Experiments with evanescent modes and tunneling particles have shown that (i) their signal velocity may be faster than light, (ii) they are described by virtual particles, (iii) they are nonlocal and act at a distance, (iv) experimental tunneling data of phonons, photons, and electrons display a universal scattering time at the tunneling barrier front, and (v) the properties of evanescent, i.e. tunneling modes are not compatible with the special theory of relativity.

A superluminal signal velocity (i.e. faster than light) is said to violate causality. However, superluminal signal velocities have been measured in tunneling experiments recently. The classical dipole interaction approach by Sommerfeld and Brillouin results in a complex refractive index with a finite real part. For the tunneling process with its purely imaginary refractive index this model obtaines a zero-time traversing of tunneling barriers in agreement with wave meechanics. The information of a signal is proportional to the product of its frequency (...) band width and its time duration. The reasons that superluminal signal velocities do not violate causality are: (i) physical signals are frequency band limited and (ii) signals have a finite time duration. (shrink)

A macroscopic realization of the peculiar virtual particles is presented. The classical Helmholtz and the Schrödinger equations are differential equations of the same mathematical structure. The solutions with an imaginary wave number are called evanescent modes in the case of elastic and electromagnetic fields. In the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanical fields they are called tunneling solutions. The imaginary wave numbers point to strange consequences: The waves are non-local, they are not observable, and they are described as virtual particles. During (...) the last two decades QED calculations of the solutions with an imaginary wave number have been experimentally confirmed for phonons, photons, and electrons. The experimental proofs of the predictions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics and the Wigner phase time approach for the elastic, electromagnetic and Schrödinger fields will be presented in this article. The results are zero time in the barrier and an interaction time (i.e. a phase shift) at the barrier interfaces. The measured tunneling time scales approximately inversely with the particle energy. Actually, the tunneling time is given only by the barrier boundary interaction time, as zero time is spent inside a barrier. (shrink)

Fifty years ago Hartman studied the barrier transmission time of wave packets (J Appl Phys 33:3427–3433, 1962). He was inspired by the tunneling experiments across thin insulating layers at that time. For opaque barriers he calculated faster than light propagation and a transmission time independent of barrier length, which is called the Hartman effect. A faster than light (FTL or superluminal) wave packet velocity was deduced in analog tunneling experiments with microwaves and with infrared light thirty years later. Recently, the (...) conjectured zero time of electron tunneling was claimed to have been observed in ionizing helium inside the barrier. The calculated and measured short tunneling time arises at the barrier front. This tunneling time was found to be universal for elastic fields as well as for electromagnetic fields. Remarkable is that the delay time is the same for the reflected and the transmitted waves in the case of symmetric barriers. Several theoretical physicists predicted this strange nature of the tunneling process. However, even with this background many members of the physics community do not accept a FTL signal velocity interpretation of the experimental tunneling results. Instead a luminal front velocity was calculated to explain the FTL experimental results frequently. However, Brillouin stated in his book on wave propagation and group velocity that the front velocity is given by the group velocity of wave packets in the case of physical signals, which have only finite frequency bandwidths. Some studies assumed barriers to be cavities and the observed tunneling time does represent the cavity lifetime. We are going to discus these continuing misleading interpretations, which are found in journals and in textbooks till today. (shrink)

The encounter of amateur science with synthetic biology has led to the formation of several amateur/do‐it‐yourself biology (DIYBio) groups worldwide. Although media outlets covered DIYBio events, most seemed only to highlight the hope, hype, and horror of what DIYBio would do in the future. Here, we analyze the European amateur biology movement to find out who they are, what they aim for and how they differ from US groups. We found that all groups are driven by a core leadership of (...) (semi‐)professional people who struggle with finding lab space and equipment. Regulations on genetic modification limit what groups can do. Differences between Europe and the US are found in the distinct regulatory environments and the European emphasis on bio‐art. We conclude that DIYBio Europe has so far been a responsible and transparent citizen science movement with a solid user base that will continue to grow irrespective of media attention. (shrink)

This paper examines the ongoing challenges of interdisciplinary collaboration in Machine Ethics (ME), particularly the integration of ethical decision-making capacities into AI systems. Despite increasing demands for ethical AI, ethicists often remain on the sidelines, contributing primarily to metaethical discussions without directly influencing the development of moral machines. This paper revisits concerns highlighted by Tolmeijer et al. (2020), who identified the pitfall that computer scientists may misinterpret ethical theories without philosophical input. Using the MACHIAVELLI moral benchmark and the Delphi artificial (...) moral agent as case studies, we analyze how these challenges persist. Our analysis indicates that the creators of MACHIAVELLI and Delphi “copy” ethical concepts and embed them in LLMs without questioning or challenging these concepts themselves sufficiently. If an ethical concept causes friction with the computer code, they only reduce and simplify the ethical concept in order to stay as close as possible to the original. We propose that ME should expand its focus to include both interdisciplinary efforts that embed existing ethical work into AI, and transdisciplinary research that fosters new interpretations of ethical concepts. Interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches are crucial for creating AI systems that are not only effective but also socially responsible. To enhance collaboration between ethicists and computer scientists, we recommend the use of Socratic Dialogue as a methodological tool, promoting deeper understanding of key terms and more effective integration of ethics in AI development. (shrink)

Realism is a term that can be understood only by contrasting it with an opposite term, such as idealism or representationalism. But representationalism has indeed to presuppose something that is represented,in order for the representation to be possible at all. This does not mean,however, to fall prey to a naïve realism: our grasp on reality is always determined by our own way of accessing it. A realism which can take hold of this presupposition is to be called phenomenological realism. In (...) this sense, reality is always given only in representation, that is, mediated by our access to it, but is not itself representation. It is an objectivity opposed to ourself, it has a particular place and it appears, but its appearance does not belong to the subject, it is simply there. Therefore, appearances are spatial and have to be described as such. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to solve a key problem of phenomenology. The problem is given with the double role of the revealing capacity for which phenomena are present. On the one hand, this capacity must be prior to all phenomena, because it allows phenomena to show themselves and thus to be what they essentially are. On the other hand, the revealing capacity must be situated in the midst of phenomena; it must belong to the phenomenal world in order to (...) have access to it. This problem has been discussed in different versions by Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, but in every version it remains aporetic. The problem can be solved by conceiving the capacity, which reveals phenomena, as spatial. The paper shows how the essential priority of the revealing capacity as well as its situatedness in the midst of phenomena has spatial character. Phenomenology thus is spatial thinking. (shrink)

Two hundred years after his death, Kant remains one of the most important modern philosophers. The Prolegomena is the ideal introduction to Kant's unique account of the nature human knowledge, according to which we actively shape the world as we know it. This new edition of Kant's own summary of his philosophy is designed specially for students. Guenter Zoeller assumes no prior knowledge of the Prolegomena and provides an extensive and comprehensive introduction which explores Kant's life, the origin and reception (...) of the Prolegomena, the organization of the work, its principal arguments, and its philosophical significance. This edition also includes detailed notes to aid student understanding, as well as a chronology, a glossary and an annotated bibliography. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric. It argues that philosophical claims are bound to language, and yet philosophy’sclaim to objective clarity is meaningless if language is radically perspectival. The paper attempts to show the limitations and possibilities that Platonic dialectics and Derridean deconstruction share in their respective approaches to the analysis of language and the relationship between speech and writing. The paper concludes that language is ambiguous, neither reducible to the relativism of sophistry nor to (...) the essentialism of metaphysics. Against Derrida, the paper argues that without structure, voice is not language; it renders only inarticulate sounds. Yet in speaking, this structural aspect gets taken for granted and passed over. Only when language is established in writing is the possibility of voice first recognized. (shrink)

Ph. Lenard—the well known Nobel prize winner—felt to be deceived concerning the discovery of the X-rays by a ungrateful and jewish dominated fate. He complained over an insufficient appreciation of his precursory research work by the definitive discoverer W. C. Röntgen. Lenard proved this interpretation by his contributions to the development of a paticular type of cathode ray tube manufactured by the glass-blower L. Müller-Unkel and the decisive part this tube played in the discovery of the new radiation. This interpretation (...) has been emphasized during the Third Reich and even nowaday it became not completely obliterate. Relying on recently discovered historical documents we describe the history of the origin of the Müller-Unkel tube. In this way we can demonstrate that essential parts of the interpretation of Ph. Lenard and his politically like-minded friends are to be transposed into the grounds of legends. (shrink)

The Symposium is one of Plato’s most literary and poetic dialogues. How might one reconcile this evidence of Plato’s predilection for poetry in light of his severe critique of poetry in the Republic? Though his critique is modified and refined in other dialogues, the power of his critique is nowhere significantly undermined. I argue in this paper that Plato’s poetic writing is not inconsistent with his critique, and that in fact there is an affinity between his practice of poetry and (...) his critique. Plato’s critique of poetry is not aimed against poetry itself, but just against its problematic claims and false promises. In turn, Plato’s use of the poetic image, especially in relationship to eros, delimits philosophy, and places it in relation to that which is not attainable for it. The battle between poetry and philosophy is seen to involve a reciprocal benefit for both, and a hidden affinity. In this sense, the poetic image has its philosophical sense precisely because it falls outside of the philosophical perspective. (shrink)

Mohr Siebeck publishing company, Tuebingen, Germany. Academic books since 1801 in the fields of theology, philosophy, law.

This paper discusses the question if there is any truth in art. Initially it poses the question whether artworks are just mere appearances or whether they have a special truth. In critical reflection on Heidegger’s conception of art as the “setting-itself-to-work of truth” this question is then elaborated and answered: The appearance character of artworks cannot be conceived as truth. What true artworks show, namely mere possibilities, is beyond truth, because it does not belong to the real world. Artworks are (...) not true; in their decentered order and their self-showing nature they are beautiful. (shrink)

"Dionysos" ist in Nietzsches Spätwerk das "Gegenwort" zum "Willen zur Macht". Anders als der philosophische Begriff des Dionysischen in der Geburt der Tragödie bündelt der Name "Dionysos" die Erfahrungen des Ewigen im menschlichen Leben. Dieses entdeckt Nietzsche in den Möglichkeiten, sich zum Gedanken der "ewigen Wiederkehr" zu verhalten. Diesem Gedanken vernag weder Gleichgültigkeit noch das Festhalten an einer moralischen Instanz, sondern allein die religiöse, aber nicht mehr christliche Erfahrung des "ungeheuren Augenblicks" grecht zu werden. Eine solche Erfahrung des Göttlichen lässt (...) aus dem "grössten Schwergewicht" die "leichte" Freheit von der letztlich noch moralisch gebundenen Selbstüberwindung werden. Während der philosophische "Lehrer der weigen Wiederkunft" Zarathustra - als "alter Atheist", der er für Nietzsche ist - nur den "Begriff des Dionysos" kennt, zielt Nietzsche selbst mit dem Namen des griechischen Gottes des "grossen Zweideutigen und Versuchers", auf ein Erfahrung des Göttlichen, das als "Genie des Herzens" jenseits des "moralischen Gottes" ist.In Nietzsche's later work, "Dionysos" is the counterconcept to the "will to power". Unlike the philosophical concept of Dionysos in The Birth of Tragedy, the name "Dionysos" in this later work signifies that which is eternal in human life. Nietzsche discovers this in the possibility of taking an attitude towards the thought of "eternal recurrence." Neither indifference nor retreat to a moral authority is appropriate when facing this thought. The correct attitude is rather an embrace of a religious yet no longer Christian experience of the "terrible moment." Such an experience of godliness allows "the most heavy weight" to become the "light" freedom of a self-overcoming still bound to mortality. While Zarathustra, the "teacher of eternal recurrance," only know the "concept of Dionysos," Nietzsche himself is in touch with the experience of the divine. This experience, with the name of the Greek God who is "the most ambiguous and seductive" and a "genius of the heart," is beyond the "mortal God.". (shrink)

Earth possesses a double-character: it supports life and grounds perception and experience, but because of being this very base, also restricts these stances, since as base of any activity, theoretical or practical, it cannot be overstepped. Thus, earth itself is also groundless. Nevertheless, this duplicity is not contradictory, is no dualism, when formulated as earth being both a space of movement and a space of sense. Understanding this duplicity means understanding the intertwining of these two spaces by articulating the possibilities (...) of movements within sense; it means an understanding of sense and meaning in moving. This is the task of philosophy: both alienation from earth and the matter-of-course of its sense and return to it by taking part in its sense of moving and becoming. This is gained by interpretation, of which we draw on as a model reading Nietzsche on 'Will to Power' and perspectivity, and Plato's conception of dialectic. Thus, interpretation represents itself sensibly in earth's duplicity. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 45, Issue 3, pp 358 - 368 In the 1949 _Bremen Lectures_, Martin Heidegger characterizes the essence of technology as a universal, or total, condition of modern existence. This makes it appear as though nothing can exist in the world independent of the technological. The fact that technology attempts to do away with distance, however, means that technology’s very workings presuppose the existence of distance and nearness that oppose it. Things, insofar as they are, according to Heidegger, (...) essentially near remain independent of technology. By describing the nearness and nearing of things, this article reinterprets the Heideggerian concepts of the fourfold and world-formation to critically challenge the universality of technology. The human experience of things in their spatiality—especially the human aesthetic enjoyment of and abiding with things—is an example of a facet of life where technology does not annihilate distance and nearness. (shrink)

InhaltVorwort SiglenverzeichnisWerner Beierwaltes: Zum Tode von Reinhard Lauth am 23. August 2007 Marco Ivaldo: Nachruf auf Reinhard Lauth Wilhelm Lütterfelds: »Ich allein aber verstehe es recht.« Fichtes idealistischer Verstehensbegriff und seine Paradoxie Jean-François Goubet: Über die akademische Freiheit. Analyse eines sittlich, rechtlich und philosophisch grundlegenden Begriffs in Bezug auf Fichtes Antrittsrede zum Rektorenamt im Jahre 1811 Marco Rampazzo Bazzan: Idee und Gesicht in den Fünf Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten Nina W. Gromyko: Das Transzendieren als grundlegende anthropologische Konstruktion in (...) Fichtes Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten Valérie Kokoszka: L’Affektenlehre dans la dernière philosophie de Fichte Kaoru Hoshiba: Das Problem der Sprache bei Fichte Martin Siegel: Die Einforderung eines lebendigen Sprachvollzugs als Kennzeichen der späten Wissenschaftslehren FichtesRainer Adolphi: Die Tatsachen der Tathandlung. Über Fichtes implizite Auseinandersetzung mit den Anfängen einer ›anthropologischen‹ Depotenzierung der Vernunft Marina Bykova: Fichte’s Doctrine of the Self-Positing Subject Alexander Kudrjaschew: Die Entfaltung des Fichteschen Erfahrungsgrundes Peter L. Oesterreich: Fichte und die Kunst des PhilosophierensGiorgia Cecchinato: Fichtes Ästhetik. Eigene Reflexionen über Kunst und WissenschaftslehreManuel Jiménez Redondo: Die unzeitgemäße Aktualität Fichtes, aufgezeigt am Beispiel der Beziehung der theoretischen und praktischen Philosophie in seinem SpätwerkFranck Fischbach: De l’acte à l’être: la dernière philosophie de Fichte Marco Ivaldo: Sittlicher »Begriff« als wirklichkeitsbildendes Prinzip in der späten Sittenlehre Katja V. Taver: Interpersonalität. Von den Wolfskindern zu den Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns von 1810/11Ulrich Fritz Wodarzik: Prinzip Liebe – zwischen Natur und Freiheit beim späten FichteAlois K. Soller: Keine moralische Selbstbestimmung im Spätwerk Fichtes. Zur Genese eines VernunftdeterminismusJean-Marie Vaysse: Fichte, penseur de l’actualité. (shrink)

The classic programme of conceptual engineering (Cappelen, Herman. 2018. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Eklund, Matti. 2021. “Conceptual Engineering.” In The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language, edited by Justin Khoo, and Rachel Sterken, 15–30. London: Routledge) envisages a two-stage ameliorating process. First, we assess ‘F’ and determine what the term should express. Second, we bring it about that ‘F’ expresses what it should express. The second stage gives rise to a (...) practical challenge: the implementation challenge. Engineering advocates need to explain by what means they can implement specific conceptual changes in the natural language shared by a community – a feat Herman Cappelen (2018. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020; “Conceptual Engineering: The Master Argument.” In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen, and David Plunkett, 132–151. Oxford: Oxford University Press) argues to be beyond our understanding and control both on an externalist and on an internalist meta-semantics. I devise a new answer to the implementation challenge. Enlisting the influential theory of social norms by Cristina Bicchieri, I argue that engineering social norms in Bicchieri’s technical sense amounts to an effective, specific, and feasible means to implement specific conceptual change, at least on internalist premises. I also argue that Bicchieri’s social norms are an essential addition to the more familiar conventions and moral norms when it comes to conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Standard Kripke-Putnam semantics is widely taken to entail that theoretical identifications like ‘Brontosauruses are Apatosauruses’ or ‘Gold is 79Au’ are necessary, if true. I offer a new diagnosis as to why this modal consequence ensues. Central to my diagnosis is the concept of a paradigm term. I argue that modal and epistemic peculiarities that are commonly considered as distinctive of natural kind expressions are in fact traits that are shared by paradigm terms in general. Philosophical semantics should broaden its focus (...) from natural kind expressions to paradigm terms. (shrink)

Jennifer Nado has recently argued that conceptual engineers should focus on (re-)designing representations and may safely ignore issues of implementation. I make a general case for the methodological importance of implementation to conceptual engineering. Using the Social Norms Account as a foil, I argue for three claims. (1) Inquiring into methods of implementation is a theoretically challenging and philosophically worthwhile project in and of itself. (2) A sound theoretical understanding of implementation is imperative for theorists of conceptual engineering. It proves (...) vital for their assessment of the prospects for engineering interventions and the political risks inherent in them. (3) A sound theoretical understanding of implementation is imperative for practitioners of conceptual engineering. The usefulness of their representational (re-)designs depends on respecting broadly cognitive and social constraints on the part of the target population. I conclude that conceptual engineers have very good reasons to seriously engage with issues of implementation. (shrink)

Standard arguments for essentialism with respect to natural kinds such as gold, star, water or tiger enlist essentialist principles or essentialist intuitions. I argue that we need neither. All it takes to establish essentialism for the kinds in question are insights from science and semantics. Semantics establishes that natural kind predicates such as “is gold” or “is a star” are paradigm terms whose application conditions are relationally determined, object involving, and actuality dependent. Science assures us that a posteriori hypotheses such (...) as “∀x” are deeply explanatory, as well as true. Taken together, these results establish essentialism for kinds such as gold, star, water or tiger. I consider this a deflationary result. When it comes to natural kind essentialism, there is no need for substantial metaphysics, be it essentialist or otherwise. (shrink)

The theories that form the heterogeneous family of two‐dimensional or 2D semantics are rooted in the tradition of possible‐worlds semantics made popular by Saul Kripke and David Lewis. Advocates of 2D semantics agree that recognizing a dependence of truth on fact is not enough. Advocates of two‐dimensional semantics share a second trademark idea. They agree that the familiar apparatus of worlds‐cum‐intensions can be modified so as to capture both the dependencies they see. The commitments of all 2D theories can basically (...) be captured by one and the same formal framework of worlds‐cum‐intensions. David Kaplan's semantics aims to cover pure indexicals such as 'today' alongside impure indexicals such as 'you' and demonstratives such as 'this'. Kaplan starts off with two 'obvious principles': The referent of an indexical systematically depends on the respective context; and Indexicals are directly referential. (shrink)

Dans mon article, je soutiens qu'il existe une voie epistemique fiable qui mène de la connaissance des verités conceptuelles a celle des nécessites métaphysiques. Dans un premier temps, je montre que nous pouvons prétendre connaitre des vérites conceptuelles dans la mesure ou nous savons à quelles conditions nos termes (ou du moins un grand nombre d'entre eux) s'appliquent. Je défends notamment cette idée face a un argument récent que Williamson adresse a la conception épistémique de l'analyticite. Dans un second temps, (...) je montre que notre connaissance des vérités conceptuelles constitue un moyen fiable de connaitre des nécessités métaphysiques. En effet, de deux choses l'une : ou bien la connaissance conceptuelle conduit directement a la connaissance de nécessités métaphysiques ; ou bien, lorsque ce n'est pas le cas, nous pouvons du moins savoir qu'une telle inférence n'est pas permise, en vertu d une réflexion purement sémantique, « depuis notre fauteuil» (armchair). J'en conclus que la connaissance conceptuelle constitue un moyen sur d'acquérir des connaissances modales. (shrink)

Man kann die Vielfalt und Dynamik der gegenwärtigen Analytischen Philosophie kaum besser unter Beweis stellen als durch sachorientierte Streitgespräche zwischen ihren herausragenden Vertretern. Die Kolloquien der GAP.5-Konferenz waren solche Streitgespräche. In ihnen haben international renommierte Philosophinnen und Philosophen über aktuelle Fragen aus dem Spektrum der Analytischen Philosophie debattiert - von Willensfreiheit bis Wohlfahrt und Armut, von Bedeutung und Normativität bis Feministische Wissenschaftstheorie, von Philosophie als Wissenschaft? bis Physikalismus. Mit Beiträgen von: Daniela Bailer-Jones, Paul A. Boghossian, Ansgar Beckermann, Jonathan Dancy, Hans-Johann (...) Glock, Jane Heal, Frank Jackson, Pierre Jacob, Janet A. Kourany, Brian P. McLaughlin, Margaret Morrison, Jan Narveson, Julian Nida-Rümelin, Cassandra L. Pinnick, Wolfgang Prinz, Michael Ruse, Ludwig Siep, Wolfgang Spohn, Larry Temkin und Holm Tetens. (shrink)

The philosophy of the art of living asks the age-old question of orienting one’s own life: ‘How can I live well?’ An art of living is always called for when people do not know what to do and how to go on, when the ways of life are no longer self-evident, when traditions, conventions, rules, and norms lose their plausibility and individuals begin to worry about themselves. The art of living and of its philosophy has a practical aim: It is (...) not concerned with ethical principles, but with the concrete practice of people’s everyday life, with their individual and successful lives. Friedrich Nietzsche, as he often did, pushed the problem of the art of living to the extreme, making it palpable both in its dignity and in its force. For him, the modern uncertainty of human orientation caused by nihilism pointed to art and aesthetics, which, he supposed, makes life if not justifiable, at least bearable. The arts open up a multi-perspectival seeing and hearing, they experiment with alternative forms and techniques, and create the finest sensibilities for both – Nietzsche himself, with his rich forms of philosophical writing, is an outstanding example of this. -/- The volume we present here, entails contributions of German-speaking scholars on Nietzsche and the ways of living he proposes, especially, but not alone in Dawn. The papers are selected from a book series on the common issue “Critical Art of Living,” edited by Günter Gödde, Jörg Zirfas, and others, and translated on behalf of the Foundation for Philosophical Orientation. (shrink)