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Professor Schellenberg thinks that recent progress in our moral thinking about what counts as a good person and what counts as morally permissible action strengthen the case for atheism. Moral evolution ought to lead to religious evolution. We don’t think the maneuver works. Despite being a clear and accessible piece of philosophy that makes some important contributions to the literature, the central move of the book falls short. In that sense, Progressive Atheism makes little progress. Our review offers a synopsis (...) and an appraisal of the project. (shrink)

Getting oriented -- An (a)theological dead end -- Naturalism's shortcut -- Unexplored territory: moral evolution -- Updating God -- A relationally responsive god -- A kinder god -- A nonviolent god -- Challenging the new theism -- Atheism's brave new world.

Emotions, morals, practices -- Sympathy for a devil's chaplain -- Common compassion and the mad scientist -- Sympathy as callousness? physiology and vivisection -- Sympathy, liberty, and compulsion: vaccination -- Sympathetic selection: eugenics -- Scientism and practice.

Buchanan and Powell’s book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the evolution of morality. I suggest that they exaggerate the degree to which their view of the evolution of moral progress is committed to a form of moral realism. I also suggest that Darwin’s own approach to the evolution of the moral sense shares more with their view than they may realise. Finally I point to some tensions in their invocation of the concept of the Environment of Evolutionary (...) Adaptedness (EEA). (shrink)

Hayek’s social theory of evolution suggests that market liberal morality is adaptive for social groups. He justified the evolutionary superiority of market liberalism by asserting that groups operating under a market liberal morality would have a higher capacity to expand and reproduce than groups with alternative tribal moralities. Thus, market liberal groups would be favoured through cultural and genetic group selection. But in fact, market liberal morality reveals maladaptive tendencies and remains insufficiently powerful to create adaptive social groups. Hayek’s dismissal (...) of moral tribalism in favour of market liberal morality is found to underestimate the importance of tribal goals in the evolutionary system. (shrink)

Michael Tomasello’s account of moral evolution includes both a synthesis of extensive experimental work done on humans and chimpanzees on their potential for perspective-taking and helpful, altruistic generosity and a major emphasis on “collective intentionality” as an important component of morality in humans. Both will be very useful to the evolutionary study of this subject. However, his disavowal of collective intentions on the parts of chimpanzees would appear to be empirically incorrect, owing to reliance on experimental captive research focused only (...) on dyadic interactions. Here, evidence to the contrary is provided from studies of wild chimpanzees as they naturally cooperate in sizable groups. Collective intentions are inferable when they go on patrol, when they mob predators, when they go hunting, and when large coalitions gang-attack disliked members of the same community. This last behavior has particularly significant pre-adaptive implications for the evolution of moralistic social control, and it suggests that moral evolution has deep roots, going back to the Last Common Ancestor of humans, bonobos, and chimpanzees. (shrink)

The neurobiology and development of human morality in light of evolution -- More than genes : human inheritances and the moral sense -- The dynamic self : emotions and development -- Moral heritage 1 : engagement of the heart -- Moral heritage 2 : communal imagination -- Undercare and the stress response : early life gone wrong -- The morality that stress promotes : self protective ethics -- Shifting moral mindsets -- Culture and imagination: cooperation or competition? -- Paths to (...) moral wisdom -- Common-self wisdom: fostering a good life for self and others -- The road to human excellence and flourishing. (shrink)

A dorsalization mechanism is a good candidate for the evolutionary origin of the isocortex, producing a radial and tangential expansion of the dorsal pallium (and perhaps other structures that acquired a cortical phenotype). Evidence suggests that a large part of the dorsal ventricular ridge (DVR) of reptiles and birds derives from the embryonic ventral pallium, whereas the isocortex possibly derives mostly from the dorsal pallium. In early mammals, the development of olfactory-hippocampal associative networks may have been pivotal in facilitating the (...) selection of a larger and more complex dorsal pallium which received both collothalamic and lemnothalamic sensory information. Finally, although it is not clear exactly when mammalian brain expansion began, fossil evidence indicates that this was a late event in mammaliaform evolution. (shrink)

The concept of a “chemical speciation”, as defined by in the year 2000, is grounded in an empiricist semantics. It is a static concept, as it is associated with the ontological category of the chemical state of the distribution of chemical species in a system and is further restricted to chemical species of a single element as it excludes chemical species with more complex chemical systemic subunits, such as molecular species, crystals, or nanoparticles. In this work, we propose a new (...) definition of “chemical speciation” based on a semantics of meaning, applying Mario Bunge’s philosophical system. Chemical speciation is the distribution of chemical systemic subunits amongst defined chemical species in a system. Additionally, we propose two dynamic concepts associated with chemical speciation: chemical species transformation and chemical species evolution. These concepts aim to account for the chemical changes that explain both the diversity of chemical species sharing common systemic subunits and the historical emergence of new modes of chemical speciation. These modes, in turn, explain the appearance of new systemic chemical subunits and novel substantial properties. Our definitions have the advantage of being consistent with general theories of the evolution of matter, such Assembly Theory. Additionally, at the chemical level, this approach encompasses broader systemic chemical subunits beyond elemental particles, allowing for the chemical speciation of families of molecules, crystals, nanoparticles, etc. Finally, our proposal offers the advantage of overcoming the issue of arbitrariness in choosing the reference systemic chemical subunit by linking this choice to the concepts of substantial property, and function. (shrink)

Reductionist forms of moral realism, such as naturalist realism, are often thought immune to epistemological objections that have been raised against nonnaturalist realism in the form of reliability worries or evolutionary debunking arguments. This article establishes that reductionist realist views can only explain the reliability of our moral beliefs at the cost of incurring repugnant first-order conclusions.

Darwin's inner voice -- Living the virtuous life -- Of altruism and free riders -- Knowing our immediate predecessors -- Resurrecting some venerable ancestors -- A natural Garden of Eden -- The positive side of social selection -- Learning morals across the generations -- Work of the moral majority -- Pleistocene ups, downs, and crashes -- Testing the selection-by-reputation hypothesis -- The evolution of morals -- Epilogue: humanity's moral future.

The theory of human moral evolution elaborated in the later work of Jürgen Habermas represents one of the most challenging and provocative of recent, linguistically inspired attempts to reinterpret our understanding of Western history. In critically examining this theory, the present article identifies some major problems with Habermas's reinterpretation of the history of the formation of Western civilization as the universal pragmatic process of the evolution of human moral communicative competences. Drawing on the works of Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault, (...) the article seeks to show how the formal grounding of Habermas's evolutionary theory in the categories of his universal pragmatic conception of communicative action ultimately prevents him from grasping the radically embodied nature of human discursive practice and its implications for the historical process of the formation of human moral will. (shrink)

Moral thinking pervades our practical lives, but where did this way of thinking come from, and what purpose does it serve? Is it to be explained by environmental pressures on our ancestors a million years ago, or is it a cultural invention of more recent origin? In The Evolution of Morality, Richard Joyce takes up these controversial questions, finding that the evidence supports an innate basis to human morality. As a moral philosopher, Joyce is interested in whether any implications follow (...) from this hypothesis. Might the fact that the human brain has been biologically prepared by natural selection to engage in moral judgment serve in some sense to vindicate this way of thinking--staving off the threat of moral skepticism, or even undergirding some version of moral realism? Or if morality has an adaptive explanation in genetic terms--if it is, as Joyce writes, "just something that helped our ancestors make more babies"--might such an explanation actually undermine morality's central role in our lives? He carefully examines both the evolutionary "vindication of morality" and the evolutionary "debunking of morality," considering the skeptical view more seriously than have others who have treated the subject.Interdisciplinary and combining the latest results from the empirical sciences with philosophical discussion, The Evolution of Morality is one of the few books in this area written from the perspective of moral philosophy. Concise and without technical jargon, the arguments are rigorous but accessible to readers from different academic backgrounds. Joyce discusses complex issues in plain language while advocating subtle and sometimes radical views. The Evolution of Morality lays the philosophical foundations for further research into the biological understanding of human morality. (shrink)

In The Evolution of Moral Progress Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell advance an evolutionary explanation of moral progress by morality becoming more ‘inclusivist’. We are prepared to accept this explanation as far as it goes, but argue that it fails to explain how morality can become inclusivist in the fuller sense they intend. In fact, it even rules out inclusivism in their intended sense of moral progress, since they believe that human altruism and prosocial attitudes are essentially parochial. We also (...) respond to their charge that the possibility of moral enhancement by biomedical means that we have defended in numerous publications assumes that moral attitudes are biologically hard‐wired to an extent that implies that they are resilient to the influence of cognitive or cultural factors. Quite the contrary, we think they are more open to such influence than they seem to do. (shrink)

"Few thinkers have stood as squarely at both the center and the periphery of an intellectual movement as has Shao Yung (1011-1077). Ethical model and eccentric, socialite and eremite, Shao Yung is perhaps not only the greatest enigma of early Neo-Confucianism, but also one of its undisputed giants. In this impressive life-and-thought study, Don J. Wyatt painstakingly sifts through all available evidence relating to Shao Yung and his scholarship to provide a portrait that fully exposes the moral center of the (...) man and his work. Drawing on the abundant store of letters and accounts by Shao's contemporaries and his own much-neglected poetry, Wyatt has assembled a study that intimately relates Shao's life to his thought. He challenges the assumptions of previous Western scholarship by persuasively arguing against the acceptance of works traditionally ascribed to Shao - specifically, the Kuan-wu wai-p'ien (Outer Chapters on Observing Things), the Yu-ch'iao wen-ta (Fisherman and Woodcutter Dialogue), and the cryptic quasi-autobiographical essay Wu-ming kung chuan (Biography of the Nameless Lord)." "Shao is presented as an independent thinker whose philosophical lexicon functioned according to a profound interdependence that was unique among the systems of his peers. His metaphysical concepts, which appear impervious to and beyond the scope of human influence - namely, his ching-shih (world ordering), kuan-wu (observing things), and I-Ching - derived hsien-t'ien (before Heaven) methodologies - are essentially the products of a morally reflective life. Wyatt's discoveries, therefore, refute the common assertion of Shao Yung's moral indifference. Moreover, by meticulously integrating the progress of this Neo-Confucian's thought into the course of his life, the author has produced one of the most textured and accessible works on a philosopher of the Sung era."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

The current project introduces a general theory and supporting models that offer a plausible explanation and viable mechanism for generating and perpetuating prosocial behavior. The proposed mechanism is preferential detachment and the theory proposed is that agents utilizing preferential detachment will sort themselves into social arrangements such that the agents who contribute a benefit to the members of their group also do better for themselves in the long run. Agents can do this with minimal information about their environment, the other (...) agents, the future, and with minimal cognitive/computational ability. The conclusion is that self-organizing into groups that maintain prosocial behaviors may be simpler and more robust than previously thought. The primary contribution of this research is that a single, simple mechanism operating in different contexts generates the conceptually distinct prosocial behaviors achieved by other models, and in a manner that is more amenable to evolutionary explanations. It also bears importantly on explanations of the evolution of our moral experiences and their connection with prosociality. (shrink)

Buchanan and Powell’s ambitious work offers a wide-ranging philosophical treatment about one of social science’s active inquries: human morality and how it evolved. This review humbly offers a brief engagement with the social science of morality, both to support the book’s conclusions and occasionally to build productive interdisciplinary bridges toward an even more fuller treatment of the topic.

Given the evolution of the public health (PH) and the changes from the phenomenon of globalization, this area has encountered new ethical challenges. In order to find a coherent approach to address ethical issues in PH policy, this study aimed to identify the evolution of public health ethics (PHE) frameworks and the main moral values and norms in PH practice and policy. According to the research questions, a systematic search of the literature, in English, with no time limit was performed (...) using the main keywords in databases Web of Science (ISI) and PubMed. Finally, the full text of 56 papers was analyzed. Most of the frameworks have common underpinning assumptions and beliefs, and the need to balance PH moral obligation to prevent harm and health promotion with respect for individual autonomy has been specified. As such, a clear shift from liberal values in biomedical ethics is seen toward the community’s collective values in PHE. The main moral norms in PH practice and policy included protecting the population against harm and improving PH benefits, utility and evidenced-based effectiveness, distributive justice and fairness, respect for all, privacy and confidentiality, solidarity, social responsibility, community empowerment and participation, transparency, accountability and trust. Systematic review of PHE frameworks indicates utilization of the aforementioned moral norms through an practical framework as an ethical guide for action in the PH policy. The validity of this process requires a systematic approach including procedural conditions. (shrink)

The subject of this book is moral change, including moral progress and regression. The intention is to use the best thinking about the evolution of morality and the best available social science research to determine the possibilities for progressive change in human moralities by examining important morally progressive changes that have already occurred, in order to determine the social conditions that are conducive to moral progress.

A short response to Michael Ruse's essay 'Commons Sense Morality and Its Evolutionary Underpinnings'. Argues that an evolutionary approach to ethics has difficulty accounting for the first-personal and existential aspects of moral deliberation.

Here, in textbook style, is a concise biological account of the evolution of morality. It addresses morality on three levels: moral outcomes (behavioral genetics), moral motivation or intent (psychology and neurology), and moral systems (sociality). The rationale for teaching this material is addressed in Allchin (2009). Classroom resources (including accompanying images and video links) and a discussion of teaching strategies are provided online at: http://EvolutionOfMorality.net.

Humans are moral creatures. Among all life on Earth, we alone experience rich moral emotions, follow complex rules governing how we treat one another, and engage in moral dialogue. But how did human morality evolve? And can humans become morally evolved? -/- In A Better Ape, Victor Kumar and Richmond Campbell draw on the latest research in the biological and social sciences to explain the key role that morality has played in human evolution. They explore the moral traits that humans (...) share with chimpanzees; how a more complex moral mind enabled Homo sapiens to arise and out-compete other human species; and the place of morality alongside historic revolutions in technology and social organization. Throughout the book, Kumar and Campbell argue that morality co-evolved with intelligence and complex sociality. Morality prevents societal collapse and enables complex knowledge. -/- After unearthing the ancient origins of human morality, Kumar and Campbell use evolutionary theory to deliver profound insights about how to advance moral progress and resist moral regress, such as reducing animal suffering on industrial farms; capitalizing on the recent revolution in gay rights to foster a nascent revolution in transgender rights; opposing intersectional inequality that impacts women and people of color in lower socioeconomic classes; and addressing major problems of global inequality, especially impending crises of injustice caused by anthropogenic climate change. Understanding how we evolved--and how we continue to evolve--can help us become a better ape. (shrink)

Abstract:Liberal thinkers of the Enlightenment understood that surplus moral constraints, imposed by invalid moral norms, are a serious limitation on liberty. They also recognized that overcoming surplus moral constraints — what we call proper de-moralization — is an important dimension of moral progress. Contemporary philosophical theorists of liberty have largely neglected the threat that surplus moral constraints pose to liberty and the importance of proper de-moralization for human emancipation. This essay examines the phenomena of surplus moral constraints and proper de-moralization, (...) utilizing insights from biological and cultural evolutionary thinking. (shrink)

Donald Broom argues that morality and the central components of religion are of great value, and presents two central ideas. He asserts that morality has a biological foundation and has evolved as a consequence of natural selection, and that religions are essentially the structures supporting morality. Many philosophers and theologians write about morality and its origins without reference to biological processes such as evolution. Likewise, biologists discuss phenomena of importance to human morality and religion without taking account of the thoughts (...) of others on these subjects. (shrink)

My essay first takes me into the arena in which science, spirituality, and theology meet. I comment on the enterprise of science and how scientists could well benefit from reciprocal interactions with theologians and religious leaders. Next, I discuss the evolution of social morality and the ways in which various aspects of social play behavior relate to the notion of “behaving fairly.” The contributions of spiritual and religious perspectives are important in our coming to a fuller understanding of the evolution (...) of morality. I go on to discuss animal emotions, the concept of personhood, and how our special relationships with other animals, especially the companions with whom we share our homes, help us to define our place in nature, our humanness. It is when we take the life of another being in the ritual of compassionately euthanizing them (“putting them to sleep”) that who we are in the grand scheme of things comes to the fore. I end with a discussion of the importance of ethological studies, behavioral research in which a serious attempt is made to understand animals in their own worlds, inquiries in which it is asked, “What is it like to be another species?” Species other than nonhuman primates need to be studied. I plead for developing compassionate, heartfelt, and holistic science that allows for interdisciplinary talk about respect, grace, spirituality, religion, love, Earth, and God. (shrink)

Morals and the Evolution of Man, a classical book, has been considered essential throughout the human history, and so that this work is never forgotten we at Alpha Editions have made efforts in its preservation by republishing this book in a modern format for present and future generations. This whole book has been reformatted, retyped and designed. These books are not made of scanned copies of their original work and hence the text is clear and readable.

Moral norms are the rules of morality, those that people actually follow, and those that we feel people ought to follow, even when they don’t. Historically, the social sciences have been primarily concerned with describing the many forms that moral norms take in various cultures, with the emerging implication that moral norms are mere arbitrary products of culture. Philosophers, on the other hand, have been more concerned with trying to understand the nature and source of rules that all cultures ought (...) to follow, with relatively little regard for what people actually do. The tension between the two approaches has to do with whether there are any standards higher than the whims of culture in determining right and wrong. Typically, the social sciences say “no”, pointing at the diversity of moral beliefs. Most philosophers (along with people of moral conviction) feel that there must be some deeper source of morality than the trends and fads of culture. Unfortunately, the nature and source of such standards has remained something of a mystery. Recent work on the evolution of norms has changed this picture dramatically. (shrink)

Designing an ontology that meets the needs of end-users, e.g., a medical team, is critical to support the reasoning with data. Therefore, an ontology design should be driven by the constant and efficient validation of end-users needs. However, there is not an existing standard process in knowledge engineering that guides the ontology design with the required quality. There are several ontology design processes, which range from iterative to sequential, but they fail to ensure the practical application of an ontology and (...) to quantitatively validate end-user requirements through the evolution of an ontology. In this paper, an ontology design process is proposed, which is driven by end-user requirements, defined as Competency Questions (CQs). The process is called CQ-Driven Ontology DEsign Process (CODEP) and it includes activities that validate and verify the incremental design of an ontology through metrics based on defined CQs. CODEP has also been applied in the design and development of an ontology in the context of a Mexican Hospital for supporting Neurologist specialists. The specialists were involved, during the application of CODEP, in collecting quality measurements and validating the ontology increments. This application can demonstrate the feasibility of CODEP to deliver ontologies with similar requirements in other contexts. (shrink)

We are moral apes, a difference between humans and our relatives that has received significant recent attention in the evolutionary literature. Evolutionary accounts of morality have often been recruited in support of error theory: moral language is truth-apt, but substantive moral claims are never true. In this article, we: locate evolutionary error theory within the broader framework of the relationship between folk conceptions of a domain and our best scientific conception of that same domain; within that broader framework, argue that (...) error theory and vindication are two ends of a continuum, and that in the light of our best science, many folk conceptual structures are neither hopelessly wrong nor fully vindicated; and argue that while there is no full vindication of morality, no seamless reduction of normative facts to natural facts, nevertheless one important strand in the evolutionary history of moral thinking does support reductive naturalism—moral facts are facts about cooperation, and the conditions and practices that support or undermine it. In making our case for, we first respond to the important error theoretic argument that the appeal to moral facts is explanatorily redundant, and second, we make a positive case that true moral beliefs are a ‘fuel for success’, a map by which we steer, flexibly, in a variety of social interactions. The vindication, we stress, is at most partial: moral cognition is a complex mosaic, with a complex genealogy, and selection for truth-tracking is only one thread in that genealogy. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Setting the Task The Moral Brain The First Layer: Kin Selection The Second Layer: Reciprocal Altruism A Third Layer: Indirect Reciprocity A Fourth Layer: Cultural Group Selection A Fifth Layer: The Moral Emotions Conclusion: From Moral Grammar to Moral Systems.

Steven Pinker has said that one of the most important questions humans can ask of themselves is whether moral progress has occurred or is likely to occur. Buchanan and Powell here address that question, in order to provide the first naturalistic, empirically-informed and analytically sophisticated theory of moral progress--explaining the capacities in the human brain that allow for it, the role of the environment, and how contingent and fragile moral progress can be.

Teaching mathematics and improving mathematics competence are pending subjects within our educational system. The PEIM (Programa Evolutivo Instruccional para Matemáticas), a constructivist intervention program for the improvement of mathematical performance, affects the different agents involved in math learning, guaranteeing a significant improvement in students’ performance. The program is based on the following pillars: (a) students become the main agents of their learning by constructing their own knowledge; (b) the teacher must be the guide to facilitate and guarantee such a construction (...) by being a great connoisseur of the fundamental aspects of the development of the child’s mathematical thinking; (c) the mathematical contents must be sequenced in terms of the complexity and significance for the student as well as contextualized at all times; and (d) the classroom must have a constructivist climate highlighting cooperative work among students. The implementation of PEIM along with the empirical evaluation conducted in several centers in Madrid and Zaragoza (Spain) confirm how students improve their mathematical competence. Both first- and second-grade students in elementary education were far more effective in solving problems, highlighting the use of more advanced strategies in their resolution and a lower incidence of conceptual errors. Moreover, it was possible to verify how the students proving greater difficulty, experienced an evolution in learning similarly to those who did not present it. The program provides customized education to allow the teacher to know at all times how he should be more influential on the students’ learning through mathematical profiles. Both teaching practice and teachers were observed, being that of the experimental group more prone to analyzing processes and allowing the construction of knowledge by students, due to their psycho-developmental training. As a result, we found several improvements through the implementation of the program that may serve, for upcoming years, as a basis for the necessary changes in the teaching of mathematics. (shrink)

Some recent philosophical analyses of gene‐culture coevolutionary theory propose that morality is a contributing cause in (and not only an outcome of) human evolution. This paper considers implications of this idea for Thomistic moral theory. According to the coevolutionary account, the social practices of early human communities create selection pressures in favour of pro‐moral adaptations, making the evolution of morality a ‘biocultural’ process in which culture in some respects drives biology. This position chimes with, and indeed advances, some core themes (...) of Thomistic ethics, including: the abiding significance of moral passions; the centrality of practical reason; the social character of practical reason; moral realism; the naturalness of morality; the link between nature and normativity. Biocultural evolutionary theory can thus offer Thomistic ethicists some new ways to understand their old ideas. If it is true that morality is a cause and not only an effect of human evolution, then Thomists are invited to see morality as an even more natural phenomenon than they previously thought. (shrink)

The prospect of replication of human beings through genetic manipulation has engendered one of the most controversial debates about reproduction in our society. Ideology is clearly influencing the direction of research and legislation on human cloning, which may present one of the greatest existential challenges to the meaning of creation. In this article, I argue that, in view of the possibility that human cloning and other emerging technologies could enhance physical and cognitive abilities, there is a need for a different (...) way of thinking about life, new technologies and creation. New scientific discoveries require a shift in the way psychology takes responsibility to help individuals and society. Today, psychology needs to follow the progress that humans are taking toward a transhuman stage of development as a transition to a later posthuman stage. (shrink)

The paper explores the interplay among moral progress, evolution and moral realism. Although it is nearly uncontroversial to note that morality makes progress of one sort or another, it is far from uncontroversial to define what constitutes moral progress. In a minimal sense, moral progress occurs when a subsequent state of affairs is better than a preceding one. Moral realists conceive “it is better than” as something like “it more adequately reflects moral facts”; therefore, on a realist view, moral progress (...) can be associated with accumulations of moral knowledge. From an evolutionary perspective, on the contrary, since there cannot be something like moral knowledge, one might conclude there cannot even be such a thing as moral progress. More precisely, evolutionism urges us to ask whether we can acknowledge the existence of moral progress without being committed to moral realism. A promising strategy, I will argue, is to develop an account of moral progress based on moral understanding rather than moral knowledge. On this view, moral progress follows increases in moral understanding rather than accumulations of moral knowledge. Whether an understanding-based account of moral progress is feasible and what its implications for the notion itself of moral progress are, will be discussed. (shrink)

The retina pigment epithelium (RPE) is a highly specialised epithelium that serves as a multifunctional and indispensable component of the vertebrate eye. Although a great deal of attention has been paid to its transdifferentiation capabilities and its ancillary functions in neural retina development, little is known about the molecular mechanisms that specify the RPE itself. Recent advances in our understanding of the genetic network that controls the progressive specification of the eye anlage in vertebrates have provided some of the initial (...) cues to the mechanisms responsible for RPE patterning. Here, we have outlined many recent findings that suggest that a limited number of transcription factors, including Otx2, Mitf and Pax6 and a few signalling cascades, are the elements required for the onset of RPE specification in vertebrates. Furthermore, using this information and the data available on the specification of the pigmented cells of primitive chordates, we have ventured some hypotheses on the origin of RPE cells during evolution. BioEssays 26:766–777, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Despite the widespread use of the notion of moral intuition, its psychological features remain a matter of debate and it is unclear why the capacity to experience moral intuitions evolved in humans. We first survey standard accounts of moral intuition, pointing out their interesting and problematic aspects. Drawing lessons from this analysis, we propose a novel account of moral intuitions which captures their phenomenological, mechanistic, and evolutionary features. Moral intuitions are composed of two elements: an evaluative mental state and a (...) feeling of rightness (FOR). We illustrate the phenomenology of the FOR with examples of non-moral and moral cases, and provide a biological and mechanistic account: the emergence of human reasoning capacities created a need for the co-evolution of a psychological system producing the feeling of rightness (the FORs). This system is triggered when we experience conflicting evaluations. The FORs renders evaluations resulting from rational deliberation less compelling than the evaluations produced by simple evolved systems. It thus facilitates optimal decision-making, preventing excessive interference by rational deliberation. Our account sheds light on why moral intuitions are so frequently experienced and why they are so compelling and resistant to argument. In addition, the account fuels interesting speculations about common metaethical intuitions. (shrink)

Some have supposed that morality has its basis in altruistic emotions implanted in accordance with the standard principles of natural selection. It is argued, to the contrary, that the falsity of group selection theory precludes founding genuine altruism on such a basis, and that the correct theory of evolution renders morality possible only if a cognitivist conception of moral psychology is accepted. Some independent reasons are given for favouring that conception over its noncognitivist rival. Morality is then claimed to be (...) a necessary corollary of advanced intelligence, so that morality cannot easily be selected against. Finally, the bearing of the foregoing considerations on the normative contention commonly labelled 'species-ism' is assessed; it is concluded that a proper view of morality suggests the inclusion of (other) animals within its domain of concern. (shrink)

In my summary lecture at the IRAS 1997 Star Island Conference on the Evolution of Morality, I reflected on the thinking of other speakers in light of my own personal experience. My remarks were organized around five questions: (1) Do worldviews matter, and how do we decide if some matter more than others? (2) What does it mean to be moral? (3) What is the relation between biology and culture? (4) How does a scientific, sociobiological description of how we have (...) become moral fit with our own personal quest for meaning and moral guidance toward richer and fuller lives? (5) How do we test evolutionary views of the biological conditions of morality scientifically? (shrink)

Christians frequently resist evolutionary theory, believing it to be incompatible with the core values of their tradition. But what exactly are the tensions between evolution and religious faith in the area of human morality? Evolution and Ethics examines the burning questions of human morality from the standpoint of Christian thought and contemporary biology, asking where the two perspectives diverge and where they may complement one another. -/- Representing a significant dialogue between world-class scientists, philosophers, and theologians, this volume explores the (...) central features of biological and religious accounts of human morality, introducing the leading theories and locating the key points of contention. Central to these discussions are the questions of whether human actions are ever genuinely selfless, whether there is something in the moral life that transcends biological function, and whether one can sensibly speak of an overall purpose to the course of evolution. (shrink)