This paper focuses on the epistemic situation one faces when using a Large Language Model based chatbot like ChatGPT: When reading the output of the chatbot, how should one decide whether or not to believe it? By surveying strategies we use with other, more familiar sources of information, I argue that chatbots present a novel challenge. This makes the question of how one could trust a chatbot especially vexing.

On-line, just as off-line, there are ways of assessing the credibility of information sources. The Internet, although it arguably makes for nothing wholly new in this regard, complicates the ordinary task of assessing credibility. In the first section, I consider a specific example and argue that Internet content providers have no clear interest in resolving these comlications. In the second, I consider four general ways that we might assess credibility and explore how they apply to life online. Finally, I argue (...) that even careful information gathering may pose subtle pitfalls but that some of these may be mitigated on-line. (shrink)

Wikipedia is a free encyclopedia that is written and edited entirely by visitors to its website. I argue that we are misled when we think of it in the same epistemic category with traditional general encyclopedias. An empirical assessment of its reliability reveals that it varies widely from topic to topic. So any particular claim found in it cannot be relied on based on its source. I survey some methods that we use in assessing specific claims and argue that the (...) structure of the Wikipedia frustrates them. (shrink)

The Argument from Inductive Risk (AIR) is taken to show that values are inevitably involved in making judgements or forming beliefs. After reviewing this conclusion, I pose cases which are prima facie counterexamples: the unreflective application of conventions, use of black-boxed instruments, reliance on opaque algorithms, and unskilled observation reports. These cases are counterexamples to the AIR posed in ethical terms as a matter of personal values. Nevertheless, it need not be understood in those terms. The values which load a (...) theory choice may be those of institutions or past actors. This means that the challenge of responsibly handling inductive risk is not merely an ethical issue, but is also social, political, and historical. (shrink)

The titles of these lectures were "In Search of the Miraculous" and "The Problems of Death." In these lectures, which were to serve as an introduction to a book on my travels it was my intention to write, I said that in India the "miraculous" was ...

The Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) account of natural kinds has become popular since it was proposed by Richard Boyd in the late 1980s. Although it is often taken as a defining natural kinds as such, it is easy enough to see that something's being a natural kind is neither necessary nor sufficient for its being an HPC. This paper argues that it is better not to understand HPCs as defining what it is to be a natural kind but instead as (...) providing the ontological realization of (some) natural kinds. (shrink)

These are details of research conducted in November and December 2007. The file is meant as a supplement to publication, and I have not attempted here to provide any analysis of the results.

Although some authors hold that natural kinds are necessarily relative to disciplinary domains, many authors presume that natural kinds must be absolute, categorical features of the reality —often assuming that without even mentioning the alternative. Recognizing both possibilities, one may ask whether the difference especially matters. I argue that it does. Looking at recent arguments about natural kind realism, I argue that we can best make sense of the realism question by thinking of natural kindness as a relation that holds (...) between a category and a domain. (shrink)

The accepted narrative treats John Stuart Mill’s Kinds as the historical prototype for our natural kinds, but Mill actually employs two separate notions: Kinds and natural groups. Considering these, along with the accounts of Mill’s nineteenth-century interlocutors, forces us to recognize two distinct questions. First, what marks a natural kind as worthy of inclusion in taxonomy? Second, what exists in the world that makes a category meet that criterion? Mill’s two notions offer separate answers to the two questions: natural groups (...) for taxonomy and Kinds for ontology. This distinction is ignored in many contemporary debates about natural kinds and is obscured by the standard narrative that treats our natural kinds just as a development of Mill’s Kinds. (shrink)

Homeostatic property clusters (HPCs) are offered as a way of understanding natural kinds, especially biological species. I review the HPC approach and then discuss an objection by Ereshefsky and Matthen, to the effect that an HPC qua cluster seems ill-fitted as a description of a polymorphic species. The standard response by champions of the HPC approach is to say that all members of a polymorphic species have things in common, namely dispositions or conditional properties. I argue that this response fails. (...) Instances of an HPC kind need not all be similar in their exhibited properties. Instead, HPCs should instead be understood as unified by the underlying causal mechanism that maintains them. The causal mechanism can both produce and explain some systematic differences between a kind’s members. An HPC kind is best understood not as a single cluster of properties maintained in stasis by causal forces, but as a complex of related property clusters kept in relation by an underlying causal process. This approach requires recognizing that taxonomic systems serve both explanatory and inductive purposes. (shrink)

Introduction 1 P. D. Magnus and Jacob Busch 1. Form-driven vs. Content-driven Arguments for Realism 8 Juha Saatsi 2. Optimism about the Pessimistic Induction 29 Sherrilyn Roush 3. Metaphysics between the Sciences and Philosophies of Science 59 Anjan Chakravartty 4. Nominalism and Inductive Generalizations 78 Jessica Pfeifer 5. Models and Scientific Representations 94 Otávio Bueno 6. The Identical Rivals Response to Underdetermination 112 Gregory Frost-Arnold and P. D. Magnus 7. Scientific Representation and the Semiotics of Pictures 131 Laura Perini 8. (...) Philosophy of the Environmental Sciences 155 Jay Odenbaugh 9. Value Judgements and the Estimation of Uncertainty in Climate Modeling 172 Justin Biddle and Eric Winsberg 10. Feminist Standpoint Empiricism: Rethinking the Terrain in Feminist Philosophy of Science 198 Kristen Intemann 11. Naturalism and the Enlightenment Ideal: Rethinking a Central Debate in the Philosophy of Social Science 226 Daniel Steel 12. New Approaches to the Division of Cognitive Labor 250 Michael Weisberg. (shrink)

There is a history of thinking that photographs provide a special kind of access to the objects depicted in them, beyond the access that would be provided by a painting or drawing. What is included in the photograph does not depend on the photographer’s beliefs about what is in front of the camera. This feature leads Kendall Walton to argue that photographs literally allow us to see the objects which appear in them. Current generative algorithms produce images in response to (...) users’ text prompts. Depending on the parameters, the output can resemble specific people or things which are named in the prompt. This resemblance does not depend on the user’s beliefs, so generated images are in this sense like photographs. Given this parallel, how should we think about AI-generated images? (shrink)

According to the standard narrative, natural kind is a technical notion that was introduced by John Stuart Mill in the 1840s and the recent craze for natural kinds, launched by Putnam and Kripke, is a continuation of that tradition. I argue that the standard narrative is mistaken. The Millian tradition of kinds was not particularly influential in the 20th-century, and the Putnam-Kripke revolution did not clearly engage with even the remnants that were left of it. The presently active tradition of (...) natural kinds is less than half a century old. Recognizing this might help us better appreciate both Mill and natural kinds. (shrink)

Leerboek voor studenten aan de pedagogische academie en de opleiding voor kleuterleidsters, geschreven vanuit protestants christelijke achtergrond.

More than half of the book is devoted to what is almost a catalogue exposition of Western moral philosophy from Kant to Nowell-Smith. Although the author claims in the preface to have included "suitable references to Indian points of view, including the Buddhist," what references there are are usually too general, and never fully explained to be of any use to Western readers. Exposition tends to be disjointed, and the English leaves much to be desired. On the whole there is (...) much eclecticism and little originality.--A. P. D. M. (shrink)

We show that the set of ultimately true sentences in Hartry Field's Revenge-immune solution model to the semantic paradoxes is recursively isomorphic to the set of stably true sentences obtained in Hans Herzberger's revision sequence starting from the null hypothesis. We further remark that this shows that a substantial subsystem of second-order number theory is needed to establish the semantic values of sentences in Field's relative consistency proof of his theory over the ground model of the standard natural numbers: -CA0 (...) (second-order number theory with a -comprehension axiom scheme) is insufficient. We briefly consider his claim to have produced a solution to the semantic paradoxes by introducing this conditional. We remark that the notion of a operator can be introduced in other settings. (shrink)

A considerable literature has grown up around the claim of Uniqueness, according to which evidence rationally determines belief. It is opposed to Permissivism, according to which evidence underdetermines belief. This paper highlights an overlooked third possibility, according to which there is no rational doxastic attitude. I call this 'Nihilism'. I argue that adherents of the other two positions ought to reject it but that it might, nevertheless, obtain at least sometimes.

We show how in the hierarchies${F_\alpha }$of Fieldian truth sets, and Herzberger’s${H_\alpha }$revision sequence starting from any hypothesis for${F_0}$ that essentially each${H_\alpha }$ carries within it a history of the whole prior revision process.As applications we provide a precise representation for, and a calculation of the length of, possiblepath independent determinateness hierarchiesof Field’s construction with a binary conditional operator. We demonstrate the existence of generalized liar sentences, that can be considered as diagonalizing past the determinateness hierarchies definable in Field’s recent (...) models. The ‘defectiveness’ of such diagonal sentences necessarily cannot be classified by any of the determinateness predicates of the model. They are ‘ineffable liars’. We may consider them a response to the claim of Field that ‘the conditional can be used to show that the theory is not subject to “revenge problems”.’. (shrink)

Thomas Reid is often misread as defending common sense, if at all, only by relying on illicit premises about God or our natural faculties. On these theological or reliabilist misreadings, Reid makes common sense assertions where he cannot give arguments. This paper attempts to untangle Reid's defense of common sense by distinguishing four arguments: (a) the argument from madness, (b) the argument from natural faculties, (c) the argument from impotence, and (d) the argument from practical commitment. Of these, (a) and (...) (c) do rely on problematic premises that are no more secure than claims of common sense itself. Yet (b) and (d) do not. This conclusion can be established directly by considering the arguments informally, but one might still worry that there is an implicit premise in them. In order to address this concern, I reconstruct the arguments in the framework of subjective Bayesianism. The worry becomes this: Do the arguments rely on specific values for the prior probability of some premises? Reid's appeals to our prior cognitive and practical commitments do not. Rather than relying on specific probability assignments, they draw on things that are part of the Bayesian framework itself, such as the nature of observation and the connection between belief and action. Contra the theological or reliabilist readings, the defense of common sense does not require indefensible premises. (shrink)

Experimental evidence strongly supports the view that the subdivision of organ anlagen into smaller structural units is an autonomous process. Dalcq &Pasteels' hypothesis which says that the boundaries between the different areas into which a morphogenetic field differentiates are determined by “Threshold values” in the “potential” of the field in question, is inconsistent with our present knowledge of biochemical reaction systems. Threshold values may only be used indescribing the spatial differentiation of a morphogenetic field. It is suggested that the latter (...) concept be replaced by the concept of “optimal values” in the intensity of a morphogenetic field-specific for the various chemo-differentiations characterizing the different regions into which a morphogenetic field will split up-and that each optimal value isdeterminative for the appearance of one particular differentiation within the morphogenetic field, each differentiation being formed within a certain range of intensity of the field. On the basis of the hypothesis formulated above a “virginal” morphogenetic field will necessarily differentiate into a number of smaller fields of second order, which in their turn will split up into fields of third order, etc. ” Pattern formation” may be defined as the differentiation of a morphogenetic field into an increasing number of smaller fields of higher order of qualitative different chemical and structural composition. Since differentiation of a morphogenetic field proceeds autonomously, the capacity for pattern formation is an intrinsic property of a morphogenetic field. In the light of these considerations it is suggested that a morphogenetic field action is responsible for the first differentiation of the developing embryo into regions with predominantly ectodermal, mesodermal or endodermal differentiation tendencies. The present knowledge about the characteristic pattern formation taking place in the axial mesoderm as well as in the overlying neural plate seems to be in good agreement with the implications of the present morphogenetic field concept. It is emphasized, however, that if the present morphogenetic field concept cannot be characterized further biochemically and biophysically, it will have to be replaced by another concept which can be defined more sharply and is more easily accessible to experimental analysis. Les preuves expérimentales confirment que la subdivision des ébauches des organes en unités structurelles plus petites est un processus autonome. L'hypothèse deDalcq &Pasteels disant que les bornes entre les différents domaines formées par la différenciation d'un champ morphogénétique sont déterminées par des „valeurs seuil” dans le „potentiel” du champ en question, n'est pas en harmonie avec notre connaissance actuelle des systèmes biochimiques. Des “valeurs seuil” ne peuvent être employés qu'en décrivant la différenciation spatiale d'un champ morphogénétique. On prend en considération de remplacer le concept des “valeurs seuil” par le concept des “valeurs optimales” dans l'intensité d'un champ morphogénétique. Ce seraient les valeurs spécifiques aux différenciations chimiques diverses qui caractérisent les différents domaines dans lesquels un champ morphogénétique se différencie. En outre, chaque valeur optimale serait déterminative à la formation d'une différenciation spéciale dans le champ morphogénétique, chaque différentiation se formant dans un certain trajet de l'intensité du champ. Par suite de l'hypothèse formulée ci-dessus un champ morphogénétique “virginal” va nécessairement se différencier en un nombre de champs plus petits de deuxième ordre, qui à leur tour se divisent en champs d'ordre troisième, etc. ... La régionalisation peut être définie comme la différenciation d'un champ morphogénétique dans un nombre de plus en plus élevé de champs plus petits d'ordre supérieur de composition chimique et structurelle qualitativement différente. Parce que la différenciation d'un champ morphogénétique se produit de façon autonome, le pouvoir de régionalisation est une propriété intrinsique d'un champ morphogénétique. Ces considérations nous mènent à proposer que l'action d'un champ morphogénétique est responsable de la première différenciation de l'embryon en régions qui possèdent des tendences de différenciation principalement ectodermiques, mésodermiques, ou bien endodermiques. La connaissance actuelle concernant la régionalisation caractéristique qui se produit dans le mésoderme axial ainsi que dans la plaque neurale superposée paraît se conformer aux conséquences du concept de champ morphogénétique. Cependant on souligne le fait que dans le cas òu le concept actuel du champ morphogénétique ne pourra pas être plus amplement caractérisé de façon biochimique et biophysique, il faudra le remplacer par un autre concept qui puit être défini plus nettement et qui est mieux accessible à l'analyse expérimentale. Die Auffassung, dass die Aufteilung von Organanlagen in kleineren Struktureinheiten ein selbständiger Prozess ist, findet Bestätigung in den experimentellen Ergebnissen. Die Hypothese vonDalcq &Pasteels , dass die Grenzen zwischen den unterschiedenen Gebieten, in denen ein morphogenetisches Feld sich differenziert, durch “Schwellenwerte” im “Potential” des genannten Feldes bestimmt werden, ist unvereinbar mit unserem heutigen Wissen über biochemischen Reaktionssystemen. Der Gebrauch des Begriffs “Schwellenwert” ist nur gestattet bei der Beschreibung der räumlichen Differenzierung eines morphogenetischen Feldes. Statt dieses Begriffs wird der Begriff “Optimaler Wert” vorgeschlagen; Werte also in der Intensität eines morphogenetischen Feldes, optimal und spezifisch für die verschiedene Chemodifferenzierungen, welche die Gebiete kennzeichnen, in denen ein morphogenetisches Feld sich differenzieren wird. Jeder optimaler Wert soll dann das Erscheinen einer bestimmten Differenzierung innerhalb des morphogenetischen Feldes veranlassen, welche Differenzierung sich bildet innerhalb eines bestimmten Bereichs der Feldintensität. Auf Grund der obigen Hypothese wird ein “virginelles” morphogenetisches Feld zwangsläufig sich differenzieren in eine Anzahl kleinerer Feldern zweiten Grades; diese in Felder dritten Grades, usw. Musterbildung könnte definiert werden als die Differenzierung eines morphogenetischen Feldes in eine zunehmende Anzahl kleinerer Felder höheren Grades von qualitativ verschiedener chemischen und strukturellen Zusammensetzung, Weil diese Differenzierung autonom vor sich geht, ist das Vermögen zur Musterbildung eine innewohnende Eigenschaft eines morphogenetischen Feldes. Im Lichte dieser Betrachtungen ist es naheliegend anzunehmen dass eine morphogenetische Feldwirkung verantwortlich ist für die erste Differenzierung des sich entwickelnden Embryos in Gebiete überwiegend ektodermalen, mesodermalen oder entodermalen Differenzierungstendenzen. Die heutigen Kenntnisse über die charakteristische Musterbildung im axialen Teil des Mesoderms und in der überliegenden Neuralplatte scheinen in guter Übereinstimmung zu sein mit den des morphogenetischen Feldbegriffs. Dennoch wird benachdruckt, dass, falls das gegenwärtige morphogenetische Feldbegriff nicht weiter biochemisch und biophysisch gekennzeichnet werden kann, anstatt dessen ein anderer Begriff entwickelt werden muß, der schärfer definiert werden kann und besser zugänglich ist für experimentelle Analyse. (shrink)

We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified account of varied revision sequences-as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.

The no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are arguably the main considerations for and against scientific realism. Recently these arguments have been accused of embodying a familiar, seductive fallacy. In each case, we are tricked by a base rate fallacy, one much-discussed in the psychological literature. In this paper we consider this accusation and use it as an explanation for why the two most prominent `wholesale' arguments in the literature seem irresolvable. Framed probabilistically, we can see very clearly why realists (...) and anti-realists have been talking past one another. We then formulate a dilemma for advocates of either argument, answer potential objections to our criticism, discuss what remains (if anything) of these two major arguments, and then speculate about a future philosophy of science freed from these two arguments. In so doing, we connect the point about base rates to the wholesale/retail distinction; we believe it hints at an answer of how to distinguish profitable from unprofitable realism debates. In short, we offer a probabilistic analysis of the feeling of ennui afflicting contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)

The substance and development of Eddington's "scientific epistemology" are presented in close parallelism with the philosophy of Kant. The author argues that Kant was far more successful in displaying the philosophical structure of Newtonian physics than Eddington is in showing the philosophy behind quantum mechanics and relativity.--A. P. D. M.

Some philosophers understand natural kinds to be the categories which are constraints on enquiry. In order to elaborate the metaphysics appropriate to such an account, I consider the complicated history of scurvy, citrus, and vitamin C. It may be tempting to understand these categories in a shallow way (as mere property clusters) or in a deep way (as fundamental properties). Neither approach is adequate, and the case instead calls for middle-range ontology: starting from categories which we identify in the world (...) and elaborating their structure, but not pretending to jump ahead to a complete story about fundamental being. (shrink)

A brief overview of _A Philosophy of Cover Songs_, highlighting some of the main themes in the book. The first part addresses the nature of covers and makes some important initial distinctions. The second part addresses the appreciation and evaluation of covers. The third part addresses covers as a clue to the ontology of songs. Written to introduce a session at the American Society for Aesthetics Rocky Mountain Division meeting in Santa Fe, New Mexico (July 13, 2024).

P D Walsh; Value Education in a Pluralist Society, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 10, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 24–33, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1.

We characterise explicitly the decidable predicates on integers of Infinite Time Turing machines, in terms of admissibility theory and the constructible hierarchy. We do this by pinning down ζ, the least ordinal not the length of any eventual output of an Infinite Time Turing machine (halting or otherwise); using this the Infinite Time Turing Degrees are considered, and it is shown how the jump operator coincides with the production of mastercodes for the constructible hierarchy; further that the natural ordinals associated (...) with the jump operator satisfy a Spector criterion, and correspond to the L ζ -stables. It also implies that the machines devised are "Σ 2 Complete" amongst all such other possible machines. It is shown that least upper bounds of an "eventual jump" hierarchy exist on an initial segment. (shrink)