Bringing together the latest work from leading scholars in this emerging and vibrant subfield of law, this book examines the philosophical issues that inform the intersection between law and neuroscience.

Morality, ethics, and the law : an overview of the foundations of contemporary clinical ethical analysis -- Case studies : ethical and legal challenges in the care of the neurologically injured critically ill patient -- Civil law and liability : the law of medical malpractice -- Legal reasoning, legal process, legal proof, and why it is confusing to clinician scientists -- Regulatory law and the clinical practice of the neurosciences -- Digital medicine and the data revolution managing digital distraction (...) and EMR : liability while leveraging opportunities in teleneurology and telecritical care -- Developing and leading a sustainable high reliability high performing unit : theories of quality, teamwork, medical error, and patient safety -- Neurolaw and the integration of neuroscience, ethics, and the law : the new frontiers. (shrink)

This paper surveys the conceptions of law and of legislation to be found in the philosophy of Julian the Emperor. A hierarchy of levels of law is described, going from transcendent divine orders and paradigmatic laws down to the laws of nature, laws innate in human souls and regional laws. Julian’s ideal legislator is discussed, as inspired by transcendent, paradigmatic laws and as subordinate to law and its protector. An example of Julian’s legislation is discussed. Attention is paid to Julian’s (...) use of Plato’s Republic, Statesman, and Laws. (shrink)

This volume presents a number of controversial cases of enforced medical treatment from around the globe, providing for the first time a common, biopolitcal framework for all of them. Bringing together all these real cases guarantees that a new, more complete understanding of the topic will be within grasp for readers unacquainted with the aspects involved in these cases. On the one hand, readers interested mainly in the legal and medical dimensions of cases like those considered will benefit from the (...) explanation of the biopolitical framework within which each case develops. On the other hand, those focusing on only one of the situations presented here will find the parallels between the cases an interesting expansion of the complexity of the problem. Despite the book's ambitious goal, for those willing to use it as supplemental material or interested in only one of the cases, the chapters can function as self-standing pieces to be read separately. This volume will be a valuable tool for both academics and professionals. Bioethicists in both the analytic and continental traditions, will find the book interesting for not only the specific concepts and issues considered, but also for its constructive bridging of the two schools of thought. In addition to philosophers, the structure of this work will also appeal to lawyers, doctors, human rights activists, and anyone concerned in the most disparate way with real-life cases of enforced medical treatment. (shrink)

This book explores the cultures of philosophy and the law as they interact with neuroscience and biology, through the perspective of American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes’ Jr., and the pragmatist tradition of John Dewey. Schulkin proposes that human problem solving and the law are tied to a naturalistic, realistic and an anthropological understanding of the human condition. The situated character of legal reasoning, given its complexity, like reasoning in neuroscience, can be notoriously fallible. Legal and scientific reasoning is to be (...) understood within a broader context in order to emphasize both the continuity and the porous relationship between the two. Some facts of neuroscience fit easily into discussions of human experience and the law. However, it is important not to oversell neuroscience: a meeting of law and neuroscience is unlikely to prove persuasive in the courtroom any time soon. Nevertheless, as knowledge of neuroscience becomes more reliable and more easily accepted by both the larger legislative community and in the wider public, through which neuroscience filters into epistemic and judicial reliability, the two will ultimately find themselves in front of a judge. A pragmatist view of neuroscience will aid and underlie these events. (shrink)

[This download includes the table of contents and chapter 1.] -/- When we praise, blame, punish, or reward people for their actions, we are holding them responsible for what they have done. Common sense tells us that what makes human beings responsible has to do with their minds and, in particular, the relationship between their minds and their actions. Yet the empirical connection is not necessarily obvious. The “guilty mind” is a core concept of criminal law, but if a defendant (...) on trial for murder were found to have serious brain damage, which brain parts or processes would have to be damaged for him to be considered not responsible, or less responsible, for the crime? The authors argue that evidence from neuroscience and the other cognitive sciences can illuminate the nature of responsibility and agency. They go on to offer a novel and comprehensive neuroscientific theory of human responsibility. (shrink)

This volume illustrates to the public, and legal experts, the basic principles of the field of neuroscience, that commonly goes under the name of Neurolaw. First, it illustrates the relationship between neuroscience, natural sciences and social sciences. Furthermore, it highlights numerous problems concerning the fundamental philosophical concepts used by Neurolaw and evaluates the validity of the method and the limits of a neuroscientific approach to the problems of law and justice. The volume explores the possibility of application of these concepts (...) on the fundamentals of the general theory of law and legal dogmatics. It also examines the main problems of Neurolaw in relation to public, private, criminal and procedural law. In conclusion, the book follows a systematic method that makes it an thorough manual for the introduction to Neurolaw. (shrink)

This paper describes the different dimensions of the relation between moral reflection and legislative processes. It discusses some examples of the institutionalisation of moral reflection. It is argued that the relation between ethics and law is still an actual and relevant question. Ethics also has to reflect on its own role in political life. The paper defends the relevance of a theological perspective on the relation between law and ethics. In the last part it is argued that the modality of (...) relation between ethics and law depends on the specific character of social domain. (shrink)

Coursebook on law and neuroscience, including the bearing of neuroscience on criminal law, criminal procedure, and evidence.

Law, often neglected in treatments of the Republic, is essential to the philosopher-kings’ rule. Only law accomplishes the partial divinization of citizens at which philosophical politics aims. Socrates’ interrogation of Thrasymachus and Glaucon reveals law to be a command whereby citizens participate in philosophical knowledge and limit the pleonexia congenital to humanity. Law does so primarily by instilling in souls a true opinion resistant to pleonectic passion, producing a state of political virtue. This primary work is supported by the musical (...) and poetical education, itself shaped by law for the sake of law. Law persuades and compels the soul by appealing to both reason and spiritedness, enabling them to overcome the appetites. The soul’s consequent acceptance of truth and resistance to the passions indeed makes it resemble divinity. In so transforming the citizens through the law, the philosopher-king also unifies the city and makes it happy under his rule. (shrink)

The central philosophical issue confronting neurolaw is whether we can reconcile the conception of ourselves as free, responsible agents with the conception of ourselves as complex physical machines. This book develops and defends an account of free and responsible agency that shows how such reconciliation is possible.

In this paper, I want to explore the question of whether or not there are laws in psychology. Jaegwon Kim has argued (Supervenience and mind. MIT press, Cambridge; 1993; Mind in a physical world. MIT press, Cambridge 1998) that there are no laws in psychology that contain reference to multiply realized kinds, because statements about such kinds fail to be projectible. After reviewing Kim’s argument for this claim, I show how his conclusion hinges on a hidden assumption: that a kind (...) can only feature in a projectible statement if it is defined by an internal physical property. This assumption, however, is false: constrained kinds can feature in projectible statements, and yet they are not defined by any set of internal physical properties. I suggest that many mental terms actually refer to constrained kinds, and give an example from motor neuroscience of a constrained kind that is multiply realizable and “projectible”: the intention to move voluntarily in a specific direction. (shrink)

Neurolaw is a new, rapidly developing area of interdisciplinary research on the meaning and implications of neuroscience for the law and legal practices. In this article three recently published volumes in this field will be reviewed.

Legislation for dementia care needs to be continually rethought, if the rights of older persons and other persons with dementia are to be addressed properly. We propose a theoretical framework for understanding vulnerability and dependency, which enables us to problematize the currently prevailing legal conception of adults as always able — irrespective of health or age — to act autonomously in their everyday lives. Such an approach gives rise to difficult dilemmas when persons with dementia are forced to make decisions (...) on their own about basic living conditions, such as housing and care, without decision-making support. In Sweden, for example, such matters are frequently left to the person him- or herself to decide, often without any assistance from social workers, and with family members serving as caregivers of last resort.Using vulnerability theory as the framework for our discussion, we argue that policymakers should not apply a group-oriented approach (based on factors like age, legal status, or mental capacity) to persons suffering from dementia. The needs of such individuals are as complex and varied as they themselves are. We discuss our findings from an interdisciplinary (law/social work) research project in which we examine the dilemma that social workers face when they are required, under the terms of the Swedish Social Services Act, to determine whether persons with dementia are to be granted support.We argue further that a cross-disciplinary approach — in which vulnerability theory furnishes the framework — opens up for new ways of understanding and developing social welfare law and practice. This, we believe, can help us better address the rights, interests, and needs of people with dementia, of their families, and of professionals in the social welfare system. Finally, many of the problems faced by ageing societies in general can be understood on the basis of such an approach. (shrink)

of (from Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics).

As Alexander D’Entrees observed over forty years ago, the case for natural law “is not an easy one to put clearly and convincingly.” Furthermore, even if one can make the case for natural law in a clear and convincing manner, one should not expect such an argument to be clear and convincing for all time. Instead, the case for natural law must be an ongoing argument, addressing itself perpetually to the needs of the time as these needs shift and change. (...) In short, the case for natural law “must needs appear in a different light according to the angle in time or in place from which it is looked at.” With this precept in mind, I seek to examine Thomas Aquinas’s natural law teaching on the legislation of virtue in light of concerns that are especially acute from the perspective of contemporary liberalism. (shrink)

The prominent contributors provide background information, survey the issues and positions, and take controversial stands from a wide variety of perspectives, including neuroscience and neurology, law and policy, and philosophy and ethics.

Comprehensive and practical handbook on ethical and legal issues affectingGpsand other practitioners.

This book addresses the philosophical questions that arise when neuroscientific research and technology are applied in the legal system. The empirical, practical, ethical, and conceptual issues that Pardo and Patterson seek to redress will deeply influence how we negotiate and implement the fruits of neuroscience in law and policy in the future.

As one of the most massive and successful business sectors, the pharmaceutical industry is a potent force for good in the community, yet its behaviour is frequently questioned: could it serve society at large better than it has done in the recent past? Its own internal ethics, both in business and science, may need a careful reappraisal, as may the extent to which the law - administrative, civil and criminal - succeeds in guiding (and where neccessary contraining) it. The rules (...) of behavior that may be considered to apply to today's pharmaceutical industry have emerged over a very long period and the process goes on. Even the immensely detailed standards for quality, safety and efficacy laid down in drug law and regulation during the second half of the twentieth century have their limitations as tools for ensuring that the public interest is well served. In particular, national and regional regulatory agencies are heavily dependent on industrial data for their decision-making, their standards and competence vary, and even the existing network of agencies does not cover the entire world. What is more there are many areas of law and regulation affecting the industry, concerning for example the pricing of medicines, the conduct of clinical studies, the health protection of workers and concern for the environment. In some fields it is indeed hardly possible to maintain standards through regulation. Professor N.M. Graham Dukes, a physician and lawyer with long term experience in industrial research management, academic study and international drug policy, provides here a powerfully documented analysis into the way this industry thinks, acts, and is viewed, and examines the current trends pointing to change. *Provides a balanced picture of the current role of the pharmaceutical industry in society *Includes indices of conventions, laws, and regulations; as well as judicial and disciplinary cases *This is the only book addressing the legal implications of big pharma activities and ethical standards. (shrink)

The focus of this book is on the epistemological and hermeneutic implications of data science and artificial intelligence for democracy and the Rule of Law. How do the normative effects of automated decision systems or the interventions of robotic fellow 'beings' compare to the legal effect of written and unwritten law? To investigate these questions the book brings together two disciplinary perspectives rarely combined within the framework of one volume. One starts from the perspective of 'code and law' and the (...) other develops from the domain of 'law and literature'. Integrating original analyses of relevant novels or films, the authors discuss how computational technologies challenge traditional forms of legal thought and affect the regulation of human behavior. Thus, pertinent questions are raised about the theoretical assumptions underlying both scientific and legal practice. (shrink)

Advances in medical technology raise new ethical and legal questions which are in turn forcing a reassessment of medical practices and the goals of legislation. This book pays close attention to these questions, bringing together leading scholars to explore a range of topics in this wide ranging collection covering persistent vegetative state, control of fertility, reproductive technologies and the autonomy in the context of medical research practice.

This book examines the controversies surrounding biomedical research in the twenty-first century from a human rights perspective, analyzing the evolution and ...

This volume offers an analysis of ethical concepts based on positive legal principles and court decisions, describing what actually happens in practice, or where there are no precedents available, what is most likely to happen. Broadly, it deals with the wide range of potentially difficult situations in which the community, as represented by the law, may come into conflict with the medical profession.

He notes that parallel to this phenomenon have been developments in the common law of malpractice that give patients a better chance than ever of winning compensation. While these developments benefit patients, Dr. Chapman describes how they have also pointed out a major flaw in malpractice law: the enormous amounts of time and money it takes to bring such cases to court. To overcome these difficulties, Dr. Chapman maintains, the medical profession needs to reconsider the basic concepts on which its (...) ethics rest. No less important is a revision of malpractice law so that it finally begins to serve, fairly and equitably, the purposes for which it originally came into being. Literate, thoughtful, and thought-provoking, Physicians, Law, and Ethics is an important contribution to today's medical care debate. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify the nature and contents of 'civil ethics' and the source of the binding force of its obligations. This ethics should provide the criteria for evaluating the moral validity of social, legal and morally valid law. The article starts with observing that in morally pluralist Western societies civil ethics already exists, and has gradually started to play the role of guiding the law. It is argued that civil ethics should not be conceived as 'civic morals' which (...) is in fact rather 'state ethics', nor as 'public ethics' which is said to reach its perfection when it becomes law, nor as ethics applicable primarily to the basic structure of a society, but instead as a citizens' ethics. Subsequently the paper attempts to show what the contents of this ethics are, and which ethical theory would be able to ground its obligations. (shrink)

This paper connects to Jon Bing’s great vision of an integrated national legal information system. The intention of this paper is to variegate Bing’s vision of an integrated information system by shifting the focus to the lay users, thus to those, who are subject to the law. The modified vision is an integrated information system that supports intelligible access to law for the citizens. This presupposes however an unambiguous and transparent legal system. Accordingly, it is also stressed that intelligent legal (...) knowledge engineering has high potential to increase precision and rationality in law, and hence safeguard the predictability of law and legal certainty. The central hypothesis is that putting the person who is subject to the law at the centre provides more rational reason to aim for the greatest possible precision of law by exploiting the means and technologies of our time than to uphold strategic vagueness. On this basis, the paper proposes the development of a basic set of controllable and justiciable basic legal drafting standards on EU and on national level, and promotes a transparency by design approach for legal knowledge engineering in order to enhance precision, integrity, comprehensibility and accessibility of law. Similarly to Jon Bing’s vision, this modified vision of an integrated legal information systems is, most probably, also likely to remain unfulfilled. However, what would science be without visions and (science) fictions? (shrink)

Introduction: the grey goose -- The origins of civil society and the function of law -- Justice, ownership, and law -- Natural justice and conventional justice -- Justice and the trading order -- Adjudication and interpretation -- Morality, law, and legislation -- Natural law -- Rights -- The force of law -- The authority and legitimacy of law -- Conclusion.

Kant has made an attempt in his Doctrine of Law to show that the principles of natural Law are a priori principles of pure practical reason. He considers this a necessary step towards establishing the obligating force of positive legislation within a legal system. It is not obvious, however, that Law, which recognizes external coercion as a possible incentive for the compliance with its duties, can be reconciled with pure practical reason, which through the categorical imperative commands that one fulfill (...) duty from the idea of duty and so independently of inclination. Accordingly, it is not clear that there is a systematic and necessary connection between Law and morality for Kant and that he has succeeded in his overall objective of justifying positive Law. ;My dissertation is concerned with the question of how, according to Kant, pure practical reason can allow for juridical legislation, a legislation which admits of an incentive other than the idea of duty for the fulfillment of certain duties. I present criticisms of interpretations according to which Law with its external character cannot be reconciled with morality for Kant. I also discuss some interpretations according to which Law with its duties and legislation is justifiable from the point of view of pure practical reason, either as directly derivable from the categorical imperative or as a means for the realization and protection of the individual's moral freedom. I argue that such accounts do not succeed in explaining the possibility of external coercion for pure practical reason. I do maintain, however, that Law is reconcilable with pure practical reason for Kant, and I offer an explanation of how this is so: an examination of the different classes of duties shows that only juridical duties, or perfect duties to others, are such that reason must recongnize for them a kind of constraint other than free self-constraint and therefore must acknowledge the possibility of juridical legislation for these duties. (shrink)

This valuable resource provides academic and student affairs practitioners with the tools to make informed legal and ethical decisions in their college and university contexts. Law is constantly changing and is interpreted differently from campus to campus based on institutional culture and history. This text provides higher education practitioners with tools to anticipate practical and responsible action, engaging readers in anticipatory and reflective practice. In this text, Boettcher and Salinas introduce the Institutional Intelligence Model, a helpful framework that guides practitioners (...) in examining a wide variety of campus issues. Throughout the book, readers can explore perspectives from current practitioners and utilize case studies to examine specific topics including admissions, academics, student living, confidential resources, and graduate student experiences. By using the strategies in this book, practitioners will be equipped to successfully navigate legal and ethical issues on their campuses. This text is ideal for graduate students, student and academic affairs professionals, and those in leadership positions responsible for working with and supporting students and staff teams. (shrink)

This thoroughly updated third edition lays a solid foundation for understanding the intersection of law, ethics and the rights of the patient, in the context of everyday nursing and health care practice.

Health and health care are vitally important to all of us, and academic interest in the law regulating health has, over the last 50 years, become an important field of academic study. An analysis of the development of, changes in, and scope of Health Law and Ethics to date, is both timely and of interest to students and scholars alike, along with an exploration of its likely future development. This work brings together contributions from leading and emerging scholars in the (...) field. Each contributor has been invited to select and analyse a 'leading work', which has for them shed light on the way that Health Law and Ethics has developed. The chapters are both autobiographical, reflecting upon the works that have proved significant to contributors, and also critical analyses of the current state of the field. This collection also includes a specially written Introduction and Conclusion, which critically reflect upon the development of Health Law and Ethics and its likely future developments in the light of the reflections by contributors on their chosen leading works. The book will be of interest to students, teachers and researchers in Health Law and Ethics, as it provides critical discussions and assessments of some of the leading scholarship in the field. (shrink)

The work draws together a rich tapestry of material across many different disciplines, covering the crucial relationship between medicine and law from the early apothecaries to the modern-day general practitioner. It presents an invaluable overview of the subject and offers vital background reading to anyone interested in medico-legal medicine, as well as providing a springboard for students of medicine and law interested in researching the field through its remarkable diversity of reference resources.

Congress's national-security legislation will often require clear and specific congressional authorization before the executive can undertake certain actions. The War Powers Resolution, for example, prohibits any law from authorizing military hostilities unless it "specifically authorizes" them. And the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 required laws to amend FISA or repeal its "exclusive means" provision before they could authorize warrantless electronic surveillance. But efforts to legislate clear-statement regimes in national-security law have failed to induce compliance. The Clinton Administration inferred congressional (...) "authorization" for the 1999 Kosovo War from an appropriations statute that failed to specifically authorize the conflict. And the Bush Administration inferred congressional "authorization" for the NSA surveillance program from ambiguous language in the post-September 11th Authorization to Use Military Force. In both situations, executive-branch lawyers employed expansive theories of implied repeal and constitutional avoidance to evade the codified clear-statement requirements, and Congress and the courts acquiesced to the President's actions. Recent proposals to strengthen the clear-statement requirements in Congress's national-security framework legislation are unlikely to be effective without institutional mechanisms, such as points of order, that can deter future legislators from enacting vague or ambiguous legislation from which the executive might claim implicit congressional "authorization," and that can induce Congress to confront Presidents that act without specific congressional authorization. Simply enacting more narrow or explicit clear-statement requirements, or adding funding restrictions to Congress's framework legislation, fails to counter the aggressive interpretive doctrines that executives of both political parties have used to concoct congressional "authorization" from vague or ambiguous statutory language. (shrink)

To what extent should parents be able to choose the kind of child they have? The unfortunate phrase 'designer baby' has become familiar in debates surrounding reproduction. As a reference to current possibilities the term is misleading, but the phrase may indicate a societal concern of some kind about control and choice in the course of reproduction. Typically, people can choose whether to have a child. They may also have an interest in choosing, to some extent, the conditions under which (...) they do so, such as whether they have a child with a serious disability or disease. The purpose of this book is to explore the difficult and controversial question of the appropriate ethical and legal extent of reproductive autonomy in this context. The book examines ethical, legal and public policy issues in prenatal screening, prenatal diagnosis (PND), selective abortion and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). It explores the ethics of these selection practices and the ability of current ethical guidelines and legal mechanisms, including the law on selective abortion and wrongful birth, to deal with advances in genetic and other knowledge in these areas. Unlike in the United States, in England the relevant law is not inherently rights-based, but the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 inevitably raises questions about the proper scope of reproductive autonomy in this context. The implications of the analysis are considered for the development of relevant law, public policy and ethical guidelines and will be of interest to academics in medical law and ethics, health professionals, lawyers, those working on public policy and students with an interest in these issues. (shrink)

Fornece um panorama sobre os avanços biotecnológicos, dando ênfase aos aspectos jurídicos e éticos do impacto destes na área genética sobre o homem e o meio ambiente.

This special issue of the Modern Law Review addresses a range of key issues - conceptual, ethical, political and practical - arising from the regulatory ...

ABSTRACTThe goal of this paper is to locate indirect legislation within Bentham’s art of legislation, and to distinguish it, as far as possible, from direct legislation. Along the way, some parallels are drawn between indirect legislation on the one hand, and the Nudge theory of Thaler and Sunstein on the other. It will be argued that many expedients categorized by Bentham as indirect legislation are simultaneously exercises of direct legislation. Another set of indirect expedients act on knowledge, and involve efforts (...) to eliminate asymmetries of information between potential offender and potential victim by providing official standards and disseminating a plethora of factual information. Other forms of indirect legislation threaten the coherence of Bentham’s theory of law, firstly by regarding all government actions as exercises in legislation, and secondly by turning the formers of public opinion into legislators. Insofar as some forms of indirect legislation operate by sleight of hand, they conflict with Bentham’s commitment to transparency in the exercise of public power, reflecting a tension between reality and appearance which runs through his thought. (shrink)

Technologies like CRISPR and gene drives are ushering in a new era of genetic engineering, wherein the technical means to modify DNA are cheaper, faster, more accurate, more widely accessible, and with more far-reaching effects than ever before. These cutting-edge technologies raise legal, ethical, cultural, and ecological questions that are so broad and consequential for both human and other-than-human life that they can be difficult to grasp. What is clear, however, is that the power to directly alter not just a (...) singular form of life but also the genetics of entire species and thus the composition of ecosystems is currently both inadequately regulated and undertheorized. In Gene Editing, Law, and the Environment, distinguished scholars from law, the life sciences, philosophy, environmental studies, science and technology studies, animal health, and religious studies examine what is at stake with these new biotechnologies for life and law, both human and beyond. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the rationality of law and legal decision making would be enhanced by a systematic attempt to recognize and respond to the implications of empirical uncertainty for policy making and decision making. Admission of uncertainty about the accuracy of facts and the validity of assumptions relied on to make inferences of fact is commonly avoided in law because it raises the spectre of paralysis of the capacity to decide issues authoritatively. The roots of this short-sighted (...) view are found in primitive mechanical models of relationships in the empirical and social world – those of objective causality and determinism. Insofar as it is believed that if we had sufficient data a clear and unequivocal answer would be available to each question, admission of uncertainty is seen as a sign of insufficiency, incompetence, impotence, and is avoided whenever a decision that must be seen to be based on valid reasons, cannot be avoided. Avoidance of some decisions, duplicity in others, is the result. -/- Decision-making must be restructured to recognize the provisional and context-bound validity and relevance of the models we use to conceptualize and order our understanding of phenomena, and to utilize this awareness as an instrument in the production of legal policies and decisions that will be authoritative precisely because they are honestly accurate and socially responsible. The paper makes a start on such a re-structuring of the legal process by exploring the implications of the observation that if law is to be “just”: 1) legal policy must be based on accurate information and rationally related to social goals; and 2) decisions applying policy to individual fact situations must be based on assumptions that are both relevant and accurate. -/- Reasons for determinations of fact must be given, otherwise the presumption that the trier of fact is “reasonable” is an unconditional licence to use private modes of logic and theories of social and natural science. What is not disclosed cannot be challenged on grounds of invalidity or irrelevance. -/- Use of “objective validity” as a standard to evaluate conclusions made by the trier of fact in contentious cases would only serve to beg all important questions by concealing: 1) fundamental normative conflict, and 2) the limited nature and applicability of many validity claims. -/- Our use of the phrases “undue risk,” “public interest,” “reasonable,” and “necessary,” reflects the weight we choose to give conflicting social values and goals when we must make decisions in relative ignorance of all the consequences. “Objective criteria” are of limited utility in legal decision-making because their social meaning is derivative. Policy generation in the absence of any coherent conceptual-normative framework, use of vague terminology in legislation stating policy, and the absence of rational means to distinguish between individual cases to which decision-makers are required by law to apply policy, make it inevitable that many legal “decisions” made in the guise of determinations of objective fact, are charades, an arbitrary, capricious, intuitive, subjective (and thus private) use of public decision-making power. -/- Law must alter its aspirations and recognize that rational decision-making is a process that can occur only within parameters set by present knowledge and societal preference structures. Only by working with the constraints imposed by these parameters is it possible to achieve “just” decisions. Where no rational basis for differentiating cases exists, “individualized justice” must be avoided and public policy articulated in law applied uniformly to all cases in a class. The terms “reasonable” and “necessary,” used to describe policy and its consequences for specific cases, must be understood to represent provisional societal assessments, attempts to implement societal preference structures in the face of limited knowledge. Heightened awareness of the limited nature of our knowledge can only result in legal policies that have a more explicit normative basis. -/- The volume is is published with an introduction by Michael D. Bayles. It is available in hardback, paperback, and as an ebook. (shrink)

This book discusses the intersection of law and sport and highlights its usefulness to both legal scholars and philosophers of sport. The book will be a valuable resource to Undergraduates, Postgraduates and for those working in the areas of legal philosophy, sports law, and philosophy of sport.

This Chapter studies legislative initiatives around sustainable finance deriving from the Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth (also called ‘Sustainable Finance Action Plan’, ‘Action Plan’ henceforth), published by the European Commission (‘Commission’) in 2018 (Communication 2018/97). I evaluate various instruments proposed in the Action Plan, using a reflexive law approach coupled with insights from business ethics and epistemology (De Bruin, 2013, 2015). I point to the challenges such an approach encounters, and offer suggestions how to address them. Reflexive law approaches to (...) legislation (Farber 1994, Hess 1999, Orts 1994, Farmer & Teubner 1994) acknowledge the limits of law as an instrument to realize social or political goals, and stress the need to encourage self-reflection and transparency among stakeholders through procedural rather than ‘command-and-control’ legislation. Typical reflexive law instruments involve disclosure, reporting, and labelling. Examining the Action Plan, I show that the main legislative instruments it puts forward are reflexive. I use empirical and theoretical work that challenges the effectiveness of some of these instruments. Drawing on recent work from behavioural economics I suggest that these problems may be overcome once we integrate more fully in reflexive law what it means for people ‘reflectively’ to recruit evidence and gather knowledge, and once we appreciate the value knowledge has over and above mere belief. My argument here is not so much to the effect that more interventionist regulatory tools are needed (they are dearly needed, but that is not the point here). Rather I argue that once a regulator opts for a reflexive law approach, a richer notion of information should be deployed. I call this ‘epistemic’ instead of ‘reflexive’ law. The Chapter gives some background information about the Action Plan, introduces the core ideas of reflexive law, shows how the Action Plan is reflexive law par excellence, considers the challenges, and offers a few modest suggestions. (shrink)