This book rethinks the discussion of sport as a cinematic subject. Arguing for the vitality of the sports film as distinctively 'modern' genre, the book looks at its innovative potential to capture twentieth- and twenty-first-century sport in all its complexity. Written in an accessible style and illustrated throughout, the book integrates work and ideas from film studies with thinking from sports psychology, philosophy, data theory and ecocriticism. In its detailed analyses of a wide-ranging group of films, the book shows how (...) film, from fictional works to biopics to experimental documentaries, can illuminate individual sporting experience, as well as sport's wider place in modern life. (shrink)

Neil Levy presents a new theory of freedom and responsibility. He defends a particular account of consciousness--the global workspace view--and argues that consciousness plays an especially important role in action. There are good reasons to think that the naïve assumption, that consciousness is needed for moral responsibility, is in fact true.

The widespread conviction that we are living in a post-truth era rests on two claims: that a large number of people believe things that are clearly false, and that their believing these things reflects a lack of respect for truth. In reality, however, fewer people believe clearly false things than surveys or social media suggest. In particular, relatively few people believe things that are widely held to be bizarre. Moreover, accepting false beliefs does not reflect a lack of respect for (...) truth. Almost everyone’s beliefs are explained by rationally warranted trust in some sources rather than others. This allows us to explain why people have false beliefs. (shrink)

This article draws attention to a pattern of development within science and other intellectual research communities that has received virtually no mention. We propose that subsequent dominance of a research community by a figure responsible for significant innovation often delays progress in the field. During the period in which the revolutionary continues to influence research in a community, far too frequently the effect is to freeze progress within the limited directions which the revolutionary sanctions.

Rationalist accounts of self-knowledge are motivated in important part by the claim that only by looking to our reasons to discover our beliefs and desires are we active in relation to them and only thereby do we take responsibility for them. These kinds of account seem to predict that self-knowledge generated using third-personal methods or analogues of these methods will tend to undermine the capacity to exercise self-control. In this light, the insistence by treatment programs that addicts acknowledge that they (...) are addicts seems puzzling. I argue that because addicts—and perhaps ordinary akratics, to some extent at least, too—are vulnerable to losing control of their actions via losing control over their beliefs, advising them to look to their reasons for actions is counterproductive and facilitates loss of control. In contrast, an insistence on what I call impersonal self-knowledge, knowledge of some of one's states and dispositions generated by third-personal means, may help to reestablish control. (shrink)

The aim here is to describe how to complete the constructive logicist program, in the author’s book Anti-Realism and Logic, of deriving all the Peano-Dedekind postulates for arithmetic within a theory of natural numbers that also accounts for their applicability in counting finite collections of objects. The axioms still to be derived are those for addition and multiplication. Frege did not derive them in a fully explicit, conceptually illuminating way. Nor has any neo-Fregean done so.

Jerome Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder is an influential hybrid of naturalist and normative theories. In order to conclude that a condition is a disorder, according to the HDA, one must determine both that it results from a failure of a physical or psychological mechanism to perform its natural function and that it is harmful. In a recent issue of this journal, I argued that the HDA entails implausible judgments about which disorders there are and how they are (...) individuated. The same arguments apply to other views that incorporate a harm criterion. More recently, David G. Limbaugh has modified the HDA by providing a novel account of the way in which a disorder must be harmful. Here, I briefly review the relevant issues and then critically assess Limbaugh’s account. I argue in the end that Limbaugh’s revisions do not succeed in making accounts like the HDA more attractive. (shrink)

A liberal state based on propositions about the desirability of individual autonomy is bound to be committed to educational programmes which are incompatible with the beliefs and values of parents from non- liberal religious and cultural minorities. One response to this has been support for public funding of those separate schools which offer an education culturally congruent with the values of parents in non- liberal communities. To resolve the potential threat to liberal individualist ideals a condition of support for individual (...) autonomy is usually attached to liberal acceptance of this solution. This condition is in conflict with the motivation which underpins the setting up of such schools. Despite the growing literature on this debate surprisingly little attention has been given to the work of Isaiah Berlin. This article draws on Berlin's version of liberalism developed within the context of a commitment to value pluralism in order to seek clarification of this liberal dilemma. (shrink)

Cushman argues that the function of rationalization is to attribute mental representations to ourselves, thereby making these representations available for future planning. I argue that such attribution is often not necessary and sometimes maladaptive. I suggest a different explanation of rationalization: making representations available to other agents, to facilitate cooperation, transmission, and the ratchet effect that underlies cumulative cultural evolution.

This is a reply to Timothy Williamson ’s paper ‘Tennant’s Troubles’. It defends against Williamson ’s objections the anti-realist’s knowability principle based on the author’s ‘local’ restriction strategy involving Cartesian propositions, set out in The Taming of the True. Williamson ’s purported Fitchian reductio, involving the unknown number of books on his table, is analyzed in detail and shown to be fallacious. Williamson ’s attempt to cause problems for the anti-realist by means of a supposed rigid designator generates a contradiction (...) with arithmetic right away, upon instantiating the obviously relevant theorem that every natural number is provably odd or provably even. The paper also explains and formulates a globally restricted knowability principle, which likewise blocks the attempted reductio. (shrink)

We bring together some facts about the weak pigeonhole principle from bounded arithmetic, complexity theory, cryptography and abstract model theory. We characterize the models of arithmetic in which WPHP fails as those which are determined by an initial segment and prove a conditional separation result in bounded arithmetic, that PV + lies strictly between PV and S21 in strength, assuming that the cryptosystem RSA is secure.

What explains the context sensitivity of some (apparent) beliefs? Why, for example, do religious beliefs appear to control behaviour in some contexts but not others? Cases like this are heterogeneous, and we may require a matching heterogeneity of explanations, ranging over their contents, the attitudes of agents and features of the environment. In this paper, I put forward a hypothesis of the last kind. I argue that some beliefs (religious and non-religious) are coupled to cues, which either trigger an internal (...) representation or even partially constitute the beliefs. I show that such coupling will give rise to the context-sensitivity, without entailing that religious believers take a different attitude to belief content. (shrink)

“The Descartes Lectures” is a biennial event at Tilburg University that invites a distinguished philosopher to deliver a series of three lectures, each followed by commentaries from other experts in the field. In 2022, Tilburg University had the honor of hosting Cheshire Calhoun for a series of talks on the important philosophical question of what it means to be a responsible person. The commentators for the lectures were Gunnar Björnsson, Jules Holroyd, and Heidi Maibom. This book is a compilation of (...) the material of Calhoun’s lectures, the commentaries by Björnsson, Holroyd, and Maibom, as well as Calhoun’s replies to their critiques. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe growing reliance on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in armed conflict raises important questions regarding our conception of both war and the warrior’s place within it. This includes the question of whether the degree to which UAVs mitigate physical risk has imperilled the ethical status of the operator. For those that view this tension as resolvable, reference is frequently made to the eventual acceptance of previous categories of “unfair” weaponry. This article engages with this historical context, identifying the role of physical (...) risk within the historical and contemporary warrior ethos. It first outlines that exposure to personal, physical risk has long been regarded as a crucial element in the ethos-based conception of legitimate violence in war. As will be further shown, however, the warrior ethos is an evolving framework, one that increasingly considers factors such as restraint and professionalism in determining ethical status. The adaptive quality of this ethos is a key explanatory fa... (shrink)

We explore the consequences, for logical system-building, of taking seriously the aim of having irredundant rules of inference, and a preference for proofs of stronger results over proofs of weaker ones. This leads one to reconsider the structural rules of REFLEXIVITY, THINNING, and CUT. REFLEXIVITY survives in the minimally necessary form $\varphi:\varphi$. Proofs have to get started. CUT is subject to a CUT-elimination theorem, to the effect that one can always make do without applications of CUT. So CUT is redundant, (...) and should not be a rule of the system. CUT-elimination, however, in the context of the usual forms of logical rules, requires the presence, in the system, of THINNING. But THINNING, it turns out, is not really necessary. Provided only that one liberalizes the statement of certain logical rules in an appropriate way, one can make do without CUT or THINNING. From the methodological point of view of this study, the logical rules ought to be framed in this newly liberalized form. These liberalized logical rules determine the system of core logic. Given any intuitionistic Gentzen proof of $\Delta:\varphi$, one can determine from it a Core proof of some subsequent of $\Delta:\varphi$. Given any classical Gentzen proof of $\Delta:\varphi$, one can determine from it a classical Core proof of some subsequent of $\Delta:\varphi$. In both cases the Core proof is of a result at least as strong as that of the Gentzen proof; and the only structural rule used is $\varphi:\varphi$. (shrink)

It is by now well established that the fact that an action or aconsequence was inevitable does not excuse the agent from responsibilityfor it, so long as the counterfactual intervention which ensures thatthe act will take place is not actualized. However, in this paper I demonstrate that there is one exception to this principle: when theagent is aware of the counterfactual intervener and the role she wouldplay in some alternative scenario, she might be excused, despite the fact that in the (...) actual scenario she acts, as we say, of her own freewill. I illustrate this contention by way of a critique of Fischer andRavizza''s well-known account of responsibility for consequences. (shrink)

Our regimentation of Goodman and Myhill’s proof of Excluded Middle revealed among its premises a form of Choice and an instance of Separation.Here we revisit Zermelo’s requirement that the separating property be definite. The instance that Goodman and Myhill used is not constructively warranted. It is that principle, and not Choice alone, that precipitates Excluded Middle.Separation in various axiomatizations of constructive set theory is examined. We conclude that insufficient critical attention has been paid to how those forms of Separation fail, (...) in light of the Goodman–Myhill result, to capture a genuinely constructive notion of set. (shrink)

I reformulate the AGM-account of contraction (which would yield an account also of revision). The reformulation involves using introduction and elimination rules for relational notions. Then I investigate the extent to which the two main methods of partial meet contraction and safe contraction can be employed for theories closed under intuitionistic consequence.

If Knobe is right that ordinary judgments are normatively suffused, how do scientists free themselves from these influences? I suggest that because science is distributed and externalized, its claims can be manipulated in ways that allow normative influences to be hived off. This allows scientists to deploy concepts which are not normatively suffused. I suggest that there are good reasons to identify these normatively neutral concepts with the folk concepts.

ABSTRACTHistorians have portrayed the papal bull Coeli et terrae as a significant turning point in the history of the Catholic Church’s censorship of astrology. They argue that this bull was intended to prohibit the idea that the stars could naturally incline humans towards future actions, but also had the effect of preventing the discussion of other forms of natural astrology including those useful to medicine, agriculture, and navigation. The bull, therefore, threatened to overturn principles established by Thomas Aquinas, which not (...) only justified long-standing astrological practices, but also informed the Roman Inquisition’s attitude towards this art. The promulgation of the bull has been attributed to the ‘rigour’ of the incumbent pope, Sixtus V. In this article I revise our understanding of this bull in two ways. First, I reconsider the Inquisition’s attitude towards astrology in the mid-sixteenth century, arguing that its members promoted a limited form of Thomist astrology that did not permit the doctrine of inclination. Second, using Robert Bellarmine’s unpublished lectures discussing Aquinas’s views of astrology, I suggest that this attitude was common during the sixteenth century, and may have been caused by the crisis of Renaissance astrology precipitated by the work of Giovanni Pico. (shrink)

The one-page 1978 informal proof of Goodman and Myhill is regimented in a weak constructive set theory in free logic. The decidability of identities in general (⁠|$a\!=\!b\vee\neg a\!=\!b$|⁠) is derived; then, of sentences in general (⁠|$\psi\vee\neg\psi$|⁠). Martin-Löf’s and Bell’s receptions of the latter result are discussed. Regimentation reveals the form of Choice used in deriving Excluded Middle. It also reveals an abstraction principle that the proof employs. It will be argued that the Goodman–Myhill result does not provide the constructive set (...) theorist with a dispositive reason for not adopting (full) Choice. (shrink)

Ausonio Marras has argued that Jaegwon Kim's principle of explanatory exclusion depends on an implausibly strong interpretation of explanatory realism that should be rejected because it leads to an extensional criterion of individuation for explanations. I examine the role explanatory realism plays in Kim's justification for the exclusion principle and explore two ways in which Kim can respond to Marras's criticism. The first involves separating criteria for explanatory truth from questions of explanatory adequacy, while the second appeals to Kim's fine-grained (...) theory of events. I argue that the first response is unconvincing on its own but when coupled with the second might provide a viable way for Kim to avoid Marras's criticism. However, I show that the second strategy is weak from a polemical point of view because Kim's theory of events already assumes what the principle of explanatory exclusion was introduced to establish: the falsity of nonreductive physicalism. (shrink)

This is in part a reply to a recent work of Vidal-Rosset, which expresses various mistaken beliefs about Core Logic. Rebutting these leads us further to identify, and argue against, some mistaken core beliefs about logic.

1. This paper is an informal exposition of a model-theoretic semantics for knowledge and belief set out in full detail else where. Considerations of space and simplicity prevent any recapitulation of tracts of formal definitions. My aim is simply to inform the reader of the alleged existence of one “new direction” in semantics, and to direct him to the original source for its detailed development. I shall explain certain self-imposed limitations on the scope and adequacy conditions of this treatment. Then, (...) in subsequent discussion of the semantical problems which I claim to have treated, I shall try to impart the flavour of the technical methods involved. (shrink)

We investigate the theories of linear algebra, which were originally defined to study the question of whether commutativity of matrix inverses has polysize Frege proofs. We give sentences separating quantified versions of these theories, and define a fragment in which we can interpret a weak theory V 1 of bounded arithmetic and carry out polynomial time reasoning about matrices - for example, we can formalize the Gaussian elimination algorithm. We show that, even if we restrict our language, proves the commutativity (...) of inverses. (shrink)