Photographer Smith allows a rare and intimate glimpse of the unique region of Southern Apalachia. Smith's images evoke a range of emotions and reveal the reality behind the stereotypes of rural Southern life.

1Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305‐2155, USAThe Evolution of Agency and Other Essays Kim Sterelny Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2001 xvi + 310 Hardback£42.50, $60.00 Paperback£15.95, $22.00.

Nicholas D. Smith considers an original interpretation of the Republic, presenting it as a work about knowledge and education. Smith pays particular attention to Plato's use of images as representations of higher realities in education, as well as the power of knowledge in the Republic.

Since Gayle Salamon’s 2018 article “What is Critical about Critical Phenomenology?”, phenomenologists and critical theorists have offered various responses to the question this title poses. In doing this, they articulated the following considerations: is renewed criticality targeting the phenomenological method itself, does it expand its subject matter to marginalized experiences, does it retool key phenomenological concepts? One aspect of this debate that has been left under-interrogated, however, is the word “phenomenology” itself. There is after all another question to ask in (...) this context: what is phenomenological about critical phenomenology? Many avenues of response are of course possible. Phenomenology could most broadly be meant as an approach that concerns itself with what is given in experience in order to describe the structures of that givenness. From a Husserlian perspective, pure phenomenology is the science which concerns itself with phenomena in the full and diverse sense of the word—not as understood by specific natural or human sciences. What is distinctive of phenomenology is thus not what subset or type of phenomena it is interested in but how it relates to them, which, as Husserl introduces Ideas I, happens “in a completely different attitude.”. (shrink)

Modern interpreters have often regarded Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics as a mystery, or even a bit of an embarrassment. In his treatises on natural science and ethics, Aristotle is constantly concerned to review the opinions of his predecessors and of people in general; where appropriate, he also takes note of experiential observations, some of them highly specialized. However, the traditional view of the Posterior Analytics is that it advances an almost Cartesian picture of sciences as deductive systems founded on intuitively evident (...) first premises. How are these to be reconciled? (shrink)

This study examines cheating behaviors among 742 marketing and management majors at three public AACSB-accredited business schools. Specifically, we studied the simultaneous influence of demographic and attitudinal characteristics on: (1) reported prior cheating behavior; (2) the tendency to neutralize cheating behaviors; and, (3) likelihood of future cheating. We additionally examined the impact of in-class deterrents on neutralization of cheating behaviors and the likelihood of future cheating. We also directly tested potential mediating effects of neutralization on cheating behavior.We conducted independent assessments (...) of the validity of the Smith et al. (2002) model of cheating behavior and its antecedents using structural equations modeling procedures. Results supported the differentiation of the theoretical constructs within the specified process model. Furthermore, tests of the aforementioned theoretical model indicated that the primary influences on future cheating were prior cheating, and the degree to which one neutralized prior cheating behaviors. Equally noteworthy, in contrast to previous research we found in-class deterrents to have no significant influence in either neutralizing behavior or future cheating proclivities. (shrink)

M̀atter Matters is a work of genius. The work exhibits a breathtaking spread of erudition from antiquity to the present, mobilized to elucidate the early modern significance of the concept of matter. The slight play of words in the title expresses the principal thesis of the work, that mathematics is intelligible for Descartes if and only if matter exists as its object. Smith understands, better than anyone, how Descartes could claim, literally, that "my physics is nothing but geometry." Many (...) will be convinced, some dismayed, and all will be dazzled by this book.'---Thomas M. Lennon, The University of Western Ontario". (shrink)

How can we make progress on the question of whether debate can do harm, and if it can, whether that’s a sufficient reason to suppress particular debates, or to adopt a ‘no debate!’ approach to particular topics ourselves? Obviously we’ll need to get clear on the key ingredients of the claim, which are what we’re counting as debate, and what we’re willing to countenance as harm. But we’ll also need to think about what exactly the harms are thought to be, (...) of debating any one of these controversial topics, and what, if anything, might be more important than avoiding those harms. I want to think about both the general question, which is whether the idea that debate can do harm makes sense and is sometimes true; and the more specific question, which is whether specific contemporary topics in which one side takes a ‘no debate!’ position or for which there is public support for not debating the topic, do in fact risk harm sufficient to justifying #nodebate tactics. (shrink)

Smith begins with a comprehensive analysis of social theory, presents a defense of Jurgen Habermas' main contribution to social ethics and contrasts Habermas' rational foundation for ethics with the decisionism defended by Max Weber, and ...

This is an annotated reading list on the beginning elements of the theory of computable functions. It is now structured so as to complement the first eight lectures of Thomas Forster’s Part III course in Lent 2011 (see the first four chapters of his evolving handouts).

An Introduction to G¨ odel’s Theorems now exists in two versions – the original 2007 printing, and a corrected reprint in 2008. The quick way of telling these apart is to glance at the imprints page (the verso of the title page): the later version notes, halfway down that page, “Reprinted with corrections 2008”. Corrections marked with marginal side-bars as here are those that have been noted after the second printing went to press, and hence still need correction/improvement. If you (...) have the corrected reprint, then these marked corrections are the only errors you need care about! This complete list of corrections is divided, for convenience, into two sections. (shrink)

Last week, we talked a bit about the Anderson-Belnap logic of entailment, as discussed in Priest’s Introduction to Non-Classical Logic. For a quite different approach to entailment, we’ll look next week at Neil Tennant’s account. Doing things rather out of order, this week I’d like to say something more basic about the problems to which both Anderson and Belnap, on the one hand, and Tennant on the other, are responding. This will give me the chance for a bit of nostalgic (...) philosophical time-travelling, revisiting work by Casimir Lewy and Timothy Smiley from the Cambridge of fifty years ago. (shrink)

Hull et al. argue that information and replication are both essential ingredients in any selection process. But both information and replication are found in only some selection processes, and should not be included in abstract descriptions of selection intended to help researchers discover and describe selection processes in new domains.

The point of departure for all discussions of nonstatistical explanation in the philosophy of science has been the deductive‐nomological or covering law model of explanation that was given its most influential exposition by Carl Hempel, who was also the pioneering figure in the discussion of statistical explanation (see statistical explanation). On this account, to explain a particular event, we cite other particular events together with a general law or laws which "cover" what we want to explain. For example, we might (...) explain why a balloon expanded when placed on a radiator, by citing the fact that the radiator was hot together with the relevant laws relating heat to expansion. (shrink)

Geography has traditionally been assigned the role of handmaiden in evolutionary studies. In this work a different understanding of the relationship between biological change and locational setting is developed: evolution as a dynamic form of spatial interaction. In the causal model presented, adaptive change is portrayed as a negative feedback response contributing to a general spatial-temporal process of resource cycle tightening involving exchanges between the two fundamental structural sectors (abiotic and biotic) of the earth's surface system. As such, it is (...) rejected as evolution per se. This position makes it possible to circumvent the adaptation yields adaptation circularity, and to view locational circumstances as being evolutionarily causal, yet not deterministic with respect to population-level change. A parallel interpretation of the relation between range and range change and evolution is also implicit; the individualistic hypothesis is thereby superceded by a model of community evolution allowing for individualistic rates of population (adaptive and) range change, but operating on the principle that populations should tend to change range in common directions (as a response to spatially-varying degrees of efficiency of turnover of resources vital to biotic sector function). This in turn leads to the possibility of normative biogeographic modelling. Comment is also made on the relationship of the present understanding to disequilibrium and dynamic equilibrium interpretations of evolutionary change, and to human cultural evolution. (shrink)