Predication is a central theme in Arabic logic that has undergone significant semantic transformation throughout history. This article explores the evolution of predication's scope and meaning across four successive stages. Rather than pinpointing specific historical moments—given that these transitions lack clearly defined beginnings or endings—the focus is on key propositions that enrich our understanding of predication, drawing on the classifications of thinkers such as Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 950), Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 1262-65), Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1635), and Muhammad Ḥusayn (...) Ṭabātabāʾī (d. 1981). The transition from the first to the second stage is characterized by the acceptance of natural propositions (ṭabīʿīya), while subsequent stages involve essential primary (dhātī awwalī) and stronger/weaker (ḥaqīqa-raqīqa) propositions. This progression illustrates a shift from expressing the properties of external objects to articulating the properties of concepts, ultimately culminating in the expression of identity between concepts and external entities. The four stages can be summarized as follows: (1) First-order predication; (2) Second-order predication; (3) Second-order identity; (4) First-order identity. (shrink)

In the discussion of global ethics, philosophical ethics risks losing its distinct theoretical horizons. This predicament arises primarily from philosophy's failure to anchor its own object and to provide a rational basis for global justice from within its current confined theoretical paradigm. Against this background, this paper will first prioritize global co-existence as the primary concern of global ethics, then propose ontological co-existence justice as its foundational principle, and finally argue that the normative validity of co-existence justice is predicated on (...) the nations fulfilling the critical requirements of modern civilization, namely, the advancement of individual freedom. (shrink)

Volume 37, Issue 1-2, March - June 2024, Page 69-73.

This paper sketches the antilogism of Christine Ladd-Franklin and historical advancement about antilogism, mainly constructs an axiomatic system Atl based on first-order logic with equality and the wholly-exclusion and not-wholly-exclusion relations abstracted from the algebra of Ladd-Franklin, with soundness and completeness of Atl proved, providing a simple and convenient tool on syllogistic reasoning. Atl depicts the empty class and the whole class differently from normal set theories, e.g. ZFC, revealing another perspective on sets and set theories. Two series of Dotterer (...) and the theorem proved by Russinoff are re-characterized in antilogistic formulas corresponding to the square of opposition and twenty-four moods of syllogism. Then the restricted equivalence between two forms of antilogism and minimal inconsistency is built up, implying the internal connection between antilogisms and minimal inconsistency and leaving two related conjectures not proved. Besides, this paper provides a new explanation for the reason why contrariety, subcontrariety, and subalternation and the nine special moods require the non-empty assumption. (shrink)

This paper follows the implications of Gadamer’s hermeneutics after Truth and Method in which the forming of social life, and with it the idea of worldly understanding, receives greater attention. I argue that the emphasis in his later writings on worldly understanding draws less on the idea of the hermeneutic circle and problematic of the Geisteswissenschaften in which the concept of tradition is prominent than on the movement in language and the encounter with the other. As in the example of (...) translation, I argue that this movement has the character of passage from one place to another that holds within it an element of opacity. The development of this issue draws on a comparative analysis with the work of the Caribbean philosopher Édouard Glissant. From this analysis I show how Gadamer’s hermeneutics addresses the issue of understanding across cultures and in mixed cultures. (shrink)

In this essay, I will examine Henri Maldiney’s phenomenological aesthetics, focusing on his claim that “art is the truth of the sensible.” This claim is presented by Maldiney in the context of a two-fold critique of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s respective attempts to phenomenologically elucidate the experience of artworks. According to Maldiney, both Husserl and Heidegger fail to recognize what he, following Erwin Straus, terms the “pathic” moment of sense experience, which is also the key moment of the aesthetic reception of (...) art. Drawing on this concept of the pathic and its way of engaging what Maldiney calls the “transpassibility” of receptivity, I argue that his phenomenology of art can be viewed as an attempt to bring together the two senses of the aesthetic in the Kantian sense, namely as an aesthetics of sense experience and as an aesthetics of art, from within the domain of sensibility itself. I develop this idea by turning to Maldiney’s notion of rhythm and examining how he thinks that it can be applied to the visual arts. Ultimately, I suggest that Maldiney’s aesthetics imbues art with ontological significance, since he takes the rhythmic presence of artworks to be a sensuous manifestation of the rhythmic ground of the world’s constitution. The truth of art, in this sense, is a revelation of the ontological functioning of rhythm. (shrink)

Hans-Georg Gadamer argues that language is the medium of all understanding and thus that it is the medium through which we can reach understanding with one another. Yet many today are sceptical of this claim and worry that Gadamerian hermeneutics ignores at its own peril the limits of the particular discourses that people utilize to reach understanding with one another. I argue here that this criticism rests on the assumption that, for Gadamer, it is the semantic features of a language (...) alone that allow it to function as the medium for shared understanding. I argue that focusing solely on semantic agreement as the source of understanding ignores the role that mutual recognition plays in allowing language to serve as a medium for shared understanding. I turn to discussions in several of Gadamer’s later essays to examine how he conceives of the mutual recognition that is essential for communicative understanding. (shrink)

Volume 11, Issue 1-2, January–December 2024.

Volume 32, Issue 3, May 2024, Page 693-697.