(2013). Distributed Capitalism: A Scientific Validation for “Going Local”. World Futures: Vol. 69, Reclaiming Free Enterprise: The Scientific and Human Story, pp. 450-478.

Tense logics in the bimodal propositional language are investigated with respect to the Finite Model Property. In order to prove positive results techniques from investigations of modal logics above K4 are extended to tense logic. General negative results show the limits of the transfer.

This paper investigates partitions of lattices of modal logics based on superintuitionistic logics which are defined by forming, for each superintuitionistic logic L and classical modal logic , the set L[] of L-companions of . Here L[] consists of those modal logics whose non-modal fragments coincide with L and which axiomatize if the law of excluded middle p V p is added. Questions addressed are, for instance, whether there exist logics with the disjunction property in L[], whether L[] contains a (...) smallest element, and whether L[] contains lower covers of . Positive solutions as concerns the last question show that there are (uncountably many) superclean modal logics based on intuitionistic logic in the sense of Vakarelov [28]. Thus a number of problems stated in [28] are solved. As a technical tool the paper develops the splitting technique for lattices of modal logics based on superintuitionistic logics and ap plies duality theory from [34]. (shrink)

The task of transforming Durkheim's sociological perspective into an explanation of poverty in rural areas carries a triple handicap: Durkheim was not concerned with material well-being, he did not conceptualize structures of inequality, and his explanation of the division of labor was flawed. His late book on religion, however, contains an explanation of institutional innovation which offers a new starting point for understanding formal dimensions such as differentiation and pluralism, and these in turn as they are related to poverty. When (...) these dimensions are combined with technical organization, differences in welfare can be explained. When the summary formula for this combination of structure and technology is compared with those for Marxist and conventional economic explanations, the result is a dramatic contrast between the two materialist theories and a true sociological position. (shrink)

In chapter 3, we reflected on the view that the fallacies on the traditional list are inherently dialectical. The answer proposed there was that, with the possible exception of, e.g., begging the question and many questions, they are not. The aim of the present chapter is to cancel theispossibility by showing that begging the question and many questions are not in fact dialectical fallacies. The reason for this is not that question-begging and many questions aren’t (at least dominantly) dialectical practices. (...) The reason is that, dialectical or not, they are not fallacies. That begging the question, BQ for short, is a fallacy is an idea which originates with Aristotle. Given logic’s already long history, it should not be surprising that Aristotle’s views of these matters have in some ways been superseded. But the traditional view retains the original connection between conception and instantiation. Whereas BQ in Aristotle’s sense is said to be a fallacy in Aristotle’s sense, so too is BQ in the modern sense said to be a fallacy in the modern (i.e., EAUI) sense.[1] As currently conceived of, BQ and fallacies can be characterized in the following ways. (shrink)

Frank Furedi argues that the traditional terms "left" and "right" as applied to politics, have been both distorted and proved inadequate by a number of ...

Human cognition is unique in the way in which it relies on combinatorial (or compositional) structures. Language provides ample evidence for the existence of combinatorial structures, but they can also be found in visual cognition. To understand the neural basis of human cognition, it is therefore essential to understand how combinatorial structures can be instantiated in neural terms. In his recent book on the foundations of language, Jackendoff described four fundamental problems for a neural instantiation of combinatorial structures: the massiveness (...) of the binding problem, the problem of 2, the problem of variables, and the transformation of combinatorial structures from working memory to long-term memory. This paper aims to show that these problems can be solved by means of neural “blackboard” architectures. For this purpose, a neural blackboard architecture for sentence structure is presented. In this architecture, neural structures that encode for words are temporarily bound in a manner that preserves the structure of the sentence. It is shown that the architecture solves the four problems presented by Jackendoff. The ability of the architecture to instantiate sentence structures is illustrated with examples of sentence complexity observed in human language performance. Similarities exist between the architecture for sentence structure and blackboard architectures for combinatorial structures in visual cognition, derived from the structure of the visual cortex. These architectures are briefly discussed, together with an example of a combinatorial structure in which the blackboard architectures for language and vision are combined. In this way, the architecture for language is grounded in perception. Perspectives and potential developments of the architectures are discussed. Key Words: binding; blackboard architectures; combinatorial structure; compositionality; language; dynamic system; neurocognition; sentence complexity; sentence structure; working memory; variables; vision. (shrink)

This critical note responds to Guiaşu and Tindale’s “Logical fallacies and invasion biology,” from our perspective as ecologists and philosophers of science engaged in debates about invasion biology and invasive species. We agree that “the level of charges and dismissals” surrounding these debates might be “unhealthy” and that “it will be very difficult for dialogues to move forward unless genuine attempts are made to understand the positions being held and to clarify the terms involved.” Although they raise several important scientific, (...) conceptual, and ethical issues at the foundations of invasion biology, we believe Guiaşu and Tindale’s attempts to clarify the debate were unsuccessful. Like some other critics of the field, they tend to misrepresent invasion biology by cherry-picking and constructing “straw people,” inaccurately portraying invasion biology, and thus failing to elevate the dialogue. In this critique, we clarify areas in the invasion biology literature misrepresented by Guiaşu and Tindale. We attempt to provide a more balanced view of areas of reasonable debate within invasion biology, including disputes about empirical evidence, diverse risk attitudes, and other diverse ethical commitments. (shrink)

Somatic mutation plays a key role in transforming normal cells into cancerous cells. The analysis of cancer progression therefore requires the study of how point mutations and chromosomal mutations accumulate in cellular lineages. The spread of somatic mutations depends on the mutation rate, the number of cell divisions in the history of a cellular lineage, and the nature of competition between different cellular lineages. We consider how various aspects of tissue architecture and cellular competition affect the pace of mutation accumulation. (...) We also discuss the rise and fall of somatic mutation rates during cancer progression. BioEssays 26:291–299, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The rule of law is a valuable human achievement. It is valuable not only instrumentally, but also for its own sake as a significant aspect of social justice. Only in a society that enjoys the rule of law is it possible for people to regard one another as fellow free citizens; no one the master of anyone else. Nevertheless, the rule of law is poorly understood. In this book, Frank Lovett develops a rigorous conception of the rule of law (...) that is grounded in legal positivism, and offers a civic republican argument for its value in terms of freedom from domination. Bridging persistent methodological gaps that divide legal philosophy, social science, and political theory, Lovett demonstrates how insights from all three can be united in a single powerful theory. This book will appeal to anyone interested in the rule of law, including scholars, legal officials, and policy-makers. (shrink)

Central to the thought of C.B. Macpherson are his critique of the culture of ‘possessive individualism’ and his defence of liberal-democratic socialism. Resurgence of interest in his works is in reaction to the rise of neoliberalism and efforts to find an alternative to societies dominated by capitalist markets. Macpherson’s theories are explained and applied to 21st century challenges.

Whether it is a question of apprehension, grasp, or simple contact, the vocabulary of perception clearly points towards the materiality of touch through what we usually think of as just a metaphorical variation. This is what ancient Greek thought recognized, or dimly felt, as a sometimes hidden constant in its history and its project: sensation, which describes the primary access to being, is first of all and above all a way of touching. Far from indicating a simple perceptual realism, this (...) acknowledgement implies a specific idea about the presence of things in the world: touch assumes a surface, and every being, in order to appear and be seen, must therefore be entirely surface, be articulated within a boundary that describes it perfectly. (shrink)

Traces the history of human beliefs concerning the nature of the universe and offers profiles of the scientists most responsible for our current understanding of the universe and its origins.

The ethics of telling stories about other people become questionable as soon as humans learn to talk. But the stakes get higher when health care professionals tell stories about those whom they serve. But for all the problems that come with such stories, I do not believe it is either practical or desirable for bioethicists to attempt to legislate an end to this storytelling. What we need instead is narrative nuance. We need to understand how to tell respectful stories in (...) which the patients are fully acknowledged fellow participants, not one‐dimensional objects of a knowing gaze. The problem is not narration itself but a particular version of narrational privilege, and getting rid of that would have benefits far beyond practices of writing case studies. In this essay, I first offer four considerations that I have found either omitted or underemphasized in discussions of the ethics of telling stories about patients. I then sketch a model of medical storytelling that might be the basis for shifting the ethical question from whether to how. (shrink)

This article examines a contemporary proposal of how to conceive of materialism, more specifically of a materialist dialectics. This proposal was formulated by Alain Badiou and it is of huge interest for the contemporary discussion as it inscribes the very historical coordinates in which it was articulated into its own proposal. The article develops this by arguing that Badiou's materialist dialectic historically situates itself after idealist options seem to have become impossible. However, the very dialectical kernel of this materialism leads (...) Badiou to claim that after the perpetuated struggle between materialism and idealism is declared to have been overcome, the very split separating the two returns in an inverted form inside materialism, splitting it again into two. Thereby the immanent split in materialism leads to two options: either one defends a materialism devoid of any idealist reference or a materialism which seeks to rescue something of idealism. The article concludes by suggesting that only from a detailed reconstruction of the functioning of philosophy in Badiou's system does it become possible to conceive of the threats that any materialism today faces and to delineate the proposed option of how to avoid them consistently. The article demonstrates how, today, materialism can only be properly materialist by resurrecting something of idealism, which is why it deserves the name of what I call an “idealism without idealism.”. (shrink)

This book is an important contribution to the theory of democracy and socialism. The underlying question it poses is: how, if at all, can one have both socialism and democracy? In posing an answer to this question, Professor Cunningham addresses the following topics: the definition of democracy and whether socialism is necessary to its progress: the socialist retrieval of liberal democracy associated with the work of C. B. Macpherson: the political consciousness that Gramsci placed at the center of socialist politics: (...) and attempts by those in women's and national liberation movements to go beyond 'class reductionism' in socialist theory and practice. Unlike other works on this topic, the book devotes much attention to defining key terms and drawing politically relevant conclusions. It will therefore be fully accessible to undergraduates as well as graduates and teachers of philosophy and political science. (shrink)

This short, smart book tells you everything you need to know about " nothing." What remains when you take all the matter away? Can empty space--" nothing "--exist?

Diminishing resources seem to be forcing rationing of medical services. Rationing the public health care system means that there needs to be ethical discussion on justice. Several years before resource allocation could impact on the levels of morbidity and mortality, economic problems created numerous methods of regulating medical and nursing services. In clinical practice, regularisation means a reduction of the possibility to decide autonomously and therefore requires specific ethical discussion. The different methods of regularisation from standards and quality control to (...) managed care are discussed with respect to their influence on medical thinking and decision making. Formalised decisions in severe disease can also be a field for regularisation, for example guidelines on the termination of life sustaining treatment (vs. Do-Not-Attempt-Resuscitation Orders). The debate on futility is discussed as a part of the economic discussion, with special regard to the impact of the macroeconomic situation on ”peripheral” medical decisions, which very often are made unconsciously, as shown by a new German study. It is impossible to discuss the influence of macroeconomy, different attempts at regularisation and the individual decision of the doctor without reflecting on their principle interdependency. Ethical reflection in this field cannot be sectioned into an economic, medical decision-making and futility sections. (shrink)

Recently Steven E. Boër gave another turn to the discussion of the free will defence by claiming that the free will defence is irrelevant to the justification of moral evil. Conceding that free will may be of real value, Boër claims that free will could have been allowed creatures without that leading to any moral evil at all. What I shall hereafter refer to as the ‘Boër reform’ is the suggestion that God could have allowed creatures to exercise free choices (...) but have intervened with ‘coincidence miracles’ to prevent all the intended evil from actually occurring. What is important to the free will defence, according to Boër, is the ability to choose freely and not the ability to succeed in effecting what we have intended to accomplish. It is no intrusion on the freedom of our wills for God to prevent us from accomplishing what we tried to do with our free wills as long as we were free to try. (shrink)

This retitled excerpt from Frank Kermode’s introduction to the symposium “Beyond Post-: A Revaluation of the Revaluation of All Values” is republished here in a special issue of representative pieces from the journal’s first twenty-five years. Kermode had called for papers in the journal’s inaugural issue on “the question of value” and was to a degree disappointed with the results. He had wanted the ensuing symposium to treat and even focus on axiology in the arts, but the papers answering (...) his call mainly dealt with political and ethical matters. In this introduction he replies chiefly to pieces by the philosophers Richard Rorty and Paul Feyerabend dealing with poverty, famine, sickness, and environmental concerns, but Kermode also addresses and mostly agrees with arguments made in Common Knowledge 1:1 by the philosopher Bernard Williams. Kermode’s piece concludes by restating the hope of his call for papers that “the matter of literary value” will be treated “in the broad context” that Common Knowledge provides “for discussion of the philosophy of value. Precedence must obviously be given to a planet at risk, but to lose what has been valued in literature is a sure way of increasing the unpleasantness of the future.”. (shrink)

I had not read To Kill a Mockingbird since I was assigned it in middle school. However, recently I revisited the novel because many of my students—future teachers—mentioned that it was their favorite book. From what I remembered from middle school, the book was about the courage of Atticus Finch as he makes the unpopular, though just, choice to defend an innocent black man in court. As well, I remember the narrator, Scout, a very strong young woman who—like her father—follows (...) her convictions, even if these put her at odds with others. What I remembered made me feel as if I understood why my students might like the novel. I worked with future teachers at a Southern women’s college.1 The strength of the female.. (shrink)