In Tullock contests in which the common value of the prize is uncertain and the elasticity of the marginal cost of effort is increasing, the effect of changes of players’ information on the equilibrium efforts and payoffs is unambiguous: if information is symmetric, then expected effort decreases as players become better informed; in two-player contests, the expected effort of a player with information advantage is less than that of his opponent. Sharper results arise when the cost of effort is linear: (...) Under symmetric information, expected effort and payoff are invariant to changes in the players’ information. In two-player contests, both players exert the same expected effort regardless of their information, although expected effort is smaller when one player has information advantage than when both players have the same information. Interestingly, the expected payoff of a player with information advantage is larger than that of his opponent, even though he wins the prize less frequently. (shrink)

Assuming that the reader accepts, albeit provisionally, that James's "will" to believe, early and late, implies that his ethics is traversed by a deontological streak, and by a "faith" which implies epistemic form on the relevant facts (both interpretations the writer argued for in two previous essays), a final feature of his position entitles one to interpret his "will" to believe as, not merely a willingness or readiness, but as a controlling resolve, in the strong sense, to interpret the facts (...) in a manner appropriate to our living in the "strenuous mood," a mood which is congruent to our universe viewed as "moral." Consider, as a crucial instance, the will to believe which undergirds the "keeping" of a friendship. (shrink)

The Old Testament epigraphs used by Leo Strauss for his study Natural Right and History tend invariably to vex his readers. In the book itself and in other of his writings, Strauss explicitly states that the Old Testament tradition does not know ‘nature’ in the philosophical sense, and hence the concept of ‘natural right’ is unknown or alien to that tradition. Another, more obvious problem they present has been seemingly universally passed over by commentators: neither epigraph tells the reader anything (...) explicitly about right, natural or otherwise. One cannot claim them to contain lessons about right, because such lessons are not directly extractable from the epigraphs as they stand. Here I wish to argue that Strauss's choice of epigraph does two things: first, it points to the fact that Old Testament stories can be given a political reading, or used to illustrate political lessons. In implying this, Strauss is following Machiavelli, who is the most important figure in Natural Right and History. Second, the epigraphs point to the deeply problematic nature of the concept of natural right, primarily the equivocal nature of the term, a difficulty never made explicit by Strauss but the awareness of which permeates his study. (shrink)

Conservative ideology in its moderate form is inspired by opposition to belief in radical political and social change on the ground that it rests on several mistaken assumptions, of which the most important are that human nature is highly malleable; that human will can refashion history in whatever ways human ideals may require; that society is the artificial product of a contract between autonomous individuals; and that evil is an eliminable feature of human existence. The unifying theme of conservative ideology, (...) by contrast, is a defence of limited politics, although different schools of conservatism have theorized the concept of limit in ways that are incompatible and even incoherent. Of these, the four principal schools are the reactionary, the radical, the moderate, and, more recently, the New Right. This chapter examines the degree of coherence achieved by each of these schools of thought. (shrink)