Propositionalism is the view that the contents of intentional attitudes have a propositional structure. Objectualism opposes propositionalism in allowing the contents of these attitudes to be ordinary objects or properties. Philosophers including Talbot Brewer, Paul Thagard, Michelle Montague, and Alex Grzankowski attack propositionalism about such attitudes as desire, liking, and fearing. This article defends propositionalism, mainly on grounds that it better supports psychological explanations.

Neil Levy presents a new theory of freedom and responsibility. He defends a particular account of consciousness--the global workspace view--and argues that consciousness plays an especially important role in action. There are good reasons to think that the naïve assumption, that consciousness is needed for moral responsibility, is in fact true.

Consider two deeply appealing thoughts: first, that we experience external particulars, and second, that what it’s like to have an experience – the phenomenal character of an experience – is somehow independent of external particulars. The first thought is readily captured by phenomenal particularism, the view that external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. The second thought is readily captured by phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of phenomenal character. -/- Here I (...) show that a novel version of phenomenal generalism can capture both thoughts in a satisfying fashion. Along the way, I reveal severe problems facing phenomenal particularism and also shed light on the mental kinds under which experiences fall. (shrink)

I provide a positive expressivist account of the permissibility of ‘standing one’s ground’ in some cases of moral conflict, based in part on an illustrative analogy with political disputes. This account suffices to undermine Enoch’s recent argument against expressivism.

Asks how exactly perceptual experiences do provide reasons for empirical beliefs. My answer is that they furnish the subject with certain essentially experiential demonstrative contents—‘that is thus’ —his grasp of which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. For a person's grasp of such contents, as referring to the mind‐independent objects that they do, and predicating the mind‐independent properties that they do, essentially involves his appreciation of them as the joint upshot of the way things are anyway, (...) in the mind‐independent world around him, and his current point of view upon them and other relevant circumstances of perception. That is to say, he necessarily understands that his current apprehension that things are thus is in part due to the very fact that they are. He therefore recognizes the relevant content ashis apprehension of the facts, his epistemic opennessto the way things mind‐independently are out there. (shrink)

Particular reasoning is arguably the most common type of legal reasoning. Neil MacCormick proposed that, in a legal context, justifiable particular reasoning has to be universalizable. This paper aims to: investigate MacCormick’s thesis; explain how a particular can ever be universal by drawing inspiration from Scott Brewer’s formula on reasoning by analogy; further comprehend MacCormick’s thesis by considering some of the arguments advanced by its opponents; use the ‘pilot-judgement procedure’ developed by the European Court of Human Rights as (...) an example to illustrate the relevance of the universalizable particular thesis in today’s legal practices. (shrink)

This article draws attention to a pattern of development within science and other intellectual research communities that has received virtually no mention. We propose that subsequent dominance of a research community by a figure responsible for significant innovation often delays progress in the field. During the period in which the revolutionary continues to influence research in a community, far too frequently the effect is to freeze progress within the limited directions which the revolutionary sanctions.

In The Varieties of Reference (1982), Gareth Evans claims that considerations having to do with certain basic ways we have of gaining knowledge of our own physical states and properties provide "the most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self" (220). In this chapter, I start with a discussion and evaluation of Evans' own argument, which is, I think, in the end unconvincing. Then I raise the possibility of a more direct application of similar considerations in defence of (...) common sense anti-Cartesianism. Progress in this direction depends upon a far more psychologically informed understanding of normal and abnormal bodily awareness than is generally found in philosophical discussions of these issues. In the context of my attempt at some such understanding, I go on to assess the potential of this more direct line of argument. (shrink)

Dewey continues to offer arguments that remain powerful on the need to break down the divisions between ‘academic’ and ‘vocational’ in terms of his specific theory of knowledge. Dewey's writings are used to argue that a democratic curriculum needs to challenge such divisions to encompass the many forms of knowledge necessary in the contemporary classroom. Gandin and Apple's investigation of community participation (Orçamento Participativo or Participatory Budgeting) in the curriculum of the Citizen School in Porto Alegre, Brazil, will be explored (...) as an example of democratic structures informing educational planning. The work of Paul Hirst, Atli Harđarson and Chris Jane Brough is analysed regarding the issue of curriculum aims and student negotiation. Dewey's emphasis on learning as a collective enterprise will resonate here. Brough offers innovative research on student-centred curriculum integration that suggests even very young children are able to participate in debate over their own learning. Hirst and Harđarson provide contrasting views on the issue of curriculum aims—Hirst arguing that a curriculum cannot exist without definable aims while Harđarson challenges the very notion of settled aims if students are to be reflexive regarding their education. The article also refers to the work of Alexander on the use of dialogic questioning in the classroom. Such questioning, it is suggested, enhances and encourages collaborative forms of enquiry necessary for a democratic curriculum through discussion between teachers, students and other stakeholders. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

While nostalgia has been the subject of some philosophical treatment (especially in the phenomenological tradition), I think new findings in the psychological literature and new historical investigations call for a re-interrogation of this phenomenon. My argument is that philosophical reflection, as well as findings from empirical psychology, gives us strong reasons to think that: (1) Nostalgic experiences can be divided between typical nostalgic experiences that are positive and strengthen our sense of narrative identity by connecting us to an idealized past (...) that we have a sense that we have lived. These typical nostalgia experiences are affectively bittersweet (though more sweet than bitter) and, as psychological literature attests, seem to arise in the wake of a crisis—and from this crisis, nostalgia attempts to make us feel at home in the world again. (2) In contrast to typical forms of nostalgia, there are what I call atypical forms of nostalgia; in these cases, the experiences are often negative, and they connect us not to a past that we have lived but to one that we wished to have lived. This form of nostalgia leads not to a strengthening of narrative identity but a weakening of it, and a feeling of grief for the world in which we could not belong. (shrink)

Caring for the competent, fragile, elderly patient at the end of life is becoming increasingly challenging. This case explores several ethical areas of concern that arise when caring for patients who have written durable powers of attorney for health care decisions and face life or death choices. Areas covered are informed consent with the elderly patient, the family's right to be involved in decision-making, futility of treatment, and the nurse's role as patient advocate during times of difficult decision-making. Recommendations for (...) increased nursing intervention during these times are incorporated. Les soins des personnes âgés, fragiles mais toujours compétentes et dont la vie touche à sa fin, posent des problèmes de plus en plus urgents. Cet article discute de plusieurs aspets qui se manifestent dans les soins des malades ayant écrit des mandats concernants leurs soins et qui doivent maintenant prendre des décisions graves concernant la vie ou la mort. Les aspets dont il s'agit dans cet article sont: le consentement informé des personnes âgés: le droit de la famille de participer à la décision; les traitements inutiles; et le rôle des infirmiers/ères pour plaider leur cause pendant des moments difficles de prises de décisions. Des recommendations pour de plus importantes interventions infirmières sont comprises. Die Pflege der geistig kompetenten aber hinfälligen Personen im hohen Alter stellt immer grössere Anforderungen. Dieser Artikel untersucht verschiedene ethische Aspekte, die bei der Pflege von Patienten, die eine schriftliche Vollmacht über medizinische Behandlung ausgestellt haben für ihre Pflege und jetzt Entscheidungen über Leben oder Tod treffen müssen. Der Artikel umfasst folgende Bereiche: informierten Zustimmung des Patienten, das Mitbestimmungsrecht der Familie, Zwecklosigkeit der Behandlung, und die Rolle des Pflegepersonals als Fürsprecher der Patienten bei schwierigen Entscheidungen. Empfehlungen für eine grössere Beteiligung oder Mitbestimmung des Pflegepersonals in diesen Fällen sind eingeschlossen. (shrink)

Rationalist accounts of self-knowledge are motivated in important part by the claim that only by looking to our reasons to discover our beliefs and desires are we active in relation to them and only thereby do we take responsibility for them. These kinds of account seem to predict that self-knowledge generated using third-personal methods or analogues of these methods will tend to undermine the capacity to exercise self-control. In this light, the insistence by treatment programs that addicts acknowledge that they (...) are addicts seems puzzling. I argue that because addicts—and perhaps ordinary akratics, to some extent at least, too—are vulnerable to losing control of their actions via losing control over their beliefs, advising them to look to their reasons for actions is counterproductive and facilitates loss of control. In contrast, an insistence on what I call impersonal self-knowledge, knowledge of some of one's states and dispositions generated by third-personal means, may help to reestablish control. (shrink)

Time passes, and the inexorability of its passing has deep emotional significance. One of the main themes of this thesis involves an investigation into the metaphysical nature of the passage of time. What sort of metaphysical account of passage should be given? And do our emotional responses to temporal passage have metaphysical implications? The other main theme of the thesis is the issue of the metaphysics of persistence. When a thing is present at more than one time, what is the (...) metaphysical underpinning of its persistence? Some subsidiary issues, which are nevertheless important in their own right, are also discussed. There are interesting connections between the issues of persistence and these further issues, which include the nature of vagueness, and the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. (shrink)

The aim here is to describe how to complete the constructive logicist program, in the author’s book Anti-Realism and Logic, of deriving all the Peano-Dedekind postulates for arithmetic within a theory of natural numbers that also accounts for their applicability in counting finite collections of objects. The axioms still to be derived are those for addition and multiplication. Frege did not derive them in a fully explicit, conceptually illuminating way. Nor has any neo-Fregean done so.

This book rethinks the discussion of sport as a cinematic subject. Arguing for the vitality of the sports film as distinctively 'modern' genre, the book looks at its innovative potential to capture twentieth- and twenty-first-century sport in all its complexity. Written in an accessible style and illustrated throughout, the book integrates work and ideas from film studies with thinking from sports psychology, philosophy, data theory and ecocriticism. In its detailed analyses of a wide-ranging group of films, the book shows how (...) film, from fictional works to biopics to experimental documentaries, can illuminate individual sporting experience, as well as sport's wider place in modern life. (shrink)

Jerome Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder is an influential hybrid of naturalist and normative theories. In order to conclude that a condition is a disorder, according to the HDA, one must determine both that it results from a failure of a physical or psychological mechanism to perform its natural function and that it is harmful. In a recent issue of this journal, I argued that the HDA entails implausible judgments about which disorders there are and how they are (...) individuated. The same arguments apply to other views that incorporate a harm criterion. More recently, David G. Limbaugh has modified the HDA by providing a novel account of the way in which a disorder must be harmful. Here, I briefly review the relevant issues and then critically assess Limbaugh’s account. I argue in the end that Limbaugh’s revisions do not succeed in making accounts like the HDA more attractive. (shrink)

A liberal state based on propositions about the desirability of individual autonomy is bound to be committed to educational programmes which are incompatible with the beliefs and values of parents from non- liberal religious and cultural minorities. One response to this has been support for public funding of those separate schools which offer an education culturally congruent with the values of parents in non- liberal communities. To resolve the potential threat to liberal individualist ideals a condition of support for individual (...) autonomy is usually attached to liberal acceptance of this solution. This condition is in conflict with the motivation which underpins the setting up of such schools. Despite the growing literature on this debate surprisingly little attention has been given to the work of Isaiah Berlin. This article draws on Berlin's version of liberalism developed within the context of a commitment to value pluralism in order to seek clarification of this liberal dilemma. (shrink)

This is a reply to Timothy Williamson ’s paper ‘Tennant’s Troubles’. It defends against Williamson ’s objections the anti-realist’s knowability principle based on the author’s ‘local’ restriction strategy involving Cartesian propositions, set out in The Taming of the True. Williamson ’s purported Fitchian reductio, involving the unknown number of books on his table, is analyzed in detail and shown to be fallacious. Williamson ’s attempt to cause problems for the anti-realist by means of a supposed rigid designator generates a contradiction (...) with arithmetic right away, upon instantiating the obviously relevant theorem that every natural number is provably odd or provably even. The paper also explains and formulates a globally restricted knowability principle, which likewise blocks the attempted reductio. (shrink)

We bring together some facts about the weak pigeonhole principle from bounded arithmetic, complexity theory, cryptography and abstract model theory. We characterize the models of arithmetic in which WPHP fails as those which are determined by an initial segment and prove a conditional separation result in bounded arithmetic, that PV + lies strictly between PV and S21 in strength, assuming that the cryptosystem RSA is secure.

ABSTRACTThe growing reliance on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in armed conflict raises important questions regarding our conception of both war and the warrior’s place within it. This includes the question of whether the degree to which UAVs mitigate physical risk has imperilled the ethical status of the operator. For those that view this tension as resolvable, reference is frequently made to the eventual acceptance of previous categories of “unfair” weaponry. This article engages with this historical context, identifying the role of physical (...) risk within the historical and contemporary warrior ethos. It first outlines that exposure to personal, physical risk has long been regarded as a crucial element in the ethos-based conception of legitimate violence in war. As will be further shown, however, the warrior ethos is an evolving framework, one that increasingly considers factors such as restraint and professionalism in determining ethical status. The adaptive quality of this ethos is a key explanatory fa... (shrink)

Suppose that wc identify physical objccts, in thc first instance, by extension, as things like stones, tables, trees, people and other animals: the persisting macroscopic constituents of the world in which we live. Of course, there is a substantive question of what it is to be y such things in the way relevant to categorization as a physical object. So this can hardly be the final word on the matter. Still, it is equally clear that this gives us all a (...) perfectly respectable initial conception of what we are talking about; and it is an entirely adequate starting point for what follows. (shrink)

We explore the consequences, for logical system-building, of taking seriously the aim of having irredundant rules of inference, and a preference for proofs of stronger results over proofs of weaker ones. This leads one to reconsider the structural rules of REFLEXIVITY, THINNING, and CUT. REFLEXIVITY survives in the minimally necessary form $\varphi:\varphi$. Proofs have to get started. CUT is subject to a CUT-elimination theorem, to the effect that one can always make do without applications of CUT. So CUT is redundant, (...) and should not be a rule of the system. CUT-elimination, however, in the context of the usual forms of logical rules, requires the presence, in the system, of THINNING. But THINNING, it turns out, is not really necessary. Provided only that one liberalizes the statement of certain logical rules in an appropriate way, one can make do without CUT or THINNING. From the methodological point of view of this study, the logical rules ought to be framed in this newly liberalized form. These liberalized logical rules determine the system of core logic. Given any intuitionistic Gentzen proof of $\Delta:\varphi$, one can determine from it a Core proof of some subsequent of $\Delta:\varphi$. Given any classical Gentzen proof of $\Delta:\varphi$, one can determine from it a classical Core proof of some subsequent of $\Delta:\varphi$. In both cases the Core proof is of a result at least as strong as that of the Gentzen proof; and the only structural rule used is $\varphi:\varphi$. (shrink)

Our regimentation of Goodman and Myhill’s proof of Excluded Middle revealed among its premises a form of Choice and an instance of Separation.Here we revisit Zermelo’s requirement that the separating property be definite. The instance that Goodman and Myhill used is not constructively warranted. It is that principle, and not Choice alone, that precipitates Excluded Middle.Separation in various axiomatizations of constructive set theory is examined. We conclude that insufficient critical attention has been paid to how those forms of Separation fail, (...) in light of the Goodman–Myhill result, to capture a genuinely constructive notion of set. (shrink)

I reformulate the AGM-account of contraction (which would yield an account also of revision). The reformulation involves using introduction and elimination rules for relational notions. Then I investigate the extent to which the two main methods of partial meet contraction and safe contraction can be employed for theories closed under intuitionistic consequence.

ABSTRACTHistorians have portrayed the papal bull Coeli et terrae as a significant turning point in the history of the Catholic Church’s censorship of astrology. They argue that this bull was intended to prohibit the idea that the stars could naturally incline humans towards future actions, but also had the effect of preventing the discussion of other forms of natural astrology including those useful to medicine, agriculture, and navigation. The bull, therefore, threatened to overturn principles established by Thomas Aquinas, which not (...) only justified long-standing astrological practices, but also informed the Roman Inquisition’s attitude towards this art. The promulgation of the bull has been attributed to the ‘rigour’ of the incumbent pope, Sixtus V. In this article I revise our understanding of this bull in two ways. First, I reconsider the Inquisition’s attitude towards astrology in the mid-sixteenth century, arguing that its members promoted a limited form of Thomist astrology that did not permit the doctrine of inclination. Second, using Robert Bellarmine’s unpublished lectures discussing Aquinas’s views of astrology, I suggest that this attitude was common during the sixteenth century, and may have been caused by the crisis of Renaissance astrology precipitated by the work of Giovanni Pico. (shrink)

The one-page 1978 informal proof of Goodman and Myhill is regimented in a weak constructive set theory in free logic. The decidability of identities in general (⁠|$a\!=\!b\vee\neg a\!=\!b$|⁠) is derived; then, of sentences in general (⁠|$\psi\vee\neg\psi$|⁠). Martin-Löf’s and Bell’s receptions of the latter result are discussed. Regimentation reveals the form of Choice used in deriving Excluded Middle. It also reveals an abstraction principle that the proof employs. It will be argued that the Goodman–Myhill result does not provide the constructive set (...) theorist with a dispositive reason for not adopting (full) Choice. (shrink)