Social factors have so far been neglected in embodied theories of perception despite the wealth of phenomenological insights and empirical evidence indicating their importance. I examine evidence from developmental psychology and neuroscience and attempt an initial classification according to whether social factors play a contextual, enabling, or constitutive role in the ability to perceive objects in a detached manner, i.e. beyond their immediate instrumental use. While evidence of cross-cultural variations in perceptual styles and the influence of social cues on visual (...) attention could not be said to play more than a contextual role, other factors such as the intricate developmental links between dyadic and triadic interactions in infancy, as well as episodes of peer-learning in children, play enabling roles. A common element in these factors is the presence and resolution of interpersonal conflict. Detached object perception could not develop without these social factors. I argue, in addition, that social skills such as managing partial social acts which are addressed to and completed by others, linguistic mediation, makebelieve play, and the ability to control perspectival switches are constitutive -- i.e. are of the essence -- of the ability to see objects as present with a detached attitude. I discuss the prospects of incorporating such social elements into dynamical interpretations of the sensorimotor approach through the enactive notion of participatory sense-making. (shrink)

In correspondence with Mersenne in 1629, Descartes discusses a construction involving a cylinder and what Descartes calls a “helice.” Mancosu has argued that by “helice” Descartes was referring to a cylindrical helix. The editors of Mersenne’s correspondence (Vol. II), and Henk Bos, have independently argued that, on the con- trary, by “helice” Descartes was referring to the Archimedean spiral. We argue that identifying the helice with the cylindrical helix makes better sense of the text. In the process we take a (...) careful look at constructions of the cylindrical helix available to Descartes and relate them to his criteria for excluding mechanical curves from geometry. Résumé Dans sa correspondance avec Mersenne en 1629, Descartes discute d’une construction qui fait intervenir un cylindre et ce que Descartes appelle une “hélice”. Mancosu a argumenté que Descartes faisait référence à une hélice cylindrique. Les éditeurs de la Correspondance de Mersenne (vol. 2), et Henk Bos, ont indépendamment affirmé que, au contraire, par “hélice” Descartes faisait référence à la spirale d’Archimède. Nous affirmons qu’identifier l’hélice avec l’hélice cylindrique est plus cohérent avec le texte. Dans le même temps nous examinons soigneusement les constructions de l’hélice cylindrique que Descartes avait à disposition et nous les mettons en relation avec son critère d’exclusion des courbes mécaniques de la géométrie. (shrink)

This review article offers an examination of some of the major recent writings (2007-2011), that bring the empirical sciences of mind into relationship with phenomenological investigations. It considers works and papers by Evan Thompson, Shaun Gallagher, Dan Zahavi and Alva Noë.

The temporality of intentions and actions in situations of social interaction can sometimes be paradoxical. I argue that in these situations it may sometimes be possible to conceive of individual acts that can, in a strong sense, be intended retroactively. This could happen when the relational patterns in social interaction literally alter the virtual structure of a participant's past corporeal intentions resulting in an odd experience of having intended something all along without knowing it. I propose that this possibility should (...) be interpreted as more than just a narrowly epistemic phenomenon. Examining this claim involves clarifying the enactive perspective on intentionality, which I do here. The enactive approach rejects the model of a causal relation between intention and action for one of an intrinsic qualitative relation between the two as facets of sense-making. I develop this idea and compare it with Merleau-Ponty's Fundierung model of the mutual relation between corporeal and reflexive intentionality to show that co-regulated moves/affections during social interaction may modulate both arcs of this relation, creating the possibility of a re-signification that alters not the actuality but the virtual tendencies that preceded the social act. (shrink)

A growing body of literature documents the important role played by moral outrage or moral anger in stakeholders’ reactions to cases of corporate social irresponsibility. Existing research focuses more on the consequences of moral outrage than a systematic analysis of how appraisals of irresponsible corporate behavior can lead to this emotional experience. In this paper, we develop and test, in two field studies, an extended model of moral outrage that identifies the cognitions that lead to, and are associated with, this (...) emotional experience. This research contributes to the existing literature on reactions to corporate social irresponsibility by explaining how observers’ evaluation of irresponsible corporate behavior leads to reactions of moral anger. The paper also helps clarify the difference between moral outrage and other types of anger and offers useful insights for managers who have to confront public outrage following cases of irresponsible corporate behavior. Finally, the analysis of the causes of stakeholders’ anger at irresponsible corporations opens important avenues for future research that are presented in the paper. (shrink)

A recent article of Chernikov, Hrushovski, Kruckman, Krupinski, Moconja, Pillay, and Ramsey finds the first examples of simple structures with formulas which do not fork over the empty set but are universally measure zero. In this article we give the first known simple $\omega $ -categorical counterexamples. These happen to be various $\omega $ -categorical Hrushovski constructions. Using a probabilistic independence theorem from Jahel and Tsankov, we show how simple $\omega $ -categorical structures where a formula forks over $\emptyset $ (...) if and only if it is universally measure zero must satisfy a stronger version of the independence theorem. (shrink)

There is a place in the Hegelian system where the notion of Objectivity is explicitly articulated. One entire section in the Science of Logic is entitled ‘Objectivity’, almost suggesting that that would be the appropriate place to unveil the question of the notion of objective thought. However, precisely that section, its content and its presence have always represented a problematic knot in the Hegelian logical system. The problem is two-fold: on the one hand, the categories of this section (Mechanism, Chemism (...) and Teleology) seem to refer to the realm of the Realphilosophie, and they seem not to respect the purity of logical thought. This makes the connection between such section and the remaining Hegelian system uncertain and questionable. On the other hand, the Objectivity section does not seem to present any character which determines its logical advancement over Subjectivity. This contribution focuses on the interpretation of the origin of this section and on the logical meaning that “objectivity” has in the Logic. This paper explores the roots of the problem attempting to undo a few of its theoretical knots via a particular interpretation of the Syllogism. The underlying thesis in this analysis is in fact that the section on Objectivity originates precisely in the internal dynamics of the Syllogism. The forms of self-reflection in the Syllogism justify the presence of the section Objectivity. In this context, Objectivity does not present itself with the characters of immediacy and externality that are normally attributed to it, but it expresses the result of the syllogistic process. The second fundamental aspect of this short analysis is that Mechanism, Chemism and Teleology as categories are not directly exported from the Realphilosophie. They are rather organizational forms in the relationships among concepts. Thus, they don’t figure as abstractions from the proper structures of nature and spirit. Rather, they express the relational structures reached by thought once the syllogism has been able to manifest a yet occult rational capacity of thought. (shrink)

Epidemiology relies upon a broad interpretation of determinism. This paper discusses analogies with the evolution of the concept of cause in physics, and analyzes the classical nine criteria proposed by Sir Austin Bradford Hill for causal assessment. Such criteria fall into the categories of enumerative induction, eliminative induction, deduction and analogy. All of these four categories are necessary for causal assessment and there is no natural hierarchy among them, although a deductive analysis of the study design is preliminary to any (...) assessment. (shrink)

We associate with any abstract logic L a family F(L) consisting, intuitively, of the limit ultrapowers which are complete extensions in the sense of L. For every countably generated [ω, ω]-compact logic L, our main applications are: (i) Elementary classes of L can be characterized in terms of $\equiv_L$ only. (ii) If U and B are countable models of a countable superstable theory without the finite cover property, then $\mathfrak{U} \equiv_L \mathfrak{B}$ . (iii) There exists the "largest" logic M such (...) that complete extensions in the sense of M and L are the same; moreover M is still [ω,ω]-compact and satisfies an interpolation property stronger than unrelativized ▵-closure. (iv) If L = L ωω(Q α ) , then $\operatorname{cf}(\omega_\alpha) > \omega$ and $\lambda^\omega for all $\lambda . We also prove that no proper extension of L ωω generated by monadic quantifiers is compact. This strengthens a theorem of Makowsky and Shelah. We solve a problem of Makowsky concerning L κλ -compact cardinals. We partially solve a problem of Makowsky and Shelah concerning the union of compact logics. (shrink)