Kişinin bazı yükümlülükleri uhdesinde barındırması için akıllı olması şarttır. Bu durum hem dinî hem de beşerî sistemlerde aynı şekildedir. Bu bağlamda Kur’an’da aklı kullanmaya vurgu yapan birçok ayet vardır. Her bir ayetin anlatmak istediği aklın nasıl kullanılacağına dair bir hakikat mevcuttur. Bu hakikatin ortaya çıkarılması ise ehil olan kişilerin izahlarıyla mümkün olacaktır. Öte yandan bu ayetlerin bağlamıyla birlikte değerlendirilmesi doğru bir anlamın ortaya çıkmasında önemli bir etkendir. Nitekim aynı ifadeler birçok ayette tekrar edilmesine rağmen her birinde farklı bir konuya temas (...) edilmektedir. Mesele aklî çerçevede Kur’an’ın ele alınmasıyla ilgili olduğu için konuyu dirayet tefsiri ekseninde değerlendirmek daha doğru olacaktır. O nedenle bu çalışmamızda aklî çıkarımlara çok fazla başvurulan Te’vîlâtü’l-Kur’ân ve Tefsîru’l-Menâr isimli iki tefsir bağlamında konunun değerlendirilmesi yapılacaktır. Yaşadıkları zaman dilimi birbirinden çok uzak olmasına rağmen her ki tefsirdeki müelliflerin meseleye bakışları arasında benzerliklerin çok olduğu görülmüştür. O nedenle ayetlerin verdiği mesajların farklı zamanlarda nasıl anlaşıldığı, ne gibi anlayış farklılıklarının oluştuğu, ortak noktaların neler olduğu bu çalışmada ortaya konmaya çalışılacaktır. (shrink)

Environmental philosophers often conflate the concepts of intrinsic value and moral standing. As a result, individualists needlessly deny intrinsic value to species, while holists falsely attribute moral standing to species. Conceived either as classes or as historical individuals, at least some species possess intrinsic value. Nevertheless, even if a species has interests or a good of its own, it cannot have moral standing because species lack sentience. Although there is a basis for duties toward some species (in terms of their (...) intrinsic value), it is not the one that the holists claim. (shrink)

In this article, we will consider how far we might be said to be active in forming our beliefs; in particular, we will ask to what extent we can be said to be free in believing what we want to believe. It is clear that we ought to believe only what is really so, at least in so far as it lies in our power to determine this, but reflection shows that, regrettably, we do not confine our beliefs to what (...) we have evidence for, nor do we always believe in accordance with the evidence we do have. So it is natural to conclude that non-intellectual factors may be at work here; such, at least, was the view of Descartes, who attributed error to the influence of our will in leading us to assent to judgments which go beyond the evidence presented by our infallible intellect. This view has some initial plausibility when we think of cases in which emotional considerations lead people to take up and genuinely believe things they have no evidence for, but it is not a view which has received much support from modern philosophers. So, in Part 1 we will look at criticisms levelled against Descartes' view by J. L. Evans, and in Part 2 we will see how far Descartes can be defended. Our conclusions here will lead us to give in Part 3 a general account of the influence of the will in beliefs. We will suggest that we are always responsible for our explicit beliefs, even though it is not true that we can simply believe what we like. Thus we will reject the idea that a man can consciously know something, and at the same time, by will power, believe the opposite. Belief is not then totally free, but we will argue that people do sometimes form beliefs which go against what they should and could believe, and that this can in a way be put down to the influence of the will. Finally we will consider some of the ways in which it is possible to influence our beliefs by willed acts over a long period of time, though this is not the way that we clami that the will might be said to play a part in every judgment that we make. (shrink)

Philosophers and cognitive scientists of perception by custom have investigated individual sense modalities in relative isolation from each other. However, perceiving is, in a number of respects, multimodal. The traditional sense modalities should not be treated as explanatorily independent. Attention to the multimodal aspects of perception challenges common assumptions about the content and phenomenology of perception, and about the individuation and psychological nature of sense modalities. Multimodal perception thus presents a valuable opportunity for a case study in mature interdisciplinary cognitive (...) science. This chapter aims to raise these issues against the background of unimodal approaches in the study of perception. It presents some of the central empirical findings concerning multimodality, and it explains the philosophical implications of these findings. Foremost, it aims to encourage and open avenues for future research. (shrink)

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

Carruthers presents evidence concerning the cross-modular integration of information in human subjects which appears to support the “cognitive conception of language.” According to this conception, language is not just a means of communication, but also a representational medium of thought. However, Carruthers overlooks the possibility that language, in both its communicative and cognitive roles, is a nonrepresentational system of conventional signals – that words are not a medium we think in, but a tool we think with. The evidence he cites (...) is equivocal when it comes to choosing between the cognitive conception and this radical communicative conception of language. (shrink)

I test the ability of Plantinga's free-will defense of theism against logical arguments from evil to defend the version of the theory I call orthodox Christian theism against a reformed logical argument from evil. I conclude that his defense fails in that task.

A proposition that theism has traditionally tried to establish, as part of its general effort to reconcile the existence of God and that of evil in the (supposedly God-made) world, is the following; that natural evil is logically a precondition of freedom of choice. Often the approach to this task has been through the free will defense. In my paper I argue that the standard formulation of that defense will not succeed in the specific task mentioned, and propose a variation (...) upon the standard formulation. Then I try to defend the variation against some powerful objections. (shrink)

International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 2, Page 308-313, May 2012.

The papers published here were given at the second biennial conference of the Hegel Society of America, held at the University of Notre Dame, November 9-11, 1972. They appear in an order which reflects roughly two headings: (1) Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy in general, and (2) his relation to individual thinkers both before and after him. Given the importance of the history of philosophy for Hegel, and the far-reaching impact of his thought upon subsequent philosophy, it becomes (...) immediately apparent that we have here only a beginning. At the conference, cries went up "Why not Hegel and Aristotle, Aquinas, HusserI and Hart mann?" Indeed, why not? The answer, of course, might be given by Hegel himself : if we wish to accomplish anything, we have to limit ourselves. We trust that future conferences and scholarship will bring to light these relationships and the many more which testify to Hegel's profound presence in the mainstream of past and present thought. It is furthermore no accident that the renaissance of Hegelian studies has brought with it a rebirth of the history of philosophy as something relevant to our own problems. For Hegel, the object of philosophy is alone the truth, the history of philosophy is philosophy itself, and this truth which it gives us cannot be what has passed away. (shrink)

Creativity of Ivan Vyshensky is one of the outstanding ideological and artistic phenomena of the end of XVI - beginning of XVII century. Closely linked to the events of the time, she witnessed the arrival in the Ukrainian spiritual culture of the artist, who put all her talent in defense of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Although, to be more specific, Ivan Vyshensky's person would be more right to recognize the apologist of the foundations of ancient Ukrainian Orthodoxy, whose spokesmen strongly opposed the (...) measures connected with the preparation, proclamation and implementation of the Orthodox-Catholic Union in the territory of the Commonwealth. The problem, it is known, turned out to be so significant and complex that it divided the Ukrainian ethnic group at the time of its active national self-awareness into two denominationally opposing camps. In such circumstances, the "Russian faith" and the Orthodox Church as a whole became the subject of special affection, the most touching place, its national banner and slogan, "or, as A. Richinsky noted, signs of nationality. It is understandable that dignitaries, including church and religious ones, also had denominators of Orthodox Catholic unification. Therefore, the attempt to objectify the view of the need for church-religious union within the framework of the Commonwealth, as well as to improve the understanding of those initial principles, which were guided by Ivan Vyshensky, requires an expansion and deepening of thematic expositions. In this sense, the task of the proposed article we would like to reduce to a brief analysis of the polemical works of anti-union content of the late XVI - early XVII centuries, that is, the time when Ivan Vyshensky lived and created, and which in one way or another will help them to comprehend their congruence or contradiction artist's credo. (shrink)

_Purpose__._ This article aims at outlining the socio-communicative prerequisites for the influence of personality on the acquisition of rigorous scientific knowledge. _Theoretical__ basis__._ The communicative foundations of an individual’s activity in general and the functioning of his consciousness in particular were laid by the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, primarily due to his introduction of the concepts of "intersubjectivity" and "lifeworld". From these positions, attempts were made to understand the discussion of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn regarding the role of the (...) individual in science, in particular, the concept of a "normal scientist" as a participant in the lifeworld of scientists who support special intersubjective norms of reproduction of this lifeworld through scientific communication. The concept of "communicative mind", correlated with the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas, best expresses the rational and argumentative principles of achieving consensus in science. _Originality__._ Social anthropology reveals the constitutive significance of teamwork in science as a way of achieving rigorous scientific knowledge. Social phenomenology concretizes this by emphasizing the need for constant improvement of the rules of this communication. The verification of scientific knowledge by facts is strictly determined by the observance of community-recognized scientific tools for achieving such verification, in particular, the conventional agreement within a certain community of scientists regarding the language of science, which is used to describe verification, falsification, and other procedures for organizing scientific knowledge into a system. _Conclusions._ Verification of the obtained scientific knowledge critically depends on the formulation, dissemination and observance of certain institutional rules of scientific communication. This applies, in particular, to the conventionally recognized rules for the verification of scientific knowledge by empirical facts: it is not an isolated scientist who should identify, verify, organize and evaluate empirical facts, but a community of scientists who conduct scientific research in an organized manner. Team scientific work is a special case of collective action, which is characterized by a high level of reflection and application of critical thinking on a communicative basis. In particular, the legitimation of acquired scientific knowledge occurs in the process of scientific research due to the observance of procedural rules and careful work with empirical facts. (shrink)

Urbach (1985) has concluded that the use of randomization in the design of clinical and agricultural trials is both inappropriate and ineffective. It is argued here that it is appropriate, as it eliminates the dependence of inference on the unknown precise physical model that underlies a set of observations, and effective, in that it is relatively simple to apply in practice compared with any competing method. Furthermore, it has been proven in practice.

'Estética da contradição' tem como objetivo constituir o corpo crítico da contradição no seio da história da estética em seus mais significativos momentos. O conceito de contradição estética é um universo autônomo, simultaneamente constituído e integrado.

Key issues in the philosophy of mind, examined by leading figures in the field.