European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 937-947, December 2021.

The present article aims at providing some clarification on the Horkheimer-Neurath 1937 debate, so as to make three main claims: (a) around 1937 (even though perhaps neither in the early 1930s, at the time of his review of Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia, nor after the Second World War, at the time of Adorno’s disenchanted statement, “the whole is the false”), Horkheimer belonged to the Hegelian-Marxist tradition stemming from Lukács’s History and Class Conscioussness (1923); (b) notwithstanding Neurath’s semantic and epistemological holism, (...) his fallibilism, his rejection of Wertfreiheit in the social sciences, his commitment to socialism, there is still a gulf between his position and Horkheimer’s, for Neurath did not accept the main methodological claim made by the latter, namely, the Lukács-inspired view that what “constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought” is the Hegelian “point of view of totality”; (c) highlighting the main differences between Neurath’s and Lukács’s versions of Marxism – one concerning the very idea of dialectic, and the other concerning the epistemic privilege of the proletariat – can throw some light on and help understand better the distinctive features of Lukács’s Hegelianization of Marxism. (shrink)

In the literature there are at least two main formal structures to deal with situations of interactive epistemology: Kripke models and type spaces. As shown in many papers :149–225, 1999; Battigalli and Siniscalchi in J Econ Theory 106:356–391, 2002; Klein and Pacuit in Stud Log 102:297–319, 2014; Lorini in J Philos Log 42:863–904, 2013), both these frameworks can be used to express epistemic conditions for solution concepts in game theory. The main result of this paper is a formal comparison between (...) the two and a statement of semantic equivalence with respect to two different logical systems: a doxastic logic for belief and an epistemic–doxastic logic for belief and knowledge. Moreover, a sound and complete axiomatization of these logics with respect to the two equivalent Kripke semantics and type spaces semantics is provided. Finally, a probabilistic extension of the result is also presented. A further result of the paper is a study of the relationship between the epistemic–doxastic logic for belief and knowledge and the logic STIT by Belnap and colleagues. (shrink)

The paper deals with the art of cross-examination or probe (peirastiké) wich is, according to Aristotle, a part of dialectic and aims at revealing falle pretensions to knowledge. A detailed discussion of the relevant passages from the Sophistical Refutations shows that "peirastic" argumenta were not easily distinguishablc forro the arguments used by the sophists against the scientists in order to undermine their reputation. It is also shows that the difficulty of telling dialectic from sophistry is a theme Aristotle inherits frorn (...) Plato's Sophist. (shrink)

In Sophistical Refutations 8 Aristotle claims that every sophistical refutation depends on a false belief which is implicitly held by the victim of the fallacy and can normally be elicited from him as an explicit additional premiss. In this case the fallacious argument will be turned into a valid one, albeit with a false premiss. The paper discusses the nature of the FVP and tries to discover how it works when it tacitly causes the false appearance of a fallacious argument.

The aim of my paper will be to provide a commentary on the introduction to the French edition of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985) by Bernard Williams (1929–2003) and to show the Nietzschean legacy that is made explicit there. In this introduction, called “L'éthique, question de style?” and published in 1990, Williams reflects on some of the problems of style that his book poses to French readers, to whom he feels his work is less familiar. Furthermore, Williams recalls (...) some moments of the Royaumont colloquium (which he attended in 1958) and dwells on some peculiarities that distinguish him from analytic philosophy, “French” philosophy, Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Finally, the text closes with a description of the image of the philosopher to whom Williams feels closest—that of Nietzsche—and illustrates the reasons that distance him from other models of philosophical writing. (shrink)

The paper aims to describe the stakes of a Nietzschean influence on Deleuze's reflections on the transcendental and conversely to highlight the Deleuzian operation of politicising Nietzsche by ‘minorising’ him. In order to further understand such a complex relationship of becoming between Deleuze and Nietzsche, the first objective of the paper is to focus on active and reactive forces, which seem to be the core of this very relation. Thus, the paper suggests that micropolitics has its conditions of possibility in (...) the Nietzschean corpus and, in particular, in the symptomatology of decadence, resentment and nihilism. In this sense, now the title of the paper reveals its meaning: the whole Deleuzian operation could be summarised as the passage from the criticism and questioning of an image of Nietzsche ‘forbidden to minors’, typical of the interpretations of the first half of the twentieth century, to a becoming-minor of these very same Nietzschean concepts. It is precisely through such a becoming-minor that Nietzsche's diagnosis and concepts are translated in a political and emancipatory key, in order to give power to minorities. (shrink)

The book presents an interdisciplinary exploration aimed at renewing interest in Luigi Einaudi’s search for “good government”, broadly understood as “good society”. Prompted by the Einaudian quest, the essays - exploring philosophy of law, economics, politics and epistemology - develop the issue of good government in several forms, including the relationship between public and private, public governance, the question of freedom and the complexity of the human in contemporary societies.

Forms of contemporary life attest to the dissolution of the concept of the ‘people’ and the renewed importance of the idea of the ‘multitude’. Though they took center stage in the seventeenth century debate that spawned much of our ethico-political lexicon, these two notions are polar opposites. The ‘people’ is by its very nature centripetal. Converging towards a general will, it acts as an interface between citizens and the State. The ‘multitude’ is plural. Fleeing all political unity, it shuns negotiations (...) with the sovereign and refuses to delegate its rights to that power; it is a recalcitrant and disobedient entity with a taste for certain forms of non-representative democracy. For example, Hobbes claims that citizens in rebellion against the State represent “the multitude against the people.” But while Hobbes spotted the greatest hindrance to the workings of the State within this multitude, Spinoza found in it the roots of liberty. The political existence of ‘multiples’ as such has been stricken from the horizon of modernity: not only by Absolute State theorists, but also by Rousseau, the liberal tradition, and the socialist movement itself. (shrink)

The publication of Guido Calabresi’s book “The Future of Law and Economics” has drawn a substantial amount of attention among law and economics scholars. We thought that the best way to devote special attention to this book was to devote a Special issue to it. This article situates Calabresi’s book among other reflections on the future of the discipline, introduces and explains the reasons behind this Special issue and discuss the organization and content of it. -/- We emphasize how Calabresi’s (...) historical-conceptual standpoint allows him to isolate the stakes of different future developments around the question of how could further appreciation of legal institutions that defy the standard economic assumptions help the field develop theoretically. Overall, the contributors all shared Calabresi’s attempt to restore the balance between Law and Economics and the need to better account for the “whole unanalysed experience of human race”, often neglected by the Economic Analysis of Law approach. Most disagreements are about the ‘how’. In any case, the search for the Law and Economics ‘not (yet) taken’ or for other “Law and … ” approaches is always open to the Future. (shrink)

This introduction explains the reasons behind this Special issue and discuss the organization and content of it. The difficulty of a genuine dialogue and understanding between economics, law and humanities, seems to be due not only to the fragmentation of reflections on man, but to a real ‘conflict of anthropologies’. What kind of conceptions of man and human values are presupposed by and / or privileged by economics, law, economic approaches to law and social sciences? How and when do these (...) conceptions come into conflict within and between disciplines? How do these conceptions of man and his values influence the conceptions of economics, law and institutions, and vice versa, how do these last conceptions influence the former? What are the normative, regulatory and practical implications of assuming an anthropological and / or axiological perspective instead of another? This Special issue aims at exploring the possibility of finding a common ground for discussion between economics, law and humanities, through the analysis and comparison of both the conceptions of man, human action and values assumed by economics, law and humanities, and their normative implications. The contributions to this Special issue and its organization are outlined at the end of this introduction. (shrink)

SummaryThis paper defends the descriptive theory of reference against recent criticisms. Saul Kripke has argued through a series of counterexamples that the descriptive theory may assign a referent to a speaker's use of a name when there is no referent, and may assign the wrong referent, or no referent at all, when there really is a referent. These conclusions follow, however, only if the speaker is not permitted to use subordinating descriptions, by means of which he borrows his reference from (...) others. It is argued that the descriptive theory can easily accomodate the use of subordinating descriptions and, on general grounds, defend their prominence in the determination of reference. The immediate consequence is that Kripke's counterexamples do not pose a serious problem for the descriptive account.RésuméCet article défend la théorie descriptive de la référence contre de récentes critiques. Saul Kripke lui a objecté, par une série de contre‐exemples, qu'elle peut assigner àľusage d'un mot par un locuteur une référence alors qǔil ňy en a pas, ou peut lui assigner une fausse référence, ou pas de référence du tout alors qǔil y en a en réalité une. Mais ces conclusions ne sont valables que si ľon ne permet pas au locuteur ľusage de descriptions subordonnantes grâce auxquelles il emprunte sa référence à?on;autres. Ľauteur montre que la théorie de la description peut facilement scar;accommoder de ľusage de descriptions subordonnantes et défend, pour des raisons générales, leur importance dans la détermination de la référence. La conséquence immédiate en est que les contre‐exemples de Kripke ne posent plus de sérieux problémes pour la théorie descriptive.ZusammenfassungIn der vorliegenden Arbeit wird die sog. deskriptive Referenztheorie gegen kritische Argu‐mente aus neuerer Zeit verteidigt. Saul Kripke hat aufgrund von Gegenbeispielen eingewendet, dass die deskriptive Theorie bei der Verwendung eines Namens durch einen Sprecher zu einer Zuschreibung eines Referenzobjekts führen kann, wo tatsächlich kein solches vorhanden ist, und dass sie ein falsches Referenzobjekt Oder gar keines zuordnen kann, wenn wirklich eines vorhanden ist. Diese Behauptung trifft jedoch nur dann zu, wenn dem Sprecher nicht erlaubt wird, unterordnende Beschreibungen zu verwenden, mit Hilfe von welchen er seine Referenz bei andern entlehnt. Es wird gezeigt, dass die deskriptive Theorie ohne weiteres die Verwendung von unter‐ordnenden Beschreibungen einbeziehen und aus allgemeinen Gründen ihre vorherrschende Rolle bei der Bestimmung der Referenz behaupten kann. Als unmittelbare Folge dieser Auffassung ergibt sich, dass Kripkes Gegenbeispiele keine unüberwindlichen Schwierigkeiten bereiten. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to comment on an episode of The Sopranos in which we are shown two simultaneous failed attempts at education. Tony Soprano’s son and “nephew” seek their own path, their own education, and both end up returning to the world of the two families: the Soprano family and the Mafia family. On this road, they meet people who could lead them out of these worlds, but their affiliation with the family will not be scratched: the (...) two families have too many attractions to be abandoned. The missed education of the two young men mirrors the fall of Tony Soprano, whose tragic fate this episode anticipates. (shrink)

Gabriel Marcel’s writings stand in a complex relationship to Nietzsche’s thought. Paying homage to Nietzsche’s influence as one of the most eminent representatives of the existential thought, Marcel is aware that he deals with a thinker who is as distant from him as he is very close. Marcel’s references to Nietzsche’s thought are tied to Nietzsche’s expression “God is dead”, and the end of the divine is the theme that simultaneously highlights the greatness and the tragedy of Nietzsche. Marcel accepts (...) the contradictions of Nietzsche’s philosophical thought as both dangerous and fruitful. (shrink)

In this essay I intend to analyze the issue of good government in the works of Adam Smith, the importance of which seems to have not received due attention. The reconstruction is driven by three hermeneutical hypotheses concerning the role played by the idea of good government in the development of Smith's speculation: 1) the «good government» has a synthetic character, holding together the different aspects – moral, legal, economic and political – of his reflection; 2) it emerges against the (...) backdrop of the first acquisitions of the Theory of Moral Sentiments about the ‘mediating’ role of the middle class, and especially during the reflection that goes from the Lectures on Jurisprudence to the Wealth of Nations, and then feeds back into the subsequent rewritings of the Theory; 3) From the moment the «good government» appears, it becomes a descriptive and prescriptive idea of the social order. In the conclusions I will show how these hermeneutical hypotheses might have implications in the history of political, legal and economic thought. (shrink)

"The fact is, man is an etymologizing animal."Etymologizing—the practice of connecting one word with one or more other similar-sounding words that are believed to elucidate its meaning1—is a complex and putatively universal phenomenon.2 Thus, to take two representative examples far apart in time and space, etymologizing practices figure prominently in some episodes of the Hebrew Bible,3 but also provide some modern influential thinkers with an important mode of argument.4 Perhaps etymologizing is so pervasive because it offers a pliable and powerful (...) tool for addressing a key question, namely, why is something called what it is?While this question has universal appeal, only a few cultures seem to have addressed it... (shrink)

Abstract:Taking my title from "Lingering in the Woods," one of Umberto Eco's Six Walks in the Fictional Woods, I present a study of Stanley Cavell's style of writing. While a dominant Anglo-American style of philosophical writing seems to be motivated principally by a desire for argumentation, a Cavellian, lingering style aims at thorough expression and description of the human experience. Traces of this style can be found also in Ludwig Wittgenstein's writing. After reopening the debate that arose from some responses (...) to The Claim of Reason, I conclude with a close reading of Cavell's "Excursus on Wittgenstein's Vision of Language.". (shrink)

Constrained coherence is compared to coherence and its role in the behavioural interpretation of coherence is discussed. The equivalence of these two notions is proven for coherent conditional previsions, showing that the same course of reasoning applies to several similar concepts developed in the realm of imprecise probability theory.

This essay explores selected examples of puns and etymologizing in the Pali canon. It argues that they do not solely serve a satirical intent, but are sophisticated rhetorical devices, skilfully employed by the Buddha to induce a reflective awareness in the listeners and persuade them into accepting his view. Their rhetorical function and efficacy is investigated, while foregrounding a new interpretation of the Aggaññasutta.

The aim of this paper is to say something significant about Stanley Cavell's style. To accomplish this task, we adopt a distant reading approach, quantifying what seems to be an idiosyncratic use of parentheses. After outlining our methodological approach and the choices of texts from Cavell's corpus, we will present the results of our quantitative analysis. Two kinds of results will be presented and interpreted: the result of a comparison between Cavell and other authors (i.e. why Cavell's use of parentheses (...) is exceptional) and the result of a quantitative analysis of Cavell's texts (i.e. how Cavell uses parentheses throughout his books). For both results, we will provide our own interpretation. In the conclusion, we will draw the moral of this parenthetical story, hoping to open future parentheses. (shrink)

The list of katēgoriai presented at the start of Top. I 9 was traditionally interpreted as a version of the canonical Aristotelian list of categories, and as largely equivalent to the list we find in Categories 4. Accordingly, its first item, the ‘what it is’, was identified with the category of substance. This interpretation has been challenged by several scholars, all sharing the view that the ‘what it is’ in Top. I 9 cannot be substance, since it collects items belonging (...) to all Aristotelian categories (e. g. human being, colour, length). Rather, they say, it is a manner of predication – i. e. essential predication – and can only determine an ontologically miscellaneous class of items. Against this family of proposals, I argue afresh that the traditional interpretation is almost entirely correct. To this purpose, I take advantage of the distinction between kinds of predicate and kinds of predication. (shrink)

This book places two key notions up against each other to imagine a new way of conceptualizing historical time. How do the experience of déjà vu and the idea of the "End of History" relate to one another? Through thinkers like Bergson, Kojève and Nietzsche, Virno explores these constructs of memory and the passage of time. In showing how the experience of time becomes historical, Virno considers two fundamental concepts from Western philosophy: Power and The Act. Through these, he elegantly (...) constructs a radical new theory of historical temporality. (shrink)

Background The convergence of neuroscience, genomics, and data science holds promise to unveil the neurobiology of psychosis and to produce new ways of preventing, diagnosing, and treating psychotic illness. Yet, moral challenges arise in neurobiological research and in the clinical translation of research findings. This article investigates the views of relevant actors in mental health on the moral challenges of accessing neurobiological information in the context of psychosis. Methods Semi-structured individual interviews with two groups: researchers employed in the National Health (...) Service (NHS) or a university in England (n = 14), and mental health professionals employed in NHS mental health services (n = 14). This article compares results in the two groups (total n = 28). Results This article presents findings around three conceptual areas: (1) research ethics as mostly unproblematic, (2) psychosis, neurobiological information, and mental health care, and (3) identity, relationships, and the future. These areas are drawn from the themes and topics that emerged in the interviews across the two groups of participants. Researchers and health professionals provided similar accounts of the moral challenges of accessing—which includes acquisition, communication, and use of—neurobiological information in the context of psychosis. Acquiring neurobiological information was perceived as mostly unproblematic, provided ethical safeguards are put in place. Conversely, participants argued that substantive moral challenges arise from how neurobiological information is delivered—that is, communicated and used—in research and in clinical care. Neurobiological information was seen as a powerful tool in the process through which individuals define their identity and establish personal and clinical goals. The pervasiveness of this narrative tool may influence researchers and health professionals’ perception of ethical principles and moral obligations. Conclusions This study suggests that the moral challenges that arise from accessing neurobiological information in the context of psychosis go beyond traditional research and clinical ethics concerns. Reflecting on how accessing neurobiological information can influence individual self-narratives will be vital to ensure the ethical translation of neuroscience and genomics into mental health. Trial registration The study did not involve a health care intervention on human participants. It was retrospectively registered on 11 July 2018, registration number: researchregistry4255. (shrink)

Like all great thinkers, Charles Taylor was able with his oeuvre to challenge and often change the vocabulary, habits and theoretical imaginary of his readers. In this sense, he deserves to be celebrated as a teacher in the broadest sense of the word. Especially remarkable is his mastery in making the complexity of our experience as modern men and women accessible. Now, the first thing that can be learned from his sane attitude towards modern epistemology is the resolve to embrace (...) what he once called "a hazy picture of history" , in which order and chaos coexist in the same picture as a warning for the purity seekers. Our view of history must remain somewhat hazy because, if we want to understand long-term change without resorting to an old-style philosophy of history, we have to do justice both to historical discontinuity and to historical continuity. Thus, understanding deep historical change means being able to combine a fair dose of theoretical recklessness and a good eye for the details. (shrink)