Scientific theories are hard to find, and once scientists have found a theory, H, they often believe that there are not many distinct alternatives to H. But is this belief justified? What should scientists believe about the number of alternatives to H, and how should they change these beliefs in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions that we will address in this article. We also ask under which conditions failure to find an alternative (...) to H confirms the theory in question. This kind of reasoning is frequently used in science and therefore deserves a careful philosophical analysis. 1 Introduction2 The Conceptual Framework3 The No Alternatives Argument4 Discussion I: A Quantitative Analysis of the No Alternatives Argument5 Discussion II: The Number of Alternatives and the Problem of Underdetermination6 ConclusionsAppendix AAppendix B. (shrink)

The defence of The No Alternatives Argument in a recent paper by R. Dawid, S. Hartmann and J. Sprenger rests on the assumption that the number of acceptable alternatives to a scientific hypothesis is independent of the complexity of the scientific problem. This note proves a generalisation of the main theorem by Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger, where this independence assumption is no longer necessary. Some of the other assumptions are also discussed, and the limitations of the no- (...) class='Hi'>alternatives argument are explored. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Tushar Menon has argued that the no-alternatives argument can only be signifi cant if the priors for numbers of alternatives are tuned in an implausible way (gerrymandered, as he calls it). In this paper, I demonstrate that priors needed for making a no-alternatives argument signi ficant are in line with what can be plausibly assumed in a successful research fi eld.

If we cannot directly empirically test the claims of particular scientific theory, then it would be nice to have some other criteria with which to assess its viability. In his 2013 book, String Theory and the Scientific Method, Richard Dawid aims to develop such criteria, with an eye to vindicating research programs in disciplines where direct empirical data is scant or non-existent. In an accompanying paper, Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger formalise Dawid’s so-called ‘No Alternatives Argument’ using a generalised (...) Bayesian framework, as a first step towards formalising Dawid’s entire re- search programme. In this paper, I argue that the formalisation of the NAA cannot play the central role in Dawid’s programme as intended. This is based on the observation that not all confirmation is non-negligible confirmation. For Dawid’s programme to be useful, it must demonstrate the viability not just of non-empirical theory confirmation, but of non-negligible non-empirical theory confirmation. I argue that Dawid et al.’s appeal to Bayesian confirmation theory to formalise his NAA cannot guarantee non-negligible confirmation. As a result, I conclude that if Dawid’s overall project is to succeed, it must do so without the NAA formalised in this way. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger claim to prove the possibility of non-empirical theory confirmation via the No Alternatives Argument. In this note, I argue that from an empiricist point of view, their "proof" begs the question in the sense that it cannot convince someone who has not already been convinced of non-empirical theory confirmation before.

Third-party certification is an increasingly prevalent tactic which agrifood activists use to “help” consumers shop ethically, and also to reorganize commodity markets. While consumers embrace the chance to “vote with their dollar,” academics question the potential for labels to foster widespread political, economic, and agroecological change. Yet, despite widespread critique, a mounting body of work appears resigned to accept that certification may be the only option available to activist groups in the context of neoliberal socio-economic orders. At the extreme, Guthman (...) (Antipode 39(3): 457, 2007) posits that “at this political juncture… ‘there is no alternative.” This paper offers a different assessment of third-party certification, and points to interventions that are potentially more influential that are currently available to activist groups. Exploring the evolution of the Non-GMO Project—a novel certification for foods that are reasonably free of genetically engineered (GE) material—I make two arguments. First, I echo the literature’s critical perspective by illustrating how certification projects become vulnerable to industry capture. Reviewing its history and current context, I suggest that the Non-GMO Project would be better suited to helping companies avoid mounting public criticism than to substantially reorient agrifood production. Second, I explore the “politics of the possible” in the current political economy and argue that while neoliberalization and organizers’ places within the food system initially oriented the group towards the private sector, the choice to pursue certification arose directly from two industry partnerships. Consequently, current trends might favor market mechanisms, but certification is only one possible intervention that has emerged as a result of particular, and perhaps avoidable, circumstances. The article offers tentative delineation of alternatives ways that activists might intervene in agrifood and political economic systems given present constraints. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Recent developments allow for the creation of human stem cells without the creation of human embryos, a process called alternate nuclear transfer (‘ANT’). Pursuing this method of stem cell research makes sense for pro‐lifers if arguments for the sanctity of the human embryo do not apply to ANT. However, the technology that makes ANT possible undermines the erstwhile technical barrier between human embryos and somatic cell DNA. These advances bring home the force of hypothetical arguments about the potential of (...) the DNA in somatic cells, showing that there is not a morally relevant difference between the potential of an embryo and the potential of the DNA in a somatic cell. Therefore, the supposed distinction between entities that are potential human life and entities that are human life does not give any support to arguments for the sanctity of the human embryo because those arguments extend value to too many entities. (shrink)

The recent debate surrounding scientific realism has largely focused on the “no miracles” argument (NMA). Indeed, it seems that most contemporary realists and anti-realists have tied the case for realism to the adequacy of this argument. I argue that it is mistake for realists to let the debate be framed in this way. Realists would be well advised to abandon the NMA altogether and pursue an alternative strategy, which I call the “local strategy”.

Douglas Walton has been right in calling us to attend to the pragmatics of argument. He has, however, also insisted that arguments should be understood and assessed by considering the functions they perform; and from this, I dissent. Argument has no determinable function in the sense Walton needs, and even if it did, that function would not ground norms for argumentative practice. As an alternative to a functional theory of argumentative pragmatics, I propose a design view, which draws (...) attention to the way participants strategically undertake and impose norms on themselves in order for their arguments to have force. (shrink)

This article explores the ‘no-self alternative’ in the debate on the metaphysical and phenomenological concept of the self. It suggests that the no-self alternative may not be an alternative at all and it could simply be the default assumption for all rational approaches to self-consciousness and subjectivity. It outlines several different anti-realist arguments about the self and explains why the idea that there are no selves is counter-intuitive. It shows why the intuitions of phenomenology are traceable to the contingent fact (...) about the causal structure of our brains, which induces in each of us a first-person perspective that makes it difficult to deny the existence of selves. (shrink)

It is common to argue that animal experimentation is justified by its essential contribution to the advancement of medical science. But note that this argument actually contains two premises: an empirical claim that animal experimentation is essential to the advancement of medical science and an ethical claim that if research is essential to the advancement of medical science, then it is justified. Both claims are open to challenge, but in the logic of the case, only one of them needs (...) to be shown false or moot in order to refute the argument. I argue that the ethical claim does not withstand scrutiny. In addition, the main so-called “alternatives” to animal research do not merit that label since they still involve the use of nonhuman animals. (shrink)

The most powerful objection to political obligations based on the principle of fairness concerns alternative supply of necessary public goods. According to this line of argument, if the subject prefers not to receive particular benefits from the state, then he need not incur obligations through their provision. However, as the discussion in Ch. 2 shows, for certain essential public goods, there is no alternative to state provision. Moreover, the fact that a subject prefers that goods be provided in a (...) different form or by a mechanism other than the state is not ordinarily sufficient to dissolve obligations that they would otherwise incur. (shrink)

This thesis concerns alternative concatenating operations in extensive measurements and the degree to which concatenating operations are matter of convention. My arguments are directed against Ellis' claim that what prevents us from choosing alternative ways of combining extensive quantities is only convenience and simplicity and that the choice is not based on empirical reasons. ;My first argument is that, given certain relational theories of measurement, there can be no more than one concatenating operation per quantity; because combining operations are (...) the only conclusive distinguishing characteristic among distinct extensive measurements and thus the only thing that can serve as an indicator for the identity of a quantity. Rectangular and collinear concatenation, for example, cannot both be used as a way of combining lengths. However, rectangular concatenation could be used to measure some other extensive quantity since it fulfills the necessary conditions for adequate numerical assignment. ;For those that adopt theories of measurement which can support the claim that dinches measure length, I demonstrate, in the second argument, that rectangular concatenation would be a bad alternative and thus no alternative at all. Implementation of rectangular concatenation requires a new science; a science compatible with dinches violates present invariance principles and a new set must be provided, if possible. It is not clear that there is a set of invariance principles compatible with dinches which also gives basis for a science that explains the phenomena as well as the old one. Moreover, new invariance principles would be unintuitive and would require that certain fundamental concepts change their meaning. For these reasons the choice between them is guided by a number of empirical reasons and is not only a matter of convention. (shrink)

I address Moti Mizrahi‟s objections to my use of the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). Mizrahi contends that other epistemologicaltheories can be supported by parallel self-defeat arguments. I argue that the self-defeat arguments for other theories either (a) are compatible with PC and thus present no problem, or (b) have a false premise, unlike the self-defeat argument for PC.

Imagine slicing your hand with a steak knife. Inevitably, this leads to a characteristic unpleasant sensation, and just as reliably, to a withdrawal of the wounded limb. But can this rather mundane fact--and other similar facts--shed any light on the mind-body problem or the issue of the role of experience in causing behavior? In my dissertation, I explore this issue head on, and in the process clarify and criticize the arguments of philosophers who have given an affirmative answer to this (...) question--philosophers such as William James and Herbert Spencer. These arguments have coupled evidence like the above with the fact that human beings have evolved, in order to make the case that epiphenomenalism with respect to qualia is false. My first task will be to formulate a rigorous version of a James-Spencer style argument, which will occupy us in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 is dedicated to answering a number of objections to the argument, in an effort to show that if there is a problem with it, this problem lies elsewhere. Chapter 3 explores alternative arguments in the spirit of the original one formulated in Chapter 1, and discusses any resulting effects on the plausibility of the conclusion. Chapter 4 is the capstone chapter of the dissertation. In it, I discuss a crucial objection to all arguments in the spirit of that given in the first chapter--namely, that physicalism has analogous flaws to epiphenomenalism where accommodating the relevant evidence is concerned. My conclusions in this final chapter are twofold. First, that even if there is no fatal flaw in the general strategy the evolutionary argument employs, it works against all forms of dualism, not just epiphenomenalism. And second, the accusations made in the objection are correct; physicalism suffers from problems analogous to those faced by epiphenomenalism. Although the primary findings of the dissertation are negative, there are many lessons we can take from them along the way. Most prominent among them is an improved perspective on the appropriate roles of empirical findings and armchair philosophical theorizing in debate over the mind-body problem. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the ultimate argument for Scientific Realism, also known as the No-Miracles Argument (NMA), ultimately fails as an abductive defence of Epistemic Scientific Realism (ESR), where (ESR) is the thesis that successful theories of mature sciences are approximately true. The NMA is supposed to be an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) that purports to explain the success of science. However, the explanation offered as the best explanation for success, namely (ESR), fails to (...) yield independently testable predictions that alternative explanations for success do not yield. If this is correct, then there seems to be no good reason to prefer (ESR) over alternative explanations for success. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with the relation between motivating and normative reasons. According to a common and influential thesis, a normative reason is identical with a motivating reason when an agent acts for that normative reason. I will call this thesis the ‘Identity Thesis’. Many philosophers treat the Identity Thesis as a commonplace or a truism. Accordingly, the Identity Thesis has been used to rule out certain ontological views about reasons. I distinguish a deliberative and an explanatory version of the (...) Identity Thesis and argue that there are no convincing arguments to accept either version. Furthermore, I point out an alternative to the Identity Thesis. The relation between motivating and normative reasons can be thought of as one of representation, not identity. (shrink)

Populism has become one of the most intensely discussed topics in both public debate and academic research. So far there has been no systematic argumentation theoretic analysis of populism, however. This paper is intended to provide first steps towards such an analysis by giving a full argumentation theoretic reconstruction of the political manifesto of the German right-wing populist party “Alternative for Germany” (AfD). This allows to draw preliminary conclusions about the AfD’s argumentative strategy as exemplary for right-wing populism.

Although Friedrich Nietzsche had no less to say about value than he did about truth, his writings reflect contradictory views about their interrelation. In several passages, Nietzsche explicitly remarks that no relation exists between phenomena and value, describing value as a derivative and secondary mode of interpretation arbitrarily ‘attached’ to primary, non-evaluative interpretations. Elsewhere and more understated, however, runs an opposing line of argumentation in which Nietzsche presents interpretation as emerging through evaluation and therefore as necessarily ‘colored’ by it. While (...) Gilles Deleauze's exegesis of Nietzsche struggles to maintain a certain faithfulness to this ambiguity, most contemporary inheritors of Nietzschean thought, including Richard Rorty and Michel Foucault, have embraced the claim of ‘no relation’ between value and interpretation. This article provides support, in part through the analytic of race, for the alternative hypothesis that holds the indissociable relation of value and interpretation. (shrink)

I defend the view that if one ought (morally) always to do the best one can, there cannot be a wrong action one cannot avoid performing for which one is morally responsible. I also argue that there cannot be a wrong action to which there are no alternative possibilities for which an agent is morally responsible if the thesis that ought' implies can' is true. My argument against a fully general principle of alternative possibilities does have implications, which I (...) briefly discuss, for conditions that must be satisfied if a person is to be blameworthy for performing actions. (shrink)

In this essay, I defend a view I call “Robust Realism” about normativity. According to this view, there are irreducibly, perfectly objective, normative truths, that when successful in our normative inquiries we discover rather than create or construct. My argument in support of Robust Realism is modeled after arguments from explanatory indispensability common in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mathematics. I argue that irreducibly normative truths, though not explanatorily indispensable, are nevertheless deliberatively indispensable, and that this (...) kind of indispensability is just as respectable as the more familiar explanatory kind. Deliberative indispensability, I argue, justifies belief in normative facts, just like the explanatory indispensability of, say, theoretical entities like electrons justifies belief in electrons. In the introduction I characterize the view I will be arguing for and sketch the main argument of this essay. In chapter 1 I draw the analogy between explanatory and deliberative indispensability, and argue that there is no non-question-begging reason to take the former but not the latter seriously. Here I also present the master-argument of the thesis, and clarify the argumentative work that needs to be done by each of the following chapters. In chapter 2 I address the worries of the antirealist who is willing to reject arguments from explanatory indispensability as well. In other words, in this chapter I try to justify the move from indispensability (of whatever kind) to belief. In chapter 3 I develop an account of deliberation that supports the premises about deliberation needed for my master-argument to go through. In chapter 4 I reject some alternative views, showing that none of them can allow for sincere deliberation. In this chapter, in other words, I support the indispensability premise: I argue that it really is impossible to deliberate sincerely without believing in irreducibly normative truths.. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that there are no categories of being⎯at least not in the robust metaphysical sense of something fundamental. Central arguments that metaphysicians provide in support of fundamental categories, such as indispensability and theoretical utility arguments, are not adequate to guarantee their existence. We illustrate this point by examining Jonathan Lowe’s [2006] four-category ontology, and indicating its shortcomings. In contrast, we offer an alternative, no-category ontology, which dispenses with any fundamental categories of being, and provides a deflationary (...) understanding of any categorization in terms of concepts. Concepts, we insist, as opposed to fundamental ontological categories, can always be revised, refined, and recast. A distinctive deflationary, no-category ontology then emerges. (shrink)

Frankfurt examples attempt to establish that a person can be morally responsible, morally blameworthy, for instance, for doing something despite not being able to do otherwise, as long as the conditions that render him unable to do otherwise play no role in bringing about what he does.Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66 . A more cautious manner of arguing would be to assume only that it is not demonstrated that the agent is not (...) morally responsible. See, e.g., John M. Fischer, “Recent Work on Moral Responsibility,” Ethics, Vol. 110 ; Ishtiyaque Haji and Michael McKenna, “Defending Frankfurt’s Argument in Deterministic Contexts: A Reply to Palmer,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 103 ; and Ishtiyaque Haji and Michael McKenna, “Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate about Freedom and Alternative Possibilities,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 101 . But for present purposes, we can work with the stro .. (shrink)

Subjective probabilities play a significant role in the assessment of evidence: in other words, our background knowledge, or pre-trial beliefs, cannot be set aside when new evidence is being evaluated. Focusing on homeopathy, this paper investigates the nature of pre-trial beliefs in clinical trials. It asks whether pre-trial beliefs of the sort normally held only by those who are sympathetic to homeopathy can legitimately be disregarded in those trials. The paper addresses several surprisingly unsuccessful attempts to provide a satisfactory justification (...) for ignoring the pre-trial beliefs of the homeopathic community. The ensuing diagnosis of the difficulties here emphasizes that the reason the arguments for choosing the pre-trial beliefs of the conventional community seem insufficient is not the arguments per se. It is rather that there is no cogent argument for choosing the conventional stance which would at the same time rationally persuade a member of the homeopathic community. The paper concludes that, once we understand that this is the predicament, there is no genuine reason to doubt the reasoning that leads us to reject the pre-trial beliefs of the homeopathic community. (shrink)

In this paper I provide a novel argument for scientific realism. In contrast to most recent defenses of SR, my defense of SR does not rely on the no-miracles argument. Instead, I take a more unconventional approach: I focus on the different kinds of justification available to different individuals in relation to different kinds of propositions. I maintain that this alternative focus shows that most people are warranted in believing many propositions about unobservables. The paper is divided into (...) three main sections. In the first, I rehearse the main moves in the recent debate about SR. In the second, I argue that the discussion in section one enables us to see that most of the arguments in the recent debate about SR mistake their target: instead of being about SR, they are about meta-SR. I argue that what I call the JJ-principle should be rejected and, further, that if the JJ-principle is rejected, then meta-SR may be cleaved from SR. This enables me to advance to a position I call thin realism in the third and final section of the paper. (shrink)

La théorie de la connaissance des années 60 et 70 a été marquée par l'emploi des arguments transcendantaux de toutes sortes. Ces arguments pourraient servir à défendre l'applicabilité de nos concepts fondamentaux qui font l'objet d'une variété d'attaques sceptiques. Malheureusement, la prise de conscience des difficultés mettant en cause l'efficacité ou même la validité des arguments transcendantaux a progressivement conduit à leur abandon, quoique certains philosophes n'aient jamais cessé de les utiliser. Mon analyse s'inspire du renouveau récent de l'intérêt pour (...) l'argumentation transcendantale dans le domaine de la raison pratique, et en particulier de l'élaboration d'un modèle de ce genre d'argumentation par A. W. Moore. Je procède à l'examen d'un argument de forme transcendantale développé par Christine Korsgaard afin de justifier l'autorité des normes morales. Je tente d'évaluer l'efficacité de cet argument et du modèle général auquel il se conforme, de le comparer à des approches alternatives et d'étudier les rapports de ses prémisses et de sa conclusion avec des prises de position réalistes et anti-réalistes en métaéthique.There is a revival of interest in transcendental arguments, which used to be very popular in recent decades but were progressively abandoned because of doubts concerning their plausibility and even their validity, although of course some philosophers never ceased to use them. My paper deals with a particular model of transcendental arguments which can be employed in the area of practical philosophy, elaborated by A.W. Moore. I examine an application of this model in the construction of a complex argument by Christine Korsgaard which aims at establishing the authority of moral norms. I discuss its structure and the relations of its premises and of its conclusion to certain realist and anti- realist positions in metaethics, I compare it to alternative approaches to the same problem, and I try to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses. (shrink)

Can economics, which is based on the notion of individual optimization, really model individuals who have a sense of exteriority? This question, derived both from Marcel Mauss's sociological analysis of the social norm of gift-giving and from Emmanuel Levinas's phenomenological analysis of the idea of 'otherness,' leads to the problem of whether it is possible to model altruism with the tool of optimization. By investigating the ways in which economic theory can address this challenge, and by introducing a postulate of (...) methodological altruism following Levinas's theory of the constitution of subjectivity through otherness, this paper uncovers an alternative foundation for the very notion of optimizing calculation - no longer as a self-centered initiative, but rather as an other-centered response. This makes it possible to clarify the implicit content of usual economic individualism, and to see on the basis of which ethical arguments the economic method of optimization may be upheld. The paper studies the consequences of this renewed foundation of optimization for the organization of a fair and efficient interaction between altruists. (shrink)

I consider the argument, thought to clinch the moral case for use of a human embryo solely as a means, that only a human individual can be a person, because it can happen at any time before formation of the primitive streak that an embryo splits into monozygotic twins, no embryo in which the primitive streak has not formed is a human individual, and therefore no embryo in which the primitive streak has not formed is a person. I explore (...) the following proffered arguments for : indivisibility is a necessary condition of individuality, nonidentity of an embryo with successor twins impugns the embryo’s individuality, and totipotency of an embryo’s constituents is inconsistent with the embryo’s being a human individual. These arguments are tested and found wanting; so too is an alternative to , the argument that indivisibility is intrinsic to personhood. Whereupon is unsustained. In search of ways to rehabilitate the nonindividuation argument, I canvass alternative metaphysical views and inquire further into biological individuality, but find that the argument cannot be saved. I conclude by analyzing where this leaves matters concerning the morality of embryo use. (shrink)

Empty names are a problem for Russellians. I describe three ways to approach solving the problem. These are positing gappy propositions as contents, nonsingular propositions as contents, or denying that sentences containing empty names have contents. I discuss methods for deciding between solutions. I then argue for some methods over others and defend one solution using those methods. I reject the arguments that either intuitions about truth value, truth, content, or meaningfulness can decide between the solutions. I give an alternative (...) argument which does decide between the three solutions. The alternative is based on the idea that a sentence and its internal negation are contrary: they cannot both be true, but they might both be false. I argue from Russellian premises to the conclusion that such sentences cannot be assigned truth values when they contain empty names. The argument shows that no Russellian should assign a truth value to a sentence containing an empty name, and therefore that no Russellian should assign a proposition as the content of such a sentence. This shows that Russellians should conclude that sentences containing empty names do not have contents, i.e. the no proposition view. (shrink)

In this article, two separate aspects of Mises’ famous economic calculation argument are identified. The first concerns the fact that the profit-and-loss calculations that drive economic decisions regarding factors of production under capitalism cannot, by definition, take place under socialism since there cannot be any prices on which to base such calculations. The second concerns that idea that, owing to the nature of value, there is no alternative means of allocation, such as a calculus in terms of value. Although (...) both of these points are well-known and frequently invoked to pass a decisive judgment against socialism, they are in fact separate arguments which have thus far been inadequately distinguished in the Austrian literature. The objective of this paper is to highlight this distinction. I further illustrate the point by emphasizing the role of monetary calculation, which nonetheless plays a real role in capitalist economies. (shrink)

Thomas Flint has claimed that my argument against Molinism suffers from a 'seemingly irreparable logical gap'. He also contests a key assumption of that argument, namely that 'something which has had causal consequences in the past is ipso facto a hard, fixed, settled fact about the past'. In reply, I show that there is no logical gap at all in the argument. And I argue that, even though Molinists have reasons, based on Molinist principles, for rejecting the (...) assumption in question, the assumption is indeed extremely plausible. Thus, the argument creates difficulties for Molinism that are more severe than Flint is willing to admit. (shrink)

Functionalism, the philosophical theory that defines mental states in terms of their causal relations to stimuli, overt behaviour, and other inner mental states, has often been accused of being unable to account for the qualitative character of our experimential states. Many times such objections to functionalism take the form of conceivability arguments. One is asked to imagine situations where organisms who are in a functional state that is claimed to be a particular experience either have the qualitative character of that (...) experience altered or absent altogether. Many of these arguments are surprisingly advanced by materialist philosophers. I argue that if the conceivability arguments were successful against functionalism, then they would be successful against their alternative materialist views as well. So the conceivability arguments alone do not provide a good reason for materialists to abandon functionalism. I further argue that functionalism is best understood to be an empirical theory, and if it is so understood then the conceivability arguments have no force against it at all. A further consequence that emerges is that on an empirical functionalist view, qualia, if real, are properties in the domain of psychology. (shrink)

When philosophers participate in the interdisciplinary ethical, environmental, economic, legal, and social analysis of nanotechnologies, what is their specific contribution? At first glance, the contribution of philosophy appears to be a clarification of the various moral and ethical arguments that are commonly presented in philosophical discussion. But if this is the only contribution of philosophy, then it can offer no more than a stalemate position, in which each moral and ethical argument nullifies all the others. To provide an alternative, (...) we must analyze the reasons behind the prevailing individual and cultural relativism in ethics. The epistemological investigation of this stalemate position will guide us to the core problem of the relation between theory and action . The stalemate can be overcome from a pragmatic philosophical standpoint, which combines epistemology, philosophy of language—that is, the philosophy of speech acts—and practical reasoning—that is, reasoning about decision-making . From this philosophical standpoint, it will be possible to show how philosophy can accompany and support the development of nanotechnologies. (shrink)

Different beliefs about the nature and justification of bioethics may reflect different assumptions in moral epistemology. Two alternative views (put forward by David Seedhouse and Michael H Kottow) are analysed and some speculative conclusions formed. The foundational questions raised here are by no means settled and deserve further attention.

What are we to make of the claim that we often hear, that there is no such thing as business ethics? This essay first examines two arguments that might be in people's minds in making such a claim — that business is a game, and hence the ordinary constraints of morality do not apply, and that one cannot survive in business if one is too ethical. The critique of these arguments begins the process of making clear what business ethics is. (...) The paper then proceeds in a more positive vein to define and explain for the sceptic what business ethics is. Everyone must confront the question, what should I do in my business relationships? Business ethics is defined, then, as the effort to develop Socratically one's answer to this question, that is, through the critical examination of alternatives. In the process of explaining this notion, several other senses in which someone might say that there is no such thing as business ethics are explored and the basic distinction between the moral point of view and ethical egoism is introduced. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 37.1 (2004) 92-95 [Access article in PDF] Rethinking the Frankfurt School: Alternative Legacies of Cultural Critique. Ed. Jeffrey T. Nealon and Caren Irr. Albany: SUNY Press, 2002. Pp. 227. $23.95, paperback. Not long ago at a gathering of arts and humanities scholars, I found myself introduced to a group of people as someone interested in the work of Theodor Adorno, whose name led one member of (...) the group to groan, "Not that old chestnut!" Such has been an ambient attitude in cultural studies toward not just the work of Adorno but many of the scholars who came to be known collectively in the 1960s as the Frankfurt School, thanks to their affiliation with the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt. Rethinking the Frankfurt School, a deceptively slim volume that manages to cover a lot of ground in a dozen densely packed essays edited by Jeffrey T. Nealon and Caren Irr, counters the conventional cultural studies wisdom regarding the Frankfurt School, debunking along the way not just the facile dismissal of some of the school's members for their "mandarin elitism," but also the notion that the scholars who arguably pioneered the critical study of mass culture have lost their relevance for cultural studies.The association of the Frankfurt School with a cranky and outdated variant of bourgeois proto-Marxism—what Lukacs once dismissed as self-indulgent despair cultivated in the comfort of "the Grand Hotel Abyss"—was at least in part a legacy of the rediscovered cultural and political optimism of the late 1960s. This optimism came to characterize those strands of cultural studies that countered the gloomy assessments of the Frankfurt School with the potential of what the collection's editors disparagingly describe as "subversive consumption." From the perspective of the new millennium it's no longer the Frankfurt scholars who look misguided. In a turning of the tables, the outdated figure of this volume is not Adorno, the pointy-headed pessimist, but rather those who helped dismiss him as such. In particular, Simon During, who edited the 1993 version of the cultural studies canon, The Cultural Studies Reader, comes in for a double dose of implicit criticism (thanks in part to what seems to be an editing oversight) for his critique of Horkheimer and Adorno's failure to take into account [End Page 92] the "opportunities for all kinds of individual collective creativity and decoding" provided by the culture industries (3, 62). If, as During suggested, the 1960s represented a time in which the mass media had become more variegated and presumably more flexible and porous than in the period treated by Horkheimer and Adorno, this collection suggests the renewed relevance of the Frankfurt School might in part be explained by the "unprecedented consolidation within the multinational 'infotainment' industry" during the 1990s (5). The triumphal resuscitation and consolidation of monopoly capitalism triggers, on this account, the rehabilitation of its most scathing critics.The more compelling argument advanced in this volume, however, is that the ostensibly outdated character of much of the work of the Frankfurt School was as much a result of superficial and dismissive readings as of changing historical conditions. As contributor Evan Watkins suggests in his discussion of Adorno, the dominant tendency in culture studies has been to contradict disparaging claims about mass culture (claims which earned Adorno and Horkheimer the sticky moniker of elitists) rather than to take seriously an approach that explored the intricate connections between mass culture and the social relations of production and consumption. Only in the abstract can the consumption of ostensibly counter-hegemonic texts be figured as subversive politics, especially during a time when "The Times They Are A-Changin' " can become a jingle for a bank commercial.Against the theoretical backdrop of the Frankfurt School, the very attempt to isolate culture as a sphere of resistance unto itself becomes a symptom of reification. As Imre Szeman puts it, perhaps the most important lesson of the Frankfurt School for cultural studies "can be summarized by a negative maxim: don't fetishize culture" (74... (shrink)

Compatibilists believe that moral responsibility and causal determinism are compatible. Incompatibilists, on the other hand, believe that if causal determinism is true, then no agent is morally responsible for her actions. The principle of alternative possibilities, or PAP, claims that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if she could have done other than the action in question. In a landmark article, Harry Frankfurt attempts to advance the compatibilist's position by arguing that the principle of alternative possibilities is (...) false. To demonstrate the falsity of PAP, Frankfurt describes a scenario in which an agent appears to have no alternative possibilities yet is still morally responsible. This scenario and others like it have come to be called Frankfurt-style counterexamples, or FSCs. ;One prominent incompatibilist response to FSCs is to argue that, despite Frankfurt's argument, FSCs do not in fact undermine PAP. Many incompatibilists argue that, contrary to Frankfurt's claim, the agent in an FSC still has relevant alternative possibilities. According to some of these incompatibilists, the actual and alternate sequences of an FSC contain numerically distinct events which can serve as the relevant alternatives. Of course, such a response depends upon one's metaphysic of events and their individuation. In this dissertation, I explore the implications of various accounts of event-individuation for the debate surrounding the success of FSCs and their purported repudiation of PAP. I survey the dominant theories of events and their individuation and raise a number of objections to these extant theories. I then develop a property-exemplification view of events and their individuation, situated within a larger Aristotelian metaphysic that avoids these criticisms. I then examine the effect this account has for the debate surrounding FSCs. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction: The Design Argument The Design Argument in Antiquity Christian Authors Hume's Onslaught William Paley's Natural Theology The Bridgewater Treatises Intelligent Design: A Political Movement Eyes to See No “There” There Blood and Tears Gambling to Non‐existence Natural Selection Natural Selection and Design Postscript: Counterpoint Notes References.

This article addresses Taruek’s much discussed Number Problem from a non-consequentialist point of view. I argue that some versions of the Number Problem have no solution, meaning that no alternative is at least as choice-worthy as the others, and that the best way to behave in light of such moral indeterminacy is to let chance make the decision. I contrast my proposal with F M Kamm ’s nonconsequentialist argument for saving the greatest number, the Argument for Best Outcomes, (...) which I argue does not follow from the premises it is based on. (shrink)

This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts (...) with the common idea that in the case of belief, there are two different incommensurable senses of rationality, one of which is distinctively epistemic. I present considerations that favor Equal Treatment over these two alternatives, reply to objections, and criticize some arguments for Evidentialism. I also show how Equal Treatment opens the door to a distinctive kind of response to skepticism. (shrink)

This article takes issue with the common view that cosmopolitan normative commitments are incompatible with recognition of state sovereignty as a basic principle of international law. Against influential cosmopolitans, who at best ascribe a derivative significance to the sovereignty of states, the article argues that state sovereignty is not only compatible with, but also essential to the recognition of individuals as units of ultimate concern. The argument challenges a problematic distributive conception of justice underlying many cosmopolitans’ support for reforms (...) of the international legal order towards a system where respect for basic human rights is the only criterion for political legitimacy. An alternative relational conception of justice makes it possible to see why there is an internal connection between the rights of individuals and the rights of states. The argument adds up to a novel defence of the so-called domestic analogy, which regards the territorial integrity of states as an internationa... (shrink)

This essay considers some central arguments given by Helen Frowe and Seth Lazar regarding the permissibility of killing civilians in war. It raises some objections to their views and defends some alternative bases for weighing harms to combatants against harms to civilians.

The article brings into focus a series of political arguments of Stanley Hauerwas's “theological politics” and argues that these arguments are in stark contrast with the theoretical perspective of a political rule by a god-like Leviathan, an image inherited in modern and contemporary political culture from the early modern English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. The first section focuses on Hauerwas's arguments regarding the political potential of the term “Catholicity” to represent an alternative to the coercive politics reinforced by the post-Enlightenment nation (...) state. The second section proposes a reflection on the way the Church's Catholicity may be expressed politically without falling into the temptation of involving the Leviathan to sort out the issues generated by its diversity. The concluding section illustrates how Hauerwas uses his approach of a universal unity of Christians “without Leviathan” in his exhortation addressed to American Christians to say “no” to Donald Trump's version of communal unity that is rather based on “total allegiance” to the United States and on “repressive politics”. (shrink)

It is well known in contemporary Madhyamaka studies that the seventh century Indian philosopher Candrakīrti rejects the foundationalist Abhidharma epistemology. The question that is still open to debate is: Does Candrakīrti offer any alternative Madhyamaka epistemology? One possible way of addressing this question is to find out what Candrakīrti says about the nature of buddha’s epistemic processes. We know that Candrakīrti has made some puzzling remarks on that score. On the one hand, he claims buddha is the pramāṇabhūta-puruṣa (person of (...) epistemic and moral authority), sarvākārajñatājñānaṃ (omniscient, wise), pratyakṣalakṣaṇam (exclusively perceptual in characteristic) [Candrakīrti (MABh VI.214)], and claims that there are clearly four pramāṇas—epistemic warrants—direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), testimony (āgama) and analogy (upamāna) [Candrakīrti (Pp I.3), cf. MacDonald 2015, pp. 287–288]. On the other hand, somewhat paradoxically, Candrakīrti claims that buddhahood is an embodiment of a complete cessation of “mind and mental processes” [Candrakīrti (MABh XI.1, 155a; MAB XI.17d)] Now how are we to make sense of these two seemingly contradictory statements? Do these statements reflect any deeper conflicts within Candrakīrti’s system or is there a coherent way to interpret these statements? The Tibetan Prāsaṅgika interpreters of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka largely agree that there is no internal contradiction in Candrakīrti’s system, and agree there is a way to make coherent sense of these statements. Nevertheless, the Tibetans exegetes bring to the table two radically conflicting proposals to approach Candrakīrti’s Mādhyamaka; both claiming to successfully address the apparent tension arising from Candrakīrti’s statements. One proposal is made by Tsongkhapa Losang Dakpa (Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419), who maintains the tension can be plausibly resolved by demonstrating that Candrakīrti’s unique non-foundationalist epistemological program renders him an epistemological coherentist. In contrast Taktsang Lotsawa Sherap Rinchen (sTag tshang Lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen, 1405–1477) argues that according to Candrakīrti buddha is a global agnostic, on the ground of the nonexistence of mind and mental processes for those who have attained fully awakening. Taktsang instead proposes the no-mind thesis as a more plausible way to resolve the tension in Candrakīrti’s philosophy, categorically refusing to attribute to buddha any cognitive processes and epistemic warrants. This paper is an analysis of Taktsang’s no-mind thesis—the claim that buddhas utterly lack any knowledge of the world because they do not have epistemic processes and warrants to perceive the world—in what follows a rational reconstruction of his arguments is developed in order to evaluate his thesis. We shall then assess the implications of accepting Taktsang’s no-mind thesis. (shrink)

At the outset of this discussion, I undertook to present an argument from design which would follow Swinburne's example in making use of a priori judgments, while avoiding some of the objections which have been posed in response to his treatment of these issues. So we need to ask: how does this approach to the question of design compare with Swinburne's?Swinburne argues that a chaotic world is a priori more likely than an ordered world: this consideration provides one central (...) reason, on his account, for giving an explanation of some sort for the world's regularity. The other central argument he advances for this claim is the argument from analogy (in terms of the coins) which we noted earlier. The approach I have taken offers an alternative route to this same conclusion. In particular, it substitutes the simpler a priori judgments recorded in (i) and (ii) for the rather difficult and contentious claim that chaos is a priori more likely than order. In place of this claim, I have offered the judgment that order, or recurrence, is more likely given the activity of a common source or common kind of source than otherwise: this proposal does not commit us to a view either way on the question of whether order is a priori likely per se. Moreover, in place of Swinburne's analogical argument, I have offered an a priori approach, with the advantages I have noted.Given that recurrence is to be explained, we might ask: why offer an explanation in terms of design? On this point, Swinburne argues, for instance, that no other explanation of temporal regularity is even possible a priori. Again, the a priori principles which I have used, in (iv) and (v), may be less ambitious, but at the same time more persuasive. In support of this same idea, Swinburne also cites various ideas to do with the predictive power of the idea of design. I have tried to bring out the role of this sort of consideration in terms of my principle (v). Principle (iv) has no place in Swinburne's account, in view of his reliance on the principle of simplicity as a measure of prior probability.Lastly, we may ask: if we are to cite a designer, are there reasons for attributing to this agent more powers than are needed for the production of the effect to be explained? On this point, Swinburne cites the principle of simplicity. Again, my approach avoids what has proved to be a relatively controversial judgment about the nature of a priori probabilities, offering in place of the principle of simplicity the less ambitious principle recorded in (iii). At this point, I have moreover inverted the logical sequence of Swinburne's argument: it seems to me that, in the ways I have indicated, it is helpful to consider the extent of the powers of the source of recurrence before addressing the question of design.In these various ways, I hope I have made good my undertaking to present an argument which avoids some of the controversy surrounding the particular measures of a priori probability which figure in Swinburne's argument. Moreover, I hope that this approach provides an indication of how a priori judgments may function in a relatively unproblematic way within an argument from design, in so far as (i)–(v) are all rather modest proposals. In sum, the argument I have presented is distinguished by its explicit use of the a priori judgments recorded in (i)–(v), by its attempt to buttress in this fashion analogical forms of argument, and by the logical role it gives to the idea that the source of regularity possesses more powers than are required for the production of this effect.Lastly, we might ask: how persuasive is this argument? Of course, the cogency of the idea of design depends upon the balance of debate in other areas of the philosophy of religion, especially upon our ability to provide some account of the existence of evil. In this paper, I have been concerned to argue simply that recurrence by kind provides evidence for design: I have not addressed the question of whether other features of the world provide good evidence against the idea of (benevolent) design. However, if we confine our attention to this one phenomenon, there is it seems to me good evidence for the idea of design, (i) and (ii) suggest that recurrence surely calls for some explanation; (iii), together with the existence in nature of statistical irregularities, suggests that whatever provides this explanation could have brought about other effects besides; and design seems the only clear explanation of why this effect should have been brought about, if (as I have argued) analogies drawn from vegetable and animal reproduction fail, and if we cannot explain the effect satisfactorily by reference to the conditions of observation. Moreover, I have argued that there are reasons for supposing that the probability a priori of design is relatively high in relation to the probability a priori of any rival hypothesis of equivalent predictive power. In brief, this is because the design hypothesis (unlike the hypothesis of theism) can cite an agent of relatively indeterminate power in order to account for the phenomenon to be explained. In this regard, it is less ‘precisely defined’ than any rival hypothesis of equivalent predictive power. If all of this is so, then as philosophers from early times have supposed, temporal regularity provides the basis for a powerful argument in favour of design. It remains true, of course, that its import can be judged in full only when we have taken into account the relevance of other phenomena, many of which are apparently less favourable to the idea of design. (shrink)

Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore (1999/2002) frame the debate over meaning holism in terms of a distinction between meaning atomism and meaning anatomism. The former holds that the meaning of an expression E is determined by some relation between E and some extra-linguistic entity. The latter holds that the meaning of E is at least partly determined by some of E’s “inward” relations (IRs) with other expressions in the very language. They (1992) argue that meaning anatomism inevitably collapses into meaning (...) holism, which is the view that the meaning of E is determined by E’s IRs with every other expression in the very language because there is no principled distinction for the anatomist to divide the meaning-determining IRs from the non-meaning-determining ones. In response, the non-holistic anatomist urges that Fodor and Lepore’s no-principled-basis consideration is groundless because the lack of a generally accepted criterion for such a distinction does not undermine the viability of the distinction itself. While this point is well taken, I think that Fodor and Lepore are onto an important question here. That is, what does it make non-holistic anatomism distinctive from its holistic counterpart if without a principled basis for the distinction among IRs? I look into this question and give an alternative argument from Fodor and Lepore’s to suggest that non-holistic anatomism cannot bypass the no-principled-basis consideration. The non-holistic anatomist will need a principled distinction in kind between IRs to back her point. (shrink)

Einstein argued in his latter years that the intelligibility of the world was in the nature of a miracle, and that in no way could one have expected a priori such a high degree of order; this is why he rejected the atheist, positivist standpoint, and believed in a Spinozist God. Einstein's argument, however, is essentially a form of the ?argument from design? for a personal God based on the existence of beautiful, mathematically simple laws of nature; that (...) physical order is a unique, improbable alternative compared to the infinite number of chaotic universes that might have existed. Einstein, in his early manhood, was a Humean, but in later years, as he moved toward Spinoza, from phenomenalism to noumenalism, he clearly rejected Hume's restriction of probable inferences to observed sequences. Darwin's arguments against biological design did not apply to Einstein's argument, because the laws of physics are not the outcome of any cumulative struggle for existence and natural selection. Perhaps the beautiful simplicity of basic physical laws helps account for the fact that relatively more physicists than biologists or psychologists hold to a theistic standpoint. Einstein's finite universe would have seriously weakened the argument that life, though infinitely improbable, would have been realized in an infinite world. But in any case, Einstein would have regarded ?emergence? theories of life as irrational. In accordance with the principle of identity of Emile Meyerson, the epistemologist whom he most respected, it would have followed that the occurrence of consciousness and intelligence was grounded in a God with those attributes, and that theism was consequently the basis for scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Epistemic nihilism for inquiry is the claim that there are no epistemic norms of inquiry. Epistemic nihilism was once the received stance towards inquiry, and I argue that it should be taken seriously again. My argument is that the same considerations which led us away from epistemic nihilism in the case of belief not only cannot refute epistemic nihilism for inquiry, but in fact may well support it. These include the argument from non-existence that there are no non-epistemic (...) reasons for belief; the linguistic argument that epistemic norms of belief are needed to capture the semantics of ordinary epistemic talk; and the argument from theoretical roles that epistemic norms are needed to play key theoretical roles for rational belief. I conclude by sketching an alternative Gibbardian picture on which norms of inquiry are all-things-considered norms governing action. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism states that evolution cannot produce warranted beliefs. In contrast, according to Plantinga, Christian theism provides properly functioning cognitive faculties in an appropriate cognitive environment, in accordance with a design plan aimed at producing true beliefs. But does theism fulfill criteria I–III? Judging from the Bible, God employs deceit in his relations with humanity, rendering our cognitive functions unreliable. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that God's purpose would be to produce true beliefs (...) in humans. Finally, from the theistic/religious perspective, it is impossible to tell whether observations have natural or supernatural causes, which undermines an appropriate cognitive environment. Reliable identification of deceit or miracles could alleviate these problems, but the theistic community has failed to resolve this issue. Dismissal of parts of the Bible, or attempts to find alternative interpretations, would collapse into skepticism or deism. Thus, Plantinga's problem of epistemic warrant backfires on theism. (shrink)

One of the central considerations to be taken into account in evaluating the ethics of compensation for donated plasma is respect for donor autonomy. And one of the main arguments against compensated donation systems is that many donors do or would come from circumstances of poverty that restrict their alternatives in a way that compromises those donors’ autonomy. In this paper, I develop and defend a novel version of this “compromised autonomy argument” which improves upon extant versions by (...) employing a more nuanced account of the relationship between alternatives and autonomy. According to the version of that argument I offer, donors lack autonomy with respect to the sale of their plasma if their economic circumstances leave them with no choice but to sell their plasma on the basis of a desire they have had no choice but to hold. After explicating the key terms of this argument, I examine its policy implications. I argue that, given several reasonable empirical assumptions, my argument implies that a majority of individuals whose income falls below a specified threshold would indeed lack autonomy with respect to the sale of their plasma. Most individuals whose income falls above that threshold, on the other hand, would be able to autonomously sell their plasma. I argue that respect for donor autonomy therefore speaks in favor of an income-restricted system of compensated donation which permits collection centers to purchase plasma from those whose income falls above the relevant threshold, but not those below it. (shrink)