The current literature suggests that the use of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s approaches to phenomenology is still practiced. However, a clear gap exists on how these approaches are viewed in the context of constructivism, particularly with non-traditional female students’ study of mathematics. The dissertation attempts to clarify the constructivist role of phenomenology within a transcendental framework from the first-hand meanings associated with the expression of the relevancy as expressed by interviews of six nontraditional female students who have studied undergraduate mathematics. (...) Comparisons also illustrate how the views associated with Husserl’s stance on phenomenology inadvertently relate to the stances of the participants interviewed as part of the study. The research questions focus on the emotional association with studying mathematics and how pre-conceived opinions regarding the study of mathematics may have influenced the essences of the experiences of the participants who have studied collegiate-level mathematics. The essences of the experiences of the participants are analyzed using bracketing and epoché to ensure personal biases of the researcher do not affect the interpretation of the expressed essences of the participants. Data collection is accomplished through two series of qualitative interviews seeking the participants’ firsthand impressions of how they view the way instructional design is oriented with regard to mathematics. Additional questions seek to illuminate the participants’ point of view regarding their emotional association with mathematics as well as their opinions and theoretical perspectives on the study of mathematics. (shrink)

Background: Genetics research is controversial in Native American communities, and the disposition and ownership of biological specimens are central issues. Within Native communities, there is considerable variety in tribal members’ views. This article reports the results from an ethnographic study conducted with a Native American community in the southwestern United States. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship (past and present) between the tribe and biomedical/genetics research. Methods: Qualitative interviews were conducted with 53 members of a (...) Native American community. Interviewees were purposively recruited to include an approximately equal number of past research participants and nonparticipants, as well as individuals with and without diabetes. Tribal members were also asked whether they identified as a “traditional person,” an emic category used in the community. Results: Tribal members’ views on specimen disposition were linked with their identification as a traditional or nontraditional person. Individuals identifying as traditional people were more likely to believe that biological specimens should be returned at the end of a study and should not be used after the research participant's death, and that they were the property of the individual who provided them. These perspectives were related to broader concerns about fragmentation of the body-self. Conclusions: Through gaining an understanding of the cultural logic related to specimen disposition, researchers may be able to work more effectively with Native American communities on developing procedures for genetics studies. The process of informed consent and other study procedures can be adapted to be culturally respectful of Native American communities. (shrink)

Moral realism of a paradigmatic sort -- Defending the parallel -- The parity premise -- Epistemic nihilism -- Epistemic expressivism : traditional views -- Epistemic expressivism : nontraditional views -- Epistemic reductionism -- Three objections to the core argument.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.2 (2001) 299-300 [Access article in PDF] D. Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin, editors. Religion and Hume's Legacy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. Pp. xx + 282. Cloth, $65.00. Books on Hume's philosophy usually emphasize either close textual analysis or historical influences on Hume. The audience for such books consists of Hume specialists and historians of philosophy. Religion and Hume's Legacy defies (...) this categorization. Edited by D. Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin, the book is a collection of 18 essays, most of which connect Hume's philosophy of religion with broader and more contemporary philosophical interests. The authors urge us to take seriously Hume's skeptical challenges and they use Hume as a springboard to develop nontraditional views of the philosophy of religion. The essays were originally presented at the 1997 Claremont Conference on the Philosophy of Religion. Although a few of these are written by prominent Hume scholars, many of the authors are Wittgenstein scholars—as is Phillips himself—and Wittgensteinian perspectives figure prominently throughout the volume.The book is thematically divided into six parts, and at the close of five of these Phillips presents a fictitious dialog—much like a panel discussion—in which about 15 voices debate the topic under consideration. The book's first part is titled "Hume's Epistemological and Moral Critique." The first essay, by Simon Blackburn and titled "Playing Hume's Hand," criticizes Hume's "Bare Claim" about the existence and nature of God. In particular, Blackburn addresses the limitations of Hume's view from a Kantian, Jamesian, and Wittgensteinian stance. The second essay, "Morality and Religion: Towards Meeting Hume's Challenge," by William H. Brenner, draws on Chesterton, Kierkegaard, and Wittgenstein in critique of Hume's conception of an amoral God in the Dialogues.The book's second part is on "Hume's 'True Religion.'" The first of these essays, "Hume's 'Mitigated Scepticism': Some Implications for Religious Belief" by M. Jamie Ferreira, explains how Hume's Natural History of Religion exemplifies Hume's reflectively-tempered skepticism. The second, "Is There Anything Religious about Philo's 'True Religion'?" by Van A. Harvey, reacts against Gaskin's theory of Hume's attenuated theism. According to Harvey, Philo's minimalist religion reflects, on the one hand, the believer's assertion of true religious feelings, and, on the other hand, the believer's distrust of rational theology and organized religion. The third, "Is Hume's 'True Religion' a Religious Belief?" by D. Z. Phillips, criticizes Harvey's interpretation and defends Gaskin; however, Philips adds that Hume's minimalist theism is inconsistent by Hume's own standards and Hume should have rejected it. [End Page 299]The third part discusses "Hume on Miracles." The first essay is "Hume and the Miraculous" by R.W. Beardsmore, who has since passed away and to whom the book is dedicated. Beardsmore agrees with Hume that it is never rational to believe that a miracle has occurred—largely because of scientific advances today. However, Beardsmore believes that Hume's argument for this position is weak. In the next essay Stephen T. Davis responds to Beardsmore. The fourth part discusses "Hume on Superstition." The first essay, "Hume on Superstition" by Martin Bell, discusses Hume's view of superstitious religion in the context of Bayle's account of superstition. In the next essay Jane L. McIntyre responds to Bell, emphasizing the role of human passions in religious belief. The fifth part is on "Philosophy of Religion after Hume." Anthony Flew opens with "Can Religion be Rational?" explaining how Hume delineates the issue of religion in his various writings. Flew also clarifies his own view of religion and reason as appears in his essay "Theology and Falsification." Nancy Murphy responds to Flew in "Overcoming Hume on His Own Terms," and suggests that we find an answer to Hume's religious critique in Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of tradition-constituted reason. The third essay by B. R. Tilghman, "Religion after Hume: Tightrope Walking in an Age of Enlightenment," contends that Hume's legacy is the... (shrink)

The zetetic turn in epistemology raises three questions about epistemic and zetetic norms. First, there is the relationship question: what is the relationship between epistemic and zetetic norms? Are some epistemic norms zetetic norms, or are epistemic and zetetic norms distinct? Second, there is the tension question: are traditional epistemic norms in tension with plausible zetetic norms? Third, there is the reaction question: how should theorists react to a tension between epistemic and zetetic norms? Drawing on an analogy to practical (...) philosophy, I develop a focal point view to resolve these motivating questions. On the focal point view, traditional epistemic norms and zetetic norms answer different types of normative questions. There is nevertheless a familiar type of evaluative tension between traditional epistemic norms and zetetic norms, but this tension is an unavoidable feature of the normative landscape and not a sign that traditional epistemic norms need revision. But if traditional epistemic norms are not zetetic norms, then in what sense is zetetic epistemology a project for epistemologists? I conclude by articulating a sense in which some nontraditional epistemic norms are zetetic norms, and in which zetetic epistemology is an important part of the study of theoretical rationality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Roger A. Shiner GETTING TO KNOW YOU IN pursuits OF happiness, Stanley Cavell attempts to establish the existence of a previously unrecognized genre of film — "comedies of remarriage " — which both includes and is defined by such movies as Adam's Rib, Bringing Up Baby, and TL· Philadelphia Story. l By "marriage" and "remarriage " is meant a certain kind of enduring emotional intimacy with which we as (...) adult men and women will be involved, an intimacy which is an integral part of the human form of life and whose relationship to an institutionally supported legal status in our culture is not one of identity. The same is true for the concept of "divorce" in this context. Using some of Cavell's interpretive ideas as a starting point, I shall seek to present the genre of remarriage as a figure for the profoundest relationships of epistemology and metaphysics — the relationship of the knower to the world which is known and the relationship of the individual to die other individuals widi whom society is shared. Specifically, divorce and remarriage as part of human life are to be seen as figures for separation and kinship, avoidance and acknowledgement in the philosophical sense of those terms.2 My discussion proceeds on several levels. There is film criticism, which attempts to find significance in certain movies. There is an examination of values, which presents a certain view ofmarriage as a human relationship. There is some metaphysics, which addresses certain traditional philosophical problems in a nontraditional way. And finally there is metaphilosophy, which attempts to present a different way ofhow to ask, and how to acknowledge as being answered, the great questions of philosophy. Only the latter two projects could be described as "philosophical" in a conventional sense. Yet, as Arthur Danto has rightly remarked,3 Cavell in Pursuits ofHappiness seems to be trying to suggest that to blur deliberately the distinction between criticism and philosophy is to show something 80 Roger A. Shiner81 important about philosophy (and thus criticism as well). If this essay in some small way is thought to show something similar, I shall be pleased. Cavell begins his chapter on It Happened One Night with some ruminations on Locke, Hume, Kant, and the idea of the limitations of human reason. Kant undertakes to show, Cavell claims (PH, pp. 75-76), that our position as human knowers is both better and worse than the Empiricists suggest. It is worse, because even if we pressed human knowledge to its Kantian limits, we would know more but not enough to fulfill the philosopher 's dream. It is better, because the very facts that are limitations of human knowledge are also the necessary conditions ofknowledge as such and to know those conditions clearly is enormously to increase human knowledge. The link between the limitations ofhuman knowledge and the comedies of remarriage is forged by the thought (CR, p. 74) that the capacity to relate oneself to the world by knowledge and the capacity to relate oneselfto others by marriage are both constitutive ofhuman society. Human community is based in part on the fact that there are limitations as to what each of us as individual knowers can know. We need each other's knowledge. If one of us were per impossibile to transcend the limitations of human knowledge, he would know, as it were, what God knows and thus have the power that God has. But the existence of these limitations reveals something deep about human knowledge, something which traditional theory of knowledge rejects, namely that it is human. Human knowledge is limited, but it is genuine. It rests on no surer a foundation than human community, but human beings are a community. We need each other, but we are there for each other. Community, and therefore knowledge, does not need to be achieved: it exists.4 Similarly, the conventions in society limiting the capacity to relate oneselfto others by marriage (one at a time, and only under protest not one forever) reveal something deep about the nature of marriage. The mutuality of the intimacy ofmarriage is possible only in conjunction with the exclusiveness of marriage. Only by turning away from all others can the taking into... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Toward a Non-Cartesian Psychotherapeutic Framework: Radical Pragmatism as an AlternativeLouis S. Berger (bio)AbstractPostmodern criticism has identified important impoverishments that necessarily follow from the use of Cartesian frameworks. This criticism is reviewed and its implications for psychotherapy are explored in a psychoanalytic context. The ubiquitous presence of Cartesianism (equivalently, representationism) in psychoanalytic frameworks—even in some that are considered postmodern—is demonstrated and criticized. The postmodern convergence on praxis as a desirable (...) alternative to Cartesianism is reported, and its relevance for psychoanalysis is considered. The severe conceptual difficulties entailed in formulating such an alternative are discussed, as are those difficulties that would be encountered were psychoanalysis to attempt the shift from explanatory mental science to praxis. The principal psychoanalytic problematics explored are: the paradoxical relationships between theory and therapeutic technique; the therapeutic action; and validation of clinical practices. Initial, nontraditional suggestions for addressing these problems are offered.Keywordspsychoanalysis, therapeutic action, representation, state space, praxis, hermeneutics, Descartes, Heidegger, Wittgenstein“But the inability to bring one’s subject under conceptual control, fixing it propositionally, is not the end of thinking; on the contrary, it were better to say that the breakdown of concepts and the failure of words is an opening that takes us out of the realm where representation and calculation are all that matter to thinking.... [T]his is what happens in the Socratic dialogue where the negativity in which one ends up at a loss for words is at the same time that which sets thinking free.”Bruns 1989, 9“To evolve theory as though our methods and processes of study were essentially the same, or could be the same, as those of other sciences, or could be disregarded when it comes to theory, implies a view of reality that is no longer tenable, least of all in that ambiguous area which we call psychic reality. Nevertheless, all of us are still more or less captives of an erroneous understanding of objectivity and objective reality....”Loewald 1970, 45 [End Page 169]CartesianismCartesianism still underlies and dominates much of today’s thought. It is the label for a network of interrelated ideas and themes:the ontological duality of mind and body; the subjective individualism implicit in the ultimate appeal to direct personal verification; the method of universal doubt which was supposed to lead us to indubitable truths; the doctrine that language and signs are an external disguise for thought; the doctrine that vagueness is unreal and that the philosophic endeavor is one of knowing clearly and distinctly a completely determinate reality; and most fundamentally, the doctrine that we can break out of the miasma of our language or system of signs and have direct intuitive knowledge of objects. (Bernstein 1971, 5–6)[The Cartesian assumptions] constitute a picture of science and the world somewhat as follows: there is an external world which can in principle be exhaustively described in scientific language. The scientist, as both observer and language-user, can capture the external facts of the world in propositions that are true if they correspond to the facts and false if they do not. Science is ideally a linguistic system in which true propositions are in one-to-one relation to facts, including facts that are not directly observed because they involve hidden entities or properties, or past events or far distant events. These hidden events are described in theories, and theories can be inferred from observation, that is, the hidden explanatory mechanism of the world can be discovered from what is open to observation. Man as scientist is regarded as standing apart from the world and able to experiment and theorize about it objectively and dispassionately.(Hesse 1980, vii)Hesse goes on to say that “almost every assumption underlying this account has been subjected to damaging criticism,” a view echoed by others: “Most contemporary philosophers have been in revolt against the Cartesian framework” (Bernstein 1971, 5); “A rejection of the Cartesian view is a central theme for both of the giants of twentieth-century philosophy, Heidegger and Wittgenstein” (Sass 1992, 444n 77); and “The notion of alternative conceptual frameworks has been a commonplace of our culture since Hegel” (Rorty 1982, 3).These criticisms arise... (shrink)

This paper is based on the comments I gave to Alfred Mele regarding his original Zygote Argument during my presentation at a small workshop on manipulation arguments in Budapest back in 2012. After those comments, Mele changed the conclusion of his original Zygote Argument (OZA) from a positive, explanatory conclusion to a negative, non-explanatory conclusion--and, correspondingly, redefined 'incompatibilism' so that it would no longer refer in his work to the view that determinism precludes (undermines, eliminates, destroys, etc.) free will, but (...) refers narrowly to the perhaps spurious association claim that appears in the conclusion of the revised Zygote Argument (Mele 2013+). Yet, over the last decade, Mele has made no comment in print about the changes he made, the invalidity objection that led to them, nor to the fact that his revised Zygote Argument was originally presented by me as a (non-optimal) reaction to my invalidity objection to his original Zygote Argument. To my knowledge, Mele has only mentioned this 2015 paper once, at it was not in the context of understanding manipulation arguments; it was, rather, in the context of defending his revised, non-explanatory definition of 'incompatibilism' at the opening of Aspects of Agency (p. 6, n. 4). There, Mele singles out *just this 2015 paper* as a place where they'll find what Mele degrades as a type of nonstandard/nontraditional definition of 'incompatibilism' that he rejects. This is notable because Mele provides no empirical evidence that his preferred definition is standard, and most (including Lehrer, who coined the term) reject the negative, non-explanatory, association-based definition that Mele came to endorse in the aftermath of my invalidity objection to OZA. So, if Mele had a genuine concern about philosophers who use the term 'incompatibilism', then Mele could have--and should have--named almost any leading figure in free will for this purpose (since most--including Pereboom, Vihvelin, Haji, etc.) reject the non-explanatory definition that Mele-2013+ now endorses. Yet, for untold reasons, Mele isolated the working definition of 'incompatibilism' used in one paper by one unemployed junior researcher to use as his example--even though Neil Levy had used this same definition in previously published work (eg. Levy 2011). Moreover, if Mele were genuinely interested in helping his readers understand the ambiguity of terms like 'compatibilism' and 'incompatibilism' it is a mystery that he referenced a paper in which nothing of substance hung on the definitions given to these terms -- especially considering that he might have instead pointed them to my OTHER 2015 paper, "A Critique of Vihvelin's Three-Fold Classification" in which the MAIN AIM of the paper is to expose the difficulties facing anyone who wants to define the terms 'compatibilism' and 'incompatibilism' in a way that everyone will accept (including a critique of the negative, non-explanatory "incompossibilist" definition that Mele adopted after my objection to OZA). By all appearances, Mele's main aim in citing specifically THIS paper and none of my other work was to give readers the false impression that my working definition of 'incompatibilism' played some role in my charge that his argument is invalid (which it doesn't, given that the term doesn't appear in either the premises or conclusion of that argument). Mele adds to this unseemly rhetorical campaign in his book *Manipulation Agents* where he mentions an invalidity objection in the intro (p. 84) and then discusses that objection in the final lines of Chapter 5 of the book (p. 120-121). The invalidity objection discussed here is completely pedantic, has never been seriously raised in the primary literature (and was previously addressed in multiple places my multiple philosophers, including me), and has nothing whatever to do with my invalidity objection. In other words, Mele was content to discuss an invalidity objection that no one has ever had to an argument that is clearly valid while completely ignoring the ONLY substantive invalidity objection to his argument in print. This is unfortunate, because it has led to serious confusion --including the patently false description of my invalidity objection to OZA as an objection to the revised version of the Zygote Argument that Mele adopted in *response* my objection (e.g., Capes mistakenly claims "Mickelson (2015) contends that arguments like this [i.e. like the revised Zygote Argument] are invalid. But that’s because she defines “incompatibilism” differently than I’ve defined it here" in his "Manipulation Arguments and Direct Arguments" chapter in the 2023 Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Free Will; I did not say this, and the definition of 'incompatibilism' is irrelevant to my objection). In "The Zygote Argument Is Invalid--Now What?", I simply use the invalidity of the simple 2-premise Zygote Argument as a foil to make a series of more philosophically significant points (e.g. regarding the dialectical structure of the free-will debate, the role of best-explanation reasoning, and to develop the first-ever "master manipulation argument"). Mele has yet to address my reasons for calling attention to the non-trivial invalidity of his OZA or to any of my answers to the "Now What?" question in this paper, even though this question and my proposed answers to this question are the paper's main point. For those interested in a more recent discussion of how the logical and metaphilosophical observations made in this "Now What?" paper have helped to move the free-will debate forward, I suggest looking at the discussions of the "paradigm shift" in the free-will debate that helps to explain why the free-will debate has become mired in stalemates and empty verbal disputes that are found, for example, in my contributions to the Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Free Will (Intro and Chapter 4, 2023) and my paper "Free Will, Self-Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck" (2019). (shrink)

BackgroundProfessional guidelines have addressed ethical dilemmas posed by a few types of nontraditional procreative arrangements, but many questions arise regarding how providers view and make decisions about these and other such arrangements.MethodsThirty-seven ART providers and 10 patients were interviewed in-depth for approximately 1 h each. Interviews were systematically analyzed.ResultsProviders faced a range of challenges and ethical dilemmas concerning both the content and the process of decisions about requests for unconventional interfamilial and other reproductive combinations. Providers vary in how they (...) respond — what they decide, who exactly decides, and how — often undergoing complex decision-making processes. These combinations can involve creating or raising the child, and can shift over time — from initial ART treatment through to the child’s birth. Patients’ requests can vary from fully established to mere possibilities. Arrangements may also be unstable, fluid, or unexpected, posing challenges. Difficulties emerge concerning not only familial but social, combinations. These arrangements can involve blurry and confusing roles, questions about the welfare of the unborn child, and unanticipated and unfamiliar questions about how to weigh competing moral and scientific concerns — e.g., the autonomy of the individuals involved, and the potential risks and benefits. Clinicians may feel that these requests do not “smell right”; and at first respond with feelings of “yuck,” and only later, carefully and explicitly consider the ethical principles involved. Proposed arrangements may, for instance, initially be felt to involve consanguineous individuals, but not in fact do so. Obtaining and verifying full and appropriate informed consent can be difficult, given implicit familial and/or cultural expectations and senses of duty. Social attitudes are changing, yet patients’ views of these issues may also vary, based on their cultural backgrounds.ConclusionsThese data, the first to examine how clinicians make decisions about unconventional reproductive arrangements, highlight several critical ethical questions and ambiguities, and variations in clinicians’ responses. While several professional guidelines exist, the current data highlight additional challenges, and have vital implications for improving future guidelines, practice, education and research.Trial registrationNot applicable. (shrink)

Changes in global patterns of grain production have affected the profitability of commercial, cash-crop agriculture in North America. The current financial crisis has highlighted a perceived conflict between the priorities of (1) strengthening net farm profit, (2) maintaining the productive potential of the land base, (3) enhancing the health and cohesiveness of the agricultural community, and (4) addressing societal demands for safe foodstuffs. Reducing input costs by reducing the need for privately owned machinery can minimize the scale-dependence of agricultural practices, (...) as illustrated with examples involving silage and intensively managed pasture in Ontario. This approach could improve farming opportunities for nontraditional, part-time farmers, and at the same time, create a niche for professional custom operators and managers. Enhancing the viability of nontraditional farm operations, a historically neglected component of the farming community, as well as commercial farms is viewed as one approach to sustaining and improving both the agricultural land base and the agricultural community. Applying resource-extensive rather than resource-intensive approaches to forage management reveals that these apparently divergent priorities are, in fact, interlocking pieces of the same puzzle. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Introduction to the Symposium on Daniel Groll's Conceiving PeopleAlice MacLachlan (bio)The ethics of donor conception is often framed as a straightforward clash of rights: the right of would-be parents to procreate and parent, the right of donor-conceived children to know and be raised by their genetic parents, and the right of gamete (sperm and egg) donors to privacy. But in this thoughtful, wide-ranging discussion of Daniel Groll's book Conceiving (...) People: Genetic Knowledge and the Ethics of Sperm and Egg Donation (2021), the ethical terrain is revealed to be far richer and more intricate. As contributor Camisha Russell puts it, the book attends to "the types of relationships that foster the emotional health of families" while remaining grounded in "the experiences and desires articulated by donor-conceived people themselves" as well as those who contribute to their creation and to their family. As a result, the pieces in this symposium not only take up crucial questions of genetics, identity, and bionormativity, they also ask what it means to frame family relationships as a philosophical problem—conceptual, ethical, and, ultimately, political.Groll's central claim is that those who intend to create a child using donated gametes should choose a donor whose identity will be available to the resulting child. This is not because, as David Velleman (2005) and others have argued, knowledge of one's genetic parentage is fundamentally important in some objective sense. Rather, Groll argues that whether such knowledge is actually important, donor-conceived children are likely to come to view it as crucial—developing what Groll calls a "significant interest" in knowing their donor's identity. Further, parents ought to help satisfy their children's significant interest assuming it is not morally problematic. This line of argument places Groll squarely in the realm of what feminists and anti-racist philosophers describe as "theorizing the non-ideal" (Tessman 2009); that is, making philosophical arguments that take as their starting point the world as it is, including the realities of social injustice. Following Charlotte Witt, Sally Haslanger, and other feminists, Groll acknowledges the dominance of the "bionormative conception of the family" (Witt 2014). He considers whether interest in knowing one's genetic parentage might express bionormative prejudice but concludes that, even if it does, [End Page 163] "interest in genetic knowledge can—in our world—be rationally grounded apart from the oppressive schema it is embedded in" (Groll 2021, 149). He further concludes that given a prospective child's likely significant interest in their genetic parentage, would-be parents ought to use an open (i.e., non-anonymous) donor. At the same time, he argues that there are good reasons to disrupt the bionormative schema on both a personal and policy level that may lead to a child's significant interest in the first place.If Groll walks the middle ground in this debate, his critics in this symposium are happy to turn his stroll into a balancing act. Both Reuven Brandt and Amanda Roth challenge Groll's significant interest approach. Brandt questions the extent to which parents owe children a truthful, detailed accounting of their origin, making the case for parental privacy. Roth questions whether the interest in genetic knowledge is rationally grounded beyond bionormative prejudice, offering as a counterexample the offspring of same-sex parents, raised in queer communities of largely nontraditional family configurations. Bradford Skow pushes from the opposite direction, challenging both the claim that bionormative prejudice is at work in the interest in genetic knowledge and, more broadly, that the so-called bionormative conception of the family has the prestige that Groll and others attribute to it in the first place.Also, Amanda Roth and Camisha Russell pressure Groll to go further in considering the nonideal circumstances in which families are formed and theorized. They specify that questions of family configuration and validity are not only conceptual and ethical, they are political. Roth challenges Groll to further consider the example of same-sex and other LGBTQ+ families as disruptive exemplars and recognize that there may be reasons to choose anonymous donation that he has not considered. She highlights the value of solidarity across families and resistance to the forces... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Humanism as Philosophia (Perennis):Grassi's Platonic Rhetoric between Gadamer and KristellerRocco RubiniToday's situation is such that in our desacralized and demythologized world we believe in no annunciations, in no purely directive statements, in no evangelist, be it a God or a prophet. We turn to rational thought, to proofs and reasons in order to free ourselves from the subjectivity and relativity of appearances.... Thus not only is every access to (...) religious sacred texts closed to us but so also is the possibility of a metaphysics, a science that tells us about the "essence of man" (Humanism).—Ernesto Grassi, Rhetoric as PhilosophyDonald P. Verene commemorated Ernesto Grassi by recognizing that his work allows for a fresh approach to Vico, Heidegger, Renaissance, and rhetorical studies (1996, 295–303). While Grassi's authority on Vico remains undisputed, examination of his relevance to other fields of study is still wanting. As for Martin Heidegger, his students have been too numerous and successful for Grassi to easily claim pride of place among them. In turn, as Verene notes, American Renaissance scholarship has failed to realize that Grassi's work represents a direct alternative to that of Paul Oskar Kristeller, another student of Heidegger. Kristeller's influential characterization of Renaissance [End Page 242] humanism as a rhetorical and thus, in his view, nonphilosophical tradition often causes Grassi to be simply dismissed.1 Finally, his reception in rhetorical studies remains problematic and limited in its own right.In his Foreword to the reprint of Grassi's Rhetoric as Philosophy (1980), Timothy W. Crusius clearly expresses the confused deference that has caused rhetoricians to steer clear of the "anomaly" Grassi represents. Crusius laments that scholars have not attempted to bring Grassi into conversation with partisans of rhetoric like Hans-Georg Gadamer and that very little attention has been paid to works such as The Primordial Metaphor (1994) or to the overall religious dimension of his thought. Crusius attributes this general neglect to the American rhetoricians' unfamiliarity with the Latin-humanist rhetorical tradition: Grassi, in direct opposition to Heidegger, would have fashioned his philosophy from Roman rather than Greek sources (2001, xiii–xviii).This essay closely narrates2 how Grassi's notions of metaphysics and "rhetoric" developed in his early writings in order to dispel some of the misconceptions that have prevented readers from entering what Grassi himself defines as the "originary tension" awakening his own and, indeed, any philosopher's concerns, interests, and pathos (1994, 5–6). For if Grassi often lamented Heidegger's philhellenism—an aversion to romanitas at which he and other "Latin" students such as José Ortega y Gasset took personal offense (1988, 347)—we shall see that his philosophy was originally grounded on a nontraditional reading of Greek sources. Indeed, a reader would be at pains to recover a sustained reading of Cicero or Quintilian in his entire corpus, while between 1932 and 1946 Grassi published three volumes dedicated to an original interpretation of Plato.3Whereas the following account might make Grassi's notion of "rhetoric as philosophy" even more idiosyncratic—originally founded neither on a recovery of Roman eloquence nor, as we shall see, on a rehabilitation of the Sophists—his early Platonism makes him conversant with Gadamer and provides insight into his religiosity. Grassi's distinctive Platonism also spurs consideration of his missed confrontation with Kristeller and of the mutual disregard between American Renaissance scholars and rhetoricians in the latter part of the twentieth century. The following pages place the reader in a position to appreciate the relevance of Grassi's work to current scholarship.Heidegger's Anti-Platonism and Recent Plato StudiesThe belated and ongoing publication of Heidegger's lectures prior to Being and Time (1927) has led us closer to the experience of his students and offered [End Page 243] clear insight into his preference for Aristotle over Plato. The WS 1924–25 lecture course on the Sophist—one of Heidegger's most sustained confrontations with Plato before his Plato's Doctrine of Truth (1942)—begins with the assertion "What Aristotle said is what Plato placed at his disposal, only it is said more radically and developed more scientifically" (1997, 8). By developing... (shrink)

Ethical egoism, when summarized into a single ethical principle, is the position that a person ought, all things considered, to do an action if and only if that action is in his overall self-interest. The criticisms standardly advanced against this view try to show either that it is subject to some fatal logical flaw or else that, even if logically coherent, it can give no account of the basic parts of morality. Both these objections are mistaken, however, and it is (...) the point of this paper to make this clear. Central to my argument is the distinction drawn in Section 1 between two kinds of moral reasoning and hence two kinds of moral reasons. I call these ‘traditional’ and ‘nontraditional’. Both are present in the writings of contemporary moral philosophers but have not been emphasized or seen as crucial. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Anonymous Versus Open Donation and Queerness as Political:Comments on Groll's Conceiving PeopleAmanda Roth (bio)1. IntroductionIn this commentary on Daniel Groll's 2021 book Conceiving People: Genetic Knowledge and the Ethics of Sperm and Egg Donation, I examine a number of the book's major themes, especially around the idea that donor-conceived children have a significant interest in genetic knowledge and therefore, donor-conceiving parents are morally required to use an open donor.1 (...) I point to some concerns about Groll's case for this view and, in doing so, highlight the way in which taking up an LGBTQ+ perspective complicates and undermines the case against anonymous donation. The major theme of my comments is that the open versus anonymous decision is not merely an ethical decision, but a political one.My comments are organized around a few of the book's major themes, so I'll begin with laying out the most relevant themes in some detail. I then take up four points to consider in more depth. In so doing, I'll be drawing on my own scholarly perspective on issues of nontraditional reproduction, which is informed by my own social positionality in relation to family matters; this means that I (not so subtly) bring a queer perspective to the discussion of Groll's book. The through-line of my comments is this: While I agree with and appreciate much of Groll's approach, I want to stress the sense in which gamete donation is not just an ethical issue, but a political one, given its implication in bionormativity (and heteronormativity). I wonder if a deeper acknowledgment of the political nature of the issues might lead to moral conclusions that are different from those that Groll comes to, even assuming similar ethical values as starting points.2. Groll's major claims(1) Claim 1: Disclosure to donor-conceived offspring—in the usual case at least—is morally required given the intimacy argument: [End Page 166]The intimacy argument suggests that keeping "the secret" about donor conception involves intentional deception and undermines the proper intimacy of parent-child relationships (Groll 2021, 36–49).(2) Claim 2: Anonymous donor conception is (generally) morally impermissible because of the significant interest view.Donor-conceiving parents can reasonably foresee that their children will likely develop a significant interest in genetic knowledge. Significant interests "matte[r] quite a lot to the person who has [them]," "tak[e] up a space … in a person's mental economy" and/or "pla[y] a structuring role in a person's life and self-conception" (Groll 2021, 62–3). But not all donor-conceived people take such an interest in genetic information, and this information is not necessary for identity construction or psychological wellbeing (Groll 2021, 58, 61).2 Rather, multiple routes to self-identity exist, the genetic route being one among the options. Moreover, one needn't experience any loss in not taking this route; however, for those who take it up, genetic knowledge is objectively valuable and nonfungible (Groll 2021, 81–9). This is because genetic knowledge is uniquely relevant to the identity-related question "Who am I?" (Groll 2021, 112–3).3Groll argues that donor-conceiving parents should assume that their child will form such an interest because this is empirically a "good bet." Further, significant interests—at least when they are worthwhile (that is, not trivial and not morally objectionable)—are connected to one's wellbeing by the wellbeing principle: In satisfying a non-instrumental significant worthwhile interest, one's life goes better (Groll 2021, 62). It follows, then, that parents ought to choose open donors since (to simplify) parents are obligated to promote their children's wellbeing (ibid).4Counter to what one might expect, Groll does not take his ethical case against anonymous donor conception to justify prohibition of the practice. This is because wronging children in this way is within the realm of (unethical) choices we allow parents to make without societal interference.5 Moreover, to aim regulation at anonymous donor conception could reinforce bionormativity and target already marginalized families for special negative attention (Groll 2021, chapter 8).(3) "Claim" 3: Groll's own personal... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:preface Within the current context in the United States, we tend to think of “choice” as the leading slogan of the liberal movement to expand women’s reproductive rights, particularly the right to elective abortion. But choice depends on context: on what is available, what is mandated, what is prohibited or discouraged, and what has not yet been imagined. This issue of Feminist Studies expands our thinking about available and (...) potential choices, both individual and social. The issue opens with Stephanie Yingyi Wang’s ethnographic study of companionate marriage in China, in which she describes cooperative marriage partnerships that look heterosexual and appear to fulfill traditional familial expectations, but that facilitate same-sex liaisons and so create new family structures. Other essays in this issue describe the kinds of choices available to those who seek nontraditional or less conventional family and erotic bonds. Leila J. Rupp discusses the “queer dilemmas of desire” that perplex undergraduate queer women in US colleges, and Sonny Nordmarken opens possibilities for new trans epistemologies that disrupt and produce new gender practices, claiming that queer instability provides “infinite possibilities” for individual and social change. More traditional choices and families take differing shapes in other historical and cultural contexts. Carla Pascoe Leahy compares the levels of maternal satisfaction felt by three historical cohorts of Australian women: those of the immediate post-World War II generation, the later generation of the Women’s Liberation Movement, and the current generation. Miriam Kienle examines how two designers, Giorgia Lupi and Stefanie Posavec, decided to explore alternatives to big data by sending each other weekly postcards that quantified their lives according to “small/slow data” points. Other essays and poems emphasize constraint rather than choice about the kinds of identities that take shape within current social structures. Bettina Judd ponders the effects on herself and others of her own rage at racial injustice and of the stereotype of raging black women perpetuated by a society that has chosen not to 8Preface deal with its endemic racism. Similarly, Vivyan Adair’s memoir on the stigmata of growing up in poverty exposes the limitations of individual choice in the context of violence, a theme echoed in the poems by Elisabeth Blair, which dramatize her experiences in an abusive institution for troubled teens. Trysh Travis reviews four books published in 2017 that together, but differently, tackle the difficult situations of the “drug-using woman” and her recovery. Marilyn Strathern and Jade S. Sasser review Adele Clarke and Donna Haraway’s edited volume Making Kin, Not Population : Reconceiving Generations, with responses from multiple authors featured in the book. Finally, a short story by Mary Anna Evans and poetry by Hannah Baker Saltmarsh and Abigail G. H. Manzella voice other individual dilemmas related to choice. We end the issue with a News and Views piece by Sonja Thomas that offers more context on the recent Women’s Wall protest in Kerala, India. In “When Tongzhi Marry: Experiments of Cooperative Marriage between Lalas and Gay Men in Urban China,” Stephanie Yingyi Wang frames cooperative marriage in mainland China between gay men and lalas (same-sex loving women), or tonghzi marriage, as an experiment in queer kinship. Such marriages appear to fulfill traditional roles on the surface, providing women and men who desire same-sex relationships a sanctioned institution—marriage—within which to fulfill these desires. According to Wang, these relational strategies are shaped simultaneously by China’s heteronormative policies and by the global circulation of gay rights narratives, “transforming the heteronormative family institution from within.” In this ethnography, Wang describes relationships as varied as those in which married partners are mutually supportive close friends who confide in one another about their same-sex relationships, to others in which subjects suffered from differing expectations between the partners, sometimes with gay husbands expecting deferential behavior from their lala wives, or between the couples and their parents and in-laws. Wang suggests applying a “decolonizing feminist methodology” to go beyond dichotomies of public/private, local/global, and success/failure and thus to better understand tongzhi marriage and critical queer subjectivities at this global juncture. Wang’s article is a co-winner of the 2018 Feminist Studies Award for the... (shrink)

This article sets forth a view about how epistemic justification figures in the ongoing justification of memory belief, a view that I call moderate justificational preservationism . MJP presupposes a nontraditional notion of memorial justification according to which what makes one's present belief that p prima facie justified is that which provided one with prima facie justification to believe that p originally . The article offers support for MJP by examining a series of cases that involve forgetting, and in (...) doing so, criticizes views of Jennifer Lackey, David Owens, Michael Huemer, and George Pappas. (shrink)

Zuckerberg almost always tells users that change is hard, often referring back to the early days of Facebook when it had barely any of the features people know and love today. He says sharing and a more open and connected world are had barely any of the features people know and love today. He says sharing and a more open and connected world are good, and often he says he appreciates all the feedback.

This paper examines the standard view of realization operative incontemporary philosophy of mind, and proposes an alternative, generalperspective on realization. The standard view can be expressed, insummary form, as the conjunction of two theses, the sufficiency thesis andthe constitutivity thesis. Physicalists of both reductionist and anti-reductionist persuasions share a conception of realization wherebyrealizations are determinative of the properties they realize and physically constitutive of the individuals with those properties. Centralto the alternative view that I explore here is the idea that (...) the requisite,metaphysically robust notion of realization is ineliminably context-sensitive. I shall argue that the sufficiency and constitutivity theses aretypically not jointly satisfied by any one candidate realizer, and that goingcontext-sensitive in one's metaphysics is preferable to the standard view.The context-sensitive views developed here are implicit in a range ofcommon views in both the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of biology,even if they have not been explicitly articulated, and even though theyundermine other views that are commonly endorsed. (shrink)

Upon what kind of moral order does capitalism rest? Conversely, does the market give rise to a distinctive set of beliefs, habits, and social bonds? These questions are certainly as old as social science itself. In this review, we evaluate how today's scholarship approaches the relationship between markets and the moral order. We begin with Hirschman's characterization of the three rival views of the market as civilizing, destructive, or feeble in its effects on society. We review recent work at (...) the intersection of sociology, economics, and political economy and show that these views persist both as theories of market society and moral arguments about it. We then argue that a fourth view, which we call moralized markets, has become increasingly prominent in economic sociology. This line of research sees markets as cultural phenomena and moral projects in their own right, and seeks to study the mechanisms and techniques by which such projects are realized in practice. (shrink)

When should nudging be deemed as permissible and when should it be deemed as intrusive to individuals’ freedom of choice? Should all types of nudges be judged the same? To date the debate concerning these issues has largely proceeded without much input from the general public. The main objective of this study is to elicit public views on the use of nudges in policy. In particular we investigate attitudes toward two broad categories of nudges that we label pro-self and (...) pro-social nudges. In addition we explore how individual differences in thinking and feeling influence attitudes toward nudges. General population samples in Sweden and the United States were presented with vignettes describing nudge-policies and rated acceptability and intrusiveness on freedom of choice. To test for individual differences, measures on cultural cognition and analytical thinking were included. Results show that the level of acceptance toward nudge-policies was generally high in both countries, but were slightly higher among Swedes than Americans. Somewhat paradoxically a majority of the respondents also perceived the presented nudge-policies as intrusive to freedom of choice. Nudge-polices classified as pro-social had a significantly lower acceptance rate compared to pro-self nudges. Individuals with a more individualistic worldview were less likely to perceive nudges as acceptable, while individuals more prone to analytical thinking were less likely to perceive nudges as intrusive to freedom of choice. To conclude, our findings suggest that the notion of “one-nudge- fits-all” is not tenable. Recognizing this is an important aspect both for successfully implementing nudges as well as nuancing nudge theory. (shrink)

Discussion about a dignified death has almost exclusively been applied to palliative care and people dying of cancer. As populations are getting older in the western world and living with chronic illnesses affecting their everyday lives, it is relevant to broaden the definition of palliative care to include other groups of people. The aim of the study was to explore the views on dignity at the end of life of 12 elderly people living in two nursing homes in Sweden. (...) A hermeneutic approach was used to interpret the material, which was gathered during semi-structured interviews. A total of 39 interviews were transcribed. The analysis revealed three themes: (1) the unrecognizable body; (2) fragility and dependency; and (3) inner strength and a sense of coherence. (shrink)

It is argued that the emergence of controversial views in discussions of theoretical medicine and bioethics is best explained by the assumption of moral realism within those discursive practices. Neither of the main alternatives of realism in contemporary meta-ethics — moral expressivism and anti-realism — can account for the rise of controversies in the bioethical debate. This argument draws from the contemporary expressivist or anti-representationalist pragmatism as advanced by Richard Rorty and Huw Price, as well as the pragmatist scientific (...) realism and fallibilism of the founder of pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce. In accordance with the fallibilist view, it is proposed that presenting controversial positions may serve epistemic purposes within bioethical debates, providing opportunities for inquiry by pointing towards problems to be solved and arguments and evidence for and against to be put forward. (shrink)

In 1944, Martin Crowe, a Catholic priest, wrote a doctoral dissertation titled The Moral Obligation of Paying Just Taxes. His dissertation summarized and analyzed 500 years of theological and philosophical debate on this topic, much of which took place in Latin. Since Crowe’s dissertation, not much has been written on the topic of tax evasion from an ethical perspective, with a few exceptions. In 1998 and 1999, a few articles were published on the ethics of tax evasion in the Journal (...) of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy. An edited book on this topic was published in 1998. The present paper summarizes, updates and expands on Crowe’s work and the other more recent work that has been published on this topic. Three basic views on the ethics of tax evasion have emerged over the centuries. This article presents and critiques those three views and raises some questions about points that have not yet been explored in the literature. (shrink)

In this paper I consider, in connection with dementia, two views of the person. One view of the person is derived from Locke and Parfit. This tends to regard the person solely in terms of psychological states and his/her connections. The second view of the person is derived from a variety of thinkers. I have called it the situated-embodied-agent view of the person. This view, I suggest, more readily squares with the reality of clinical experience. It regards the person (...) as embedded in a history and culture. The human person is also an embodied agent. I contend that this view encourages a more appropriate approach towards the ethical issues that arise in dementia and towards people with dementia. (shrink)

Synthetic biology is a broad term covering multiple scientific methodologies, technologies, and practices. Pairing biology with engineering, synbio seeks to design and build biological systems, either through improving living cells by adding in new functions, or creating new structures by combining natural and synthetic components. As with all new technologies, synthetic biology raises a number of ethical considerations. In order to understand what these issues might be, and how they relate to those covered in ethics literature on synbio, we conducted (...) an interview study with practicing synthetic biologists affiliated with a synthetic biology centre in Australia. Scientists identified a range of ethical challenges germane to the field, including precarious employment, pressures from industry, gender inequity, and the negative effects of the hyping of synbio. These challenges differed markedly from those identified in the ethics literature, whose treatment of the harms and benefits of synbio remains largely speculative and abstract. In our discussion of the pragmatic, every day ethical issues synthetic biologists face, we illustrate how issues of waste or research integrity play pivotal roles in everything from lived experiences in the laboratory, to long-term research trajectories guiding the field. In a confirmation of the ethical relevance of our participant’s views on the field, we argue that the subjects they raise must be included in any ethical analysis of synbio as a field. (shrink)

Work done within the realm of what is sometimes called ‘descriptive ethics’ brings two questions readily to mind: How can empirical findings, in general, inform normative debates? and How can these empirical findings, in particular, inform the normative debate at hand? Brick et al 1 confront these questions in their novel investigation of public views about lives worth living and the permissibility of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from critically ill infants. Mindful of the is-ought gap, the authors suggest modestly that (...) their data ‘may be useful when constructing guidelines for clinical practice’. In this commentary, I consider some potential limitations on the generalisability of these data in the context of policy and clinical practice, limitations which may in turn serve as directions for future empirical research. The authors’ study presented participants six case scenarios, five of which involved the possibility of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from critically ill infants. The results revealed that “[a]lmost all respondents agreed that at some level of quality of life, life may be of no benefit or worse than death for an infant” and that “participants significantly favoured withdrawal of treatment for the most severe cases.” One salient detail in these scenarios …. (shrink)

Background Informed consent is often cited as the “cornerstone” of research ethics. Its intent is that participants enter research voluntarily, with an understanding of what their participation entails. Despite agreement on the necessity to obtain informed consent in research, opinions vary on the threshold of disclosure necessary and the best method to obtain consent. We aimed to investigate Australian researchers’ views on, and their experiences with, obtaining informed consent. Methods Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 23 researchers from NSW institutions, (...) working in various fields of research. Interviews were analysed and coded to identify themes. Results Researchers reported that consent involved information disclosure, understanding and a voluntary decision. They emphasised the variability of consent interactions, which were dependent on potential participants’ abilities and interests, study complexity and context. All researchers reported providing written information to potential participants, yet questioned the readability and utility of this information. The majority reported using signed consent forms to ‘operationalise’ consent and reported little awareness of, and lack of support in implementing more dynamic informed consent procedures, such as verbal informed consent, that was fit for the purposes of their studies. Views on Human Research Ethics Committees varied. Some reported inconsistent, arduous inputs on the information form and consent process. Others expressed reliance on HRECs for guidance, viewing them as institutional safeguards. Conclusions This study highlights the importance of transparent relationships, both between researchers and participants, and between researchers and HRECs. Where the relationship with study participants was reported as more robust, researchers felt that they were better able to ensure participants made better, more informed decisions. Where the relationship with HRECs was reported as more robust, researchers were more likely to view them as institutional safeguards, rather than as bureaucratic hindrances. Conscientious and mindful researchers are paramount to ensuring the procedure accommodates individual requirements. This study advocates that when designing ethical informed consent practices, researchers should be integrated as autonomous players with a positive input on the process, rather than, in the worst case, predatory recruiters to be curtailed by information forms and oversight. (shrink)

Addiction is increasingly described as a “chronic and relapsing brain disease”. The potential impact of the brain disease model on the treatment of addiction or addicted individuals’ treatment behaviour remains uncertain. We conducted a qualitative study to examine: (i) the extent to which leading Australian addiction neuroscientists and clinicians accept the brain disease view of addiction; and (ii) their views on the likely impacts of this view on addicted individuals’ beliefs and behaviour. Thirty-one Australian addiction neuroscientists and clinicians (10 (...) females and 21 males; 16 with clinical experience and 15 with no clinical experience) took part in 1 h semi-structured interviews. Most addiction neuroscientists and clinicians did not uncritically support the use of brain disease model of addiction. Most were cautious about the potential for adverse impacts on individuals’ recovery and motivation to enter treatment. While some recognised the possibility that the brain disease model of addiction may provide a rationale for addicted persons to seek treatment and motivate behaviour change, Australian addiction neuroscientist and clinicians do not assume that messages about “diseased brains” will always lead to increased treatment-seeking and reduced drug use. Research is needed on how neuroscience research could be used in ways that optimise positive outcomes for addicted persons. (shrink)

The last 20 years have witnessed the dramatic growth of the animal rights movement and a concurrent increase in its social scientific scrutiny. One of the most notable and consistent findings to emerge from this body of research has been the central role of women in the movement. This paper uses General Social Survey data to examine the influence of views of the relationship of humanity to nature on this gender difference. Holding a Romantic view of nature is associated (...) with higher levels of support for extending moral rights to animals and lower levels of support for animal-based testing. A Darwinian view is associated with greater support for testing on animals but is unrelated to views on moral rights for animals. In general, views of nature affect animal rights advocacy to a greater extent among males than females. (shrink)

Is the assessment of a view of life only a matter of personal preference? I argue that there is more than personal preference. I defend the position that a view of life must be useful for the ascription of meaning and therefore needs to fulfil the requirements of the process of ascribing meaning. In this article I analyse this process and its requirements and deduce from them a set of criteria by which views of life can be assessed.

The authors of the contribution closely follow the published results of their sociological research regarding views of Slovak teachers at primary and secondary schools in the area of relationships with students, parents, colleagues and superiors (Gluchman, & Gluchmanová, 2016). The present contribution analyses views of students at the second level of primary school and at secondary schools by means of evaluating their relationship to teachers, as well as relationships between parents and teachers while students’ views regarding the (...) presence of violence and bullying at school are also addressed. The research results indicate that almost a third of students do not perceive their teachers as ethical models of behaviour and actions; moreover, they have also witnessed instances of corrupt behaviour on the part of teachers. On the other hand, almost two thirds of students appreciate that teachers, when addressing problems at school, proceed in accordance with ethical principles and norms. Unlike teachers, students do not believe serious problems are present when it comes to the behaviour of parents toward teachers. They, however, believe the behaviour of students towards teachers is a more problematic area. (shrink)

北宋代 이후에는 山水가 본격적으로 人格의 형성과 自然과의 交融을 위해 반드시 필요한 繪畵 영역으로 자리하게 되었다. 이처럼 山水는 宇宙 自然의 性情과 관련되어 중요한 役割을 하게 되었다. 특히 서양과 달리 동양의 산수에서 性情이 인간 삶의 중심이기도 하면서 文學 및 哲學을 토대로 山水畵 등 감성의 영역에서도 중요한 역할을 하였다. 西洋에서는 과학적인 면이 강조되면서 理性과 感性의 영역이 철저하게 구분되어 전개되어온 반면에, 東洋에서는 이들이 性情이라는 하나의 특별한 개념 속에서 하나로 인식되며, 실제 人間의 삶과 예술 철학 등에 직간접적으로 活用되었다. 이는 東洋과는 다른 視覺 差를 나타낼 수밖에 (...) 없는 부분이다. 東洋에서는 西洋의 理性 중심의 세계와는 달리 性과 情의 세계를 우주 질서를 이루는 중요한 根幹이자, 人格의 중심으로 생각해 왔다. 이 性과 情은 우주 세상과 인간을 연결시킬 수 있는 중요한 哲學的, 文學的, 美學的 槪念으로서, 본래 인간과 자연이 지니고 있는 本性이라 할 수 있다. 『周易』에서 “性은 사람의 理致이며 命은 天地의 이치이다.”라고 하였듯이, 자연 속에서 사람이 살아가는 이치를 담은 인격을 性과 情으로 상정하며 산수를 인간의 삶과 예술에 결부시켜 왔던 것이다. 이런 부분은 東洋과 西洋의, 自然을 소재로 한 그림에서도 모양은 일부 유사한 부분이 있을 수 있으나 근본적으로는 차이를 가질 수밖에 없게 하는 요인이기도 하다. 동양의 회화는 과학과 원근법을 중시하는 서양의 풍경화와는 달리, 성과 정 그리고 진경을 바탕으로 한 想像性(imaginary)을 특색으로 하고 있다고 할 수 있다. 그러나 중국의 산수 관념은 산수화에서 理와 性이나 精神性, 哲思性 등으로 결정된다. 그러기에 동양의 산수화는 서양의 풍경화가들이 추구했던 시각적이고 조형적인 상상력이 동원된 이미지적인 효과 보다는 오히려 性이나 理가 바탕이 된 精神性적인 표현을 추구했음에 주목할 필요가 있다. 앞서 살펴본 것처럼, 서양의 풍경화에서 어떤 精神性이나 자연의 진리를 담아내려는 의지가 좀처럼 보이지 않는 것은 그동안 이들이 추구해 왔던, 遠近法에 입각한 과학을 기초로 한 사실 그대로의 外的 再現의 審美的 範疇가 얼마나 큰 영향을 주었는지를 실감하게 해준다. 자연을 정복할 수 있다는 어리석은 믿음이 자연과 마음을 열고 인간적으로 소통할 수 있는 가능성을 없애버린 것이다. 인간의 본성이 발견하고자 하나 좀처럼 찾을 수 없는 것이 자연의 性情이다. 이처럼 인간의 산수자연을 통한 性情을 찾기 위해 東洋의 山水畵는 그 매개체 역할을 하며, 實在하는 산의 외면을 그리는 걸 그다지 중시하지 않았다. 사람의 정신과 교합되면서 이루어질 수 있는 形象을 그리기 위하여 무한한 자연이 지닌 性과 情과 관련 된 인격을 중시하였으며, 이는 서양의 이성 중심의 풍경화와 근본적으로 차이를 지닐 수밖에 없는 중요한 審美精神이라 생각된다. (shrink)

Background: One of the ethical imperatives for a valid consent process in clinical medication trials is that the process be guided by and recorded in an informed consent document (ICD). Concerns have been expressed, however, about readability and participant understanding of ICDs, which are often 10–20 pages long. Objective measures of readability and understanding have been used to support these concerns in several articles, but surprisingly the voice of trial participants on ICDs has not been heard in previous studies. Hence, (...) this study compares participants' subjective views on readability and their understanding of ICDs with those ICDs' objective readability scores. It also evaluates whether family, friends, and additional aids would foster better understanding of the ICD. Methods: Sixty current trial participants rated the readability and their understanding of deidentified standard ICDs. These had been sourced from two multicenter international Phase III trials on medication for diabetes mellitus and cancer. Results: Less than 10% of participants considered the ICDs difficult to read or difficult to understand in spite of objective readability scores at levels of about 12th grade education, but about a quarter considered the ICDs to be too technical. Participants gave mixed responses about friends or family members helping or the need for videos, pictures, additional reading material, and frequently answered questions (FAQ) sheets as an aid to their understanding. Conclusions: These findings suggest individual clinical trial participants should be engaged on their views of an ICD, for doing so is part of informed consent as a process rather than consent being merely focused on written information. Such participant-specific engagement should guide whether family and friends, videos, pictures, additional reading material, and FAQ sheets would be of assistance in improving understanding. (shrink)

Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this text represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate. Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposing viewpoints of libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and revisionism The first half of the book contains each philosopher’s explanation of his particular view; the second half allows them to directly respond to each other’s arguments, in a lively and engaging conversation Offers the reader (...) a one of a kind, interactive discussion Forms part of the acclaimed Great Debates in Philosophy series. (shrink)

Background End-stage renal disease (ESRD) is the final stage of chronic kidney disease. Yet dialysis is not suitable for all ESRD patients. Moreover, while shared decision-making (SDM) is the preferred model for making medical decisions, little is known about SDM between nephrology nurses and ESRD patients in Israel. Research Objective Assessing the views, attitudes, practices, and ethical dilemmas of nephrology nurses in Israel regarding SDM with ESRD patients. Methods Using the descriptive quantitative approach, questionnaires were completed by 444 nephrology (...) nurses in Israel. In addition to conducting descriptive statistics, t-tests for independent samples, f-tests for analysis of variance, and both tests for independence were also performed. Ethical Considerations The research aims, expected advantages and risks have been explained to respondents before completing the questionnaire to secure informed consent. Anonymity and confidentiality were ensured throughout the study. The study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee at the University of Haifa (Approval # 411/21). Results About one-third (30%–36.5%) of nurses reported discussing quality of life issues with ESRD patients, asking about their advance directives/power of attorney, exploring cultural/religious beliefs in end-of-life care, and ask about their preferred place of death. Nurses who convey high levels of patient-centered care (68.9%, p<0.0001), have high end-of-life training (76.2%, p<0.0001), and report cooperating with interdisciplinary teams (63.8%, p = 0.0415), also reported higher SDM practices than others. Nurses who refer less patients to palliative care (70%, p<0.0001) reported higher involvement in SDM compared to other nurses. Conclusions Nephrology nurses in Israel do not tend to implement the SDM model, despite its potential for improving quality of life for ESRD patients and their families and increasing conservative care options. Policy makers and educators in Israel should develop and implement training programs and support in the workplace, to enhance SDM between nephrology nurses and ESRD patients. (shrink)