Miriam Fischer-Geboers montre que le corps dansant – que Nancy aborde à partir de sa pensée du sujet et du sens – nous présente une « mutation » : le corps dansant mute en performance du sens, mute en pensée ; « le corps devient l’incorporel d’un sens qui pourtant n’est pas ailleurs qu’à travers le corps ». La réflexion sur la danse comme pensée mène finalement à une réflexion sur la pensée en général, et surtout sur (...) la pensée philosophique. L’auteure met en relief que la « véritable pensée » est, selon Nancy, toujours une pensée dont on éprouve la vérité, dont on sent le sens, dont on pèse le poids du sens. Elle se demande si, en conséquence, il faut penser la relation entre la danse et la philosophie d’une nouvelle manière. (shrink)

Die elf Beiträge dieses Bandes gehen aus verschiedenen Blickwinkeln dem Problem der Verkörperung von Sinn nach: phänomenologische, psychoanalytische und sprachwissenschaftliche Ansätze bilden dabei den Schwerpunkt; sie werden aber durch Studien aus der Literaturtheorie, der politischen Theorie und der Filmwissenschaft ergänzt. Was heißt es – das ist die zentrale Frage –, den Körper als leibliches Medium aufzufassen, welches Sinn nicht nur verkörpert, sondern überhaupt erst entstehen lässt? Gibt es bereits eine Sprache des Leibes diesseits der Ebene ausdrücklicher Rede?

I investigate what we mean when we hold people responsible for beliefs. I begin by outlining a puzzle concerning our ordinary judgments about beliefs and briefly survey and critique some common responses to the puzzle. I then present my response where I argue a sense needs to be articulated in which we do have a kind of control over our beliefs if our practice of attributing responsibility for beliefs is appropriate. In developing this notion of doxastic control, I draw from (...) John Fischer's discussions of “guidance control”. A central feature of this kind of control is the idea of “ownership”. I argue that we can own our beliefs and that we expect each other to do so. We take responsibility for our beliefs and taking responsibility includes taking control of them. I end by considering objections to my view as well as some implications of it. (shrink)

Much has been written recently about free will and moral responsibility. In this paper I will focus on the relationship between free will, on the one hand, and various notions that fall under the rubric of “morality,” broadly construed, on the other: deliberation and practical reasoning, moral responsibility, and ethical notions such as “ought,” “right,” “wrong,” “good,” and “bad.” I shall begin by laying out a natural understanding of freedom of the will. Next I develop some challenges to the common-sense (...) view that we have this sort of freedom. I will go on to explore the implications of this challenge for deliberation, moral responsibility, and the central ethical notions. (shrink)

Some people have moral objections to insect consumption. After explaining the philosophical motivations for such objections, I discuss three of them, suggesting potential replies. The first is that insect consumption ignores the precautionary principle, which we can gloss here as “Don’t know, don’t farm.” In other words, while there might be evidence that insects are not conscious, we do not know that they are not; so, we should not take the moral risk associated with killing them en masse. The second (...) concern is driven by a different way of assessing moral risk — namely, by calculating expected utility. The short version: even if it is incredibly unlikely that insects are conscious, farming them involves harming so many of them that it is better simply to grow plants instead. The third concern is about whether insects live “net negative lives,” with more pain than pleasure. The thought is that if they do, then their lives are not worth living overall, in which case it is wrong to bring them into existence. I conclude by considering the prospects for strategic alliances between animal advocates and those who promote insect consumption, in the even that they are unable to resolve their moral disagreements. (shrink)

In this brief concluding chapter we first wish to present the overall argument of the book in a concise, nontechnical way. We hope this will provide a clear view of the argument. We shall then point to some of the distinctive--and attractive--features of our approach. Finally, we shall offer some preliminary thoughts about extending the account of moral responsibility to apply to emotions.

In a fascinating and challenging article in this journal, Kadri Vihvelin presents a spirited and vigorous critique of the strategy of defending compatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility that employs the ‘Frankfurt-examples.’ Here is her presentation of such an example:… Jones … chooses to perform, and succeeds in performing, some action X. Tell the story so that it is vividly clear that Jones is morally responsible for doing X. If you are a libertarian, you may specify that Jones is (...) an indeterministic agent who can choose otherwise, given the actual past and the laws. If you are a compatibilist, you may fill in the details so that Jones does X in a way that satisfies your favorite account of the counterfactual or dispositional facts that make it true that Jones could have done otherwise in the sense you think relevant to responsibility. Now, add to your story the following facts: there is standing in the wings another agent, Black. Black is interested in what Jones does. In particular, he wants Jones to do X and, moreover, Black has it in his power to prevent Jones from doing anything other than X. (shrink)

1. bd. Descartes' leben, werke und lehre. 4. neu bearb. aufl. 1897.--2. bd. Spinozas leben, werke und lehre. 4. neu bearb. aufl. 1898.--3. bd. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Leben, werke und lehre. 4. aufl. 1902.--4-5. bd. Immanuel Kant und seine lehre. 4. neu bearb. aufl. 1898-99.--6. bd. Fichtes leben, werke und lehre. 3. durchgesehene aufl. 1900.--7. bd. Schellings leben, werke und lehre. 3. aufl. 1902.--8. bd. l.-2. th. Hegels leben, werke und lehre. 1901.--9. bd. Schopenhauers leben, werke und lehre. 2. neu (...) bearb. und verm. aufl. 1898.--10. bd. Francis Bacon und seine schule. Entwicklungsgeschichte der erfahrungsphilosophie. 3. aufl. 1904. (shrink)

In current debates about coming to terms with individual and collective wrongdoing, the concept of forgiveness has played an important but controversial role. For a long time, the idea was widespread that a forgiving attitude — overcoming feelings of resentment and the desire for revenge — was always virtuous. Recently, however, this idea has been questioned. The contributors to this volume do not take sides for or against forgiveness but rather examine its meaning and function against the backdrop of a (...) more complex understanding of moral repair in a variety of social, circumstantial, and cultural contexts. The book aims to gain a differentiated understanding of the European traditions regarding forgiveness, revenge, and moral repair that have shaped our moral intuitions today whilst also examining examples from other cultural contexts (Asia and Africa, in particular) to explore how different cultural traditions deal with the need for moral repair after wrongdoing. -/- . (shrink)

Guiding principles are central to theory development in physics, especially when there is only limited empirical input available. Here I propose an approach to such principles looking at their heuristic role. I suggest a distinction between two modes of employing scientific principles. Principles of nature make descriptive claims about objects of inquiry, and principles of epistemic action give directives for further research. If a principle is employed as a guiding principle, then its use integrates both modes of employment: guiding principles (...) imply descriptive claims, and they provide directives for further research. By discussing the correspondence principle and the naturalness principle as examples, I explore the consequences for understanding and evaluating current guiding principles in physics. Like principles of nature, guiding principles are evaluated regarding their descriptive implications about the research object. Like principles of epistemic action, guiding principles are evaluated regarding their ability to respond to context-specific needs of the epistemic agent. (shrink)

What kinds of ethical considerations, if any, are relevant to research, management, or conservation efforts involving insects? What limits might be appropriate for those actions? These are questions we ask as members of a profession—one that’s devoted to the study of certain organisms. We probably won’t make any progress as a discipline by beginning the way philosophers generally do: namely, by trying to assess whether insects have intrinsic value; that is, whether they have value even when we don’t value them. (...) It is better, we submit, to reflect more carefully on our own values and practices, paying special attention to the role that insects play in our scientific endeavors, whether those endeavors are basic research, vector control, integrated pest management, or insect conservation and biodiversity assessment. -/- From a professional standpoint, the goals of entomologists center around learning about, working with, and responding to insects. Because insects are living organisms, the tie that binds the many strands of entomology together, we should affirm the significant role that insects play in everyday life and encourage examination of how to relate to them. (shrink)

La violencia de género es toda acción violenta basada en la desigualdad de las relaciones de dominación del hombre sobre la mujer. Primero, se evidenció las bondades psicométricas del instrumento utilizado desde el Modelo de Ecuaciones Estructurales (SEM) para establecer un análisis estadístico multivariado de rasgos de personalidad y factores predictivos para identificar las características de personalidad vinculadas a factores predictores de la violencia contra la mujer. La muestra estuvo conformada por 137 mujeres víctimas de violencia por parte de sus (...) parejas que acudieron a las comisarías de la mujer de Lima metropolitana. El diseño fue Ex post facto y el análisis de datos se realizó a partir del SEM, cumpliendo los supuestos de normalidad multivariado. Los resultados reportan un efecto directo entre los rasgos de personalidad vinculados con los factores predictores que favorecen la violencia de género, historia de violencia, grado de instrucción y lugar de procedencia. (shrink)

The paper seeks to refute the idea that physiology can explain at best an organism’s behaviour, outward and inner, but not the conscious experiences that accompany that behaviour. To do so, the paper clarifies the idea by confrontation with an actual example of psychophysical explanation of perceptual experience. This reveals that the idea relies on a prejudice about physiological practice. Then the paper explores some peculiar ways in which this prejudice may survive its refutation. This is to bring out that (...) such explanations of experience as are actually offered by contemporary psychophysics explain nothing less than what they purport to explain; and that these achievements are not, in some peculiar way, more remarkable than equally clever physical explanations of other phenomena. (shrink)

In acht auf deutsch und zwei auf englisch geschriebenen Aufsätzen werden Themen aus der Forschungstätigkeit, dem Leben und der Lehre des Autors behandelt: das Schicksal eines Wiener Emigranten, die angloamerikanische und die österreichische Philosophie und manche ihrer hervorragenden Gestalten. Die Schriften sind autobiographisch, historisch und kritisch und vermitteln vor allem geistesgeschichtliche und kulturhistorische Aspekte unseres Jahrhunderts.

What are ethics? And why are they important? -- Ethics and goal-setting -- Employee ethics -- Marketing ethics -- Ethics and customers.