Volume 37, Issue 1-2, March - June 2024, Page 69-73.

While Russian leaders are clearly dissatisfied with the United States and the European Union, they are not inherently opposed to a liberal world order. The question of Russia's desire to change a liberal international order hangs on the type of liberalism embedded in that order. Despite some calls from within for it to create a new, post-liberal order premised on conservative nationalism and geopolitics, Russia is unlikely to fare well in such a world.

Russia's war against Ukraine has had devastating human consequences and destabilizing geopolitical effects. This roundtable takes up three critical debates in connection with the conflict: Ukraine's potential accession to the European Union; the role of Ukrainian nationalism in advancing democratization; and the degree of human rights accountability, not just for Russia, but also for Ukraine. In addition to challenging conventional wisdom on each of these issues, the contributors to this roundtable make a second, critically important intervention. Each essay (...) explores the problem of concealed political and normative commitments within much of the research on Russia's war against Ukraine by unearthing biases intrinsic to particular conceptualizations. The collection also questions the perceived separation between “interests” and “values” that permeates policy analysis. This roundtable further draws attention to the ethical problems that scholars and policymakers bring to policy debates through the occlusion of their preexisting political commitments. It argues for greater transparency around and awareness of the ways in which values, not just evidence, inform research findings and policy positions. (shrink)

In Matthew 24, Jesus prophesied to his disciples about ‘wars and rumours of wars’ and other eschatological birth-pangs to prepare them in advance on how they are to be responding to eschatological events as they would be unfolding in the interim of his ascension and his promised Parousia. What then does Jesus mean by enlisting ‘wars and rumours of wars’ in this eschatological era to be functioning as ‘the beginning of birth-pangs’ and how should Christians be responding to wars and (...) rumours of wars as eschatological birth-pangs? Employing the redaction exegetical method, this study focuses on interpreting Matthew 24:6−8 to explain what Jesus most probably meant as he enlisted ‘wars and rumours of wars’ as eschatological birth-pangs; and with special reference to the Russia–Ukraine war that broke out on 24 February 2022, recommends from the Olivet prophecy how Christians are to be righteously responding to ‘wars and rumours of wars’ as eschatological birth-pangs. Contribution: This study explored Matthew 24:6−8 to unveil what Jesus means by enlisting wars and rumours of wars as eschatological birth-pangs. With special reference to the Russian military invasion of Ukraine, theological highlights were recommended on how Christians are to be responding to war and war rumours as end-time birth-pains. (shrink)

Russia’s October 1917 revolution had an international vector along with its domestic one. The idea of transforming not only a single country but the entire world into a dictatorship of the proletar...

Empirical data on food sharing in native Dolgan, Nganasan, and Nenets communities in Siberia provide evidence for hunter control over big game and fish, as well as likely benefits of inter-household sharing. Most food sharing occurs with kin and, thus, kin-selection-based nepotism cannot be ruled out. Reciprocal interhousehold sharing at meals occurs less often. Social context is discussed.

The exclusion of Russia from the Bologna process creates serious challenges for the higher education system. The beginning reform will affect the whole institution of higher learning of our country. This, in turn, opens up new opportunities to improve the efficiency of the entire system. The introduction of three basic elements, namely: a bank of pedagogical ideas, a triple helix model and a system for introducing creative technologies into the educational process, can allow us to form a qualitatively new (...) level of training of specialists in the country. (shrink)

I examine issues tied to the allegeddifficulties of mutual understanding betweenRussia and the West. I show that some of thebackground to these issues lies in thedifference of culturally grounded differencesin perceptual and conceptual schemata. In theWest, a broadly understood Aristotelianism andin Russia Neoplatonism designate dominantattitudes to the world. The Russian `lunar''consciousness, in comparison with the `solar''consciousness of the West, tends by and largeprecipitously to totalize the world, and theexperienced multiplicity of the real isreferred to its imagined center. The differencebetween (...) Russia and the West, limited to somedegree by mutual similarities, can become thebasis of an axiological and intellectualdialogue important for one side and theother. (shrink)

One of the most famous gods of the pagan pantheon of Ancient Rus is the Thunder Perun. Usually, in the minds of modern humans, the image of Perun is perceived as the embodiment of the terrible and unaffiliated forces of nature, as the personification of thunderstorms, thunder and lightning. Certainly, such a perception came to us from the ancient pagan times as a kind of accumulation inherent in our ancestors ideological paradigm. However, the idea of ​​Perun as the personification of (...) thunder and lightning is confirmed by numerous linguistic intelligence. In particular, at one time, this well-known French researcher L. Lezhe found that the Slavic meaning of the word - lightning. The concept Perun in the Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Polish and Slovak languages ​​means the same thing. It is lightning. Apparently, in the pagan worldview, this god appears as a symbol of something scary, frightening. The ancient Slavs leaned over to Perun's force, as they generally bowed to any force, considering everything that was stronger than them, "strange", and therefore worthy of respect and worship. (shrink)

The article gives a short account of V.A. Smirnovs scientific biography, including his work in Tomsk University in Siberia and in the Department of Logic of the Institute of Philosophy in Moscow.

The early 18th century saw the beginnings of Russian military occupation of Poland, followed by a secret agreement by the neighboring countries, meant to maintain a political status quo in the internal affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Then, the dynamics of the economic transformations of the European continent led to a permanent economic deadlock, particularly in the regions with large agricultural areas, such as Poland. Five years from the turn of the 18th century the Polish polity disappeared from the map (...) of Europe for 123 years. Analyzing the relationships and causes of a number of phenomena related to Old Poland is made all the more difficult by some historical processes which blow some ritual events of limited importance out of proportion, such as theadoption of the Constitution of 3 May (1791; particularly due to its content being rather reactionary); these also glorify the past of the society and the state as a “golden myth” of social harmony in relationships obtaining within the classes and between them. (shrink)

In the case of rapprochement, reconciliation and possible coexistence, as they said, the Uniates and Disunians, united and united P. Moigul initiated a major action of ecumenism. This case in P.Mogile's understanding was based on a purely confessional framework, concerning the existence and survival of the entire Ukrainian people. Being an orthodox, that is, a truly Orthodox Metropolitan, P. Moghila was thinking of non-confessional and supra-confessional categories, had a European and universally Christian vision of this problem. Consequently, he was not (...) a one-sided confessional fanatic, understood the detriment of disagreement and the church split in Ukraine. (shrink)

This article argues that combining elements of the sociological theories of Johann Arnason and Peter Wagner can contribute to an understanding of the causes of the ‘new Cold War’ on the European continent. Comparisons of today’s confrontation between Russia and the West with the original Cold War are largely misleading since the Soviet model of modernity represented a radical alternative to its liberal western version. Unlike the original Cold War, the current ideological confrontation is not connected with a clash (...) of different forms of modernity. Today’s Russia lacks a clear civilizational identity and does not follow an alternative project of modernity. The recent ‘conservative turn’ in Russian politics largely draws on a specific interpretation of European modernity. (shrink)

Russia’s relations with the European Court of Human Rights since the time of Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe have received a lot of attention on the part of academic scholars, practitioners, and media. Research on the ECtHR became especially important in the context of the twentieth anniversary of Russia’s acceptance of ECtHR jurisdiction that coincided with the unprecedented worsening of relations between Russia and the European countries due to the 2014 Crimea annexation. With voices (...) that consistently advocate Russia’s exit from the CoE, we believe it necessary to examine Russia-ECtHR relations as they are presented in the academic narrative. Drawing mostly on Russian-language sources, we want to highlight the variety of overarching themes and arguments relating to the crisis caused by the 2015 Constitutional Court Decision. We would like to examine various dimensions of this “crisis,” in order to be able to conclude whether Russia’s reaction to the Markin case and cases of non-compliance that followed was indeed part of a broader strategy of “backlash against international courts” we are currently witnessing worldwide. In the conditions when Russia’s exit from the Council of Europe is as likely as ever, the possibility of the “snowball effect” on the part of other member states threatens undermine the very raison d’être of the European human rights protection system. (shrink)

The article analyzes responses to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine by philosophers on the left, like Balibar and Zizek, and feminist philosophers, such as Butler and Hark. A large-scale war in Europe proved to be a challenge for a number of feminist, pacifist, and leftist certainties, and this challenge was presented in philosophy and feminist theory as a series of antinomies that do not imply a simple solution. Some leading contemporary philosophers believe that Ukraine should stop resisting aggression in (...) the face of the threat of a world nuclear war or if the conflict turns into a war of extermination. An alternative solution was suggested by some left and feminist philosophers who argued that a true Ukrainian victory over an authoritarian aggressor would amount to preserving and empowering democracy in Ukraine, and that this was possible only on the basis of building broad transnational anti-Putin alliances, including alliances with the representatives of all forces opposing Putin in Russia and Belarus. (shrink)

As a mono-energy-economy, Russia’s fortunes are closely linked to the price of energy. That same link explains why when energy prices hit record highs, there was such strong public support for Vladimir Putin. But when energy prices plummeted in late 2008, Russia found itself with an economic downturn which brought with it, factory closings, worker layoffs and political grumbling. Because of Russia’s inexperience with economic upheaval, Russia is likely to go through greater turmoil and political uncertainty (...) if not unrest, than more traditional market economies which over the years have had to learn how to deal with economic cycles of this sort. (shrink)

China, the most populous country in the world after India with 1.4 billion people, shares a 4200 km (2600 mi) border with Russia, the country with the world’s largest geographical territory, roughl...

The paper discusses the perception of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s work by Yuly Aykhenvald (1872–1928), a famous literary critic of the first quarter of the twentieth century. It shows that Aykhenvald’s attitude toward Dostoevsky had undergone a certain evolution from a rejection via demands to “overcome” him to his recognition as one of the “spiritual leaders” of the thinking Russia alongside Pushkin and Leo Tolstoy. Yet Aykhenvald still had some controversy with Dostoevsky, above all over philosophy of history. The ques­tion of (...) Russia’s destiny and its relation to the West is addressed by Aykhenvald following the same algorithm that is used in the article by Thomas G. Masaryk (to which Aykhen­vald was reacting), namely through the prism of and in dispute with Dostoevsky. The pa­per proves that Aykhenvald focuses not on interpreting or analyzing Masaryk’s ideas, but on refuting the views of the Eurasianists and that Eurasian ideas are the very philosophi­cal context that serves as a background for his argument with Dostoevsky. In refuting Dostoevsky’s views on Europe and justifying his own historiosophic view of the entire world as a unified Europe, Aykhenvald eventually comes to the paradox that Dostoevsky, being the “denier of Europe”, is the “intercultural cross-link” that ties Europe and Russia even more closely together. In this way, Dostoevsky’s work turns out to be a starting point for Aykhenvald’s own historiosophic framework, which brings him closer to both Russian interpreters of the Silver Age (Vikentii V. Veresaev) and the European philosoph­ical and political tradition (Thomas G. Masaryk). (shrink)

Dr. W. Elgersma-Helleman heeft in een uitvoerig artikel haar reflecties naar aanleiding van mijn boek Geboeid door Plato vastgelegd. Het stuk bedoelt niet een recensie van het geschrift in kwestie te leveren, maar een bijdrage te zijn aan de discussie over Plato en het christelijk platonisme, gekleurd door de ervaringen van de schrijfster in Rusland, waar zij en haar echtgenoot doceren aan de Staatsuniversiteit van Moskou. Plato en de kerkvaders verdienen het, dat ze vanuit verschillende hoeken besproken en belicht worden. (...) Maar dr. Elgersma had misschien toch liever geheel onafhankelijk haar eigen betoog moeten opzetten. Nu lijkt ze haar gedachten te ontwikkelen naar aanleiding van het werk van een andere auteur, zonder werkelijk in te gaan op de kwesties die die auteur had aangemerkt als de voor hem centrale punten. (shrink)

Western perceptions of Russia have a long history, starting from the earliest reports in the fifteenth century. For some Westerners Russia appeared as a utopian, harmonious society. For others it appeared as an ideal monarchy. Some, however, saw it as a despotic Asian state. The Western images of Russia from the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries were thus mixed and ambiguous. The positive image of Russia as the ideal Biblical society that stood outside of history somewhat (...) blurred the differences between Russia and the West. In contrast, for an increasing number of Westerners, especially from the more advanced proto-capitalist countries, Russia was part of the non-Western world, thus emphasizing its difference from the West. Russia was thus assimilated into the Western image of the Orient where repulsion combined with fascination, until, under the impact of Romanticism in the nineteenth century, its foreignness was articulated in terms of civilizational and religious differences. (shrink)

This paper brings together the late Freud’s concept of the death drive and Dostoevsky’s vision of primordial suffering in order to analyze anti-Ukrainian and pro-Ukrainian trends in today’s Russia. The paper encourages embracing the suffering that the death drive entails, instead of escaping it through the narrative of Russia’s ‘greatness’.

The word blat refers to the system of informal contacts and personal networks which was used to obtain goods and services under the rationing which characterised Soviet Russia. Alena Ledeneva's book is the first to analyse blat in all its historical, socio-economic and cultural aspects, and to explore its implications for post-Soviet society. In a socialist distribution system which resulted in constant shortages, blat developed into an 'economy of favours' which shadowed an overcontrolling centre and represented the reaction of (...) ordinary people to the social constraints they faced. In social and economic terms, blat exchanges became vital to the population, and to the functioning of the Soviet system. The book shows that the nature of the economic and political changes in contemporary Russia cannot be properly understood without attention to the powerful legacy of the blat economy. (shrink)

The correctness of application of orientalist discourse of E. Said to the colonial policy of the Russian Empire is analyzed in the article on the example of P. I. Rychkov research. By studying integration of Bashkirs in the structure of the Russian state, the author came to the conclusion that Russia’s policy in the East was based on the experience of the management of non-Russian peoples, which was developed in the 16-17th centuries. The establishment of ‘cultural distance‘ is typical (...) only for a small group of educated administrators of past-Petrine era. Most of the officials of the region, as in the preceding period, and during the time of Rychkov and Tatishchev preferred to rely on traditional methods of Bashkir management, which was developed in the period of their voluntary accession. Managerial stereotypes of 16-17th centuries, had significant influence on policy towards South-Eastern peoples of Russia even in the 19th century. The Russian administration inherent in the desire to integrate the non-Russian peoples in the General class structure of the state on the basis of analogies or correspondences, the objective of which was social and cultural rapprochement of the two societies. (shrink)

The 1990s are marked by a change of major landmarks in the cultural-historical self-awareness of the peoples of Russia, Europe, and perhaps the entire world. Not long ago at all, "post-Soviet" social science was celebrating its liberation from the "formation" dogma in favor of a civilizational approach. This meant, first, a way out of the socialist ghetto, which had been shut off from the rest of the world and had defended this isolation with the thesis of an "irreconcilable struggle (...) between two worlds," two lifestyles, and so forth. (shrink)

In this article, I consider the historical stages of development of nanotechnology in Russia as well as the political framework for this. It is shown that early federal nanotechnology programs in Russia date back to the 1990s and that since the mid-2000s, nanotechnology has attracted the increasing attention of government. I characterize the formation of the political landscape and the basic institutions for the promotion of nanotechnology in relation to the adoption of the Russian Federation president’s initiative “Strategy (...) of Nanoindustry Development” in 2007. The evaluative part of the article deals with three aspects: (a) bibliometric to assess Russian research output in nanotechnology, (b) scientific cadre to assess the research capacity of Russia in the long term, and (c) economical to consider the early results and prospects of the domestic nanoindustry. To construct the scientometric indicators, I used the Science Citation Index Expanded and some internal databases. The texts of program documents and available reports served as the source of economic information. (shrink)

The article offers an attempt to understand the present state of Kant’s legacy in Russia on the threshold of the Tercentenary. An explanans is found in the metaphors of “ tabula rasa ” and “unplowed virgin soil,” first used by Leibniz in relation to Russia in his letters and memoranda addressed to tsar Peter I and other members of the Russian elite, which became the country’s “absolute metaphors to live by” up to present time. Several known and unknown (...) episodes from the history of the reception of Kantian ideas, his followers in Russia, and the transformation of the urban environment of Kant’s life in Königsberg, as it was becoming Kaliningrad, are presented through the prism of this metaphor. Without hoping to make specific recommendations of any use from such metaphorical grounds, this study aims to emphasize the depth, interconnectedness, and basic, metaphysical tension of the relationship between Europe and Russia, which cannot be terminated at will by either side, or by a third party. In a situation where the sides are doomed to dialog, Kant, appropriated by Russia as its “subject,” occupies the unique position of mediator of philosophical understanding and peaceful action. (shrink)

The paper argues that the philosophy that was taught in Orthodox schools of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in late 16th – early 17th century and then became the ideological basis for the Moscow “Latinism” can be attributed to so-called Second scholasticism. The main features of Second scholasticism are the rejection of predestination in theology, usage of probabilistic approaches in logic and ethics and confrontation with absolutism in politics. These features made Second scholasticism unacceptable for absolute monarchies emerging in Europe (including the (...) Russian Empire) which utilized universal rationalism of the early Enlightenment as an ideological basis. Both in Western Europe and in Russia Second scholasticism became “a zone of cultural exclusion”. However prevalence of Second scholasticism in Orthodox schools of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth concurred with making up of the Ukrainian cultural originality and in many respects defined characteristic features of the Ukrainian mentality. (shrink)

This book, focusing on the history of religious and political thinking in early modern Russia, demonstrates that Russia’s path toward enlightenment began long _before_ Peter the Great’s opening to the West. Examining a broad range of writings, G. M. Hamburg shows why Russia’s enlightenment constituted a precondition for the explosive emergence of nineteenth-century writers such as Fedor Dostoyevsky and Vladimir Soloviev.

The article raises three key questions: what explains Putin’s (mis)calculations in the field of security and Russia’s hard-power projection onto Ukraine, what prevented both Russian and international experts from taking seriously Putin’s resolve to launch the war prior to February 24, 2022, and what would be the long-term repercussions of the war for liberal international order? To answer these interconnected questions, we refer to the discipline of foreign-policy analysis and political theory.

One of the most significant changes in the medical professions in Europe is the trend towards feminization. Some of the patterns of gender inequality arising from the feminization of the European medical professions are clearly apparent within the Russian medical profession, which experienced feminization 70 years ago. Yet little is known about the processes by which these patterns of gender inequality emerged and were maintained. This article is based on interviews with female doctors in Voronezh, Russia in 1996. It (...) explores the attitudes of these women to gender divisions within the medical profession. This is placed within the wider context of Soviet and post-Soviet employment and family policies directed at women. It is suggested that the material and ideological focus on women’s role in reproduction had direct implications for the choices women made in relation to paid labour. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to identify how modern Russia can build good relationships between multiple Russian religions and the state. At present there are many obstacles standing in the way of achieving this goal. The article includes a great many statistics, and discusses political, social, and religious views of the issue.The working Russian Constitution provides major legal provisions for democratic relationships between religions and the state. The law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” (1997) clarified constitutional (...) provisions. It should not forgotten that Russia is a secular state claiming to respect all religions. No doubt the supremacy of Orthodoxy in Russia after 1721 and the extreme atheism that arose in the Soviet Union after 1917 influenced people’s minds greatly. While the countries in Western Europe were moving from religiosity to secularism, Russia was developing the other way around. But while respecting all religions, Russia should not forget to be mindful of extremism. Religious associations themselves are likewise uneasy about the danger presented by certain mystic, neo-pagan, and destructive sects. The author argues that the best compromise between religions and the modern Russian state canonly be achieved on the basis of equality and freedom. (shrink)

In this year of bicentennial celebration, there will no doubt take place several cultural analyses of the American tradition. This is only as it should be, for without an extensive, broad-based inquiry into where we have come from, we shall surely not foresee where we might go. Nonetheless, most cultural analyses of the American context suffer from a common fault - the lack of a different context to use for purposes of comparison. True, American values and ideals were partly inherited (...) from the European tradition. But that tradition is in many ways an inadequate mode of comparison. Without going too far afield, let us note two points: first, European culture was the proud inheritor of the Renaissance tradition, and, going back still further, of classical culture; second, the European countries are compact. Their land masses are such that the notion of "frontier" simply would not have arisen in the same way as it did in America. On the other side of the globe, however, there does exist a country capable of serving as a suitable mirror. We speak, of course, of Russia. That country also came relatively late onto the cultural horizon, and was not privy to the Renaissance tradition. Furthermore, her land mass is such as to be "experi mentally infmite" in character - not unlike the American frontier. It is hoped that much can be leamed about the present cultural context by com paring the two countries in their youthful stages. (shrink)

Philosophical Thought in Russia in the Second Half of the 20th Century is the first book of its kind that offers a systematic overview of an often misrepresented period in Russia's philosophy. Focusing on philosophical ideas produced during the late 1950s – early 1990s, it reconstructs the development of genuine philosophical thought in the Soviet period and introduces those non-dogmatic Russian thinkers who saw in philosophy a means of reforming social and intellectual life. Covering such areas of philosophical (...) inquiry as philosophy of science, philosophical anthropology, the history of philosophy, activity approach as well as communication and dialogue studies, the volume presents and thoroughly discusses central topics and concepts developed by Soviet thinkers in that particular fields. Written by a team of internationally recognized scholars from Russia and abroad, it examines the work of well-known Soviet philosophers (such as Mikhail Bakhtin, Evald Ilyenkov and Merab Mamardashvili) as well as those important figures (such as Vladimir Bibler, Alexander Zinoviev, Yury Lotman, Georgy Shchedrovitsky, Genrich Batishchev, Sergey Rubinstein, and others) who have often been overlooked. By introducing and examining original philosophical ideas that evolved in the Soviet period, the book confirms that not all Soviet philosophy was dogmatic and tied to orthodox Marxism and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. It shows Russian philosophical development of the Soviet period in a new light, as a philosophy defined by a genuine discourse of exploration and intellectual progress, rather than stagnation and dogmatism. In addition to providing the historical and cultural background that explains the development of the 20th-century Russian philosophy, the book also puts the discussed ideas and theories in the context of contemporary philosophical discussions showing their relevance to nowadays debates in Western philosophy. With short biographies of key thinkers, an extensive current bibliography and a detailed chronology of Soviet philosophy, this research resource provides a new understanding of the Soviet period and its intellectual legacy 100 years after the Russian Revolution. (shrink)

This work is a historical study of the philosophical writings emerging from Imperial Russia's theological "academies" – Orthodoxy’s higher educational institutions that ran parallel to the secular universities – from their inception to the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution. Unlike with nineteenth century Russian revolutionary thought, there are few secondary studies of the philosophical works stemming from the academies. These philosophical works focused on ontology and, as such, stand in sharp contrast to the shift toward epistemology in that century (...) as happened in Germany. Another feature of the "academy" philosophies was the continual and explicit attempt to set themselves apart from the pervasive "subjectivism" of Western philosophical systems, although a largely unacknowledged influence persisted. At no time did the academy philosophers look to rational inquiry for more than an assist in understanding their theology. Instead they appealed to tradition and to an alleged direct insight into religious truths at the expense of logic and rational argument. The ultimate result was the pecular historical insularity of their community and concomitantly a subservience to the political state, traits that persist to this day. (shrink)