In this article it is argued that Popper's well-known deductive and falsificationistic epistemology is historically rooted in German psychology, notably the work of Otto Selz. Drawing on Popper's early and still unpublished psychological manuscripts it is shown how Otto Selz's psychology of thinking with its emphasis on the guiding role of schematic anticipations gave the impetus to Popper's theory of problem solving, his theory of the Searchlight, and its attendant rejection of empiricism, the so-called Bucket theory of knowledge. (...) In the second part of the article it is argued that Selz's theory of schematic anticipations is rooted in Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie. Because Meinong's theory was partly an attempt to do justice to the objectivity of thinking, this may explain why the anti-psychologist Popper felt nevertheless attracted to the psychology of Selz. (shrink)

The idea that we acquire knowledge by trial and error has been one of the truly great ideas of the twentieth century. As no reader of his philosophical and autobiographical work could have failed to notice, Karl Popper credits himself for having invented this idea. The theory of trial and error or, in Popper's words, the Searchlight theory of knowledge and mind, is not just a part of Popper's comprehensive philosophy but rather one of its key features. It is at (...) the bottom of some of his most spectacular achievements in methodology, epistemology, the philosophy of biology, and even political philosophy. Indeed, it is put forward at once as a model for the growth of individual knowledge (both human and animal), the growth of life (Darwin's theory of evolution), and the growth of scientific knowledge (philosophy of science). As happens so often with innovative ideas, the Searchlight theory derives much of its glamour from the theory it rejects: the view of the mind being a tabula rasa and sense perception the origin of all (human) knowledge. Popper nicknames this empiricists' view as the Bucket theory since it conceives of the mind as nothing but the conduit for sense-impressions, an empty bucket to be filled by the accumulation and storage of information. 1 In his hands the Bucket theory collapses under the strain of philosophical arguments and scientific facts and is replaced by a theory which maintains that our knowledge of the physical world is drawn from our mind and constructed from the repertoire of knowledge dispositions we already possess. Acquiring dispositions proceeds according to the method of trial and error elimination. This method, Popper contends, consists essentially of three stages: forming a problem or expectation, trying out a number of solutions of the problem, and eliminating or discarding false solutions as erroneous. 2 A key feature of Popper's theory of trial and error elimination, and the reason for speaking of a Searchlight theory of knowledge and mind, is his insistence that problems or expectations take precedence over observations. Observations are always preceded by expectations, points of view, questions or problems which, as a searchlight, illuminate a certain area, thereby enabling the organism or the scientist to know what to observe in the first place. -/- The question arises how and when did Popper come to this theory of the growth of knowledge and mind which was to have such radical implications for the philosophy of science, epistemology, and the philosophy of psychology? My aim in this article is to trace the roots of his theory of the Searchlight. The earliest traces of the theory are to be found in his unpublished dissertation, Zur Methodenfrage der Cognitive psychology (1928). Here I will focus upon this "hasty last minute affair" written in the tradition of early German cognitive psychology and supervised by one of its most outstanding proponents, Karl Bühler. Scrutiny of this manuscript, however, reveals not so much the formative influence of Bühler as that of Otto Selz. Indeed, I will argue that Popper borrowed his crucially important Searchlight theory from Selz. Thus having found the origin of the key notion of his epistemology in psychology, the relation between psychology and philosophy in Popper's work, always fraught with tension, is up for thorough reconsideration. (shrink)

This book is about Karl Popper's early writings before he began his career as a philosopher. The purpose of the book is to demonstrate that Popper's philosophy of science, with its emphasis on the method of trial and error, is largely based on the psychology of Otto Selz, whose theory of problem solving and scientific discovery laid the foundation for much of contemporary cognitive psychology. By arguing that Popper's famous defence of the method of falsification as well as his (...) elaboration of an evolutionary theory of knowledge are equally indebted to German psychology, Michel ter Hark challenges the received view of the development of Popper's philosophy. The book concludes with a reinterpretation of Popper's theory of the mind-body problem, emphasizing its contemporary relevance. (shrink)

Ce petit livre, richement illustré par des affiches des années 1950 aux années 1980, a un goût de madeleine incarnée par le mimosa (dont celui qui orne la couverture) offert à des milliers de femmes italiennes en cette journée séculaire, qui a pris toute son ampleur au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Si le Premier Mai des travailleurs a suscité de nombreuses études, ce n’est pas le cas de la journée des femmes du 8 mars. Pourtant cette commémoration rituelle, (...) en voie d’extinction, se... (shrink)

Dans les Archives Neurath conservées à Haarlem, une des correspondances les plus volumineuses est celle qu’il a échangée avec Louis Rougier. Les deux hommes ayant été chargés de co-organiser le premier congrès du mouvement pour l’unité de la science, qui s’est tenu à Paris en septembre 1935, cette correspondance permet de retracer l’histoire, pleine de péripéties, des préparatifs de cet événement, dont l’idée première surgit à Berlin en 1932, lors d’une conversation entre Rougier et Reichenbach. Outre l’éclairage qu’elle apporte sur (...) le congrès, cette étude permet, de façon plus générale, de combler une lacune dans l’histoire du mouvement pour l’unité de la science, où le nom de Rougier n’apparaît que rarement, alors pourtant que, de 1933 à 1940, il en a été un des membres les plus actifs. Aussi, il s’agira également, de façon subsidiaire, de mettre en valeur l’action de Rougier dans l’histoire de la philosophie scientifique et de s’interroger en particulier sur le rôle qui lui revient dans la non-réception en France des idées du Cercle de Vienne. (shrink)

Lire Heidegger, c'est relire autrement tout ce que nous lisons. Ce Cahier invite à mieux comprendre la pensée heideggérienne autours des thèmes principaux qu'il aborde.Des essais, témoignages et lettres retracent l'impacte de sa pensée dans la culture moderne.Textes de : Walter Biemel, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Ernst Jünger, Roger Munier, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Herbert Marcuse, Jean-Luc Marion, John Sallis, David Farrel Krell, Jean-François Courtine, Jean Beauffret, Dominique Janicaud, Otto Pöggeler, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Jean-Pierre Charcosset, F. Wybrands, Jacques Taminiaux, Hubert L. Dreyfus, (...) Marc Froment-Meurice, Jean-Michel Palmier, Reiner Schürmann, Jean-Marie Vaysse, Henri Birault, Jacques Derrida, Gérard Granel, Daniel Charles, Gabriel Liiceanu, Jean Greisch, René Gonner.Contient un choix de textes de Heidegger. (shrink)

The problem of explaining color perception has fascinated painters, philosophers and scientists throughout the history. In many cases, the ideas and discoveries about color perception in one of these categories influenced the others, thus resulting in one of the most remarkable cross-fertilization of human thought. At the end of the nineteenth century, two models stood out as the most convincing ones: Young-Helmholtz’s trichromacy on one side, and Hering’s opponency on the other side. The former was mainly supported by painters and (...) scientists, although with some noticeable exceptions as, e.g., Otto Runge, while the majority of philosophers supported the latter. These two apparently incompatible models were proven to be two complementary parts of the hugely complex chain of events which leads to human color perception. Recently, a rigorous mathematical theory able to incorporate both trichromacy and opponency has been developed thanks to the use of the language and tools of quantum information. In this paper, we discuss the placement of this model within the philosophical theories about color. (shrink)

This chapter highlights the impact of the work of French phenomenologist Michel Henry and Austrian psychoanalyst Otto Rank on psychoanalysis. I contend that Henry and Rank clarify the nature and role of mindfulness and creativity in psychoanalysis. To begin, I draw out the implications of Henry’s critique of Freudian psychoanalysis. In my view, Henry’s work reveals and untangles basic inconsistencies in Freud’s views on the unconscious, affective layer of the subject’s life, and establishes that the creativity of life’s (...) immanent movement is essential to the development of the subject’s personality and to the acquisition and alleviation of neuroses. At the same time, I maintain that, while Henry’s work acknowledges a potential role for mindfulness in the development of life’s creativity, his account is problematic. At the end of the day, Henry’s conception of life as an immanent, self-enclosed reality fails to adequately account for the relation between life (creativity) and intentionality (mindfulness). As a result, it fails to sufficiently account for the intersubjective character of creativity and mindfulness. To address these issues, I bring Henry’s insights into these matters into dialogue with Rank’s psychology of difference, which similarly regards affectivity and creativity as central to human life and to psychoanalysis. By doing so, what comes forward is that mindfulness and creativity are relationships that can strengthen and weaken one another, and which always involve self-enclosure and openness towards others and the cosmos. Bearing this in mind, I maintain that mindfulness and creativity can play an important role in allowing psychoanalysis to realize its aim of improving the well-being of human beings. (shrink)

This chapter highlights the impact of the work of French phenomenologist Michel Henry and Austrian psychoanalyst Otto Rank on psychoanalysis. I contend that Henry and Rank clarify the nature and role of mindfulness and creativity in psychoanalysis. To begin, I draw out the implications of Henry’s critique of Freudian psychoanalysis. In my view, Henry’s work reveals and untangles basic inconsistencies in Freud’s views on the unconscious, affective layer of the subject’s life, and establishes that the creativity of life’s (...) immanent movement is essential to the development of the subject’s personality and to the acquisition and alleviation of neuroses. At the same time, I maintain that, while Henry’s work acknowledges a potential role for mindfulness in the development of life’s creativity, his account is problematic. At the end of the day, Henry’s conception of life as an immanent, self-enclosed reality fails to adequately account for the relation between life (creativity) and intentionality (mindfulness). As a result, it fails to sufficiently account for the intersubjective character of creativity and mindfulness. To address these issues, I bring Henry’s insights into these matters into dialogue with Rank’s psychology of difference, which similarly regards affectivity and creativity as central to human life and to psychoanalysis. By doing so, what comes forward is that mindfulness and creativity are relationships that can strengthen and weaken one another, and which always involve self-enclosure and openness towards others and the cosmos. Bearing this in mind, I maintain that mindfulness and creativity can play an important role in allowing psychoanalysis to realize its aim of improving the well-being of human beings. (shrink)

The early research of Karl Popper both in psychology and in philosophy of science is described; its basis for his later breakthroughs in the philosophy of science is explained. His debt to Otto Selz’s thought psychology is thereby detailed. Otto Selz’s philosophy of science is then explained, and its conflict with Popper’s early as well as his later views is portrayed. These studies of the conflicting views of Popper’s early views and Selz’s philosophy of science provide the basis (...) for demonstrating the mistakes that Michel ter Hark has made in claiming that the alleged originality of Popper’s views occurred only in the 1970s and are little more than a rehash of Selz’s alleged evolutionary epistemology. (shrink)

Festschrift with papers by Stephan Otto, Michel Malherbe, Jean-Marie Pousseur, Wolfgang Bartuschat, Rita Widmaier, Franco Volpi, Guiseppe Micheli, Han-ding Hong, Esther Seidel, Gregorio Piaia, Mario Longo, Larry Steindler, Ulrich Charpa, Anne Mylott, Rudolf A. Makkreel, Frederick Gregory, Lucien Braun and Hardy Boullion. - The three parts of the book are related to the categories Metaphysics and History of Ideas, Cultural Identities in History of Philosophy, and Hermeneutics and Philosophy of Science.

“What characterizes the act of justice is not resort to a court and to judges; it is not the intervention of magistrates. What characterizes the juridical act, the process or the procedure in the broad sense, is the regulated development of a dispute. And the intervention of judges, their opinion or decision, is only ever an episode in this development. What defines the juridical order is the way in which one confronts one another, the way in which one struggles. The (...) rule and the struggle, the rule in the struggle, this is the juridical.” - Michel Foucault Penal Theories and Institutions is the title Michel Foucault gave to the lectures he delivered at the Collège de France from November 1971 to March 1972. In these lectures Michel Foucault presents for the first time his approach to the question of power that will be the focus of his research up to the writing of Discipline and Punish and beyond. His analysis starts with a detailed account of Richelieu’s repression of the Nu-pieds revolt and then goes on to show how the apparatus of power developed by the monarchy on this occasion breaks with the system of juridical and judicial institutions of the Middle Ages and opens out onto a “judicial State apparatus”, a “repressive system”, whose function is focused on the confinement of those who challenge its order. Michel Foucault systemizes the approach of a history of truth on the basis of the study of “juridico-political matrices” that he had begun in the previous year’s lectures and which is at the heart of the notion of “knowledge-power”. In these lectures Foucault develops his theory of justice and penal law. The appearance of this volume marks the end of the publication of the series Foucault’s courses at the Collège de France. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION THE SEEMING CONTINGENCY OF THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE BODY AND THE NECESSITY FOR AN ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BODY When we disclose and..

This book is an English-language translation of a bestselling book in France that explores the relationship between humans and new technologies.

In this critical notice we argue against William Craig’s recent attempt to reconcile presentism (roughly, the view that only the present is real) with relativity theory. Craig’s defense of his position boils down to endorsing a ‘neo-Lorentzian interpretation’ of special relativity. We contend that his reconstruction of Lorentz’s theory and its historical development is fatally flawed and that his arguments for reviving this theory fail on many counts.

It is commonly thought that authors can make anything whatsoever true in their fictions by artistic fiat. Harry Deutsch originally called this position the Principle of Poetic License. If true, PPL sets an important constraint on accounts of fictional truth: they must be such as to allow that, for any x, one can write a story in which it is true that x. I argue that PPL is far too strong: it requires us to abandon the law of non-contradiction and (...) entails a radical revision of otherwise ordinary commitments about truth in fiction. (shrink)

There is a striking difference between the methodology of the young Einstein and that of the old. I argue that Einstein’s switch in the late 1910s from a moderate empiricism to an extreme rationalism should at least in part be understood against the background of his crushing personal and political experiences during the war years in Berlin. As a result of these experiences, Einstein started to put into practice what, drawing on Schopenhauer, he had preached for years, namely to use (...) science as his means of escaping from “the merely personal.” Whatever the exact sources of Einstein’s about-face, the older man has left us with a highly misleading picture of how the younger man achieved the successes that we still celebrate today. This has had a harmful influence on theoretical physics. If the young Einstein’s successes are any guide as to how successful theoretical physics is done, close adherence to general features of the empirical data is much more and mathematical elegance is much less important than the old Einstein wanted us to believe. (shrink)

Readers of this volume will notice that it contains only a few papers on general relativity. This is because most papers documenting the genesis and early development of general relativity were not published in Annalen der Physik . After Einstein took up his new prestigious position at the Prussian Academy of Sciences in the spring of 1914, the Sitzungsberichte of the Berlin academy almost by default became the main outlet for his scientific production. Two of the more important papers on (...) general relativity, however, did find their way into the pages of the Annalen [35,41]. Although I shall discuss both papers in this essay, the main focus will be on [35], the first systematic exposition of general relativity, submitted in March 1916 and published in May of that year. (shrink)

This book’s basic argument is that the Freudian unconscious, far from constituting a radical break with the philosophy of consciousness, is merely the latest exemplar in a heritage of philosophical misunderstanding of the Cartesian cogito that interprets “I think, therefore I am” as “I represent myself, therefore I am” (in the classic interpretation of Heidegger, one of the targets of the book).

Contemporary or postmodern thought is based on the lack of foundation. The impossibility of having a principle for philosophy has become a position of principle. As a result, rhetoric has taken over. Content has given way to the priority of form. Michel Meyer's book aims at showing that philosophy as foundational is possible and necessary, and that rhetoric can flourish alongside, but the conception of reason must be changed. Questioning rather than answering must be considered as the guiding principle. (...) What the author calls "problematology" is not only the study of questioning but also the analysis of the reasons why it has been repressed throughout the history of philosophy. Since Socrates, philosophers and scientists have reasoned by asking questions and by trying to solve them. Questioning has been the unthematized foundation of philosophy and thought at large. Philosophers, however, have preferred another norm, granting privilege to the answers and thereby repressing the questions into the realm of the preliminary and unessential. They have not considered their discursive practice as being based upon some question-answer complex, but exclusively on the results they call propositions. Meyer argues that propositions ensue from corresponding questions, and not the other way around. Anthropology, ontology, reasoning, and language thus receive a new interpretation in the problematological conception of philosophy, a conception in which questions and problems are thematized afresh. The theory of language in everyday use, in argumentation, or in literary analysis receives a full and decisive treatment here, making Meyer's question-view one of the leading theories in contemporary thought, alongside his rhetoric for which he is already well known. (shrink)

Most discussions frame the Liar Paradox as a formal logical-linguistic puzzle. Attempts to resolve the paradox have focused very little so far on aspects of cognitive psychology and processing, because semantic and cognitive-psychological issues are generally assumed to be disjunct. I provide a motivation and carry out a cognitive-computational treatment of the liar paradox based on a cognitive-computational model of language and conceptual knowledge within the Predictive Processing framework. I suggest that the paradox arises as a failure of synchronization between (...) two ways of generating the liar situation in two different PP sub-models, one corresponding to language processing and the other to the processing of meaning and world-knowledge. In this way, I put forward the claim that the liar sentence is meaningless but has an air of meaningfulness. I address the possible objection that the proposal violates the Principle of Unrestricted Compositionality, which purportedly regulates the conceptual competence of thinkers. (shrink)

Iacobvs Bernays uir sagacissimus, exposuit in Porphyrii de abstinentia libris exstare excerpta ex Theophrasti de pietate libro satis magna, quae antea partim inscientia, partim neglegentia uirorum doctorum erant neglecta. Ad haec fragmenta coniecturas quasdam profero, usus Nauckii editione altera.

La visée de cette étude se résume en peu de mots : abandonné à lui-même, le système économico-politico-social actuel est condamné et son trépas sera douloureux, à moins qu’une réforme profonde ne survienne. Les pistes de réflexion qu’il rassemble dans cette étude trouvent leur origine dans deux systèmes de pensée complémentaires : la philosophie organique du dernier Whitehead et le matérialisme dialectique de Marx. Poliment mis entre parenthèses comme une double aberration historique, leurs travaux ont pourtant déterminé les balises conceptuelles (...) de tous les problèmes contemporains : les racines et les enjeux de la technoscience, du matérialisme, du capitalisme et de l’existence démocratique dans une biosphère en faillite, au propre comme au figuré... De plus, ce balisage s’alimente d’une pensée processuelle et pragmatique qui est tout à fait à l’ordre du jour. Ainsi, à la lumière des travaux de ces deux penseurs, Michel Weber aborde la thèse simple suivante : la civilisation occidentale mondialisée a atteint un point de rupture qui ne tardera plus à se manifester sous une forme insurrectionnelle, à moins que des réformes radicales soient promptement mises en oeuvre. Il en propose principalement trois : déprofessionnaliser la politique, recentrer la société sur les communautés et restaurer le droit régalien de battre monnaie. En somme, il s’agit ici de dessiner une réponse politique à une crise globale systémique qui est radicalement politique. (shrink)

More or less explicitly inspired by the Aristotelian classification of arguments, a wide tradition makes a sharp distinction between argument and proof. Ch. Perelman and R. Johnson, among others, share this view based on the principle that the conclusion of an argument is uncertain while the conclusion of a proof is certain. Producing proof is certainly a major part of mathematical activity. Yet, in practice, mathematicians, expert or beginner, argue about mathematical proofs. This happens during the search for a proof, (...) then when the proof is presented and discussed by experts, and finally when it is taught or used in didactical contexts. (shrink)

Most states are multination states, and most peoples are stateless peoples. Just as collectives can behave as sovereign states only if they are recognized by the international community, liberal multination states must recognize stateless peoples in order to determine their political status within that state. There is, however, no agreement on the kind of principles that should be considered, especially under classical liberalism, which gives individuals preeminence over groups. Liberal theories that attempt to accommodate collective rights are often based on (...) a comprehensive version of liberalism that subscribes to moral individualism. Within such a framework, they develop a watered-down concept of collective rights. In A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights Michel Seymour explores the theoretical resources of John Rawls’s political liberalism and shows that this particular approach can accommodate genuine collective rights. By Rawls’s account, Seymour explains, peoples are moral agents and sources of valid moral claims and are therefore entitled to collective rights. These kinds of rights translate, in the constitution of the multination state, to a true political recognition for stateless peoples. Ultimately, A Liberal Theory of Collective Rights answers three important questions: Who is the subject of collective rights? What is the object of collective rights? And can they be institutionalized in real politics? (shrink)

L'ONTOLOGIE comme question de l'Etre aura dominé le XXe siècle, avec L'Etre et le Temps de Heidegger et l'Etre et le Néant de Sartre. Mais que dire sur l'Etre sans le présupposer, sans dire qu'il est ceci ou cela alors que c'est ce dire même qui fait problème? L'Etre se présente ainsi comme la problématicité de la philosophie, et c'est du même coup cette problématicité qui pose question avant tel ou tel objet, aussi éminent soit-il. En se voulant interrogation sur (...) l'Etre, la philosophie néglige de prendre en compte l'être de sa propre interrogation, et de s'interroger non seulement sur son questionnement, mais sur le questionnement en général, qu'elle met cependant en œuvre comme une évidence. Le but de cet ouvrage est d'analyser, de Platon à Heidegger, en passant par Kant, Sartre, Bergson et Wittgenstein, les apories de l'ontologie et leur dépassement par la thématisation du questionnement, la problématologie. Car qu'est-ce que la philosophie sinon un questionnement radical, à questionner enfin comme tel, et non plus au travers de l'Etre ou du sujet? MICHEL MEYER. (shrink)

Le monde moderne est en proie à une crise majeure de civilisation. La doxa parlera de " perte des repères ", et les pouvoirs publics croient contenir les périls en multipliant les " comités d'éthique ", dans de nombreux secteurs d'activité à commencer par ceux des pratiques médicales et des recherches en biotechnologies. Mais encore cette crise porte sur les valeurs, les moeurs, la politique, l'économie, la violence, la criminalité, les médias, l'éducation, le sport, etc. À ne pas interroger plus (...) en profondeur cette crise, ces divers comités d'éthique seront autant de " rustines " destinées à colmater en vain ce qui fait eau de toute part. Les questions sous-jacentes de l'éthique contemporaine portent sur les " limites ": "peut-on tout faire?", "peut-on tout dire?", "peut-on tout montrer?", "peut-on rire de tout?". Elles interrogent la formation et la condition du lien social, dans un contexte où la démocratie est une valeur inconditionnée. Thomas Jefferson en avait identifié le point de tension : " Le prix de la Liberté, c'est une vigilance éternelle ". Ce champ de réflexion appelle donc un croisement de disciplines : le droit, la sociologie, l'anthropologie, la philosophie, l'histoire, la psychanalyse, les sciences du comportement et des systèmes intelligents et robotiques, les sciences politiques, les sciences du vivant, les sciences de l'environnement. Sous la direction de Michel Gad Wolkowicz l'ouvrage réunit des intervenants de référence de toutes ces disciplines. (shrink)