In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Zen Pathways by Bret W. DavisRika Dunlap (bio)Zen Pathways. By Bret W. Davis. New York: Oxford Unity Press, 2022. Pp. 455. Hardcover $110.00, isbn 978-0-19-757369-3.Bret Davis introduces Zen Pathways as his attempt to write "the book that I wish had been there for me to read more than thirty years ago, when I started down the parallel pathways of Zen and philosophy" (p. xi). Although much ink has (...) been spilled on the tradition that claims to be beyond words and letters, Davis thinks that this book "makes a unique contribution, one that will be welcomed especially by readers who are interested in both the philosophy and practice of Zen" (p. xi). Davis is right: Zen Pathways stands out as an excellent book of Zen for both philosophers and practitioners as well as for students who are interested in Mahāyāna Buddhism or modern Japanese philosophy of the Kyoto School. The scope of the book is quite comprehensive with twenty-four chapters that seamlessly flow to cover the fundamental teachings of Zen and the philosophical issues therein. While Davis does not divide these chapters with headings, some chapters can be group together under certain themes; the overview of Zen (chapters 1–2), practice of meditation (chapters 3–4), overview of Buddhism, especially Mahāyāna, from the perspective of Zen (chapters 5–7, 10), no self and enlightenment (chapters 8–9, 11), comparative analyses with Christianity (chapters 8–9, 12–16, 23), notable topics in Zen, such as language, art, no-mind, and nature (chapters 17–20), Zen and modern Japanese philosophy (chapters 21), different schools of Zen (chapters 22), and the oxherding pictures as the path of Zen (chapters 24). Readers can focus on one specific theme or read the whole book to get a good grasp of Zen Buddhist philosophy.One of the strengths of Zen Pathways is that it offers clear explanations and rigorous philosophical analyses of Zen teachings without becoming either a purely scholarly inquiry or an anti-intellectual apology for the impossibility of explaining enlightenment. In Chapter 1, "What Really Is Zen?", Davis explains the foundation of Zen in a nutshell: "Zen is neither a matter of subjective opinion nor a matter of objective doctrine; it is a matter of universal truths manifesting in ways and words appropriate to particular times and places" (p. 15). This characterization clarifies two important aspects of enlightenment in Zen Buddhism: there are universal truths or insights that practitioners are after, and once they learn them, they need to live by these insights and actualize [End Page 1] these truths in their own particular ways. Davis endeavors to balance these two aspects through the rigorous yet engaging ways in which he develops these chapters, offering clear philosophical explanations of teachings and kōans while supplying stories and examples from his own experiences of Zen practice. Thus, this book is not just on Zen but of Zen, negotiating these aspects to strike what he calls "the appropriate middle way between the unwholesome and unhelpful extremes of being 'stingy with the Buddha Dharma,' on the one hand, and spreading 'the stench of Zen' by flaunting [his] personal experience, on the other" (p. xix). Given that the intended primary audience is teachers and students in college courses on Asian and comparative philosophy and religion, this book, with the academic rigor of a scholar and the personal touch of a practitioner, is an outstanding resource to learn and teach these universal truths of Zen.The details of these truths are spelled out in chapters 5–11 in particular, as Davis offers philosophical explanations of Zen Buddhist teachings, such as the Four Noble Truths, Middle Way, anātman, nonduality of self and other, panentheism, and enlightenment as realizing one's true self or kenshō. Before plunging into these technical notions, Davis makes it clear that all of these are ultimately about self, that Zen is about realizing one's true self to discover within "an opening to the outside, an opening that in fact frees us from the rigid and absolute distinctions we are accustomed to making between inside and outside, self and other, and... (shrink)

Study on Īśvarakr̥ṣṇa's Sāṅkhyakārikā, basic work of the Sankhya school in Hindu philosophy, and its commentary Sāṅkhyataruvasanta by Mudumba Narasimhacarya, 1842-1928.

An Enquiry into the Nature of Liberation: Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti, a Commentary on Sadyojyotiḥ’s Refutation of Twenty Conceptions of the Liberated State. Edited and translated by Alex Watson, Dominic Goodall, and S. L. P. Anjaneya Sarma. Collection Indologie, vol. 122. Pondicherry: Institut Français de Pondichéry, École française d’Extrême-Orient, 2013. Pp. 508. €38.

Ve svém článku ‘Je elementární logika totéž co predikátová logika prvního řádu?’ (Pokroky matematiky, fyziky a astronomie 42, 1997, 127-133) klade Jiří Fiala nesmírně zajímavou otázku, zda je opodstatněné ztotožňovat elementární logiku s predikátovou logikou prvního řádu; s pomocí argumentů propagovaných již delší dobu finským logikem a filosofem Jaako Hintikkou (viz již jeho Logic, Language-Games and Information, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973; nejnověji jeho The Principles of Mathematics Revisited, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996) naznačuje, že by tomu tak být nemuselo. Myslím, (...) že uváděná argumentace stojí za bližší rozbor. Hintikka v podstatě říká: Kvantifikované formule predikátové logiky jsou svou podstatou o vybírání prvků z univerza; například ∀x∃yR(x,y) neříká nic jiného než to, že ke každému x můžeme vybrat y, které je k němu ve vztahu R. Obecněji říká Hintikka to, že každá formule je vlastně zápisem určité hry (ve smyslu matematické teorie her), jejíž některé tahy spočívají ve vybírání individuí. Na základě tohoto se pak ptá: je nějaký rozumný důvod, proč se omezovat jenom na hry toho typu, které jsou vyjádřitelné formulemi standardního predikátového počtu? Proč připouštět jen hry s úplnou informací (tj. ty, při kterých jsou při každém tahu k dispozici všechny tahy předchozí), proč vylučovat hry jiné; tudíž proč připouštět jen lineárně uspořádané kvantifikátory, a nepřipustit i kvantifikátory uspořádané třeba jen částečně? Hintikkova argumentace je příkladem argumentace typu formule logiky prvního řádu jsou ve skutečnosti o tom a o tom, tudíž ... . Uveďme pro ilustraci jiný nedávný příklad stejného argumentačního schématu, který pochází od Johana van Benthema (Exploring Logical Dynamics, CSLI, Stanford, 1997). Ten říká: Kvantifikátory jsou v podstatě modality, kvantifikované formule jsou tedy formule modální a jsou tudíž o existenci nějakých alternativ: formule ∀xP(x) říká, že P(x) je nutné, neboli že P(x) platí v každém „dosažitelném možném stavu věcí“, zatímco formule ∃xP(x) říká, že P(x) je možné, neboli že platí alespoň v jednom takovém stavu věcí.. (shrink)

In recent years, many philosophers of modern physics came to the conclusion that the problem of how objectivity is constituted (rather than merely given) can no longer be avoided, and therefore that a transcendental approach in the spirit of Kant is now philosophically relevant. The usual excuse for skipping this task is that the historical form given by Kant to transcendental epistemology has been challenged by Relativity and Quantum Physics. However, the true challenge is not to force modern physics into (...) a rigidly construed static version of Kant's philosophy, but to provide Kant's method with flexibility and generality. In this book, the top specialists of the field pin down the methodological core of transcendental epistemology that must be used in order to throw light on the foundations of modern physics. First, the basic tools Kant used for his transcendental reading of Newtonian Mechanics are examined, and then early transcendental approaches of Relativistic and Quantum Physics are revisited. Transcendental procedures are also applied to contemporary physics, and this renewed transcendental interpretation is finally compared with structural realism and constructive empiricism. The book will be of interest to scientists, historians and philosophers who are involved in the foundational problems of modern physics. (shrink)

Central to Thomas Sprat's History of the Royal Society was the description and justification of the method adopted and advocated by the Fellows of the Society, for it was thought that it was their method which distinguished them from ancients, dogmatists, sceptics, and contemporary natural philosophers such as Descartes. The Fellows saw themselves as furthering primarily a novel method, rather than a system, of philosophy, and the History gave expression to this corporate self-perception. However, the History's description of their method (...) was not necessarily accurate. Rather, as will be argued below, by a combination of subtle misrepresentation and selective exposition, Sprat portrayed a method which would further the aims of social and ecclesiastical stability and material prosperity, essential for the Royal Society since its continued existence depended upon the creation of a social basis for the institutionalized pursuit of natural philosophy. Some link had to be forged between the activities of the Society and the intellectual and social aspirations of the Restoration. To understand the intent and meaning of Sprat's History and the method there portrayed, we must therefore look to the institutional needs which it fulfilled. (shrink)

Three recent empirical studies on the use of placebos and two papers arguing for the deliberate use of placebos in clinical practice are analysed. Empirical studies demonstrate that placebos are commonly used. The concept of the placebo is currently understood in different ways, many of which do not refer to inert substances or treatments. The papers arguing for the use of placebos are shown to fail to make their case.

If the agent responsible for an action is to be given praise or blame by the moral community for that action, then accurate responsibility ascriptions must be made. Since the moral community may have to evaluate the actions of corporate agents, care must be taken to insure that the assumption of Methodological Individualism (MI) does not infect that process. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that accurate responsibility ascriptions will be made in cases connected with corporate action as long as corporate (...) scapegoating may occur. Because corporate scapegoating is a behavior pattern that attempts to falsify correct responsibility ascriptions it will be of interest to the moral theorist. Once I have considered three objections to the idea of corporate scapegoating I shall offer a fictional description of it found in Ayn Rand''s work,Atlas Shrugged. Finally, I shall raise a question about its present day use by corporations in our society. (shrink)

Justice Stephen J. Field was the champion of a form of liberalism often said to be especially friendly to capitalism, the approach to the Constitution traditionally identified with “Lochnerism,” i.e., a laissez-faire oriented judicial activism. More recently a form of judicial revisionism has arisen, challenging the accepted descriptions of “Lochnerism” and of Field's jurisprudence. This article is an attempt to extend the revisionist approach by arriving at a more satisfactory understanding of the grounding of Field's jurisprudence in the natural rights (...) philosophy. Field, it turns out, orienting around natural rights, was not so unambiguously friendly to capitalism as previous generations of scholars maintained, but his approach is surely friendlier than the constitutional theories that have replaced natural rights since Field's day. (shrink)

In their introduction to this volume, Ram and Leake usefully distinguish between task goals and learning goals. Task goals are desired results or states in an external world, while learning goals are desired mental states that a learner seeks to acquire as part of the accomplishment of task goals. We agree with the fundamental claim that learning is an active and strategic process that takes place in the context of tasks and goals (see also Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard, 1986). (...) But there are important questions about the nature of goals that have rarely been addressed. First, how can a cognitive system deal with incompatible task goals? Someone may want both to get lots of research done and to relax and have fun with his or her friends. Learning how to accomplish both these tasks will take place in the context of goals that cannot be fully realized together. Second, how are goals chosen in the first place and why are some goals judged to be more important than others? People do not simply come equipped with goals and priorities: we sometimes have to learn what is important to us by adjusting the importance of goals in the context of other compatible and incompatible goals. This paper presents a theory and a computational model of how goals can be adopted or rejected in the context of decision making. In contrast to classical decision theory, it views decision making as a process not only of choosing actions but also of evaluating goals. Our theory can therefore be construed as concerned with the goal-directed learning of goals. (shrink)

A new realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is introduced. Quantum systems are shown to have two kinds of properties: the usual ones described by values of quantum observables, which are called extrinsic, and those that can be attributed to individual quantum systems without violating standard quantum mechanics, which are called intrinsic. The intrinsic properties are classified into structural and conditional. A systematic and self-consistent account is given. Much more statements become meaningful than any version of Copenhagen interpretation would allow. A (...) new approach to classical properties and measurement problem is suggested. A quantum definition of classical states is proposed. (shrink)

Recently, Alper, Bridger, Earman and Norton have all proposed examples of dynamic systems that, in their view, are incompatible with classical (Newtonian) mechanics. In the first section of the present paper I shall show that their arguments are all undermined by the same fallacy. The second section proves that their conclusions of incompatibility are indeed false, and that what we are really looking at are new forms of indeterminist evolution of the same kind as that found recently in the literature (...) on supertasks. In the third section of the paper, I argue that one of these new forms of evolution is particularly interesting, and that analysis of it leads to a new vision of the relation between interaction by contact and impenetrability. 1. Introduction2. The fallacy3. Understanding some physical supertasks4. A philosophically interesting implication: contact and impenetrability. (shrink)

The author clarifies the existential philosophy that is implicit in Kurt Goldstein's philosophy of organism (Goldstein, 1963; 1995). Situated in response to the growing trend that psychological phenomena are reducible to the nervous system, the author argues for the reverse: that the significance of nervous system activity can only be understood by viewing it as background to foreground performances. Like the organization of perception into meaningful figure-- ground Gestalts, the existential modes of embodiment, sociality, temporality, spatiality, and attunement are organized (...) together to accomplish foreground performances. It is only within this context that the activity of the nervous system may be understood as significant or insignificant. Speech is given as an example. The article concludes with a commentary on how the trend of reducing psychological phenomena to neurological phenomena has impaired our understanding of brain disorders and psychological disorders. (shrink)

Problem: There is currently a great deal of mysticism, uncritical hype, and blind adulation of imaginary mathematical and physical entities in popular culture. We seek to explore what a radical constructivist perspective on mathematical entities might entail, and to draw out the implications of this perspective for how we think about the nature of mathematical entities. Method: Conceptual analysis. Results: If we want to avoid the introduction of entities that are ill-defined and inaccessible to verification, then formal systems need to (...) avoid introduction of potential and actual infinities. If decidability and consistency are desired, keep formal systems finite. Infinity is a useful heuristic concept, but has no place in proof theory. Implications: We attempt to debunk many of the mysticisms and uncritical adulations of Gödelian arguments and to ground mathematical foundations in intersubjectively verifiable operations of limited observers. We hope that these insights will be useful to anyone trying to make sense of claims about the nature of formal systems. If we return to the notion of formal systems as concrete, finite systems, then we can be clear about the nature of computations that can be physically realized. In practical terms, the answer is not to proscribe notions of the infinite, but to recognize that these concepts have a different status with respect to their verifiability. We need to demarcate clearly the realm of free creation and imagination, where platonic entities are useful heuristic devices, and the realm of verification, testing, and proof, where infinities introduce ill-defined entities that create ambiguities and undecidable, ill-posed sets of propositions. Constructivist content: The paper attempts to extend the scope of radical constructivist perspective to mathematical systems, and to discuss the relationships between radical constructivism and other allied, yet distinct perspectives in the debate over the foundations of mathematics, such as psychological constructivism and mathematical constructivism. (shrink)

This paper explores the consequences of the oft ignored fact that public health insurance must actually be supplied by the state. Depending how the state is modeled, different health insurance outcomes are expected. The benevolent model of the state does not account for many actual features of public health insurance systems. One alternative is to use a standard public choice model, where state action is determined by interaction between self-interested actors. Another alternative—related to a strand in public choice theory—is to (...) model the state as Leviathan. Interestingly, some proponents of public health insurance use an implicit Leviathan model, but not consistently. The Leviathan model of the state explains many features of public health insurance: its uncontrolled growth, its tendency toward monopoly, its capacity to buy trust and loyalty from the common people, its surveillance ability, its controlling nature, and even the persistence of its inefficiencies and waiting lines. (shrink)