Pain is the most prominent member of a class of sensations known as bodily sensations, which includes itches, tickles, tingles, orgasms, and so on. Bodily sensations are typically attributed to bodily locations and appear to have features such as volume, intensity, duration, and so on, that are ordinarily attributed to physical objects or quantities. Yet these sensations are often thought to be logically private, subjective, self-intimating, and the source of incorrigible knowledge for those who have them. Hence there appear to (...) be reasons both for thinking that pains (along with other similar bodily sensations) are physical objects or conditions that we perceive in body parts, and for thinking that they are not. This apparent paradox is one of the main reasons why philosophers are especially interested in pain. One increasingly popular but still controversial way to deal with this apparent paradox is to defend a perceptual or representational view of pain, according to which feeling pain is in principle no different from undergoing other standard perceptual processes like seeing, hearing, touching, etc. But there are many who think that pains are not amenable to such a treatment. Although it was the treatment of pain as a sensory-discriminative experience that had dominated the philosophical discussions throughout most of the twentieth century, attention to pains’ affective-motivational dimension has gained prominence in recent years. (shrink)

This new edition of Baran and Davis's successful text provides a comprehensive, historically based, introduction to mass communication theory. Clearly written with examples, graphics, and other materials to illustrate key theories, this edition traces the emergence of two main bodies of mass communication theory: social, behavioral and critical, cultural. The authors emphasize that media theories are human creations that typically are intended to address specific problems or issues.

This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely (...) tie them to the brain states realizing conscious qualitative experiences. We then develop an account of introspection which exploits this special nature of sensory concepts. The result is a new class of concepts, which, following recent terminology, we call phenomenal concepts: these concepts refer to phenomenal experience itself and are the vehicles used in introspection. On our account, the connection between sensory and phenomenal concepts is very tight: it consists in different semantic uses of the same cognitive structures underlying the sensory concepts, such as the concept of red. Contrary to widespread opinion, we show that information theory contains all the resources to satisfy internalist intuitions about phenomenal consciousness, while not offending externalist ones. A consequence of this account is that it explains and predicts the so-called conceivability arguments against physicalism on the basis of the special nature of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Thus we not only show why physicalism is not threatened by such arguments, but also demonstrate its strength in virtue of its ability to predict and explain away such arguments in a principled way. However, we take the main contribution of this work to be what it provides in addition to a response to those conceivability arguments, namely, a substantive account of the interface between sensory and conceptual systems and the mechanisms of introspection as based on the special nature of the information flow between them. (shrink)

This paper presents a position called Scheme-based Alethic Realism, which reconciles a realist position on the nature of truth with a pluralistic Kantian perspective that allows for multiple environments in which truthmaking relationships are established. We argue that truthmaking functions are constrained by a stable phenomenal world and a stable cognitive architecture. This account takes truth as normatively distinct from epistemic justification while relativizing the truth conditions of our statements to what we call Frameworks. The pluralistic aspect allows that these (...) stable elements, while constraining representational and linguistic schemes, do not define a single framework for truthmaking relations. We strengthen this position by considering themes on situated rational agency from cognitive science and artificial intelligence, arguing that whatever enables or supports rational action within a particular environment must figure into some account of truth and truthmaking, and vice versa. (shrink)

This paper examines pain states (and other intransitive bodily sensations) from the perspective of the problems they pose for pure informational/representational approaches to naturalizing qualia. I start with a comprehensive critical and quasi-historical discussion of so-called Perceptual Theories of Pain (e.g., Armstrong, Pitcher), as these were the natural predecessors of the more modern direct realist views. I describe the theoretical backdrop (indirect realism, sense-data theories) against which the perceptual theories were developed. The conclusion drawn is that pure representationalism about pain (...) in the tradition of direct realist perceptual theories (e.g., Dretske, Tye) leaves out something crucial about the phenomenology of pain experiences, namely, their affective character. I touch upon the role that introspection plays in such representationalist views, and indicate how it contributes to the source of their trouble vis-à-vis bodily sensations. The paper ends by briefly commenting on the relation between the affective/evaluative component of pain and the hedonic valence of emotions. (shrink)

Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it.

Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. This is a truism. But understanding what makes these experiences pleasant and unpleasant is not an easy job. Various difficulties and puzzles arise as soon as we start theorizing. There are various philosophical theories on offer that seem to give different accounts for the positive or negative affective valences of sensory experiences. In this paper, we will look at the current state of art in the philosophy of mind, present the main contenders, critically (...) compare and contrast them. In particular, we want to examine how they handle the reason-giving power of affective states. We will look into two representationalist proposals (Evaluativism and Imperativism) and a functionalist proposal, and argue that, contrary to their own advertisements, the representationalist proposals don’t have good accounts of why and how sensory affect can motivate, rationalize, and justify subsequent behavior and intentional mental activity. We will show that our own functionalist proposal does a much better job in this regard, and that when the representationalist proposals are modified to do a better job, they fare better not because of their representationalist credentials but due to their functionalist ones. (shrink)

A lot of qualitatively very different sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant. The Felt-Quality Views that conceive of sensory affect as having an introspectively available common phenomenology or qualitative character face the “heterogeneity problem” of specifying what that qualitative common phenomenology is. In contrast, according to the Attitudinal Views, what is common to all pleasant or unpleasant sensations is that they are all “wanted” or “unwanted” in a certain sort of way. The commonality is explained not on the basis of (...) phenomenology but by a common mental, usually some sort of conative, attitude toward the sensation. Here I criticize both views and offer an alternative framework that combines what is right in both while avoiding their unintuitive commitments. The result is the reductive (psychofunctionalist) adverbial sensory modification view of pleasure and displeasure. (shrink)

[This is the penultimate version, please send me an email for the final version]. Some sensations are pleasant, some unpleasant, and some are neither. Furthermore, those that are pleasant or unpleasant are so to different degrees. In this essay, I want to explore what kind of a difference is the difference between these three kinds of sensations. I will develop a comprehensive three-level account of sensory pleasure that is simultaneously adverbialist, functionalist and is also a version of a satisfied experiential-desire (...) account. (shrink)

Several times, when faced with a difficult passage of scripture in Sermones ad populum, Augustine implores his audience, “knock and it shall be opened” (Matt. 7:7c; par. Luke 11:9c). Augustine uses this phrase to stress humility and the human need for God’s activity when interpreting scripture. Studying the archeological record of domestic architecture of locked doors in Roman North Africa elucidates Augustine’s message. Knowledge of the material culture shows that Augustine calls upon Christians to “knock” upon scripture as if it (...) were a door, locked and barred in such a way that it could only be opened from inside. Thus, a reader of scripture is like a petitioner calling from outside a locked door, needing God to open its meaning. Augustine’s use of “knocking” contrasts with the metaphor of “keys” to scripture, which was favored by Tyconius and other early Christian writers. In De doctrina Christiana, Augustine expresses concern that “keys” could lead a person into overconfidence, expecting to unlock obscure passages of the Bible by his or her own power. Augustine’s frequent use of Matt. 7:7c is a call for exegetes to approach scripture with humility. All members of the totus Christus, great and small, must humbly knock. The image of “knocking” provides a versatile theological message: human effort is important, but the meaning of the Bible is ultimately unlocked by God’s activity. (shrink)

[Penultimate draft] I present the perceptualist/representationalist theories of pain in broad outline and critically examine them in light of a competing view according to which awareness of pain is essentially introspective. I end the essay with a positive sketch of a naturalistic proposal according to which pain experiences are intentional but not fully representational. This proposal makes sense of locating pains in body parts as well as taking pains as subjective experiences.

Bu makale Blaise Pascal’i bir iktidar düşünürü olarak incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Pascal’in, Descartes’tan farklı olarak akıl düzeni dışında iradenin yani yüreğin düzeni ve tenin yani dünyevi isteklerin düzenini ayırt etmesi, düşüncesinin temel bir özelliği olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Böylelikle düzenler arasında farklı güç odakları ve farklı rasyonalite tipleri gözeten Blaise Pascal için Kartezyen akıl iki açıdan rasyonel olarak işlemez. Birincisi gücün düzeninde fikirler yetersiz kalır. İkincisi ise imgelem akla rakip olmanın ötesinde aklın üzerine yaslandığı zeminin kurucusudur. Aklın sınırını çizen Pascal, hem aklı (...) daha etkin kullanmanın bir yolunu bulmuştur hem de aklın hiç işlemediği alanlarda akılla kavrayış geliştirmenin yarattığı sorunları göstermiştir. Bu bağlamda etkiler alanı aklın nedenleriyle anlaşılamaz aksine etkiler alanı kendisine ait bir akıl üretir. Güç hâkim olur, imgelemi kurar ve dünyevi istekleri yönetir. Bir fikir ile bir çıkar arasındaki mücadelenin galibi her zaman için güç sahibi olan çıkardır. Ancak bir güç, meşruiyet ilişkisi üretmeden iktidar olamaz. Bu yüzden her iktidar kendi duygularını, inanç ve fikir tiplerini de üretir. Pascal açısından gerçek bir hakkı ancak kılıç verir. Bu yüzden kılıçla hakkını elde eden iktidar kendisini adalet olarak sunar. Pascal’in düşüncesi iktidarı düşünmek açısından iki önemli yönelim sunmaktadır: İlk olarak iktidar akıl karşısında bir irrasyonalite değildir aksine kendisine ait bir rasyonalite sunar. İkinci olarak ise bu rasyonalite iktidarı güç, imgelem ve isteklerin yönetimi olarak kendisine özgü bir otonomi içerisinde ele almaya olanak tanır. (shrink)

Inquiries about existence in Mesopotamia started with the Sumerians. They set an example for the civilizations established in this geography and affected them deeply. According to Sumerian mythology, they are cosmic forces identified with fresh water, salt water and mist that are eternal. With the combination of these cosmic elements, the sky and the earth, which are symbolized by the gods, were formed. The whole they formed was separated from each other by Enlil, who was identified with air, and celestial (...) bodies were formed with the expansion of air. The Semites continued this understanding with its main lines. In the Babylonian Epic of Creation, the beginning of the cosmic process is based on the generational conflict between the gods and is explained with the sacrifice of Tiamat, one of the first cosmic forces. The Chief God Marduk shattered Tiamat and created the universe from her remains, and man from the remains of Kingsu. According to the Mesopotamian mythological tradition, gods were derived from the first cosmic elements, which were eternal, and then they created the universe and man from these cosmic remains. According to Egyptian mythology, the eternal is the ocean. The primary gods, who existed in the eternal ocean, created the universe and humans with their natural secretions. According to many mythological narratives, the dominant god has performed the act of creation by expressing his thoughts or the imagination of the heart. As in Mesopotamian mythology, gods and natural beings were identified with a symbolic language in Egyptian mythology. Greek mythological approaches are gathered in outlines in the works of Homer and Hesiod, who are considered to be the founders of religion. Homer stated that the eternal, the divine ocean, is the source of everything. According to Hesiod, in the beginning, chaos (emptiness) occurred, and then the universe, gods and human beings emerged from this chaos, respectively. These understandings of existence also contain a significant amount of philosophical content. There is a parallelism between the understanding of being in myths and those of philosophers. (shrink)

The review of literature on stakeholders reveals that there is need to understand more about firm-stakeholder relationships especially from stakeholders’ point of view. Market integration in the European Union (EU) provides an excellent context for increasing such understanding since it is creating opportunities and threats for firms and their stakeholders. This research aims to make a contribution in this direction by analyzing strategic responses of primary stakeholders to selected threat events in the history of Volkswagen (VW) since 1960.

This is a Letter to Editor responding to the reaction by Ken Craig, Amanda Williams, KJS Anand, to my previous article on the IASP definition of pain that appeared in PAIN Reports 4(2019)e777. The reaction is also in the form of a Letter to Editor in PAIN Reports 5(2020)e811.

There are good reasons to reject absolutism about truth not only for theoretical purposes but also in connection with the issues of cross-cultural communication and understanding. In explaining the neorealist approach, an analogy given by Alvin Goldman is employed and it is maintained that despite its difficulties Goldman's account is on the right track vis-à-vis truth and the ontological matters related to it.

As a result of its failure to embrace the increasingly visible social and political diversity in the country, Kemalism, the founding ideology of modern Turkey, is currently facing its severest legitimacy crisis. Through interviews with representatives of leading voluntary Kemalist associations, this article inquires whether there are attempts to reinterpret the doctrine in order to offer an alternative, credible vision in harmony with the existing social, political and economic realities of Turkey.

This book represents the author's view of humanity.

The official definition of ‘pain’ by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) hasn’t seen much revision since its publication in 1979. There have been various criticisms of the definition in the literature from different quarters: that the definition implies a dubious metaphysical dualism, that it requires a strong form of consciousness as well as linguistic abilities, that it excludes many vulnerable groups that are otherwise perfectly capable of experiencing pain, that it has therefore unacceptable practical as well (...) as ethical consequences, that it is unhelpful to the health-care professional as an operational definition, that it is too narrow, and many others. In my view, most of these criticisms depend on misunderstandings or on uncharitable interpretations. My aim is to go over the definition, clarify some potential ambiguities, and argue that these criticisms don’t cut much ice. At the end, I will present a few slightly reworded versions of the definition that I claim are more felicitous and capture the original intended meaning by the members of the taxonomic committee in a much better and transparent way that avoids all the major extant criticisms in the literature. (Written for interdisciplinary audiences.). (shrink)

The ordinary conception of pain has two major threads that are in tension with each other. It is this tension that generates various puzzles in our philosophical understanding of pain. This is a short encyclopedia entry surveying some of the major philosophical puzzles about pain.

Yenidoğanlara ve hayvanlara dair herhangi bir soru sorduğumuzda ve soruyu cevaplamaya çalıştığımızda çoğu örtük olan birtakım varsayımlarımız vardır. Bunlardan en önemlisi, insanı insan yapan ve diğer canlılardan ayıran temel unsurlar hakkındadır. Yani, “insanı insan yapan nedir?” sorusuna keskin sınırları olan bir cevabımız varsa, bu cevabımız, aynı zamanda yenidoğanlara ve hayvanlara dair birtakım soruların da cevabı haline gelir. Örneğin “insanı insan yapan veya en azından onu diğer canlılardan ayırt eden unsurların en önemlilerinden biri dildir ve dil öğrenebilmesidir” dersek, bu ifade, en (...) temelde, dünyaya henüz gelen bebeğin ve örneğin bir kedinin yalnızca “gelişmemiş” değil, aynı zamanda “aynı zeminde gelişmemiş” olduğu yönünde bir varsayıma bizi götürür, zira dil öğrenmek veya öğrenebilmek ve bu süreç neticesinde alışageldiğimiz, bildiğimiz anlamda diller aracılığıyla iletişim kurabilmek ve düşünebilmek “gelişmek”tir. Bu yazının amacı, yenidoğanlara ve hayvanlara dair özellikle bilinç çalışmalarının, bu eksende yürütülen dil ve en genel anlamda felsefe ve psikoloji araştırmalarının (yukarıdaki örnekteki gibi) temel varsayımlarını ve hareket noktalarını sorgulamak ve son dönemde Yalçın Koç’un geliştirdiği aşkınlık tasavvuru çerçevesinde eleştiriler ve öneriler sunmaktır. Son olarak, bir tecrübe sahibi olmak ile en geniş anlamıyla tecrübe sahibi olmaya dair bir fikriyat inşa etmek ve -mümkünse- bilimini yapmak arasındaki ilişkiye değineceğiz. (shrink)

Bu makale, Platon’un mektupları arasında “felsefî” içeriği bulunan 2. 7. ve 10. Mektup’un diyaloglar ile arasındaki ilişkiyi açığa çıkarma çabasıdır. Literatürde hem Platon’un mektuplarının Türkçe çevirisi hem de mektuplar ile diyaloglar arasındaki tutarlılık veya tutarsızlık meselesi hakkında ciddi bir eksiklik mevcuttur. Dolayısıyla, bahsi geçen mektupların en azından “felsefi” olarak kabul edilen kısımlarının Türkçeye çevrilmesi ve diyaloglar ile tutarlı olup olmadığının açığa çıkarılması gerekmektedir. Makalenin ilk kısmında, diyaloglar ile mektuplar arasında ciddiye alınması gereken ölçüde tutarlılık olduğu savunulmaktadır. Özellikle 2. 7. 10. (...) Mektuplara ve diyaloglara bir bütün olarak bakıldığında, Platon’un sisteminde hayatî önem taşıyan hakiki-sahte ayrımının tutarlı bir şekilde anlatılmaya çalışıldığı, bu ayrım temelinde Platon’un dönemin Surakousa kralı Dionûsios ile ilişkisi üzerinden “philosophia” derken ne kastettiğini ve ne kastetmediğini birbirinden ayırt etmeye çalıştığı görülmektedir. Myles Burnyeat, Platon sisteminde hayatî bir anlamı bulunan söz konusu hakiki-sahte aslî ayrımını dikkate almadan diyaloglar ile 7. Mektup arasında bir bütünlük bulunmadığını hatta çeliştiklerini iddia ederek ironik bir şekilde 7. Mektup’u “sahte” ilân etmiştir. Makalenin ikinci kısmında, 7. Mektup’un sahte olduğunu iddia eden Burnyeat’in “7. Mektup’un Sahte-Felsefi Ara-Sözü” başlıklı makalesine bir eleştiri sunulmuştur. (shrink)

In this paper I present Pluralistic Kantianism as a viable alternative to other prominent accounts of the determination of the truth conditions of our ordinary empirical statements. I further claim that this sort of Kantianism is capable of handling certain theoretical difficulties faced by any scheme-based semantics. Moreover, Pluralistic Kantianism can shed some light on such crucial issues as cross-cultural communication and understanding. As a result, if the account offered here is on the right track, we may get a palatable (...) alternative to both restrictive monism and apathetic relativism, both of which ultimately fail to explicate or enlighten the successful and unsuccessful instances of cross-cultural understanding. (shrink)

Die Möglichkeit zur Organtransplantation kreierte neue Probleme für die Medizinethik wie auch für die klinische Medizin. Eines davon, die Organbeschaffung, versucht man hauptsächlich mithilfe zweier Systeme anzugehen. Zahlreiche Staaten haben das ‚OptinSystem’ angenommen, das die Bewusstseinserhöhung sowie Selbstentscheidung der Einzelnen zur Organspende anzielt. Das andere System, das ‚Optout’ bzw. die ‚angenommene Zustimmung’, das sämtliche Gesellschaftsmitglieder als potenzielle Organspender ansieht, wurde von einigen Staaten übernommen. In diesem System sollen Einzelne ausdrücklich erklären, sie wollen keine Organe spenden, anderenfalls werden sie für Organspender (...) gehalten. Indem wir unser Argument auf unterschiedliche Rechtfertigungen zu gründen suchen, behaupten wir, das OptoutSystem zur Organbeschaffung sei eine gerechtere Option in puncto Recht auf Zugang zur notwendigen Gesundheitsfürsorge, und demzufolge solle es anstelle des Optin implementiert werden. (shrink)

In The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I show that there has been no change in Fodor's treatment of Frege cases and cases involving the so‐called deferential concepts. And for good reason: his notion of narrow content (1985‐91) couldn't explain them. The only apparent change concerns his treatment of Twin Earth cases. However, I argue that (...) the notion of broad content that his purely informational semantics delivers is, in some interesting sense, equivalent to the mapping notion of narrow content he officially gave up. I also critically reconstruct the evolution of Fodor's thinking between 1980 and 1994. (shrink)

Consider the following two sentences: (1) I see a dark discoloration in the back of my hand. (2) I feel a jabbing pain in the back of my hand. They seem to have the same surface grammar, and thus prima facie invite the same kind of semantic treatment. Even though a reading of see in (1) where the verb is not treated as a success verb is not out of the question, it is not the ordinary and natural reading. Note (...) that if I am hallucinating a dark discoloration in the back of my hand, then (1) is simply false. For (1) to be true, therefore, I have to stand in the seeing relation to a dark discoloration in the back of my hand, i.e., to a certain surface region in the back of my hand marked by a darker shade of the usual color of my skin, a certain region that can be seen by others possibly in the same way in which I see it. Also note that although the truth of (1) doesnt require the possession of any concept by me expressed by the words making up the sentence, my uttering of (1) to make a report typically does if we take such utterances as expressions of ones thoughts. So my seeing would typically induce me to identify something in the back of my hand as a dark discoloration. This is a typical case of categorization of something under a concept induced by perception. Of course, my uttering of (1) does more than attributing a physical property to a bodily region, it also reports that I am seeing it. (shrink)

The paper reports two studies exploring the relationship between scholars’ self-reported publication pressure and their self-reported scientific misconduct in research. In Study 1 the participants ( N = 423) were scholars representing various disciplines from one big university in Poland. In Study 2 the participants ( N = 31) were exclusively members of the management, such as dean, director, etc. from the same university. In Study 1 the most common reported form of scientific misconduct was honorary authorship. The majority of (...) researchers (71%) reported that they had not violated ethical standards in the past; 3% admitted to scientific misconduct; 51% reported being were aware of colleagues’ scientific misconduct. A small positive correlation between perceived publication pressure and intention to engage in scientific misconduct in the future was found. In Study 2 more than half of the management (52%) reported being aware of researchers’ dishonest practices, the most frequent one of these being honorary authorship. As many as 71% of the participants report observing publication pressure in their subordinates. The primary conclusions are: (1) most scholars are convinced of their morality and predict that they will behave morally in the future; (2) scientific misconduct, particularly minor offenses such as honorary authorship, is frequently observed both by researchers (particularly in their colleagues) and by their managers; (3) researchers experiencing publication pressure report a willingness to engage in scientific misconduct in the future. (shrink)

Denken geschieht an einem Ort. Zugleich gilt es zu bedenken, was einen Ort zum Ort werden lasst. Offenbar setzt also das Denken, wie auch jedes Sprechen und Handeln, einen Standort bzw. einen Standpunkt voraus, die selbst wiederum zum Thema philosophischer Betrachtung werden bzw. gemacht werden mussen. Dabei kann freilich Ort ein Mehrfaches bedeuten, etwa den Korper, die politische Schicht, den sozialen Status, das sozialisierte Geschlecht, die Sprache, kulturelle Geflechte, Lebenswelten und nicht zuletzt geographische Landschaften sowie geschichtliche Zeitraume. All dies sind (...) - je nach Konstellation - Orte, die das Denken bedingen. Andererseits haben verschiedene Denkweisen in der Geschichte und Gegenwart immer wieder den Anspruch erhoben, universal zu agieren, d. h. in Unabhangigkeit von allen Milieus, Raumen, Zeiten, Sprachen, Geschlechtern usw. diese uberschreiten zu konnen. Von dieser vielschichtigen Fragestellung ausgehend setzt der vorliegende Band diesseits inter- wie transkultureller Selbstverstandigungen an. Anstatt jedoch von einer antagonistischen Gegenuberstellung auszugehen, wonach man sich einer der beiden Diskurslandschaften - wie etwa Universalismus hier, Relativismus/Partikularismus dort - anzuschliessen hatte, wird hier vielmehr die Abhangigkeit und Reziprozitat beider betont. In diesem Sinne, und dies ware der Leitfaden dieses Buches, bedeutet Ort/e des Denkens zugleich Denken des Ortes wie der Orte. (shrink)

This article seeks to address the increasingly pertinent concern of how to form a satisfactory liberal stance in the face of certain democratically mandated policies of non-liberal and even sometimes illiberal governments. To that end, a close analysis is provided of a particular debate that generated controversy in certain liberal circles in Turkey during the run-up to the referendum on constitutional amendments in 2010. Identifying and evaluating 5 factors which seemed to have influenced the opposing positions in the debate, the (...) article tries to demonstrate how disagreement over the ‘correct’ liberal position entails differences in overall judgement of the political situation and assessment of the circumstances. (shrink)

There is a strong association between reliance on the promotional activities of pharmaceutical companies and a generally less appropriate use of prescription drugs. Pharmaceutical companies direct some of their promotion towards health workers who do not have the authority to prescribe medicines, such as nurses in certain countries. The aim of this study was to determine the impact that exposure to the marketing methods of pharmaceutical companies has on judgments made by nursing students about health worker—pharmaceutical company relationships. A cross-sectional (...) survey was carried out with 442 nursing students in Istanbul, Turkey. The exposure of students to the marketing methods of pharmaceutical companies, whether it be indirectly through observation or directly by first-hand experience, increases the probability that students will adopt rationales that underlie affirmative judgments of health worker—pharmaceutical company relationships. Based on the pervasiveness and ability of drug promotion to influence the perceptions of students, it is imperative that attempts be made to reduce its negative impact. (shrink)

In this paper I reflect critically on the concept of pragmatism as it is used in Ottoman historiography. Pragmatism has gained increasing currency over the last ten to fifteen years as one of the defining features of the Ottoman polity. I argue that unless it is properly defined from a theoretical-philosophical perspective, and carefully contextualized from a historical perspective, pragmatism cannot be used as an explanatory or comparative category. When used as a framework of explanation for historical change, pragmatism blurs (...) more than it clarifies an essential aspect of the Ottoman polity that it seeks to define, namely, the political. It is essential to reflect on the difference between the political and politics because whereas the political refers to the configuration of the power relations that organize a society as a legitimate entity, politics refers to the strategies, practices, institutions, or discourses whose purpose is to construct and retain hegemony within a polity. Through an analysis of the concept of pragmatism in Ottoman historiography, I show that for most proponents of Ottoman pragmatism, pragmatism pertains to politics rather than to the political. From a perspective rigorously confined to political theory, I argue that much like the discourse of modern tolerance, pragmatism in Ottoman historiography posits a problematic periodization, relegates the political to the background, and depoliticizes essential power relations. (shrink)

Ce compte rendu a déjà paru dans E-rea [En ligne], n° 6.1, 2008. F. Gaillet-de-Chezelles, Wordsworth et la marche : parcours poétique et esthétique, Grenoble, Ellug, 2007, 423 p. Spécialiste de la période romantique, et de William Wordsworth en particulier, Florence Gaillet-de-Chazelles a développé dans Wordsworth et la marche : parcours poétique et esthétique une approche critique qui s'inscrit très bien dans celle de la collection « Esthétique et représentation : monde anglophone », - Recensions.