Through the ratification and implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Japan’s policy towards people with disabilities and their rights has moved away from its traditional focus on economic and socio-cultural rights (known as “social rights”) to encompass civil and political rights (or “liberty rights”). Several factors have contributed to this development: firstly, the efforts of the Japanese disability rights movement, which benefited in 2009 from a favorable change of government when the coalition comprising the Liberal (...) Democratic Party and the New Kōmeitō was defeated in the elections by the Democratic Party of Japan; and secondly, the judicial developments surrounding the Law on Election to Public Office, as well as the support given to the victims of the former Eugenic Protection Law. As the first findings of the 2022 survey of Japan by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities suggest, a better balance in the approach to social and liberty rights will be essential if Japan is to meet the main challenges posed by its disability policy. (shrink)

BackgroundThis essay provides an ethical and conceptual argument for the use of informed consent prior to the diagnosis of brain death. It is meant to enable the family to make critical end-of-life decisions, particularly withdrawal of life support system and organ donation, before brain death is diagnosed, as opposed to the current practice of making such decisions after the diagnosis of death. The recent tragic case of a 13-year-old brain-dead patient in California who was maintained on a ventilator for over (...) 2 years illustrates how such a consent would have made a crucial difference.MethodsConceptual, philosophical, and ethical analysis.ResultsI first consider a conceptual justification for the use of consent for certain non-beneficial and unwanted medical diagnoses. I suggest that the diagnosis of brain death falls into this category for some patients. Because the diagnostic process of brain death lacks the transparency of traditional death determination, has a unique epistemic structure and a complex risk-benefit profile which differs markedly from case to case, and presents conflicts of interest for physicians and society, I argue that pre-diagnostic counseling and informed consent should be part of the diagnostic process. This approach can be termed as “allow cardiac death”, whose parallel logic with “allow natural death” is discussed. I also discuss potential negative impacts on organ donation and health care cost from this proposal and offer possible mitigation. I show that the pre-diagnostic counseling can improve the possibility for well-thought-out decisions regarding organ donation and terminating life-support system in cases of hopeless prognosis. This approach differs conceptually from the pluralism of the definition of death, such as those in New Jersey and Japan, and it upholds the Uniform Determination of Death Act.ConclusionsMy intention is not to provide an instant panacea for the ongoing impasse of the brain death debate, but to point to a novel conceptual ground for a more pragmatic, and more patient- and family-centered approach. By enabling the family to consent to or decline the diagnostic process of brain death, but not to choose the definition of death, it upholds the current legal definition of death. (shrink)

This paper investigates the semantics of measure phrases in Japanese. Based on new data, we argue that the interpretation of measure phrases in Japanese is sensitive to scale structure such that (i) measure phrases are introduced by a degree morpheme that selects only for gradable predicates whose scale contains a minimal element (i.e., a lower closed scale) and (ii) violations to this restriction are repaired via coercion, which forces a comparative interpretation with a contextually determined standard and hence a minimal (...) element. We compare the Japanese facts to data in other languages and argue that the requirement of having a minimal element is not specific to Japanese, but universal. We show that languages may vary in how they deal with potential violations of this universal constraint, including coercion of a contextually recoverable derived minimal element (Japanese), ungrammaticality (e.g., Spanish, Korean, Russian), and a hybrid system of ungrammaticality for some adjectives and allowed constraint violation for others (e.g., English, German, Italian). (shrink)

In this paper I investigate the possibility of a dictatorship in the context of Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem. Preliminarily, some propositions about Harsanyi's Theorem are presented using an alternative principle that I name Quasi-strong Pareto, which is the latter part of Strong Pareto. Then I define dictatorship as a requirement that social preference agrees with a dictator's preference or those of members of dictatorial group even if their preferences strictly contradict those of all other people in the society. Conclusively, although (...) in each version of Harsanyi's Theorem with Pareto Indifference, Weak Preference Pareto or Weak Pareto the social utility function may have a form of dictatorship, however if individuals' vNM utility functions are all 'individualistic' and Quasi-strong Pareto is satisfied, then the dictatorship is excluded. (shrink)

This chapter traces the evolution of Japan's systems of household and land registration from c.1600 to the period of early Meiji reforms in the 1870s and 1880s, with due attention to the distinction between a system designed by the state and local forms of registration practice. In the section on the pre-Meiji period, one such local practice of having people ‘disowned’ and its consequence — registerlessness — is examined. The section on the Meiji reforms and the section that follows turn (...) to the issue of continuity and discontinuity, and the question of whether any progress was made by those reforms. In order to illustrate the actual changes that took place at the local level, the chapter begins with an eighteenth-century story about a peasant woman and ends with a case of a family dispute that another village woman brought before the court some 120 years later. (shrink)

This study investigates interpretations of the Japanese initial mora-based minimizer “X.Y...”-_no_ “X”-_no ji-mo_ ‘lit. even the letter “X” of “X.Y...”.’ Although initial mora-based minimizers have a literal interpretation of _ji_ ‘letter’, they have a non-literal interpretation as well. The non-literal interpretation has several distinctive features that are not present in ordinary minimizers. First, it is highly productive in that various expressions can appear in the form “X.Y...”-_no_ “X”-_no ji_. Second, non-literal minimizers typically co-occur with predicates that relate to knowledge, information, (...) concepts, thought, and habituality, as seen in the corpus data (Balanced Corpus of Contemporary Written Japanese [BCCWJ]). I argue that in the non-literal use, X refers to the minimum on the scale of the main predicate concerning “X.Y...”. I suggest that the non-literal use was developed as a result of the conventionalization of the pragmatic inference derived from the literal reading, and that the co-occurrence with predicates related to knowledge, information, knowledge, concepts, thought, or habituality is due to the interpretation of “X.Y...”, which were originally interpreted as letters as an abstract concept. The theoretical implication of this study is that, in addition to a non-compositional (lexically specified) minimizer whose scale is lexically fixed (e.g., _give a damn_, _lift a finger_), there also exists a compositional (lexically unspecified) minimizer in natural language, whose scale is specified via the predicate with which the minimizer co-occurs. The last section of this paper briefly discusses similar/related phenomena in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, Korean, and English from a cross-linguistic perspective. (shrink)

This dialogue introduces type nihilism and token realism about the meaning of life.

There are two contrasting views on the decision-making for life-sustaining treatment in advanced stages of dementia when the patient is deemed incompetent. One is to respect the patient's precedent autonomy by adhering to advance directives or using the substituted judgement standard. The other is to use the best-interests standard, particularly if the current judgement on what is best for the incapacitated patient contradicts the instructions from the patient's precedent autonomy. In this paper, I argue that the protracted clinical course of (...) dementia over many years requires the extended perspective of a progressive decision-making process—extended in both social space and time. The ongoing debate between these two competing views has missed this perspective by focussing on an exclusive disjunction between the competent former self and the incompetent current self. Drawing on theories of situated cognition in cognitive science, I will show that the cognition of a demented patient can be viewed as extended and embodied by her supportive social environment. As the disease progresses, the content of the mind of a demented person becomes partially constituted by such external resources along with her diminishing intrinsic mind. With this understanding, medical decision-making for a demented patient can be construed as a temporally and socially extended practice. A collective decision-making body consisting of the patient, her family and surrogates, and the clinician, should make progressive decisions as a whole over years of the disease course. Finally, I will provide a practical example of how this proposal can be applied in clinical practice. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to elaborate philosophical and ethical underpinnings of posthumous diagnosis of famous historical figures based on literary and artistic products, or commonly called retrospective diagnosis. It discusses ontological and epistemic challenges raised in the humanities and social sciences, and attempts to systematically reply to their criticisms from the viewpoint of clinical medicine, philosophy of medicine, particularly the ontology of disease and the epistemology of diagnosis, and medical ethics. The ontological challenge focuses on the doubt about (...) the persistence of a disease over historical time, whereas the epistemic challenge disputes the inaccessibility of scientific verification of a diagnosis in the past. I argue that the critics are in error in conflating the taxonomy of disease and the act of diagnosing a patient. Medical diagnosis is fundamentally a hypothesis-construction and an explanatory device that can be generated under various degrees of uncertainty and limited amount of information. It is not an apodictic judgment as the critics presuppose, but a probabilistic judgment with varying degrees of plausibility under uncertainty. In order to avoid this confusion, I propose that retrospective diagnosis of a historical figure be syndromic without identifying underlying disease, unless there is justifiable reason for such specification. Moreover it should be evaluated not only from the viewpoint of medical science but also in a larger context of the scholarship of the humanities and social sciences by its overall plausibility and consistency. On the other hand, I will endorse their concerns regarding the ethics and professionalism of retrospective diagnosis, and call for the need for situating such a diagnosis in an interdisciplinary scope and the context of the scholarship of the historical figure. I will then enumerate several important caveats for interdisciplinary retrospective diagnosis using an example of the retrospective diagnosis of Socrates for his life-long intermittent neurologic symptoms. Finally, I will situate the present argument in a larger context of the major debate among the historians of medicine and paleopathologists, and discuss the similarities and differences. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to develop a new connection between naming and necessity. I argue that Kripke’s historical account of naming presupposes the functional necessity of naming. My argument appeals to the etiological notion of function, which can be thought to capture the necessity of functionality in historical terms. It is shown that the historical account of naming entails all conditions in an etiological definition of function.

The “units of selection” debate in philosophy of biology addresses which entity benefits from natural selection. Nanay has tried to explain why we are obsessed with the question about the meaning of life, using the notion of group selection, although he is skeptical about answering the question from a biological point of view. The aim of this paper is to give a biological explanation to the meaning of life. I argue that the meaning of life is survival and reproduction, appealing (...) to the teleological notion of function in philosophy of biology. (shrink)

In this article, I will offer some remarks about Tarski’s nominalism. First, I will show that, even though it was mainly developed in private conversation and lectures, Tarski did try to develop a rigorous nominalistic theory, which shows that the issue was of some importance to him. In particular, I show how Tarski’s formulation is based on the idea of a humanly understandable language and show how he tried to develop this idea throughout his career. Unfortunately, even though his formulation (...) is interesting, it seems to face an insurmountable obstacle, which I examine in detail in the article. Finally, I offer some remarks about what went wrong with Tarski’s nominalist program. (shrink)

We provide two alternative characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution. We introduce new simple axioms, strong undominatedness by the disagreement point, and egalitarian Pareto optimality. First, we prove that the Nash solution is characterized by symmetry, scale invariance, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and strong undominatedness by the disagreement point. Second, we replace the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom with the sandwich axiom and egalitarian Pareto optimality. We then demonstrate that the Nash solution is characterized by symmetry, scale invariance, strong undominatedness (...) by the disagreement point, the sandwich axiom, and egalitarian Pareto optimality. (shrink)

現代人が直面する、安楽死、臓器移植、死刑といった倫理問題に、徳、善、良心、愛を基礎として、読者と共に考えぬく強靱な思索。.

Purpose: Some enigmatic remarks and behaviors of Socrates have been a subject of debate among scholars. We investigated the possibility of underlying epilepsy in Socrates by analyzing pathographic evidence in ancient literature from the viewpoint of the current understanding of seizure semiology. Methods: We performed a case study from a literature survey. Results: In 399 BCE, Socrates was tried and executed in Athens on the charge of “impiety.” His charges included the “introduction of new deities” and “not believing in the (...) gods of the state,” because he publicly claimed that he was periodically and personally receiving a “divine sign,” or daimonion, that directed him in various actions. We found textual evidence that his daimonion was probably a simple partial seizure (SPS) of temporal lobe origin. It was a brief voice that usually prohibited Socrates from initiating certain actions. It started when he was a child, and it visited Socrates unpredictably. Moreover, we found at least two descriptions of Socrates’ unique behavior that are consistent with complex partial seizures (CPSs). The fact that Socrates had been experiencing both SPSs and CPSs periodically since childhood makes the diagnosis of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) likely. Conclusions: We hypothesize that Socrates had a mild case of TLE without secondary generalization. This is the first report in 2,400 years to present a pathographic diagnosis of TLE in Socrates based on specific diagnostic features in the ancient textual evidence. Our study demonstrates that the knowledge of modern epileptology could help understand certain behaviors of historic figures. (shrink)

Naturalistic teleological accounts of mental content rely on an etiological theory of function. Nanay has raised a new objection to an etiological theory, and proposed an alternative theory of function that attributes modal force to claims about function. The aim of this paper is both to defend and to cast a new light on an etiological theory of function. I argue against Nanay’s “trait type individuation objection,” suggesting that an etiological theory also attributes modal force to claims about function. An (...) etiological theory of function can be thought to analyze claims about function with modal force, not relying on any theory of counterfactuals. (shrink)

The social and cultural causes behind the widespread use and acceptance of robots in Japan are not yet completely understood. This study compares humans and robots in images gathered through Google searches in Japanese and in English. Numerous pictures obtained by the search in Japanese were found to have a human and a robot looking together at something else (“third item”), whereas many of the images acquired by search in English show a human and a robot facing each other. This (...) is similar to the composition of mother and child in paintings: in _ukiyo-e_ that was painted mainly in the Edo period of Japan, the mother and child are often depicted together viewing something other than themselves, whereas this is not the case in Western paintings of mother and child. It has also been pointed out that, in modern Western paintings, the world inside the picture is separated from the outside world, forming an independent microcosmos, whereas the inside and outside are continuous in Japanese paintings. These may indicate that, in Japanese society, robots are to a certain extent regarded as fellow human beings who can share the third item. In Western society, on the other hand, no code is embedded that can fix robots’ superiority or inferiority to humans, which would easily trigger an antagonistic view toward artificial intelligence (AI)/robots as threatening entities, as shown in most of Western literature and movies. We suggest that such cultural characteristics of Japanese society can contribute to enhance coexistence with AI/robots. (shrink)

Cognitive science uses artificial intelligence to model the human mind. In this book, Yukio Pegio Gunji, a Japanese theoretical biologist, proposes the notion of “traumatic structure” to capture human creativity. He suggests that creativity is difficult to model with AI because it comes from “the outside.” According to Gunji, cognitive scientists like Boden (2004) view creativity merely as a manipulation of data, and fail to capture anything that comes from the outside. He compares the outside to what Wittgenstein (1922/1998) stated (...) “we cannot speak of.” The outside is also compared to what speculative realism (Brassier et al., 2007) posits lies outside the correlation between thinking and being. Gunji not only speaks of the outside but also proposes a notion that makes us accessible to it. The notion of traumatic structure is proposed to capture creativity that comes from the outside.... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Tyranny of Merit: What’s Become of the Common Good? by Michael J. SandelYoko NagaseMichael J. Sandel. The Tyranny of Merit: What’s Become of the Common Good? New York: Penguin Books, 2021. 272 pp. Hardcover, £9.99. ISBN 978-0-141-99117-7.Is a meritocratic capitalist society a utopia? The answer depends on who you are. A libertarian is likely to embrace the meritocratic credo that talent and effort deserve rewards, regarding their (...) success in a competitive market system as their own doing and even looking down on those who are not successful (25). A liberal may emphasize the need for a redistributive safety net and yet still promote meritocratic capitalism as utopian as we may ever achieve.1 Michael Young, who coined the term meritocracy in 1958, depicted an imaginary meritocratic society as a dystopia (116). In The Tyranny of Merit, Michael J. Sandel spends six out of seven chapters exemplifying the misery of not-being-a-winner in a meritocratic society.The Tyranny of Merit does a brilliant job at providing an “A-ha!” moment to anyone who has been compelled to accept, and to live with, the seemingly fair meritocratic rule of evaluating individuals, despite the frustrating awareness that something is not quite right. The author articulates exactly what’s wrong with meritocratic capitalism.The problem of meritocratic capitalism is, succinctly put, “merit drives out grace” (58). Meritocratic capitalism denigrates those who lack abilities or, worse, it humiliates those who hold jobs that are needed by the society but do not pay a lot (203). Meritocracy provides a justification for inequality that markets deliver by making people believe that their success is their own doing, not something they inherit (120, 125). However, distribution of income and wealth based on the natural distribution of talent and abilities on which the success depends is just as arbitrary as the distribution based on the [End Page 154] historical and social fortune such as class.2 This lack of gratitude and humility among those who are rewarded richly by the markets, Sandel points out, discourages the successful people from caring for the common good or those who are less fortunate than themselves (14, 59).Any mainstream introductory economics textbook would say that prices provide market participants with information about the scarcity of productive inputs and incentive to pursue their self-interests (utility and profits), resulting in markets’ delivering goods and services that best serve consumers’ needs and wants. These textbooks would also clarify that efficiency that markets deliver in allocating productive resources and goods does not imply that the outcomes are necessarily fair or equitable. What is not necessarily made explicitly clear, however, is that market prices do not represent moral values. Rawls, Hayek, and Friedman agreed with Knights in that a market price depends on supply and demand that depend on institutional settings such as property rights, taxation, and support for higher education; therefore, distributing according to the market outcome has “little or no ethical significance.”3 Sandel laments that, in reality, those who are marked by markets as lacking merits (via low pay) live with a sense of demoralizing, humiliating failure (185). The outcome is a lack of contributive justice; those who lack merits struggle to achieve the recognition and honor that they deserve for what they offer through their works (203).What is likely to be completely missing in introductory economics classes at universities is the emphasis on contributive justice. Contributive justice, in my view, is the most important concept introduced by The Tyranny of Merit. The author emphasizes that individuals should be given a chance “to win the social recognition and esteem that go with producing what others need and value” (206). The author challenges us to think again how we should value different types of occupations (191). Aren’t plumbers, social workers, and teachers just as important for society as bankers? Why should there be any prejudice against those who choose not to go to universities? (73). Economics should emphasize that we are not just consumers; we are (proudly?) producers as well. Chapter 3 of The Tyranny of Merit provides many examples of politicians embracing meritocratic policies based on... (shrink)

(2005). The Problem of Vitalism Revisited. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the french tradition issue editor: andrew aitken, pp. 13-26.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist by Kate RaworthYoko NagaseKate Raworth, Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist. London: Random House Business Books, 2017. 372 pp. £20. ISBN 9781847941374.Question: Is this a book about utopia? Answer: Yes, indeed; it is a book about a twenty-first-century utopia represented by the Doughnut.The author presents a vision of a pragmatic utopia, represented by the (...) inside of her Doughnut that is both distributive and regenerative. According to the author, a distributive economy is "one whose dynamics tend to disperse and circulate value as it is created, rather than concentrating it in ever-fewer hands." A regenerative economy is "one in which people become full participants in regenerating Earth's life-giving cycles so that we thrive within planetary boundaries" (156).The emphasis on the fair distribution of income, wealth, and means of production is an ideal pursued by famous utopians, from perfectly equal distribution of everything in Thomas More's Utopia to very libertarian position of "whatever he has justly made he has a right to keep" by H. G. Wells.1 The distributive Doughnut community aims to enable individuals to be, in Amartya Sen's words, "healthy, empowered and creative—so that they can choose to be and do things in life that they value" (43). This ideal of individuals' rights to choose their life and to realise their ends is the centerpiece of libertarians' ideal society.2 The Doughnut, however, leans heavily toward democratic socialism. Arguments for redistributive measures such as a universal basic income and taxes on land and wealth put forward by the author go beyond promoting equal opportunity and emphasize the necessity of economic means to make the best out of the opportunities (164, 180, 200). [End Page 528]The issue of sustainability at the global level is a concept that does not appear in the classical utopian literature, even though the idea of living happily in perpetuity is very much the tenet of many classical utopian societies. Given the extent of the geographical knowledge that existed by the time Wells explored his idea of a utopia, he was no longer able to set it in some not-yetdiscovered place on Earth like his predecessors did—hence the adaptation of "another planet."3 But this setup had nothing to do with the concept of the ecological limit of Earth. Pre-nineteenth-century utopians would be familiar with the contents of the Doughnut's foundation, the inner shell that consists of the social and economic factors such as food, health, education, and housing. However, the outer shell of the Doughnut is very twenty-first century, enclosing the nine planetary boundaries of the Doughnut as a life-support system, such as ozone layer depletion, ocean acidification, biodiversity loss, and climate change (44–48).The author points out that we need to get a grip on understanding how we belong in the world. Instead of relying on the power of words as George Orwell's Thought Police, the author takes full advantage of the power of the visual, by drawing the Doughnut as a map for a new economy and society.4 If studying economics is tantamount to "mastering the mother tongue of public policy" (287), Doughnut Economics is a critical introduction to and the foundation of economic, environmental, and social policymaking.Rather than utopias as purely thought exercise by Plato or More, Raworth, like David Hume, presents a model of a utopia that is meant to be achievable.5 The economics of the Doughnut does not depend on any unrealistic assumptions of human nature. The author proposes means to reaching inside the Doughnut without abolishing the market system or private property rights. But a strong emphasis is placed on additional redistributive policies and regulations that are deemed critical toward sustainability. This position is consistent with that of the former chancellor of Germany who reportedly said that she "wanted as much market economics as possible, but as much state intervention as necessary."6 In promoting the open-source circular economy movement, the author wonders if it may seem "unfeasibly utopian" (231). Yet given the pace... (shrink)

Ce texte propose un essai d’interprétation des contes de Kenji Miyazawa à la lumière de la théorie de l’imagination matérielle de Gaston Bachelard. Il s’agit d’une mise à l’épreuve de ce cadre conceptuel dans un contexte culturel totalement différent. Ces contes de fées japonais sont relus en fonction de leurs évocations des quatre éléments d’Empédocle. Ces quatre éléments révèlent une source d’inspiration inconsciente des expressions et des intrigues de cet auteur japonais. Dans son cas, je montrerai que la terre est (...) l’élément dominant. (shrink)

A framework for “improvisational” social acts and communication is introduced by referring to the idea of “relationalism” such as natural farming, permaculture and deep ecology. Based on this conception, the notion of Existential Graph by C. S. Peirce is introduced. The notion of extended self in deep ecology is substantiated based on the Roy Adaptation Model in Nursing Theory and Narrative approaches. By focusing on Leibnizian notions of space and time and by introducing Petri net, a spatio-temporal model of improvisation (...) is constructed. This model is expected to substantiate the interesting notion of “Ba” proposed by H. Shimizu reflecting Japanese culture. (shrink)

This book poses the question of: what is an ideal tax system, in a utopian society?What is taxation? It is "government-required sacrifice for the general welfare" imposed on the members of society.1 This clear and simple definition allows the author to explore hypothetical tax systems of utopian communities based on their corresponding moral principles, viewing more broadly than just pecuniary taxes. This is an enlightening exercise, and in this sense the book successfully stimulates the reader's mind. As the functional context (...) of taxation as defined above can take the form of nonmonetary rules and legal requirement of society, the author studies such "constructive" taxes in utopian societies, as... (shrink)

Rauszer and Sabalski proved in [2] that distributivity with respect to infi- nite joins and meets is a sucient and necessary condition making the RasiowaSikorski Lemma valid in distributive lattices. The main part of their proof is a direct construction of a required filter under distributivity. In this note we show that a generalization of the result can be obtained from the Rasiowa-Sikorski Lemma for Boolean algebras by using Gornemann’s result in [1] instead of a direct con- ¨ struction. Suppose (...) A is a distributive lattice and Q; R 2 A f;g. We call A complete if 8M 2 Q9 M 2 A and 8N 2 R9 F N 2 A. M 2 Q is -dis if 9 M 2 A and 8a 2 A a t M = m2M. N 2 R is F -dis if 9 F N 2 A and 8a 2 A a u F N = F n2N. is called distributive if every M 2 Q is -dis and every N 2 R is F -dis. Suppose A is complete and C; D A. By rC we mean the filter in A generated by C, in particular, let r; = ; = ;. is called complete if and , where 8M 2 Q 9m 2 MrC \ D[fmg = ;) 8N 2 R 9n 2 NrC[fng \ D = ;). (shrink)