Michael Pirron is CEO of Impact Makers, an IT consulting firm based in Virginia. Impact Makers decided to reincorporate as a Benefit Corporation when Virginia passed the legislation. In this interview with Professor Daryl Koehn from DePaul University, Pirron discusses why he chose to reincorporate and their organization’s decision to give all their profits to charity. To do this, Impact Makers set up a new financial innovation to protect the social purpose of the organization. They gave all (...) their common stock to two public charities and if the organization is ever sold, all the proceeds would go to charitable organizations in their community. (shrink)

The object of study in this paper is belief. Our aim is to show how, through this concept, Hume's modern and Pirro's ancient scepticism may converge into a fairly similar position. Both the theoretical and at the same time practical attitudes consider it licit to "assent to what presents itself to man in an unavoidable way and independently from our will". As we now, there is for Sixtus as well as for Hume something, regardless of the name we give it (...) , which "induces" us to or "demands" assent from us, [the latter being] a fundamental term which seems to indicate a concept common to both, ancient scepticism and Hume's thought. Would it then be legitimate or justified to keep giving our support to that statement of history that called Hume first an "empiricist" and afterwards a "naturalist"? Would it not be more accurate to trace some pirronism, even unconscious, in the Scot's ideas? Our answer starts off from Michael Frede's non-traditional interpretation, who somewhat firmly set up the idea that the sceptical resign having beliefs, or at least, can have them without by it trespassing the epoché. The central issue will then be to determine which meaning should be attributed to the term "belief".El objeto de estudio de este trabajo es la creencia. Nuestro objetivo es mostrar cómo a través de ese concepto el escepticismo moderno de Hume y el antiguo de Pirrón pueden llegar a converger en una posición bastante similar. Ambas actitudes teóricas y a la vez prácticas consideran que es lícito dar "asentimiento a aquello que se presenta al hombre de modo inevitable e independientemente de nuestra voluntad. Sabemos que tanto para Sexto como para Hume hay algo, independientemente del nombre que le demos , que nos "induce" o nos "exige" asentimiento, término fundamental que parece indicar un concepto común al escepticismo antiguo y al pensamiento de Hume. ¿Será entonces legítimo o justificado seguir apoyando el juicio de la historia que calificó en un principio a Hume de "empirista" o posteriormente de "naturalista"? ¿No será más exacto rastrear cierto pirronismo, aunque sea inconsciente, en las ideas del escocés? Nuestra respuesta parte de la interpretación no tradicional de Michael Frede que fundamentó con cierta solidez la idea de que el escéptico no renuncia a tener creencias o, al menos, puede tenerlas sin infringir con ello la epoché. La cuestión central será entonces determinar qué significado habría que atribuir al término "creencia". (shrink)

Do pharmaceutical companies have a moral obligation to expand access to investigational drugs to patients outside the clinical trial? One reason for thinking they do not is that expanded access programs might negatively affect the clinical trial process. This potential impact creates dilemmas for practitioners who nevertheless acknowledge some moral reason for expanding access. Bioethicists have explained these reasons in terms of beneficence, compassion, or a principle of rescue, but their arguments have been limited to questions of moral permissibility, leaving (...) for future research the question of whether expanded access is morally obligatory. We take up this further question and argue that pharmaceutical companies have a moral obligation to expand access. Our defense is not based on beneficence, compassion, or rescue, but instead on a reciprocal moral expectation resulting from existing social commitments that help ensure a robust pharmaceutical practice within the broader healthcare system. Our aim is to give this obligation, along with several others, a coherent and plausible structure within the wider clinical trial process so that one might better explain the sources of the dilemmas and their possible resolutions. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Hegel's philosophy of mind is a systematically current conception due to its consistent anti-scientism and its multifaceted rejection of all forms of philosophical scepticism and its being a conception that has many references to pragmatism. In its detailed examination of Hegelian texts this book offers various systematic references to current philosophy of mind. From the starting point of a basis of action theory the specific moves of Hegel's concept of mind are developed: The antidualistic synthesis of corporality and spirituality and (...) the genuine sociability of the human mind create the framework in which Hegel develops a modern conception of concrete freedom. The primary goal of this book is to turn Hegel's philosophy of mind into fertile terrain for the addressing of central problems of the present by bringing his systematic views into a dialogue with philosophical positions which have proponents today. (shrink)

Yli-Vakkuri argues that content externalism can be established without thought experiments, as the deductive consequence of a pair of uncontroversial principles about beliefs, contents and truth. I argue that the most dialectically plausible motivation for the first principle, that truth is a broad property or beliefs, undermines the second principle, that the truth-value of a belief goes hand-in-hand with that of its content, and that other motivations are likely to depend on externalist thought experiments the argument was meant to avoid. (...) As it stands, the argument for externalism therefore fails. (shrink)

This two-volume collection brings together Michael C. Rea's most substantial work in analytic theology. The first volume considers the nature of God and our ability to talk and discover truths about God, whereas Volume II focuses on theological questions about humanity and the human condition. -/- The chapters in the first part of Volume I explore issues pertaining to discourse about God and the authority of scripture. Part two focuses on divine attributes, while part three discusses doctrine of the (...) trinity and related issues. Part one of Volume II considers the doctrines of the incarnation, original sin, and atonement. Part two examines the problem of evil, the problem of divine hiddenness, and a theological problem that arises in connection with the idea God not only tolerates but validates a response of angry protest in the face of these problems. (shrink)

Peirce’s philosophy, to a great extent, continues to be neglected as a potentially valuable resource for theologians and scholars of religion. This essay represents an attempt to rectify that state of affairs, albeit focused narrowly on how some of Peirce’s ideas might help to illuminate the role that attention plays in transforming consciousness and shaping certain meditative practices. Such practices display a logic consistent with the one that Peirce described in the process of developing his semiotic theory and his theory (...) of inquiry. While his writings on logic are voluminous, Peirce produced only a very few scattered remarks about the “logic of meditation,” broadly conceived. One purpose of this essay is to collect and to examine carefully those remarks. Another is to evaluate their significance for contemporary philosophers of religion who are invested in the task of trying to understand the nature and purpose of meditation, not as a single type of exercise, but in its various forms and manifestations. (shrink)

Michael Kelly is the author of 68 entries altogether. The New Oxford Companion to Literature in French is far more than a simple revision of the original Oxford Companion to French Literature, published in 1959, and described by The Listener as the `standard work of reference for English-speaking enquirers into French literature'. As the change in title implies, this completely new work presents an authoritative guide not only to ten centuries of literature produced in the territory now called France, (...) but also to the rich literary output of other French-speaking countries around the world. The scope of the Companion is deliberately open and inclusive, challenging and extending the traditional canon. Literature is understood in a broad sense, ranging from strip cartoon and pamphlet to tragedy and epic, and particular attention is devoted to francophone writing from outside France. Written by an international team of specialists, entries cover individual authors and works - over 3,000 of them - from the troubadours to Césaire, and from La Princesse de Clèves to La Vie mode d'emploi. Each is discussed in detail within their historical, cultural, and intellectual context. Among the new features of the Companion are the substantial essay-entries, reflecting up-to-date scholarship and theoretical debates on topics such as: - literary movements and genres - historical subjects such as chivalry, or Occupation and Resistance in wartime France - movements of thought from Scholasticism to feminism - linguistic topics - the sciences - the arts and media, including opera, cinema, and press. (shrink)

El artículo estudia la apropiación que hace Agustín del argumento de Platón respecto a la existencia de un demiurgo cósmico en Timeo 27d-28c. Muestra cómo Agustín se enfrenta implícitamente a la falacia cosmogónica, haciendo algunas enmiendas al argumento de Platón, a fin de conservarlo para los teístas como modelo filosófico de los orígenes cósmicos.

In a Normal Case, a subject has a justified true belief that P and also knows that P. In a Gettier Case, a subject has a justified true belief that P but does not know that P. The received view (endorsed by Lycan and others) is that if one is in a Normal Case then one cannot know that he is not in a Gettier case. I argue that the received view is mistaken and I discuss the implications this has (...) on some other epistemological issues. (shrink)

In the Classical Museum of University College, Dublin, there is a small black glaze Attic cup belonging to the Vienna-Cup group. It is 7·7 cm high and 13·8 cm in diameter. It has been broken and repaired at some time and parts of the handles are modern, and some of the lip is restored. It might be as well to point out that the foot is whole and has never been broken. The cup is almost wholly black, except for the (...) insides of the handles, the outside edge and resting surface of the foot, and the centre of the foot which are all reserved. It looks quite normal, but if one picks it up and tilts it, one hears a rattling, almost a ringing, sound from the foot which is not only hollow, but contains three small clay pellets, as revealed by an X-ray examination. There is no vent hole.The cup is to be dated to some time within the period 475–450 B.C. I do not know of any parallels among the Vienna-Cup group, but there is another black glaze cup in Leningrad which belongs to the Kalliades-Brygos group and which has a hollow foot and rattling pellets just like those on the Dublin cup. The Kalliades-Brygos group is generally dated to between 500 and 470 B.C. This would mean that the Leningrad cup is probably earlier than the Dublin example, but they both still belong to the first half of the fifth century. The relevance to the discussion of a fragmentary foot in Toronto from a cup of Cup-Type C painted by Skythes c. 500 B.C., is debatable. In the case of this foot there is a hollow channel around the edge as in the Dublin and Leningrad examples, but it differs from them in that there was originally a small rectangular hole in it, the left side of which is preserved. The hole was apparently never closed, so that it is unlikely that the hollow held pellets as did the others, or if it did, there might have been a temporary stopper of, say, unbaked clay. The hole is a puzzle, for it seems too big to be merely a vent hole. (shrink)

Throughout Theodor Adorno’s Negative Dialectics moral philosophy is discussed only indirectly, as a subject which is relevant to the more primary discussions of freedom and world history, among others. In the relatively recently released English translation of the History and Freedom lectures, however, moral philosophy is more explicitly discussed, but even there its subject matter is of secondary importance to the more fundamental discussions of the philosophy of history and of freedom. In fact, that moral philosophy is an auxiliary concern (...) in these lectures reveals much about how Adorno views moral philosophy. Perhaps a trivial detail but revealing nonetheless, the lecture entitled ‘Transition to Moral Philosophy’ points to something quite essential about Adorno’s moral philosophy. In this lecture Adorno attempts to show that his previous discussions of the philosophy of history have direct bearing on the concept of freedom. He claims that his task is to articulate “what we [can glean]…about the problem of freedom, from the discussions of the philosophy of history” (HF, 177). Adorno rightfully believes that freedom, the ability to act (in some way) without being determined to do so, is a precondition of one’s actions being considered on moral grounds, of one being held morally accountable for such actions. Surely, therefore, it is appropriate that a transition takes place from discussing freedom to discussing moral philosophy. There is something else going on here, however, that reveals the peculiar nature of Adorno’s moral philosophy. The above quote reveals that the philosophy of history conditions the problem of freedom, and therefore moral philosophy for Adorno. The following paper attempts to show how Adorno’s moral philosophy is situated within his more foundational considerations of the philosophy of history and of freedom. As a result of it being so situated it also attempts to argue that the History and Freedom lectures reveal that the task for moral philosophy is the critique of moral philosophy. (shrink)

This article is a defense of the Nuremberg Trials. It addresses the standard criticism of the trials and outlines six principles of international law that constitute the legacy of Nuremberg.

Ausgehend von der geplanten, letztlich nicht zustande gekommenen Teilnahme des Filmregisseurs Friedrich Wilhelm Murnau am zweiten Kongress der Gesellschaft für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft verfolgt der Beitrag zwei Absichten: Zum einen skizziert er die Anfänge der Auseinandersetzung der Gesellschaft und ihrer Zeitschrift mit der Frage nach der Kunstfähigkeit des Films. Zum anderen nimmt er die geplante Mitwirkung Murnaus zum Anlass, dessen ästhetische Ansichten in einen Dialog mit Positionen zu versetzen, wie sie in dieser Frage auf dem 1924 nachgeholten Kongress und (...) in der Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft vertreten wurden. Die Übereinstimmungen, die sich zwischen den Auffassungen feststellen lassen, zeugen von der Ernsthaftigkeit, mit der die Gesellschaft, wenn auch nur für kurze Zeit, die Modernisierung ihrer Kunstreflexion und deren Öffnung auf die ästhetische Praxis und die technischen Medien hin betrieben hat. Mit Blick auf Murnau dokumentieren sie die wache Zeitgenossenschaft eines Regisseurs, der noch immer zu Unrecht als »Romantiker« und »Melancholiker« des Films gilt. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Greek Writing from Knossos to Homer: A Linguistic Interpretation of the Origin of the Greek Alphabet and the Continuity of Ancient Greek LiteracyMichael WeissRoger D. Woodard. Greek Writing from Knossos to Homer: A Linguistic Interpretation of the Origin of the Greek Alphabet and the Continuity of Ancient Greek Literacy. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. xiv = 287 pp. Cloth, $65.Woodard's is an important and groundbreaking (...) work which has put the question of the origin of the Greek alphabet in a new light. His thesis is that scribes literate in the Cypriot syllabary were responsible for the first Greek adaptation of the alphabet, and in order to demonstrate this thesis Woodard must investigate the spelling principles of the Mycenaean and Cypriot syllabic scripts. Although his initial chapters devoted to these scripts may at first seem irrelevant to the reader interested in the origin of the alphabet, they do turn out to be crucial for his theory.Woodard first describes the principles of the syllabic alphabets. Since neither Linear B nor the Cypriot syllabary was originally designed for the representation of the Greek language, both systems are relatively inefficient. In particular the representation of consonant clusters presented a problem for both syllabaries, for which a number of spelling strategies were devised. In Linear B the first consonant of a consonant cluster is either not written at all—e.g., ka–ko [khalkos], a strategy Woodard calls "partial spelling"—or the first consonant of the cluster is spelled with a dummy vowel copying the vowel of the syllable to the right: e.g., a–ko–ro [agros]. This type of spelling Woodard calls "plenary spelling." In Cypriot an internal consonant cluster is spelled either with "regressive spelling," whereby the first consonant of the cluster is expressed with a sign containing a dummy vowel copying the vowel immediately to the left—e.g., a–ra–ku–ro [argurō]—or with "progressive spelling," whereby the first consonant of the cluster is expressed with a sign containing a dummy vowel copying the vowel immediately to the right: e.g., pa–ti–ri [patri]. Cypriot progressive spelling is essentially identical to Linear B plenary spelling. Furthermore, Cypriot regressive spelling is used for precisely those internal clusters which are represented in Linear B with partial spelling.Trying to explain which factor(s) determine(s) whether a cluster will be spelled with, on the one hand, partial spelling in Linear B and regressive spelling in Cypriot or, on the other hand, with plenary spelling in Linear B and progressive spelling in Cypriot has been a long–standing project of Greek linguistics. In chapter 3 Woodard deals with the various theories which attempt to explain these different spelling strategies as the result of different syllabifications of consonant clusters. The simplest of the theories examined explains [End Page 163] partial/regressive spelling as indicating that the first consonant of the cluster closed the preceding syllable and the second consonant opened the following syllable. In other words, partial/regressive spelling is an indication of heterosyllabicity. Plenary/progressive spelling, on the other hand, is taken to indicate that the entire cluster began the following syllable; that is, clusters which are spelled in the plenary/progressive fashion are tautosyllabic. But, as Woodard rightly observes, the syllabifications needed to justify such a theory—e.g., de–so–mo to be syllabified [de–smois]—are abundantly contradicted by the metrical evidence of both later Greek and Vedic, which show that clusters of the type [–sm–] made position and therefore must have been heterosyllabic. If such clusters were heterosyllabic both in PIE, as the Vedic evidence suggests, and in later Greek, they must have had the same syllabification in Mycenaean. More sophisticated versions of syllable–based theories have tried to get around this problem in a variety of ways. The delicate versions of Ruijgh and Morpurgo Davies attempt to explain plenary spellings of the de–so–mo type as reflecting "orthographic syllabification" which arises through spelling in full those internal consonant clusters which are also spelled in full in word initial position. But even these versions, despite their partial agreement with the doctrines of the Greek grammarians, fail in... (shrink)

This paper discusses the 'master argument' of diodorus cronos from a semantic perspective. An argument is developed which suggests that proposition (1), 'every proposition true about the past is necessary', May have provided the principal motivation for diodorus denial of proposition (3), I.E., His equation of possibility with present-Or-Future truth. It is noted that (1) and (3) are jointly inconsistent only given the assumption of a linear ordering of time. It is further noted that diodorus' fatalism "could" be employed to (...) justify this additional assumption. However, To then use the conclusion of the 'master' to argue for fatalism would obviously be circular. I suspect, Rather, That diodorus' assumption of temporal linearity was implicit and uncritical. (shrink)

Loven is het verheerlijken en aanbidden van wat ons bevattingsvermogen en begrip te boven gaat. Dat maakt het een religieuze aangelegenheid: het voorwerp van lof is transcendent, blijvend en troostrijk. Wanneer het over menselijke, imperfecte zaken gaat, zoals de politiek, weten we dat we lof moeten behoeden voor afgoderij. Daarom spreken we in die context in plaats van aanbidding over loven als begrensde rechtvaardiging, als een rationele afweging. In de politiek klinken geen lofzangen. De taal van de politiek moet de (...) spreektaal van het volk zijn over het hier en nu, de echte wereld van de mogelijkheden, niet het transcendente hiernamaals. Het is een menselijke wereld waar we vat op hebben, waar we elkaar in de ogen kunnen zien, vanuit rationele overwegingen waardering kunnen toekennen en onthouden, in plaats van op onze knieën neer te vallen en eer te betonen aan een rechtvaardigheid en genade die ons begrip te boven gaat. Politiek is een realistische ontgoocheling voor en door het volk en dat is precies wat haar zo waardevol maakt. (shrink)