Transcendental Meditation (TM) holds that the essence of reality is “pure consciousness.” This piece contrasts three interpretations of their meditative trance: (i) TM doctrine, and (ii) scientific physicalism, (iii) with my own meditative experience. Pure consciousness events, defined as wakeful contentless consciousness, are known to occur, but what ontological basis do they have? While cosmic consciousness may be the only ontological ultimate there is, my meditative introspection does not neatly align with TM dogma. In search of the right metaphor, this (...) piece journeys over mystical notions of divine darkness, contemplates evidence regimes, and proposes “mystic doubt” or ontological skepticism as an alternative to ontological relativism. (shrink)

Constitutivism explains norms in terms of their being constitutive of agency, actions, or certain propositional attitudes. However, the shmagency objection says that if we can be shmagents – like agents, minus the norm-explaining features of agency – we can avoid the norms, so the explanation fails. This paper extends this objection, arguing that constitutivists about practical norms suffer from it despite their recent attempts to solve it. The standard response to the objection is that it is self-defeating for agents to (...) become shmagents. I agree, but the response ignores the possibility of shmagents who consider whether to be agents while already standing outside agency. Another response says that we ought to be agents because agency is, in some sense, normatively valuable, and if so, we can explain norms in terms of this valuable form of agency. But then the norms that our constitutions are supposed to explain are underdetermined because it is unclear how much we ought to care about this value. I conclude that the shmagency objection has yet to be answered. (shrink)

In recent discussions of the Humean Theory of Motivation (HTM), several authors – not to mention other philosophers around the proverbial water cooler – have appealed to the simplicity of the theory to defend it. But the argument from simplicity has rarely been explicated or received much critical attention – until now. I begin by reconstructing the argument and then argue that it suffers from a number of problems. Most importantly, first, I argue that HTM is unlikely to be simpler (...) than even close competing theories, and second, it is unlikely that a plausible version of the theory will be very simple. Moreover, I argue that a convincing case for HTM is likely to have to show that it is more virtuous than defenders have done so far. (shrink)

Constitutivist approaches to the normativity of rationality have recently come into vogue. Unlike their moral counterparts, however, they have not been confronted with the shmagency objection. In this paper, I challenge them with two versions of the objection based on recent developments in the debate surrounding the normativity of morality. These are shmagency as modal escapability, which is based on taking sophisticated shmagents to be able to modally escape various norms, and shmagency as underdetermination, which is based on taking constitutive (...) norms that allegedly have independent value to be underdetermined by that value. I consider three different kinds of constitutivist theories of the normativity of rationality: first-person-authority views, single-mental-state views, and systems-of-mental-states views. None of the three are able to deal with either of these shmagency objections. There are sophisticated shmagents who escape all these types of constitutivist principles of rationality, so they are modally escapable, and the value of rationality underdetermines all the views. Upshot: constitutivists about structural rationality ought to worry about shmagency. (shrink)

Realists about corporate agency, according to whom corporate agents may have aims above and beyond those of the individuals who make them up, think that individual agents may switch between participating in individual and corporate agency. My aim is, however, to argue that the inescapability of individual agency spells out a difficulty for this kind of switching – and, therefore, for realism about corporate agency. To do so, I develop Korsgaard’s notion of plight inescapability, which on my take suggests that (...) individual agents are continuously faced with fully exercising their individual agency (absent external limits at the time of its exercise). But then individual agents may not switch to acting as members of corporate agents if the aims of the corporation differ from their own, in the sense that they have different mental state tokens. But as it is possible to participate fully in the action of a corporate entity, this incompatibility between individual and corporate aims suggests that we ought to think of corporate agents as in some sense reducible to individual aims. (shrink)

Personalism is understood today as the name of an important current in twentieth-century thought which, inspired by the Christian and humanistic traditions of the West, has sought to deepen our understanding of the meaning and value of human personhood. Opposing both individualism and collectivism, personalism has stressed the uniqueness of each person, the meaning and value of interpersonal relations, and the unity that holds persons together and is, ultimately, also personal in itself: the person of God. Personalism's insights into the (...) nature of personhood have broad implications for our view of ethics, politics, education, and religion. The history of personalism has, however, been poorly understood. Jan Olof Bengtsson shows that personalism began as early as the eighteenth century and was a central, international current of thought throughout the nineteenth century - that it was, in fact, more characteristic of the nineteenth century than of the twentieth. (shrink)

Resumen Al menos desde la publicación del clásico Ética en el Congreso. De la corrupción individual a la institucional de Dennis F. Thompson, el concepto de corrupción institucional ha recibido gran atención. Este tipo de corrupción se diferencia de la corrupción personal en que, entre otras cosas, la última requiere de la existencia de motivos morales personales. En este artículo exploro esta distinción y hago algunas observaciones críticas a la manera en la que Thompson la ha recientemente elaborado.At least from (...) the publication of Dennis F. Thompson’s classic Ethics in Congress. From Individual to Institutional Corruption the concept of institutional corruption has received great attention. This type of corruption is different from personal corruption in that, among other things, the latter requires the existence of personal moral motives. In this article I explore this distinction and raise some critical observations to the way in which Thompson has recently elaborated it. (shrink)

Student behavioural disengagement is a problem in many schools. This paper aims to explain why students’ behavioural disengagement occurs and reoccurs in Swedish classrooms in terms of two mechanisms. Mechanisms that explain student disengagement are tested quantitatively and illustrated qualitatively with primary data consisting of 74 video-recorded classroom lessons from three compulsory schools in Sweden. The regressions suggest that peer encouragement and the school subject curriculum are central for explaining student behavioural disengagement. Qualitative analysis decomposes how the mechanisms of peer (...) encouragement and school subject curriculum increase the risk of behavioural disengagement in real time using transcripts and images. In conclusion, this study shows how both mechanisms provide complementary explanations for students’ behavioural disengagement. (shrink)

Constitutivists often argue that agency is inescapable. This is supposed to, among other things, explain why norms that are constitutive of agency are forceful. But can some form of inescapability do that? I consider four types of inescapability—psychological, further factor, standpoint, and plight—and evaluate whether they manage to explain four necessary features of normative force: that it does not vary with desire change, that ought-implies-can and can-fail, and that we are criticizable for failing to live up to forceful norms. The (...) former three all fail to explain some of these features, but a version of plight inescapability does, in fact, appear able to explain them all. This is good news for constitutivists. The catch? The plight inescapability explanation generates relativism. This leaves constitutivists at a choice point: accept the plight inescapability explanation of normative force and relativism—or give up the plight inescapability explanation. (shrink)

How should we understand the relation between corporate agency, corporate moral agency and corporate moral patienthood? For some time, corporations have been treated as increasingly ontologically and morally sophisticated in the literature. To explore the limits of this treatment, I start off by redeveloping and defending a reductio that historically has been aimed at accounts of corporate agency which entail that corporations count as moral patients. More specifically, I argue that standard agents are due a certain type of moral concern, (...) but corporate agents are not due that type of concern, so they are not agents of, at least, the standard type. Diagnosis: because corporations plausibly lack qualia, they are ‘zombie agents’ that mimic real agents. This explains why they are neither standard agents nor standard moral patients: they are not standard agents because they lack mental states, and because they lack experiences, they are, at best, morally notable rather than morally respectable. However, I then argue that we nevertheless have instrumental reasons to include them in our moral responsibility practices, both because that is what notability involves and bluffingly, and both when it comes to treating them as moral agents and as moral patients. Hence, we may treat corporations as part of our moral responsibility practices to a limited extent anyway. (shrink)

This paper argues that Socrates’ discussion about selfhood in the first Alcibiades does not only dissociate the soul from the body and from the soul-body complex, but also from λόγος. It suggests that the most promising and influential take on this, the so-called theocentric view, is insufficient, and needs to be supplemented in terms of how Socrates’ notion of ideal selfhood is conditioned by knowledge of a real or personal self.

This dissertation is a study of appetite in Plato’s Timaeus, Republic and Phaedrus. In recent research is it often suggested that Plato considers appetite (i) to pertain to the essential needs of the body, (ii) to relate to a distinct set of objects, e.g. food or drink, and (iii) to cause behaviour aiming at sensory pleasure. Exploring how the notion of appetite, directly and indirectly, connects with Plato’s other purposes in these dialogues, this dissertation sets out to evaluate these ideas. (...) By asking, and answering, three philosophically and interpretatively crucial questions, individually linked to the arguments of the dialogues, this thesis aims to show (i) that the relationship between appetite and the body is not a matter of survival, and that appetite is better understood in terms of excess; (ii) that appetite is multiform and cannot be defined in terms of a distinct set of objects; and (iii) that appetite, in Plato, can also pertain to non-sensory objects, such as articulated discourse. -/- Chapter one asks what the universe can teach us about embodied life. It argues that Plato, in the Timaeus, works with an important link between the universe and the soul, and that the account of disorder, irrationality and multiformity identifying a pre-cosmic condition of the universe provides a key to understanding the excessive behaviour and condition of a soul dominated by appetite. -/- Chapter two asks why the philosophers of the Republic’s Kallipolis return to the cave, and suggests that Plato’s notion of the noble lie provides a reasonable account of this. By exploring the Republic’s ideas of education, poetry and tradition, it argues that appetite – a multiform and appearance oriented source of motivation – is an essential part of this account. -/- Chapter three asks why Socrates characterizes the speeches of the Phaedrus as deceptive games. It proposes that this question should be understood in the light of two distinctions: one between playful and serious discourse and one between simple and multiform. It argues that the speeches of the Phaedrus are multiform games, and suggests that appetite is the primary source of motivation of the soul addressed, personified by Phaedrus. -/- . (shrink)

Why be moral? According to constitutivism, there are features constitutive of agency, actual or ideal, the properties of which explain why moral norms are normative for us. I aim to investigate whether this idea is plausible. I start off critically. After defining constitutivism and outlining its attractions and problems (chapter 1), I discuss the theories of various features of agency that are supposed to ground morality according to the leading constitutivists in the literature. I find these theories wanting. They are (...) based on implausible assumptions about agency (chapter 2), and they fail to make sense of moral (and other) norms because the so-called shmagency objection, according to which we can shirk from our normative commitments by being ‘shmagents’ rather than agents, appears in new ways for them (chapter 3). Then I get more constructive. I defend a two-tiered form of constitutivism. The first tier captures practical rationality, and the second tier captures reasons for action. Starting with the first tier, I defend a Humean theory of agency (chapter 4) and add a principle of instrumental rationality to it (chapter 5). Appendices A and B supplement these chapters with replies to criticisms of the Humean picture. In chapters 6 and 7, I put this conception of agency to work to reach the second tier of the view. I start by defending a form of reasons internalism which treats practical reasons as grounded in the desires of ideal agents (chapter 6). Then I extend this theory to moral reasons, arguing – unexpectedly for a Humean – that we have universally prescriptive reasons to cooperate with other cooperative agents to satisfy our other respective desires (chapter 7). Hence, the constitutive features of ideal agency ground a morality of cooperation. I conclude by summarizing the case for constitutivism (chapter 8). (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Studien zur antiken Philosophie" verfügbar.

Résumé Cette étude basée sur une expérience concrète et pratique mais trop sommaire peut être résumée ainsi. 1:o En parlant d'une »prévention générale» sans y donner des qualifications précises, l'on pose le Problème de manière à rendre impossible toute réponse, affirmative ou négative. Si l'influence anticriminelle du code était universelle il n'existerait pas de crimes. D'autre part, nier toute influence anticriminelle du code et de son application serait absurde. Puisque le terme de prévention générale est erroné et entretient des malentendus, (...) il doit être supprimé dans le langage scientifique. 2:o Lorsque le code a une influence anticriminelle diffuse, c'est par le risque de sanction subjectif. 3:o Son influence anticriminelle diffuse est limitée à certains groupes de citoyens. 4:o Elle est plus grande parmi les hommes mentalement normaux et sains et bien adaptés à la vie sociale, c'est à dire là où elle est le moins utile. Elle est plus faible parmi les anormaux, les malades d'esprit et les mal adaptés, c'est à dire là oú elle serait le plus nécéssaire. 5:o Pour que les hommes disposés à commettre un certain genre de crimes soient influencés par les sanctions appliquées à d'autres personnes qui ont commis les mêmes crimes, il faut qu'ils s'identifient avec elles à certains égards. 6:o L'influence anticriminelle diffuse du code, exercée par moyen d'une création ou raffermissement des fonctions morales chez les citoyens, n'est possible qu'à mesure que les opinions morales exprimées par le code ne soient pas neutralisées par des opinions morales antagonistes répandues parmi les citoyens. 7:o L'influence anticriminelle diffuse du code s'exerce surtout à mesure que les autorités auxquelles incombent la législation et les décisions concernant les moyens budgetaires nécessaires aux fonctions de la politique criminelle, montrent par leur activité qu'elles prennent la criminalité au sérieux et qu'elles font leur mieux pour la supprimer. 8:o En dehors des fonctions utiles du code et de ses agents pratiques, la législation et son application peuvent produire des effets nuisibles à la moralité du peuple et à l'obéissance aux lois, en statuant des sanctions contre des comportements neutres ou même méritoires ou en permettant aux tribunaux de rendre des arrêts mal fondés pour favoriser des personnes agréables au pouvoir exécutif ou pour rendre inoffensifs ceux qui lui déplaisent. 9:o A l'exception de quelques cas très rares l'influence anticriminelle diffuse du code est soutenue par un traitement des délinquants à la fois rationnel, effectif et humanitaire. Cela peut se faire de plusieurs manières. a. En appliquant, chaque fois qu'un crime est commis et le criminel poursuivi, la meilleure reaction individuelle et sociale qui soit à portée. b. En améliorant successivement le système de réactions vers le plus haut degré d'utilité. c. En augmentant les ressources personnelles et techniques de la police afin de renforcer son activité anticriminelle, préventive et réparative. d. En améliorant les moyens curatifs et éducateurs des établissements de politique criminelle ainsi que les expédients et les mesures de traitement préventif ambulant et en éliminant autant que possible les conditions sociales favorisant la criminalité. e. En ne permettant pas que des criminels connus aux autorités judicères continuent pendant des mois ou des années leur activité criminelle, sans qu'aucune mesure sérieuse ne soit prise à leur égard. f. En évitant autant que possible d'adopter des mesures législatives qui peuvent faire croire au public que la société ne prend pas aus sérieux la criminalité. En appliquant ainsi aux criminels des mesures pratiques suffisantes et rationnelles du point de vue prévention individuelle on renforce aussi l'influence anticriminelle diffuse du code sauf dans des cas tout à fait exceptionnels. (shrink)

Argues that the humanities are valuable (in Swedish).

El artículo explora la posible relación analítica entre la idea de ser un miembro de una comunidad democrática y tener derechos civiles, políticos y de bienestar. Llamo a esta relación la tesis analítica. Después de distinguir una interpretación trivial y una no-trivial de dicha tesis, ofrezco algunas razones a favor de esta última.

In the Timaeus, Plato makes a distinction between reason and necessity. This distinction is often accounted for as a distinction between two types of causation: purpose oriented causation and mechanistic causation. While reason is associated with the soul and taken to bring about its effects with the good and the beautiful as the end, necessity is understood in terms of a set of natural laws pertaining to material things. In this paper I shall suggest that there are reasons to reconsider (...) the latter part of this account and argue for a non-mechanistic understanding of necessity. I will first outline how the notion of necessity is introduced in the dialogue. I will then show how a mechanistic account of necessity fails to capture Plato’s purpose of treating it as a causal factor; and, finally, argue that this purpose is better understood as an attempt, on Plato’s part, to account for the causal origin of disorder and irrationality, an origin articulated in terms of a pre-cosmic situation and the notoriously difficult notion of the third kind. (shrink)

Argues that reasons internalism, suitably understood, explains categorical reasons for us to cooperate with each other. The norms we then cooperate to satisfy can lie at the heart of legal systems, yielding unexpected implications in the philosophy of law.

A debate has recently appeared regarding whether non-naturalism is better than other metaethical views at explaining moral progress. I shall take the occasion of this debate to present a novel debunking dilemma for moral non-naturalists, extending Sharon Street's Darwinian one. I will argue that moral progress indicates that our moral attitudes tend to reflect contingent sociocultural and psychological factors. For non-naturalists, there is then either a relation between these factors and the moral facts, non-naturalistically construed, or there is not. If (...) there is no relation, the contingent factors are unlikely to lead to moral knowledge. If there is a relation, they must be likely to lead to non-naturalist-style moral knowledge, but no theoretically virtuous explanation of moral progress is likely to accommodate non-naturalist commitments. It follows that non-naturalist moral realism cannot explain our moral knowledge. I call this a contingentist challenge to non-naturalism. (shrink)

As is well known, the rule of the philosophers is what ultimately completes the political project in Plato's Republic. Only if the philosophers accept to rule, may the city see the light of day. Yet, as is equally well known, the philosophers are reluctant to rule. But ruling is what they are designed to do. Their entire education was constructed to prepare them for this task. And therefore, as Plato's repeatedly puts it, they will need to be compelled. How? As (...) this paper sets out to argue, it is what Plato calls the noble lie that does the job. Established in the philosophers' souls during their childhood, and tested like "gold in the fire", it is only the city-love established by the noble lie that can counteract their otherworldly desire for truth and knowledge. Designed to imbue their souls with a sense of responsibility and care, the noble can outweigh their political reluctance, and turn their eyes back to the city. (shrink)

This book presents a number of fundamentally challenging perspectives that have been brought to the fore by the national tests on religious education (RE) in Sweden. It particularly focuses on the content under the heading Ethics. It is common knowledge that many teachers find these parts difficult to handle within RE. Further, ethics is a field that addresses a range of moral and existential issues that are not easily treated. Many of these issues may be said to belong to the (...) philosophical context, in which "eternal questions" are gathered and reflected upon. The first chapters highlight the concepts of ethical competence and critical thinking. In the following chapters the concept of ethical competence is analyzed with regard to teachers' objectives and to students' texts, respectively. These chapters pursue a more practice-related approach and highlight specific challenges identified from both teacher and student perspectives. Next, the book raises the issue of global responsibility. What kind of critical issues arise when handling such matters at school? Further, can contemporary moral philosophers contribute to such a discussion? In turn, the book discusses the role of statistical analyses with regard to national tests, while the closing chapters present international perspectives on the book's main themes and concluding remarks. The book's critical yet constructive approach to issues regarding assessment in ethics education makes a valuable contribution to an ongoing debate among researchers as well as to the everyday communication on testing in schools and classrooms. As such, it will appeal to scholars in ethics education and researchers in the field of assessment, as well as educators and teachers interested and engaged in the task of testing ethics in school contexts where curricular demands for valid and authoritative evaluation may provide important guidelines, but may also pose challenges of their own. (shrink)

Since 1923 the Sammlung Tusculum has published authoritative editions of Greek and Latin works together with a German translation. The original texts are comprehensively annotated, and feature an introductory chapter. In the new volumes, additional essays delve into specific aspects of the works, illuminating their historical context and reception to the present day. The high academic quality of the new editions together with clearly written essays and annotations make the Sammlung Tusculum essential reading for students who are discovering an ancient (...) author for the first time as well as professional scholars who would like to gain a deeper understanding of specific aspects of a given work. Moreover, the series is ideal for lay readers who would like to engage with antiquity through a reliable German translation. The series contains over 270 titles, available in print and eBook editions, making previously out-of-print titles and rarities available again for the first time. In order to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the series, De Gruyter is proud to present Tusculum Online, an eBook package which contains all titles that appeared between 1923 and 2013 - a fitting tribute to an important part of German publishing history. For more information, please see www.degruyter.com/tusculum. (shrink)

Summary: The organization of the treatment of mentally diseased ab‐normal or defective people should be carried out on the follow‐ing lines.