatible goals that are nonetheless kept open for the time being, while the agent is waiting to acquire more information to determine which option is better. These intentions are the basic tool for balancing, in our planning agency, rigidity and flexibility, stability and responsiveness to changing circumstances. They are a pervasive feature of intentional diachronic agency and contribute to secure dynamic consistency in (...) our plans. I show how they differ from simple disjunctive intentions, where the agent is indifferent between the options. I argue that pro-tempore disjunctive intentions meet the distinctive pressures of intentions and that, contrary to the initial impressions, they are both stable and successful at settling practical matters. In closing, I argue that pro-tempore disjunctive intentions are all-out intentions that are more explanatorily powerful than Holton's "partial" intentions. (shrink)

“Intention Cognitivism” (IC) refers to a family of theories concerning the relation between the concepts of intention and belief. While there are important differences between the various theories that belong to this family, each is committed to the idea that an agent intends to X only if they believe that they (probably) will X. In this article I argue against this core commitment of IC on the basis of recent experimental evidence concerning the ways in which ordinary speakers of English (...) use the concepts of intention and belief. After summarizing some of this evidence, I consider a possible defense of IC, one based on the distinction between full versus partial intentions and beliefs. I report on a new study that was conducted specifically to evaluate this defense of IC, the results of which indicate that this distinction fails to protect IC against the compelling empirical evidence against it. Additionally, I consider, and argue against, two recent arguments for IC. (shrink)

PurposeDrawing upon the stimulus-organism-response model, this paper aims to investigate the effects of stores’ environmental components on Chinese consumers’ emotions and intentions to purchase luxury brands.Design/Methodology/ApproachData were collected from Chinese consumers who have purchased luxury brands from retail stores. Partial least squares-structural equation modeling and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis were employed for data analysis.FindingsThe results of PLS-SEM indicated that three dimensions of the store environment directly and significantly influenced Chinese consumers’ emotions. However, fsQCA revealed greater heterogeneity among respondents (...) by highlighting stores’ environmental components and Chinese consumers’ emotions.Originality/ValueThis study makes significant contributions to the marketing literature by examining the S-O-R model alongside fsQCA approach to conditionally predict outcomes in a luxury brand context. The present study may be one of the first to examine the effects of stores’ environmental components on Chinese consumers’ emotions and purchase intentions, applying both symmetrical test and asymmetrical test approaches to determine significant components of the store environment as well as component combinations that predict Chinese consumers’ emotions and purchase intentions. (shrink)

Speakers typically use the sentence “I will go to the store” to simultaneously express an intention to go to the store and a belief that they will go to the store. This is consonant with two popular theses about intentions: first, intending to j implies believing that one will j; second, intending to j commits one to j-ing. In this paper, I argue that at least one of these theses is false. I do so by exploring what speakers express (...) when they utter a sentence with a slightly different form, like “I will probably go to the store” in a typical situation. After laying down a framework for thinking about this sort of communication, I explore some different things speakers might express with this sentence in different situations. Most importantly, I argue that in some typical situations speakers express either ordinary intentions but not beliefs or partial intentions that don’t commit them to performing the intended action. Either way, at least one of the popular theses is false. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there is a preface paradox for intention. The preface paradox for intention shows that intentions do not obey an agglomeration norm, requiring one to intend conjunctions of whatever else one intends. But what norms do intentions obey? I will argue that intentions come in degrees. These partial intentions are governed by the norms of the probability calculus. First, I will give a dispositional theory of partial intention, on which (...) degrees of intention are the degrees to which one possesses the dispositions characteristic of full intention. I will use this dispositional theory to defend probabilism about intention. Next, I will offer a more general argument for probabilism about intention. To do so, I will generalize recent decision theoretic arguments for probabilism from the case of belief to the case of intention. (shrink)

This paper introduces and argues for contrastivism about intentions. According to contrastivism, intention is not a binary relation between an agent and an action. Rather, it is a ternary relation between an agent, an action, and an alternative. Contrastivism is introduced via a discussion of cases of known but (apparently) unintended side effects. Such cases are puzzling. They put pressure on us to reject a number of highly compelling theses about intention, intentional action, and practical reason. And they give (...) rise to a puzzle about rather than constructions such as ‘I intend to φ rather than ψ’: In side effect cases it can seem wrong to claim that the subject intends to φ, yet acceptable to claim that they intend to φ rather than ψ. This cries out for explanation. Contrastivism provides a unified response to all of these problems. (shrink)

Partial/particular will (al-irādah al-juz’iyyah) and the creation of human acts are two issues related to the predestination belief. Nowadays, it is unarguably accepted that humans have volition. However, the controversy over the formation steps of human will and act does not seem to be settled. Māturīdīs’ approach, taken with the intent to allow some space for freedom for humans in their actions and based on the partial will and postulation that there is a part in human actions that (...) are not created nor subject to creation, could not be understood at times. When it comes to misunderstandings of this kind, Sadr al-Sharī‘a and Ibn al-Humām, who are among the Hanafī-Māturīdī kalam scholars, are mentioned. Both mutakallims are some of the eminent figures who left their marks on the Hanafī-Māturīdī school. They affected a significant number of scholars coming after them by the authentic ideas they presented. However, even though neither Sadr al-Sharī‘a nor Ibn al-Humām did regard humans as creators of their own actions, they are confronted with an accusation as if they vitiated the fact that God is the Absolute Creator. Therefore, it is of grave importance to reveal Sadr al-Sharī‘a’s ideas, which are represented in his “Four Premises” concerning the formation of an act and Ibn Humām’s thoughts put forward in his “Ījādu al-‘Azm al-Musammamah” and “Takhsīsu Irādah al-Juz’iyyah.”. (shrink)

Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; (...) but, unlike intentions, motor representations cannot feature as premises or conclusions in practical reasoning. This implies that motor representation has a distinctive role in explaining the purposiveness of action. It also gives rise to a problem: were the roles of intention and motor representation entirely independent, this would impair effective action. It is therefore necessary to explain how intentions interlock with motor representations. The solution, we argue, is to recognise that the contents of intentions can be partially determined by the contents of motor representations. Understanding this content-determining relation enables better understanding how intentions relate to actions. (shrink)

What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. (...) Intentions are treated as elements of partial plans of action. These plans play basic roles in practical reasoning, roles that support the organization of our activities over time and socially. Bratman explores the impact of this approach on a wide range of issues, including the relation between intention and intentional action, and the distinction between intended and expected effects of what one intends. (shrink)

Machiavellians are often seen as manipulative people who contribute negatively to teams and ventures. However, recent work has shown that Machiavellians can also cooperate and act in pro-social ways in a team context. Thus, some aspects of Machiavellianism might be conducive for teams and team members’ intentions to start a business venture. Most studies in this area have failed to (a) assess the effect of Machiavellianism at the team level, (b) take into account the dimensional nature of Machiavellianism, and (...) (c) assess moderators of these effects. We propose that the combination of Machiavellianism and resilience in teams predict team entrepreneurial intentions (EI). Moreover, we propose that different team level dimensions of Machiavellianism (amoral manipulation, desire for status, desire for control, distrust of others) are differentially related to EI. More specifically, we expect at the team level that amoral manipulation and desire for status are positively related to changes in EI (as teams high on these dimensions feel that they can use unethical practices that give them an advantage in being successful), whereas desire for control and distrust of others should be negatively related to changes in EI (as entrepreneurial teams usually work in less structured situations and need to closely work together). Furthermore, all sub-dimensions of Machiavellianism should interact positively with team resilience as resilience acts as a buffer that protects teams from potential negative effects of Machiavellianism. In a multi-wave study among newly formed teams engaged in entrepreneurship projects, controlling for psychopathy and narcissism, we found partial support for our hypotheses. Results supported our expectations for the “amoral manipulation” and “desire for control” sub-dimensions, but not for the “desire for status” and the “distrust of others” sub-dimensions of Machiavellianism, with distrust of others showing unexpectedly opposite effects. This study contributes to the literature by looking at the dimensions of Machiavellianism at the level of entrepreneurial teams in conjunction with the more positive team characteristic, resilience. Our results indicate that the relationship between Machiavellianism and EI is more complex than previously hypothesized, as the sub-dimensions are sometimes positively and sometimes negatively related to entrepreneurial intentions and interact with team-level resilience. (shrink)

Doxasticism is the thesis that intention is or involves belief in the forthcoming action (Velleman, Harman). Supporters claim that it is only by accepting that thesis that we can explain a wide array of important phenomena, including the special knowledge we have of intentional action, the roles intention plays in facilitating coordination, and the norms of rationality for intention. Others argue that the thesis is subject to counterexample (Davidson, Bratman). Yet some others contend that the thesis can be reformulated in (...) a way that avoids such counterexamples and preserves its explanatory significance (Pears, Setiya). Their suggestion is that we view intention as involving partial –rather than full—belief. I argue that while the move from full to partial doxasticism helps to accommodate such counterexamples, it does so in a way that undermines the ability of the resulting view to explain the coordinating roles of and rationality norms for intention. (shrink)

Our study contributes by providing new insights into the relationship between the individual levels of the antecedents and how the intention of whistleblowing is moderated by perceived organizational support, team norms, and perceived moral intensity. In this paper, we argue that the intention of both internal and external whistleblowing depends on the individual-level antecedents [attitudes toward whistleblowing, perceived behavioral control, independence commitment, personal responsibility for reporting, and personal cost of reporting ] and is moderated by POS, TNs, and PMI. The (...) findings confirm our predictions. Data were collected using an online survey on 256 Indonesian public accountants who worked in the audit firm affiliated with the Big 4 and non-Big 4. The results support the argument that all the antecedents of individual levels can improve the auditors’ intention to blow the whistle. The nature of the relationship is more complex than analysis by adding moderating variables using the Partial Least Squares-Structural Equation Modeling approach. We found that POS, TNs, and PMI can partially improve the relationship between the individual-level antecedents and whistleblowing intentions. These findings indicate that the POS, TNs, and PMI are a mechanism or that attribute is important in controlling behavior. (shrink)

In this paper, I will discuss the various ways in which intentions can be said to be conditional, with particular attention to the internal conditions on the intentions’ content. I will first consider what it takes to carry out a conditional intention. I will then discuss how the distinctive norms of intention apply to conditional intentions and whether conditional intentions are a weaker sort of commitments than the unconditional ones. This discussion will lead to the idea (...) of what I call the ‘deep structure’ of intentions. Roughly, this is the idea that the conditional nature of our intentions is only partially made explicit in the expressions we use to communicate our intentions and in the explicit form of our thinking about and reasoning with them. Most conditions that qualify our intentions are part of a deep functional structure that can be evinced by observing the actual psychological functioning of intentions and by considering the rational requirements that they engage. I will argue that the deep structure of intentions is characteristically conditional. Genuinely unconditional intentions are only limiting instances of conditional intentions and their contribution to agency can only be understood in light of this fact. I will conclude by showing that the characteristic conditional structure of intentions is intimately related to distinctive features of human agency, especially to its unity over time. (shrink)

What are the objects of speaker meaning? The traditional answer is: propositions. The traditional answer faces an important challenge: if propositions are the objects of speaker meaning then there must be specific propositions that speakers intend their audiences to recover. Yet, speakers typically exhibit a degree of indifference regarding how they are interpreted, and cannot rationally intend for their audiences to recover specific propositions. Therefore, propositions are not the objects of speaker meaning (Buchanan 2010; MacFarlane 2020a; 2020b; and Abreu Zavaleta (...) 2021). In this paper I do two things. Firstly, I outline a collective analogue of this challenge that undermines the most prominent responses to the original challenge. Secondly, I provide a new solution: typical utterances are backed by a cluster of partial communicative intentions. This response resolves both individual and collective variants of the problem and allows us to retain the traditional propositional view of speaker meaning. (shrink)

Given the success of the formal approach, within contemporary epistemology, to understanding degreed belief, some philosophers have recently considered its extension to the challenge of understanding intention. According to them, (1) intentions can also admit of degrees, as beliefs do, and (2) these degreed states are all governed by the norms of the probability calculus, such that the rational norms for belief and for intention exhibit certain structural similarity. This paper, however, raises some worries about (2). It considers two (...) schemes for representing degreed intention, and casts some doubt on applying probabilistic norms to degreed intention on each scheme. And it argues that the norms of Intention–Belief Consistency and Enkrasia cannot plausibly be turned into norms prescribing a simple correspondence relation between one’s degrees of belief and intention. The results suggest a potential structural discrepancy between the norms of theoretical and practical rationality—at least for degreed belief and intention. This potential discrepancy not only raises interesting questions about the intention–belief relation and rational norms for degreed intention. It also poses a new challenge for intention-based expressivism about normative judgment and cognitivism about practical rationality. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the self-knowledge of emotions. I first argue that several of the leading theories of self-knowledge, including the transparency method (see, e.g., Byrne 2018) and neo-expressivism (see, e.g., Bar-On 2004), have difficulties explaining how we authoritatively know our own emotions (even though they may plausibly account for sensation, belief, intention, and desire). I next consider Barrett’s (2017a) empirically informed theory of constructed emotion. While I agree with her that we ‘give meaning to [our] present sensations’ (2017a, p.26), (...) I disagree with her that we construct our emotions, as this has some unwelcome implications. I then draw upon recent data from the science of emotions literature to advance a view I call partial first-person authority. According to this view, first-person authority with respect to our emotions is only partial: we can introspect and authoritatively know our own sensations, and beliefs, in ways others cannot; but we still need to interpret those sensations and beliefs, to know our emotions. Finally, I consider self-interpretational accounts of self-knowledge by Carruthers (2011) and Cassam (2014). I argue that while these accounts are implausible when applied to beliefs, desires, and intentions, they are more plausible when applied to our emotions. (shrink)

High turnover intention is a problem in the workforce today. The purpose of this study is to determine the relationship between experienced workplace incivility and psychological well-being on turnover intention. The subjects of this study were 46 millennial employees who had worked for at least three months. Data were collected with turnover intention scale, experienced workplace incivility scale, and psychological well-being scale. Partial Least Square PLS-SEM analysis was used to analyze the data. Findings indicate that experienced workplace incivility is (...) positively related to turnover intention, while psychological well-being is negatively related to employee turnover intention. The results show that workplace incivility affects employee turnover intention higher than psychological well-being for millennial employees. Connections and communality are characteristics of millennial employees; therefore, they consider that the environment is essential. It is essential for employers to develop a work condition that minimalizes experienced workplace incivility and improves the psychological well-being of their employees to reduce turnover intention among millennial employees. (shrink)

Arguments over the value of ‘extreme music’ and the use of highly controversial imagery within these genres have existed since its inception. Detractors claim that using extreme imagery such as fascist symbols, pornography and racially charged photographs inherently promotes the corrosive ideologies behind these images. Some purveyors of extreme music disagree, arguing that musicians use these images to explore humanity’s darker elements which, in turn, allow audiences to better understand these problematic aspects of modern society. When played out within underground (...) music communities, these arguments often devolve into name calling and accusations of censorship. However, by addressing extreme music on its own terms and critiquing the effectiveness of these genres, a more nuanced understanding of the issues intrinsically embedded within extreme music emerges. In this article, I employ this approach by exploring the music and imagery of power electronics band Whitehouse and argue that the ambiguous nature of their work partially mirrors the intention behind Paulo Freire’s concept of codifications. While this notion provides some defence for extreme music more broadly, the lack of venues that promote communal explorations of these images hinders the genre’s ability to achieve its own goals. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Katherine Dormandy argues that there is no partiality in virtuous faith. Partiality biases and leads to noetic entrenchment. In response, I contend there is an important sense in which virtuous faith is partial towards its object. Namely, it disposes one to perceive the object as more trustworthy and to rely on this partialist evidence in forming beliefs, even when the impartialist evidence points in the other direction. There are, after all, situations in which impartialist evidence is apt to (...) mislead or to fail to bring one to the truth. In such cases, faith attunes one to the subject’s true motivations and intentions. Here the partiality of faith constitutes a kind of social acuity or expertise, not a bias. Indeed, to lack faith in such situations—and to give impartialist evidence equal weight with the partial—might constitute a kind of bias against the subject, casting his or her actions in an overly negative light. (shrink)

BackgroundIn this study, medical errors are defined as unintentional patient harm caused by a doctor’s mistake. This topic, due to limited research, is poorly understood in Malaysia. The objective of this study was to determine the proportion of doctors intending to disclose medical errors, and their attitudes/perception pertaining to medical errors.MethodsThis cross-sectional study was conducted at a tertiary public hospital from July- December 2015 among 276 randomly selected doctors. Data was collected using a standardized and validated self-administered questionnaire intending to (...) measure disclosure and attitudes/perceptions. The scale had four vignettes in total two medical and two surgical. Each vignette consisted of five questions and each question measured the disclosure. Disclosure was categorised as “No Disclosure”, “Partial Disclosure” or “Full Disclosure”. Data was keyed in and analysed using STATA v 13.0.ResultsOnly 10.1% intended to disclose medical errors. Most respondents felt that they possessed an attitude/perception of adequately disclosing errors to patients. There was a statistically significant difference when comparing the intention of disclosure with perceived disclosures. Most respondents were in common agreement that disclosing an error would make them less likely to get sued, that minor errors should be reported and that they experienced relief from disclosing errors.ConclusionMost doctors in this study would not disclose medical errors although they perceived that the errors were serious and felt responsible for it. Poor disclosure could be due the fear of litigations and improper mechanisms/procedures available for disclosure. (shrink)

The power to exercise control is a crucial feature of agency. Necessarily, if S cannot exercise some degree of control over anything - any state of affairs, event, process, object, or whatever - S is not an agent. If S is not an agent, S cannot act intentionally, responsibly, or rationally, nor can S possess or exercise free will. In my dissertation I reflect on the nature of control, and on the roles consciousness plays in its exercise. I first consider (...) the fragmented state of philosophical and empirical work on control. I argue that a mature philosophy of agency stands in need of a detailed personal-level account of control, and I begin by explicating a notion I call intentional control. On this explication, an agent J exercises intentional control in service of an intention X to the degree that behavior of J's for which X plays a (non-deviant) causal role approximates the representational content of X. With this explication in hand, I offer analyses of theoretically salient points along a degreed spectrum (covering, e.g., the exercise of minimal, successful, and perfect intentional control). Next, I develop an account of the degrees of intentional control's possession. This involves elucidation of ingredients of intentional control, i.e. those features of agents and environments that constitute an agent's causal potency and skill. It turns out that an agent's possession of control regarding an intention is intimately tied to her ability to repeatedly execute that intention across some specified (hypothetical) set of scenarios. Finally, I discuss a number of potentially fruitful applications of the account. In chapter three I confront a strong intuition, persistent in both philosophy and cognitive science, that consciousness is somehow intimately involved in the exercise of control. In this connection recent empirical work indicates the causal powers of consciousness remain poorly understood. I argue that Functional Agnosticism - the view that any claim regarding a function of consciousness for behavior is currently underdetermined by the data - is the wisest position on the causal powers of consciousness. Recognition of this unsatisfying state of affairs motivates reflection on what might enable progress beyond it. I argue that establishing a causal function for consciousness is facilitated by clarity on several issues. First, what is the sense of consciousness at issue? I isolate state consciousness, discuss the potential relevance of various types of conscious states, and distinguish between ambitious and modest approaches to the causal powers of state consciousness. In short, ambitious approaches seek to understand the causal contributions of a conscious mental state in virtue of the fact that the state is conscious; modest approaches seek to understand the causal contributions of conscious mental states, full stop. I argue that for various theoretical purposes, both approaches can be useful. Second, what is the sense of control at issue? I argue that for many important theoretical purposes, intentional control is the relevant sense. Finally, I illustrate the usefulness of clarity on these issues by examining recent work on the roles of conscious and unconscious vision for action. This work suggests that some important subset of our overt action is controlled by non-conscious processes. I apply insights developed earlier, noting common mistakes made in this literature, and highlighting important empirical possibilities these mistakes obscure. In later chapters I develop a novel account of conscious control. In chapter four I develop a central part of the account, which involves a view on the intentional structure of conscious trying. The leading view entails that conscious trying possesses a descriptive (or thetic) structure. Based on relevant empirical work concerning deafferented and paralyzed patients, I argue for the view that conscious trying is (at least) partially constituted by directive (or telic) structure. Finally, I argue that the exercise of conscious control is best understood as an exercise of intentional control for which the experience of trying plays a constitutive role. After presenting arguments for this view and defending the view against objections, I discuss the importance of conscious control for a mature philosophy of mind and agency. (shrink)

Companies in the world today understand that keeping users in touch is essential to enhancing their trust. The primary objective of this study was to determine the intention-based critical determinants of E-commerce utilization in China from the end users’ perspective. We developed a framework that identifies the factors that influence E-commerce utilization in China. Besides, we introduced observational research conducted in a real-world E-commerce sense. Results are based on a sample of 400 respondents by employing a comprehensive questionnaire survey. The (...) structural equation modeling and the partial least squares regression approach was used to analyze the data. Study results show that perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, reputation, trust in vendors, and purchase frequency significantly influence consumers’ intention to use E-commerce systems. Research outcomes emphasize transforming social norms, raising consumers’ awareness, redesigning policy frameworks, and highlighting the paybacks that E-commerce offers through integrative and consistent efforts. (shrink)

Due to their role as a centre of knowledge and character development,public higher education institutions serve as the best platform for emphasisinghealth communication messages and promoting a healthy lifestyle. Highereducational institutions’ employees should have good physical and mentalhealth to enable them to demonstrate good values to the students. Thus,the social cognitive theory was specifically selected to take a closelook at how a conducive environment and knowledge influence employees’intention towards the tobacco-free policy. This study used the partial leastsquares and structural (...) equation modelling software to examinefactors influencing the adoption of tobacco-free policy among employeesin a Malaysian higher education institution. It also measured the impact ofworkplace health promotion on employees’ intention to comply with tobaccocessation regulations. Statistical results confirmed that all three constructsof employees’ environment, self-efficacy, and knowledge have a significant influence on employees’ intention to adopt the tobacco-free policy. The resultsof the study contribute to a better understanding of the effectiveness of highereducation institutions’ tobacco-free policy in Malaysia. The findings are usefulfor policymakers, higher education institutions, and practitioners in enhancingtobacco cessation policy in Malaysia. Limitations and suggestions for futureresearch are also included in this paper. (shrink)

In Art and intention Paisley Livingston develops a broad and balanced perspective on perennial disputes between intentionalists and anti-intentionalists in philosophical aesthetics and critical theory. He surveys and assesses a wide range of rival assumptions about the nature of intentions and the status of intentionalist psychology. With detailed reference to examples from diverse media, art forms, and traditions, he demonstrates that insights into the multiple functions of intentions have important implications for our understanding of artistic creation and authorship, (...) the ontology of art, conceptions of texts, works, and versions, basic issues pertaining to the nature of fiction and fictional truth, and the theory of art interpretation and appreciation. Livingston argues that neither the inspirationist nor rationalistic conceptions can capture the blending of deliberate and intentional, spontaneous and unintentional processes in the creation of art. Texts, works, and artistic structures and performances cannot be adequately individuated in the absence of a recognition of the relevant makers4intentions. The distinction between complete and incomplete works receives an action-theoretic analysis that makes possible an elucidation of several different senses of "fragment" in critical discourse. Livingston develops an account of authorship, contending that the recognition of intentions is in fact crucial to our understanding of diverse forms of collective art-making. An artist's short-term intentions and long-term plans and policies interact in complex ways in the emergence of an artistic oeuvre, and our uptake of such attitudes makes an important difference to our appreciation of the relations between items belonging to a single life-work. The intentionalism Livingston advocates is, however, a partial one, and accommodates a number of important anti-intentionalist contentions. Intentions are fallible, and works of art, like other artefacts, can be put to a bewildering diversity of uses. Yet some important aspects of art's meaning and value are linked to the artist's aims and activities. (shrink)

I am most grateful to James Blair and Justin D’Arms for commenting on my work. I would be hard put to name two other moral psychologists whose reactions I’d be so keen to hear. There is a striking asymmetry in their commentaries. Blair prefers a minimalist story about moral judgment, maintaining that the appeal to rules is unnecessary. D’Arms, by contrast, maintains that the account I offer is overly simple and that children lack moral concepts despite their partial facility (...) with moral language. It is tempting to treat my account as achieving the golden mean between Blair’s austerity and D’Arms’ extravagance. But it would be unfair to both. Blair is attracted to the sparse account for empirical reasons, and D’Arms is attracted to a richer account for philosophical reasons. Nonetheless, I still think that the account I offer is preferable to Blair’s minimalism and to D’Arms neosentimentalism. Rather than give a point-by-point reply, which would likely be tedious, I’ll try to say why I think that my account is still more plausible than the alternatives proffered by Blair and D’Arms. (shrink)

One of the greatest challenges facing materialist theories of the human mind is the problem of intentionality. As many non-materialists of various stripes have pointed out, it is very difficult to say, if the human mind is a purely material thing, how this material thing can be about or represent another thing wholly distinct from itself. However, for their part, these same non-materialists have relied heavily or exclusively on this intuition that one material thing cannot be about another. In this (...) paper, that hole in the intentionality objection to materialist theories of mind is filled by way of providing the germ of a new theory of the metaphysics of intentionality. On this view, intentionality just is partial identity. Partial identity is a concept introduced by David Armstrong and used by Donald Baxter to give a metaphysics of instantiation. The aboutness exhibited by our mental activity is simply a partial identity relation between the mind and the object of thought. This thesis, I contend, is a faithful interpretation of Brentano’s “intentional inexistence,” which the objects of thought have in the mind and which he held to be characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. Some interesting and fortuitous consequences, including an elucidation of precisely why one material thing can never be about something distinct from itself, are then examined, and finally a defense against some objections is given. (shrink)

This paper argues that the types of intention can be modeled both as modal operators and via a multi-hyperintensional semantics. I delineate the semantic profiles of the types of intention, and provide a precise account of how the types of intention are unified in virtue of both their operations in a single, encompassing, epistemic space, and their role in practical reasoning. I endeavor to provide reasons adducing against the proposal that the types of intention are reducible to the mental states (...) of belief and desire, where the former state is codified by subjective probability measures and the latter is codified by a utility function. I argue, instead, that each of the types of intention -- i.e., intention-in-action, intention-as-explanation, and intention-for-the-future -- has as its aim the value of an outcome of the agent's action, as derived by her partial beliefs and assignments of utility, and as codified by the value of expected utility in evidential decision theory. (shrink)

In aesthetics, the topic of intentions comes up most often in the perennial debate between intentionalists and anti-intentionalists over standards of interpretation. The underlying assumptions about the nature and functions of intentions are, however, rarely explicitly developed, even though divergent and at times tendentious premises are often relied upon in this controversy. Livingston provides a survey of contentions about the nature and status of intentions and intentionalist psychology more generally, arguing for an account that recognizes the multiple (...) functions fulfilled by intentions in the lives of temporally situated agents who deliberate over what to do, settle on ends and means, and try to realize some of their plans. Artists’ intentions are the same sorts of attitudes that we attribute to ourselves and to others as we attempt to describe, explain, and predict our actions. As such, intentions are relevant not only to debates over the interpretation of works of art but also to a range of other basic topics in the philosophy of art, including artistic creation and authorship, the ontology of art, the nature of texts, works, versions, and life-works, and the status and nature of fiction and fictional truth. With regard to the controversy over the interpretation of art, Livingston advocates a ‘partial’ intentionalism. Intentions are never infallible, so there is a conceptual gap between the completed work and the intentions that initiated and guided its making. Yet in spite of the fallibility of intentions and of our beliefs and claims about them, intentions regularly contribute to the determination of a work’s features, including implicit meanings, the recognition of which requires the uptake of the artist’s intentional design. Partial intentionalism also finds support in the idea that at least one sort of artistic value depends on the artist’s skilful accomplishment of intentions. (shrink)

The research into the typical behavioral pattern, motivational structure, and the value system of psychopaths can shed light on at least three aspects related to the analysis of the moral agency. First, it can help elucidating the emotive and cognitive conditions necessary for moral performance. Secondly, it can provide empirical evidence supporting the externalist theories of moral motivation. Finally, it can bring into greater focus our intuitive notion of the limits of moral responsibility. In this paper I shall concentrate on (...) the last one—the question of responsibility of the amoralists, but the discussion will have an indirect bearing on the other two themes as well. My main reason for holding psychopaths morally responsible breaks down into two claims: the assumption that most ordinary people are morally responsible for their intentional actions and the denial that the psychopaths are qualitatively different from the non-psychopaths. This thesis is further defended against two objections. First, I am arguing that the genetically based emotive deficiency of the psychopaths cannot be seen the factor condemning them to amoral existence, and thus cannot be cited as an exempting condition. Secondly, my position is defended against the claim that psychopaths are partly responsible for their actions. It is argued that the notion of partial responsibility is either incoherent or else rests on a false empirical premise. My conclusion is in agreement with, and provides a theoretical justification for, the position of most classifications of the persons with antisocial personality disorder in the DSM IV. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss Ludwig's systematic and illuminating account of conditional intentions, with particular reference to my own view (presented in "Conditional Intentions", Noûs, 2009). In contrast to Ludwig, I argue that we should prefer a formal characterization of conditional intentions rather than a more substantial one in terms of reasons for action (although the conditions that qualify an intention bear on the reasonableness and justifiability of the intention). I then defend a partially different taxonomy of (...) the conditions that might qualify an intention and discuss how the difference bears on the application of the rational pressures of intention. I go on to acknowledge that Ludwig is correct on insisting on the centrality of the *epistemic* element in the antecedent of conditional intentions. But I argue that even when a condition has been settled (that is, when the agent has ascertained that it holds), the intention remains genuinely conditional. In my view, conditions that have been settled are not just part of the background of planning: they continue to qualify the content of the intention (although they come to play a different role when settled). I then discuss how the settling of a condition does not interrupt the *continuity* of the content and structure of the intention---in contrast to Ludwig's account, where the conditional intention appears to give rise, when the conditions are taken as settled, to a distinct *unconditional* intention. I close by discussing the serious concern that my way of characterizing conditional intentions threatens to swallow most intentions, given that it is unlikely that we have intentions that do not rest on our accepting the obtaining of relevant conditions. (shrink)

Research suggests a direct negative relationship between peers’ unethical behavior and employees’ ethical intention. But several possible mechanisms might explain this relationship in more detail. For example, Machiavellianism is a personality trait characterized by interpersonal manipulation and the use of unethical means to achieve certain self‐interested ends, whether useful or pleasant. This article adopts an Aristotelian understanding of philia, related to three goods on which human relationships rest: useful, pleasant, and honest. We propose that Machiavellianism, a self‐interested, pragmatic personality orientation, (...) might explicate the relationship between peers’ unethical behavior and ethical intention. The results of a structural equation model applied to a sample of 436 banking employees in Spain reveals that Machiavellianism partially mediates the relationship between peers’ unethical behavior and employees’ ethical intention. We also find that with a greater level of peers’ unethical behavior, the negative effect of Machiavellianism on ethical intention increases, and that when peers’ unethical behavior is nonexistent, the negative effect of Machiavellianism on ethical intention disappears. These findings advance current literature by revealing that unethical peers can indirectly influence ethical intention, through shaping Machiavellianism. Our study is also the first to show that pairing high Machiavellians with ethical peers can help to cancel out the negative influence of Machiavellianism on ethical intention. (shrink)

Suppose we wish to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality. Like several other philosophers, we focus on the intentionality of belief, hoping that we may later supplement our account to accommodate other intentional states like desires and fears. Now suppose that we also take partial beliefs or credences seriously. In cashing out our favoured theory of intentionality, we may for the sake of simplicity talk as if belief is merely binary or all-or-nothing. But we should be able to supplement (...) or modify our account to accommodate credences. I shall argue, however, that it is difficult to do so with respect to certain causal or teleological theories of intentionality-in particular, those advanced by the likes of Stalnaker (Inquiry, 1984) and Millikan (J Philos 86:281–297, 1989). I shall first show that such theories are tailor-made to account for the intentionality of binary beliefs. Then I shall argue that it is hard to extend or supplement such theories to accommodate credences. Finally, I shall offer some natural ways of modifying the theories that involve an appeal to objective probabilities. But unfortunately, such modifications face problems. (shrink)

Technological products such as computer, communication, and consumer electronic products, apps, smart wearables, and streaming services have become inseparable from people’s lives. In technological fields of practice, imagination, creativity, innovation, and entrepreneurship may influence one another. A vivid imagination can generate creativity and trigger the entrepreneurial intention to “bring new things to the market.” This study aims to understand the formation of internet entrepreneurial intention to use technology products. Drawing on social cognitive theory, this study explores and empirically tests how (...) technology product imagination disposition and social support impact internet entrepreneurial intention to use technology products. Drawing from self-determination theory, this study proposes and examines the mediating role of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in the relationship between technology product imagination disposition and internet entrepreneurial intention, as well as the relationship between social support and internet entrepreneurial intention. We conducted a survey of 568 adults in Taiwan and used partial least squares to test our hypotheses. The results show the following: Technology product imagination disposition is positively associated with challenge, enjoyment, compensation, and outward motivation. Social support is positively associated with challenge, enjoyment, compensation, and outward motivation. Challenge, enjoyment, and outward motivation are positively associated with internet entrepreneurial intention to use technology products. Technology product imagination disposition intensifies internet entrepreneurial intention to use technology products by strengthening challenge, enjoyment, and outward motivation. Social support intensifies internet entrepreneurial intention by increasing challenge, enjoyment, and outward motivation. The partial mediation model represents a significant improvement in the total effect over the direct effect. We discuss the implications of these results for research and internet entrepreneurship practices. (shrink)

The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 requires company executives to certify financial statements and internal controls as a means of reducing fraud. Many companies have operationalized this by instituting a sub-certification process and requiring lower-level managers to sign certification statements. These lower-level organizational members are often the individuals who are aware of fraud and are in the best position to provide information on the fraudulent act. However, the sub-certification process may have the effect of reducing employees’ intentions to report wrongdoing. (...) We suggest that subordinates with knowledge of a superior who committed a fraudulent act and certified that there is no fraud will feel less personal responsibility to report the act, thus, decreasing reporting intentions. Additionally, we suggest that if the fraud is discovered subsequent to the reports being filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, employees will perceive lower management responsiveness to investigate the fraud, which will reduce intentions to report. Using an experimental approach, we manipulate two between-participant variables: the presence or absence of sub-certification by the transgressor and the timing of fraud discovery, either before or after the reports have been filed with the SEC. We find that when sub-certification is present, perceived personal responsibility and intentions to report were diminished compared to when sub-certification is absent. Timing of the discovery of the fraudulent act did not influence perceived management responsiveness or reporting intentions. Supplemental analysis shows that personal responsibility partially mediates the relationship between sub-certification and reporting intentions. Our findings suggest that audit committees and senior executives may want to carefully consider the costs and benefits of the sub-certification process. (shrink)

This is a partial phenomenological study of a phenomenon that I call “displaced feeling”, which is best illustrated through a concrete example. I am overcome by a strong desire to stop writing. For one reason or another, I reject the possibility of pursuing this desire. Instead of giving up the desire altogether, however, I may “speak to myself” as follows: “I feel like having a coffee” and, the chatter goes on in the background “of course to make coffee means (...) to stop writing”. I endorse the desire to get a cup of coffee. But the action through which I pursue this desire is coloured not by the feeling that anticipates the value associated with drinking coffee but by a feeling that anticipates the value associated with stopping writing. The latter feeling has displaced the former: I am in a state of displaced feeling. Here, I will elucidate two invariant structures of displaced feeling. First, I will show that displaced feeling involves the realisation of an endorsed state of affairs, the bringing about of a rejected state of affairs, and the belief that the former will determine the latter. Next, I will show that the endorsed state of affairs appears prominently as the end of an intention, that the rejected state of affairs appears inconspicuously in the horizon of the same intention, and that the belief appears twice: as a motive for this intention and as the “glue” that keeps its prominent and inconspicuous zones together. (shrink)

Public university business schools appear to struggle in upholding their educational self. Corporate scandals linked to business graduates raise questions about the role of PUBS in the development of civilized societies. This study develops an ethical decision making model in the PUBS context based on moral theories and then empirically tests the model. The model hypothesizes that individuals’ moral philosophies in terms of egoism and utilitarianism as well as subjective norm in terms of peer influence affect their unethical behavioural intention. (...) Moreover, this study compares ethical levels between business students with those from other disciplines. Data was collected using a structured questionnaire from established public universities in Malaysia. The data was analysed using the Smart Partial Least Squares, a second generation structural equation modelling software, as well as the SPSS version 23. The results reveal that moral philosophies and subjective norm exert positive and significant effects on unethical behaviour intention. The study, however, found no significant effect with regard to unethical behaviours between business and non-business students. The authors argue that a university’s status may explain a student’s intentions towards ethics. Implications of the results and future research are proposed. (shrink)

Intentionality is a curious notion and so is partial identity; the latter is employed by Christopher Tomaszewski (henceforth, CT) in his paper to afford solutions to a wide array of different philosophical problems. The author’s central thesis is that intentionality is a kind of partial identity; i.e. when the mind is intentionally directed towards an external object, it "takes in" a part of the object – its form, but not its matter. In my essay I first expound Franz (...) Brentano's views on intentionality - inspired by Aristotle's doctrine of hylomorphism. Contrary to what CT suggests, I conclude (in light of Brentano's later work) that intentionality should not be characterized as a genuine relation since one can be intentionally directed towards existing as well as non-existing objects and since, in the case of the latter, it remains unclear what it is that the mind “takes in”. Second, I clarify the notion of partial identity. In this context it is not obvious to me what exactly CT's appeal to partial identity contributes to the solution of the problem of material constitution. Third, I explicate CT's thesis that intentionality is partial identity (based on previously given definitions) and conclude that his argument in support of mind/body-dualism fails. Overall, skepticism remains as to whether partial identity adequately captures the tricky terrain of intentionality. (shrink)

This study evaluates the relationship between diversified relationships established under the umbrella of the Stimuli-Organism-Response framework to study the consumer continuation intention of the Airbnb platform from a Malaysian perspective. A web-based survey was conducted among Malaysian Airbnb consumers, and a sample of 303 respondents was obtained. SmartPLS has been used for data analysis. The statistical output of the respondent’s data indicates that social overload and information overload influence consumer continuation intention. Moreover, the satisfaction and trust in the platform partially (...) mediate the relationship between the stimuli and behavioral response. Further, perceived health risk strengthens the negative relationship between continuation and trust in the platform. The theoretical implications include enacting a SOR framework to understand the consumer’s internal state of mind and ability to influence the consumer platform continuation intention. The practical implications suggest that the managers and business owners focus on limiting the social exposure at the host destination and the flow of information from the application. (shrink)

In this paper, I first review some of the recent empirical work on the biasing effect that moral considerations have on folk ascriptions of intentional action. Then, I use Mark Alicke's affective model of blame attribution to explain this biasing effect. Finally, I discuss the relevance of this research - both philosophical and psychological - to the problem of the partiality of jury deliberation. After all, if the immorality of an action does affect folk ascriptions of intentionality, and all serious (...) criminal offenses - e.g., murder and rape - are immoral in addition to being illegal, then a juror's ability to determine the relevant mens rea (i.e., guilty mind) of a defendant in an unbiased way may be seriously undermined. (shrink)

Purpose This study aims to investigate the impact of perceived service quality (PSQ) on tourist satisfaction and behavioral intentions and explore the potential mediating role of tourist satisfaction in the relationship between service quality and behavioral intentions in the yoga tourism context during the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, this is to examine to what extent yoga tourist satisfaction directly affects their behavioral intentions. Design/methodology/approach Based on a review of literature, the study proposes a conceptual model to test four (...) hypothesized relationships among the constructs of perceived service quality, tourist satisfaction, and behavioral intentions. Data was collected by using a self-administrated questionnaire that was developed and directed to a convenience sample of yoga tourists (380 forms). Structural equation modeling (SEM) was employed to determine the relationship between study constructs. Findings The results of SEM illustrated that all the hypothesized relationships are supported. The findings confirm that yoga tourists’ behavioral intentions are significantly affected directly and indirectly (through tourist satisfaction) by perceived service quality. Additionally, tourist satisfaction significantly partially mediates the relationship between PSQ and tourists’ behavioral intentions. Research limitations The subject of this study was yoga tourists staying in yoga retreats/studios in Egyptian destinations (South Sinai Governorate). Future research may focus on other geographical destinations and other influential variables of yoga tourists’ satisfaction and behavioral intentions should be investigated. Practical implications For improving tourists’ satisfaction and behavioral intentions, yoga service providers should take care by giving tourists personalized attention, and understanding, fulfilling their specific needs. Health and hygiene practices must be considered during the COVID-19 pandemic. Originality/value This study is perhaps the first empirical study that examines the relationship between PSQ and tourists’ satisfaction and behavioral intentions in the yoga tourism context. A new integrated conceptual model that combined three service quality dimensions, namely, tangibles, intangibles as well as health and hygiene was developed and validated. (shrink)

The main purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of after sales service, brand equity, environmental awareness, and product pricing towards consumer purchase intention of green home appliance. Data were collected from 150 Penang, Malaysia citizen who were age from 18 to 60 via convenient sampling method analysed using partial least square structure equation modelling. Results indicated that BE, EA, and PP has significant effect on CPI of green home appliance brand. However, ASS do not have significant (...) effect on CPI on green home appliance brand. This research helps home appliance manufacturer to better design marketing promotions, considering the consumers focus on BE, EA, and pricing. In addition, this study provides consumer insight for the government agency to construct better policy in order to increase the green home appliance penetration rate among citizens. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to investigate the antecedents of guests’ behavioral intentions in Malaysia’s peer-to-peer accommodation industry. This study focused on the effects of physical and social environment on guest emotions, satisfaction, and subsequently on guest’s behavioral intentions towards P2P accommodation. The proposed research framework was developed based on Stimulus-Organism-Response model. Partial Least Square Structural Equation Modeling was used to examine the proposed hypotheses. Data were collected from 476 foreign visitors who stayed at P2P accommodations (...) in Malaysia using online survey. The findings demonstrated that the P2P accommodation’s social and physical environment had a positive impact on guest satisfaction and emotions, while both satisfaction and emotions had significant impact on guest behavioral intentions. The findings also extend the applicability of the S-O-R theory in P2P accommodation context. In practice, both the physical and social environments are important stimuli cues to induce favorable level of organism factors, i.e., satisfaction and emotions. While behavioral intentions acted as the response factor in examining visitor’ responses towards P2P accommodation. All in all, this study emphasizes how crucial it is to emphasize on the external and internal factors when encouraging positive response in P2P accommodation platforms. (shrink)

Entrepreneurship and its influence on the development of the economy are significant in competitive global advancement. Entrepreneurs need entrepreneurial intentions to improve the commercial environment of the country. Therefore, studying entrepreneurial intentions’ influencing predictors is vital for business development. We collected data from small and medium-sized enterprises employees of the developing country and used partial least square structured equation modeling to analyze the proposed relationships. The results assist the literature extension and practically contribute to developing entrepreneurs’ (...) class='Hi'>intentions through education and opportunity recognition. The findings aid the institutions in improving course planning and establishing practical business setups. This study facilitates the government’s ideas of commencing entrepreneurial businesses through proper resource provisions for the entrepreneurs. (shrink)

Quine claims that his naturalized epistemology which is a science about science must take the place of traditional epistemology. Because physics is the paradigm of science for Quine, there is apparently no room for normative and intentional discourses in Quine's naturalized epistemology. However, Quine uses normative and intentional discourses in his naturalized epistemological inquiry. Hence, the problem addressed in this dissertation is the place of normative and intentional discourses in Quine's naturalized epistemology. ;My procedure is to examine critically the above (...) mentioned contradiction from two different angles. In an initial and external criticism I assume the in-principle gap between physicalistic discourse and normative and intentional discourses. In an internal criticism I assume the gap merely practical. In the former criticism I offer my own interpretation of the status of naturalized epistemology in Quine's philosophy and argue for the presence of a tension between methodological concerns and what Quine calls his physicalistic bias. I explain three manifestations of the tension in Quine's writings: his discussions of language acquisition, induction and scientific method in general. I also argue that methodological concerns play the ineradicable role in an epistemology, which Quine must and at least partially does recognize. In the internal criticism I discuss the nature of the gap between physicalistic discourse and normative and intentional discourses and examine and criticize Quine's behavioristic physicialism. On the basis of the criticism of Quine's behavioristic physicalism I criticize Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of translation which denies the fact of the matter for intentional discourse. ;I find, as a result, that because both methodological concerns and physicalistic bias are basic elements of Quine's naturalized epistemology, the resultant tension is serious. I also find that Quine's naturalized epistemology as it is cannot resolve the tension, whether we assume the gap as in-principle or merely practical. ;Thus, I conclude that as the unsettling status of normative and intentional discourses indicates, Quine's naturalized epistemology does not make a coherent whole. (shrink)

As the journal is effectively defunct, I am uploading a full-text copy, but only of my abstract and article, and some journal front matter. -/- Note that the pagination in the PDF version differs from the official pagination because A4 and 8.5" x 11" differ. -/- Note also that this is not a mere repetition of the argument in /Mind/, nor merely an application of it; there are subtle differences. -/- Finally, although Christians are likely to take this as applicable (...) to a God who can enter time, Jewish readers who wish a full understanding of its intent are referred to M.R. II:13:3. Note that /some/ free will, however miniscule, must remain, exactly as argued. Also, Maimonides speaks differently, albeit metaphorically, elsewhere, and nothing here contradicts his statements. (shrink)

Paisley Livingston claims that an artist’s intentions are successfully realized and hence determinate of the meaning of a work if and only if they are compatible and “mesh” with the linguistic and conventional meanings of the text or artefact taken in its target or intended context. I argue that this specific standard of success is not without its difficulties. First, I show how an artist’s intention can sometimes be constitutive of a work’s meaning even if there is no significant (...) meshing between the artist’s intention and his work. Second, I argue against the claim that the artist’s intentions need to be compatible with the linguistic and conventional meanings of a text. Third, I discuss a case that creates a particular puzzle for Livingston since the intentions of the artist concerned are clearly not successfully realized, though they are compatible and mesh with all the relevant data. I conclude my paper by suggesting a solution to this puzzle. (shrink)

Purpose This study aims to investigate and comprehend the key factors that affect citizens’ adoption of electronic government (e-government) in Nigeria. In addition, the exploration intends to assess the potential determinants that may affect the Nigerian’s behavioural intention (BI) to adopt e-government services. The findings can be helpful for policymakers and government officials to provide e-government practices effectively. Design/methodology/approach The research adopted a quantitative method using the unified model of e-government adoption (UMEGA). In this study, data are collected from 410 (...) citizens aged above 18 years old and analysed using partial least squares path modelling technique. Findings The results showed that performance expectancy and effort expectancy positively influenced attitude (ATT) towards e-government. In contrast, perceived risk negatively impacted ATT towards e-government. However, social influence did not have a significant influence. The results showed that ATT and facilitating conditions (FC) positively influenced the BI to use e-government services. The explanatory and predictive power of UMEGA in Nigeria accounted for 63.9%. Originality/value To the authors’ knowledge, no prior studies analysed citizens’ adoption of e-government in Nigeria. This study, however, filled this gap. This study has contributed to the current knowledge of e-government adoption in Nigeria, which policymakers and government officials can use. (shrink)

This work has aimed to investigate the consumers’ green product purchase attitudes and behavioral intention during COVID-19 pandemic. Data was collected through a survey method of 503 consumers in Malaysia. Data were analyzed using the partial least square method. The findings revealed that fear of COVID-19 pandemic has a significant impact on green product behavioral intention. Green product literacy, green product orientation, and social influence have a significant influence on green product purchase attitudes. The results also indicated that consumers’ (...) green product purchase attitudes mediate the effect of green product literacy, green product orientation, and social influence on behavioral intention. The findings of this work will provide strategically relevant references to green marketers and retail managers in the understanding of consumers’ green product purchase attitudes and green product behavioral intention during the ongoing uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)