Comparativism is the view that comparative confidences (e.g., being more confident that P than that Q) are more fundamental than degrees of belief (e.g., believing that P with some strength x). In this paper, I outline the basis for a new, non-probabilistic version of comparativism inspired by a suggestion made by Frank Ramsey in `Probability and Partial Belief'. I show how, and to what extent, `Ramseyan comparativism' might be used to weaken the (unrealistically strong) probabilistic coherence conditions (...) that comparativism traditionally relies on. (shrink)

This thesis concerns the metaphysics of scale. It investigates the implications of a physical determinable being dimensionful. In particular, it considers the case study of mass, as it features within Newtonian Gravity. Nevertheless, most of the terminology, methodology and arguments developed should be relatively straightforwardly applicable to other determinables and theories. -/- Weak Absolutism about mass holds that mass ratios obtain in virtue of absolute masses. Weak Comparativism denies this. In the first five chapters I argue in favour of (...) Weak Absolutism over Weak Comparativism. The sixth chapter argues against reducing mass to other non-mass facts. The overall conclusion is Strong Absolutism about mass within Newtonian Gravity: mass ratios obtain in virtue of absolute masses, which themselves are fundamental (i.e. they do not require anything further in order to obtain). -/- Comparativism promises to recover all the virtues of absolutism, in particular its empirical adequacy, but at a lower 'metaphysical cost'. Special attention is given to Dasgupta's recent comparativist proposal. Dasgupta interprets the requirement of empirical adequacy in terms of the undetectability of the absolute mass scale. I argue that undetectability is an unsuitable way of understanding empirical adequacy and that we would do better to understand it in terms of a theory's ability to correctly generate the set of empirically possible worlds (or at least the actual world). I refute Dasgupta's comparativism both on my terms and on his own terms. I subsequently develop and strongly criticise alternative versions of comparativism. Chapter five sheds doubt on the supposed 'metaphysical parsimony' of comparativism. -/- This debate should be of particular interest to readers who engage with the substantivalism-relationalism debate. These debates are much more entwined than previously acknowledged, which provides a significant source of mutual inspiration, although I do also draw out some important disanalogies. -/- . (shrink)

Traditional ethical theories have paradoxical implications in regards to questions concerning procreation and our moral duties to future people. It has been suggested that the crux of the problem resides in an all too ‘impersonal’ axiology and that the problems of population axiology can be solved by adopting a ‘Person Affecting Restriction’ which in its slogan form states that an outcome can only be better than another if it is better for people. This move has been especially popular in the (...) context of medical ethics where many of the problems of population axiology are actualized. Examples are embryo or egg selection, pre-implantation genetic testing, assisted reproduction programmes, abortion, just to mention a few. I discuss a number of different interpretations of the Restriction and in particular one interpretation which I call Comparativism. According to this view, we should draw a distinction between uniquely and non-uniquely realizable people. The former people only exist in one out of two possible outcomes, whereas the latter exist in both of the compared outcomes. The idea is that we should give more weight to the well-being of non-uniquely realizable people or take it into account in a different way as compared to the well-being of uniquely realizable people. I argue that the different versions of the Person Affecting Restriction and Comparativism either have counterintuitive implications of their own or are compatible with traditional theories such as Utilitarianism. (shrink)

This article provides a new argument and a new value-theoretical ground for person-centered care and shared decision making that ascribes to it the role of enabling rational choice in situations involving clinical choice. Rather than referring to good health outcomes and/or ethical grounds such as patient autonomy, it argues that a plausible justification and ground for person-centered care and shared decision making is preservation of rationality in the face of comparative non-determinacy in clinical settings. Often, no alternative treatment will be (...) better than or equal to every other alternative. In the face of such comparative non-determinacy, Ruth Chang has argued that we can make rational decisions by invoking reasons that are created through acts of willing. This article transfers this view to clinical decision making and argues that shared decision making provides a solution to non-determinacy problems in clinical settings. This view of the role of shared decision making provides a new understanding of its nature, and it also allows us to better understand when caregivers should engage in shared decision making and when they should not. (shrink)

This thesis consists of several independent papers in population ethics. I begin in Chapter 1 by critiquing some well-known 'impossibility theorems', which purport to show there can be no intuitively satisfactory population axiology. I identify axiological vagueness as a promising way to escape or at least mitigate the effects of these theorems. In particular, in Chapter 2, I argue that certain of the impossibility theorems have little more dialectical force than sorites arguments do. From these negative arguments I move to (...) positive ones. In Chapter 3, I justify the use of a 'veil of ignorance', starting from three more basic normative principles. This leads to positive arguments for various kinds of utilitarianism - the best such arguments I know. But in general the implications of the veil depend on how one answers what I call 'the risky existential question': what is the value to an individual of a chance of non-existence? I chart out the main options, and raise some puzzles for non-comparativism, the view that life is incomparable to non-existence. Finally, in Chapter 4, I consider the consequences for population ethics of the idea that what is normatively relevant is not personal identity, but a degreed relation of psychological connectedness. In particular, I pursue a strategy based in population ethics for understanding the controversial 'time-relative interests' account of the badness of death. (shrink)

The person-affecting restriction, in its slogan form, states that an outcome can be better than another only if it is better for someone. It has a strong intuitive appeal and several theorists have suggested that it avoids certain counterintuitive implications in population ethics. At the same time, the restriction has highly counterintuitive implications and yields non-transitive orderings in some nonidentity cases. Many theorists have taken this criticism to be decisive. Recently, however, there have been some reformulations of the restriction, suggesting (...) that the restriction survives this “old” criticism. This paper investigates the viability of those reformulations, which are versions of “Comparativism,” and argues that most of them either have counterintuitive implications or are extensionally equivalent with impersonal theories, but that “Soft Comparativism” seems to have an advantage over impersonal theories. (shrink)

According to standard comparativist views, death is bad insofar as it deprives someone of goods she would otherwise have had. In The Ethics of Killing, Jeff McMahan argues against such views and in favor of a gradualist account according to which how bad it is to die is a function of both the future goods of which the decedent is deprived and her cognitive development when she dies. Comparativists and gradualists therefore disagree about how bad it is to die at (...) different ages. In this paper I examine two prominent criticisms of gradualism and show that both misconstrue McMahan. I develop a related criticism that seems to show that a gradualist cannot coherently relate morbidity and mortality. This criticism also fails, but has an instructive implication for how policy-makers setting priorities for health care investments should regard choices between life-saving interventions and interventions against non-fatal diseases in the very young. (shrink)

Despite the declarations about the possibility of rationalities that are alternative to Western European, despite the reasoning about philosophical multipolarity, the multiplicity of ways of thinking, etc., nowadays, the Western European paradigm of rationality (and concepts that corresponds to it), which is derived from Hellenic thought, continues to claim the status of ideological neutrality and transcend any intercivilizational differences. The Western European rationality in all its diversity is now acting as rationality as such. The indispensability of the reference to the (...) Greek conceptual apparatus in contemporary philosophizing manifests itself most openly in the form of comparativism. Thus, there is the focus on carrying out explicit parallels between, on the one hand, the studied non-European intellectual phenomena and, on the other hand, their supposed European counterparts. An example of the cross-cultural and methodologically sound research of the problems of rationality is an analysis of the Dao through the prism of the Logos. The statement of the uniqueness of the Greek Logos does not imply the prohibition of the existence of its original counterparts in the so-called “non-Western” civilizations with an ancient and distinctive culture. The assumption of the existence of their own analogues of the Logos and rationality in various non-European civilizations presumes the most interesting question about the pluralism of rationalities – the question about the existence of rationalities in the past that could be considered as an alternative to the now prevailing Western European standard of rationality. (shrink)

According to comparativist theories of quantities, their intrinsic values are not fundamental. Instead, all the quantity facts are grounded in scale-independent relations like "twice as massive as" or "more massive than." I show that this sort of scale independence is best understood as a sort of metaphysical symmetry--a principle about which transformations of the non-fundamental ontology leave the fundamental ontology unchanged. Determinism--a core scientific concept easily formulated in absolutist terms--is more difficult for the comparativist to define. After settling on the (...) most plausible comparativist understanding of determinism, I offer some examples of physical systems that the comparativist must count as indeterministic although the relevant physical theory gives deterministic predictions. Several morals are drawn. In particular: comparativism is metaphysically contingent if true, and it is most natural for a comparativist to accept an at-at theory of motion. (shrink)

Članak predstavlja komentarski prikaz glavnih tema knjige Wu Xiaominga, Filozofija i Zhexue. Put k drugome i natrag te diskusiju o pojmu tzv. ‘druge’, ne-evropske filozofije, o njegovu sistematskom mjestu između povijesti filozofije, kulturne antropologije i postkolonijalne teorije diskursa. Nastojanje autora da pomoću Derridinog pojma différance i kineskog dao revolucionira hijerarhijski odnos interpretirajućeg i interpretiranog intelektualnog nasljeđa vrednuje se u članku kao genuino filozofsko nasuprot kulturno-antropološkim pristupima filozofiji, što je suprotno negiranju kineske filozofije od sâmog Derride. Usporedno s glavnim tekstom, u (...) pratećem aparatu, članak donosi pregled i komentare novije, interdisciplinarne literature, zapadne i kineske, o tematici komparativizma i njegovim osnovama u filozofiji, humanističkim i egzaktnim znanostima.The article gives a detailed review and commentary on the main topics in the book Philosophy and Zhexue. The Way To the Other and Back by Wu Xiaoming and a discussion about the very notion of the so-called ‘other’, non-European philosophy, its systematic place between history of philosophy, cultural anthropology and post-colonial discourse theory. The effort by Xiaoming to revolutionize, by means of Derridean différance and Chinese dao, the hierarchical pattern in the relation between the interpreting and the interpreted intellectual heritage has been estimated as genuinelly philosophical and different from cultural anthropological approaches, which is even contrary to late Derrida’s denial of Chinese philosophy. Parallel to the discussion in the main text, the article provides a survey with commentaries of recent cross-disciplinary publications, both Western and Chinese, in related issues such as comparativism in philosophy, in human and exact sciences, including Chinese authors. (shrink)

My aim in this book is to propose a comparativist, Buddhist-Neoplatonic interpretation of the idea of “logos” in the Prologue to the Gospel according to John. To do so, I proceed in three steps. I begin with Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness. Nāgārjuna thinks that that all things are empty because they depend on causes and conditions in a way that makes it impossible for them to genuinely exist. Nevertheless, they are not completely non-existent, for they possess the appearance of something (...) that exists. This corresponds, in turn, to Vasubandhu’s response to Nāgārjuna. Emptiness is not ultimate because there is the appearance of empty things. The place where this appearance unfolds is the mind, which, in an absolute sense, exists, but which, in the sense of external, objectifiable reality does not exist. Vasubandhu thus thinks of the mind as an entity that does not conform to the categories of ordinary existence. This, then, corresponds to what Meister Eckhart says about God. God is a Mind ("intellectus"). But due to his fundamental ontological role, God transcends ordinary existence and cannot be compared to any specific being. God is the mind of which Vasubandhu states that it is non-dual, transcendent knowledge. To conclude, I use this triadic constellation of Buddhist and Neoplatonic concepts to read John’s Prologue. The Prologue describes the generation of a foundational concept, “logos,” by a primordial, divine Mind. Since this Mind is, in a Buddhist sense, “empty,” the concept that it generates can be said to be absolute. It has no beginning and no cause. Against this background of Buddhist and Neoplatonic ideas, John’s Prologue can thus be interpreted as a narrative describing the foundation of reality as an intellectual process. (shrink)

In this article, the author carries on his research into critical bibliographic reviews of foreign biblical studies made by professors of Kyiv Theological Academy in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. In his analysis of the structure and topics of those reviews, the author spotlights how the European experience of biblical studies played a role in shaping of the Orthodox Biblical discourse in Kyiv Theological Academy. The European biblical studies of that period increasingly promoted the biblical (...) knowledge. Several leading intellectual centers were emerging as conceptual and methodological ‘camps’, including rationalistic, apologetic, and ‘moderate’ ones. Structurally, the foreign studies of Bible have been focusing on the origin, authorship, historicity, and authenticity of biblical books. Critical and apologetic interpretation strategies have been compared. The catalyzing effect was brought about by the text studies based on new critical editions of the Hebraic, Old Greek, and Greek New Testaments as well as new dictionaries and grammar books. Biblical studies were in pursuit of their proper place at the crossroads of theology and a wide range of historical, humanitarian and social sciences. Biblical studies were increasingly linked to current social and cognitive issues debated in the West. Remarkably, various biblical and non-biblical sources have been compared more and more frequently. Against this background, the sprouts of religious comparativism and early efforts of historical religious reconstructions have emerged. Finally, the comparison of historical and mythological elements in the Bible was the focal point of debates in the West for researchers of both the Old and the New Testaments. Critical bibliographic publications, in particular the large annual reviews of foreign literature, strongly illustrate that the Kyiv spiritual and academic biblical studies had been increasingly integrating in the global academic and theological dimension. (shrink)

By placing Butler’s Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism (2012) in counterpoint with Said’s After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives (1986), this essay aims to shed new light on Butler’s political and ethical writing, revealing, in particular, the ways in which a politics of cohabitation is inseparable from the process of translation. Both Butler and Said articulate the difficult yet necessary task of establishing a just cohabitation through the translation between two histories of exile, Jewish and Palestinian. Firstly, (...) I examine Butler’s efforts to derive a principle of cohabitation from the Jewish history of diaspora, arguing that it should be understood as a response to Said’s reflections on Jewishness in Freud and the Non-European. I then seek to illuminate how statelessness structures the interplay of text and image in After the Last Sky, arguing that exilic tension provides the framework for Said’s rethinking of comparativism. (shrink)

Comparative philosophers have noted that some comparative methods perpetuate colonial legacies. What follows employs aspects of the scholarship of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Anîbal Quijano, and María Lugones to identify one colonially problematic methodology that some well-regarded contemporary comparative representations of “Buddhist Philosophy” arguably adopt. In 1995, Lin Tongqi, Henry Rosemont, Jr., and Roger Ames identified “the most fundamental methodological issue facing all comparativists” by raising and responding to the question: “Does the imposition of modern Western conceptual categories on non-Western patterns (...) of thought and modes of discourse with different categories promote or hinder our.. (shrink)

Bai Tongdong’s Against Political Equality argues for Confucian meritocracy over a pure democracy of equals. His arguments draw on a multiple modernities comparison between the Spring and Autumn Warring States period in China and early modernity in the West, and rest on a Mencian conception of human nature according to which humans are equal in moral potential but not in moral actuality. I argue that there is a crucial disanalogy between this Chinese early modernity and Western early modernity: the role (...) of capitalism. In a similarly comparativist and modernist spirit, drawing on B. R. Ambedkar and M. K. Gandhi, I argue that this disanalogy challenges both Bai’s critique of democracy and his positive account. Bai’s failure to take into account the role of capitalism in Western modernity raises a challenge to the explanatory power of his Mencian conception of human nature with regard to the failings of contemporary democracies, namely that capitalism fosters the relevant features of our moral psychology that cause those failings. Further, without that grounding assumption, Bai’s arguments against democracy cut equally against his Confucian meritocracy. The disanalogy also creates challenges for his positive proposal. Bai, I argue, provides an ideal theory of Confucian meritocracy at the same time as he provides a non-ideal theory of democracy. But, taking into account the non-ideal cultural and moral psychological features of capitalism, Bai’s Confucian meritocracy is likely to fall into an unjust and oligarchic hierarchy. (shrink)

The Roma have been a people most misunderstood and misrepresented in history. Professor Yaron Matras is an unwavering figure dismantling these myths about the Roma. He founded the Romani Project in 1999 and has authored meticulously researched books on Romani culture. To name a few, I Met Lucky People, The Romani Gypsies, Open Borders Unlocked Cultures, Romani: A Linguistic Introduction, Language Contact, are widely acknowledged. In this interview, the essential feature of Roma’s uniqueness in the discourse on diaspora is expressed (...) by Prof. Matras in dialectical terms of their non-territoriality and uncommonness. The Roma disqualifies appropriative measures of the non-Roma (gadze) socio-political hegemony through self-subjectivisation that Prof. Matras expresses through the comparativist socio-anthropological framework. The inclusion and exclusion of the Roma people are multilayered and complex, resulting in them being representative of a world community defying limitations of boundary, nation, religion, class, caste and so on. The Roma, in his words, escape even definitions of diaspora and rest somewhere in the liminal tensional space of self and the other, reclaiming ‘systems of values’ whose preservation through features of language, customs, kinship structures marks their resilience and sovereignty, while outlining their history and their presence without origin and return except that which is self-defined. With no land to profess, yet dispersed in almost every part of the world, the Roma continue to resist prejudices of the non-Roma (gadze) population. Roma activists have a long trail to lead. (shrink)

A contribution to the Common Knowledge symposium “Caroline Walker Bynum across the Disciplines,” this essay explores the side of Bynum's scholarly personality that may be regarded as comparativist. She is interested in comparison with regard to periods of time, with regard to ritual and gender-based religious practices in the Christian West, and with respect to similarities that might be claimed between elements of Christian and non-Christian cultures. Her thoughts about morphology, materiality, and gender extend beyond medieval Europe to the world (...) at large. Her coedited volume Gender and Religion (1986), the first of its kind, has figured importantly in the development of the field many call comparative religion. Here Bynum's impact on selected scholars of Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh religion — as well as of non-Western Christianity — is assessed. This essay concludes with the text of a response delivered by the author, who is a scholar of Hinduism, to Bynum's Lionel Trilling Lecture at Columbia University, “Am I My Body? Medieval Theories of Bodily Resurrection and Some Modern Implications” (1991). (shrink)

In “A Critique of Critical Psychiatry,” Chapman asserts that a dominant philosophical premise among many “criticals” (the label used in that paper, which I adopt here) is adherence to a Szaszian distinction between psychiatry and other branches of medicine. Chapman eloquently summarizes the problems with this perspective. Their elucidation of the complexity of non-psychiatric conditions, which are not nearly as well delineated as Szasz and his followers would have one believe, is clear and compelling. The notion of comparativist critique, that (...) is, negative assessments of psychiatry as compared to general medicine, is helpful. Chapman’s interests extend into the realm of activism, where development of allies is... Read More. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Volcanus: Recherches comparatistes sur les origines du culte de VulcainJ. LinderskiGérard Capdeville. Volcanus: Recherches comparatistes sur les origines du culte de Vulcain. Rome: Ecole Française de Rome, Palais Farnèse, 1995. viii 1 521 pp. Cloth, no price stated. (Bibliothèque des Ecoles Françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, fasc. 288)In the last twenty years the French School has published every two years one book on Roman religion: monographs dealing with (...) Fortuna, Mercurius, Ops, Penates, Providentia Deorum, Fratres Arvales, l’Association Dionysiaque (cf. JRS 78 [1988] 207–8), the Bacchanalia, religious architecture (Aurea templa), La vie religieuse des matrones, Le délit religieux (cf. CP 79 [1984] 174–77). Now we have a book about Volcanus. First let us remark on what this book is not: it is not a study of the cult of Volcanus, an encyclopedia that would systematically list and discuss all the literary, iconographic, and epigraphical evidence in Rome, Italy, and the provinces. It would be very pleasing to have such a book; perhaps pedestrian, but useful. For information we still have to turn to Georg Wissowa, to his ageless Religion und Kultus der Römer (2d ed. Munich 1912, 229–32); also informative is W. Eisenhut, “Volcanus,” RE Suppl. 14 (1974) 948–62. A rather balanced account of the origines appears in G. Camassa, “Sull’origine [End Page 644] e le funzioni del culto di Volcanus a Roma,” RSI 96 (1984) 811–54. Capdeville’s book we have for speculations, a paradise for those eager to delve into murky origins, and those who are transposed by the dazzling and uncertain art of comparativistic pleading. If bibliography (fifty-one pages, 425–75) stands for learning, it is a learned monograph; it ranges from Rome through Etruria to Crete and Cyprus. Surprisingly we find no Hittites or Turks (the relevance of the latter the reader will see revealed at the end of this piece).The book opens with an evocation of Georges Dumézil. Where do his manes lead the author? They lead to the fish. The monograph “est né... d’une interrogation sur les pisciculi des Volcanalia” (1), a subject which intrigued Dumézil himself (REL 36 [1959] 121–30). At the feast of Volcanalia on 23 August (see the references in A. Degrassi, Fasti anni Numani et Iuliani (5 Inscr. It. XIII.2 [Rome 1963] 500–502), populus pro se in ignem animalia mittit (Varr. LL 6.20). On 7 June (cf. Degrassi 466) the Ludi Piscatorii were celebrated a praetore urbano pro piscatoribus Tiberinis, quorum quaestus non in macellum pervenit, sed fere in aream Volkani, quod id genus pisciculorum vivorum datur ei deo pro animis humanis (Festus 274–76 L); but at the Ludi Piscatorii the offering was not pro animis but rather pro quaestu piscantium (Festus 232 L); cf. J. Le Gall, Recherches sur le culte du Tibre (Paris 1953) 48–50; J. Linderski, Ktema 17 ([1992] 1996) 58. Agni, the Indian god of fire, hated water and fish; this explains the Roman ritual (so Dumézil). Most scholars tacitly assume that pisciculi vivi were offered also on the Volcanalia, but Varro speaks generally of animalia: if he wanted to say pisces he would have said so. Volcanus was a god of destructive fire (so Wissowa, Dumézil, and many other scholars); it makes sense that to propitiate him not only fish, a symbol of water, were burnt, but also other animals (perhaps as a substitute offering; cf., on that sort of sacrifices, G. Capdeville, MEFRA 83 [1971] 283–323). In the context of incendia arcenda an inscription of the Domitianic time (ILS 4914) records an offering on the Volcanalia of vitulus robeus and verres r(obeus). This calls to mind the sacrifice of the rutilae canes to protect the crops from the burning sun (Festus 358 L).Of all of this Capdeville, surprisingly, does not write at all: after their debut on page 1 the pisciculi and the Volcanalia feebly reappear at the very end of the book (420–23), only to be disregarded. Capdeville claims that Volcanus was not at all, and never, a god of “feu destructeur.” But Dumézil too... (shrink)

Particular persons have claims against being made worse off than they could have been. The literature, however, has focused primarily on only two-option cases; yet, these cases fail to capture all of the morally relevant factors, especially when a person’s existence is in question. This paper explores how to assess claims in multiple-option choice sets. We scrutinize the only extant proposal, offered by Michael Otsuka, which we call the Weakening View. In light of its problems, we develop an alternative: the (...) Combining View. The Weakening View holds that a person’s claim against a loss of well-being relative to one distribution is weakened by the availability of further alternatives relative to which the person gains well-being. By contrast, our view holds that a person has an overall claim for or against a certain distribution relative to the whole option set, where overall claims are second-order functions of the different pairwise claims. Finally, we defend the Combining View by exploring its implications for the impact of a person’s possible non-existence on their overall claims, and we develop a proposal for how the number of distributions relative to which a person gains or loses welfare influences the strength of their overall claims. (shrink)

The article considers the problem of rationality on the basis of two key texts by the prominent proponents of the new cartography for philosophy. These include A Manifesto for Re:emergent Philosophy by Jonardon Ganery (2016) and Comparative Philosophy without Borders edited by Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralf Weber (2016). The both mentioned texts are imbued with the fervor of the movement for liberation from colonial intellectual servitude and epistemological injustice that does not recognize a plurality of ways of thinking. They call (...) for redefinition of the distinctive models of understanding as well as for justification of their rights to be acknowledged. A new cartography of philosophy presupposes a new atlas of rationality. The Manifesto by J. Ganery is compared with The Manifesto for Philosophy by A. Badiou. Both are calling for support for their global projects - “rebuilding of philosophy’s edifice” (Badiou) and “re:emergence of philosophy” (Ganeri). Badiou implies “an approach to the Philosophy” or “a return to the philosophy” by recognition of the four sources of the truth, which he regards as politics, love, art and science. Ganery speaks about “the plurality of ways of thinking”, about the movement for liberation from colonial intellectual dependence by applying the intercultural approach. The two philosophers acknowledge the plurality of cultural worlds. Badiou means “the philosophy of events,” while Ganery - “philosophy of a new cartography.” Badiou discovers different logics in disparate worlds that every time are submitted in specific forms, and thus he comes to the conclusion that single universal logic is impossible. Ganery is consistent and does not contradict himself by claiming plurality of rationalities, of logical systems, and thus advocates the promotion of the project for a new cartography of philosophy. (shrink)

Description: Contents: Preface 1. General Remarks on the Vedanta 2. Fundamental Distinction Between The Self and the Ego 3. The Vital Centre of the Human Being, Seat of Brahma 4. Purusha and Prakriti 5. Purusha Unaffected by Individual Modifications 6. The Degrees of Individual Manifestation 7. Buddhi or the Higher Intellect 8. Manas or the Inward Sense : The Ten External Faculties of Sensation and Action 9. The Envelopes of the Self ; The Five Vayus or Vital Functions 10. The (...) Essential Unity and Identity of the Self in all the States of the Being 11. The Different Conditions of Atma in the Human Being 12. The Waking State or the Condition of Vaishwanara 13. The Dream State or the Condition of Taijasa 14. The State of Deep Sleep or the Condition of Prajna 15. The Unconditioned State of Atma 16. The Symbolical Representation of Atma and its Conditions by the Sacred Monosyllable Om 17. The Posthumous Evolution of the Human Being 18. The Reabsorption of the Individual Faculties 19. Differences in the Posthumous Conditions According to the Degrees of Knowledge 20. The Coronal Artery and the Solar Ray 21. The Divine Journey of the Being on the Path of Liberation 22. Final Deliverance 23. Videha-mukti and Jivana-mukti 24. The Spiritual State of the Yogi : The Supreme Identity. (shrink)

QUALITY AND QUANTITY are fairly generally regarded as complementary terms, although the profound reason for their comple- mentarism is often far from being understood, this reason lying in the 'polar' correspondence referred to toward ...

The concluding chapter lays down the essential conditions for any genuine understanding between East and West, which can only come through the work of those who have attained, at least in some degree, to the realization of 'wisdom uncreate' ...