I address the recent debate between Meehan and Vaidman concerning the claim made by the former for a new problem to quantum mechanics. I argue that while Meehan's incompatibility claim does hold in the situation he presents, it does not genuinely involve considerations that can limit quantum state preparation, nor does it introduce new constrains over possible interpretations of quantum theory.

Nietzsche was a harsh critic of German culture and yet, at the same time, realized he was quite inseparable from it. His disagreement with the Germans began as a dispute with Richard Wagner and then, after renouncing him, increasingly turned into an internal dispute with himself. This subject is important for a philosophical understanding of his thought as a whole.

This paper reimagines the traditional problem of other minds. On a Cartesian view, the problem involves humans’ inability to perceive other persons’ minds. Similarly, Gilbert Ryle claims that we cannot directly access another’s mind. The paper’s rethinking of the problem of other minds moves beyond these questions of perceptibility and accessibility. It asks whether there are certain groups of people whose minds are systematically misinterpreted, or even denied mentality. It argues that there are. This claim builds off (...) recent work in philosophy and social psychology on epistemic injustice and the role of social categories in mental state attribution. The paper proposes the Problem of the Other’s Mind: the phenomenon of a (relatively) socially privileged person’s inability or lack of desire to understand the mind of a (relatively) socially underprivileged person. (shrink)

Diese Betrachtungen versuchen das Problem der intellektuellen Intuition bei R. Descartes anhand der Abhandlung "Die Regeln zur Leitung des Verstandes" vorzustellen. Die Intuition der Gemüt (intuistus mentis) ist eine eigentümliche Fähigkeit der menschliechen Vernunft, kraft dessen nicht nur direkte Erkenntnis der obersten Prinzipen, aber auch jede unsere gültige Erkenntnis möglich ist. Deshalb ist die Intuition der Gemüt (als ein Erkenntnisvermögen des Subjekts) notwendig, um eine Konzeption der Intuition (die Methode) zu entwickeln. Das aber, was unbedingter Grund (Principium) und zugleich (...) die Bedinung der Möglichkeit jeder unserer unmittelbaren Erkenntnis ist, kann nicht direkt erkannt werden. Dem die Methode kann nicht ein unbedingtes Wissen um Intuition sein, und ausserdem ist ihre Gültigkeit problematisch. Darum betreffen diese Überlegungen vor allem das Problem der Gültigkeit der kartesianischen Konzeption der intellektuellen Intuition. Die Methode kann nur erklären wie die Intuition (und Deduktion) richtig gehandhabt wird. Aber sie kann nicht lehren, wie diese Operationen vollgezogen werden. Die Fragestellung lautet nun: wie die Intuition zu erkennen sei? (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie wybranych wątków myśli Paula Ricreura, szczególnie jego rozważań dotyczących niewolnej woli. Po pierwsze, zaprezentowana zostaje Ricreurowska filozofia woli oraz koncepcja ludzkiej ułomności. Następnie omówionajest reinterpretacja fenomenologii Husserla, której dokonuje Ricreur, co prowadzi go do wypracowania hermeneutycznej formuły, wskazującej, że symbol daje do myślenia. Ostatecznie twierdzę, że fenomenologia hermeneu- tyczna Ricreura tworzy określoną wizję antropologiczną i rozumienie ludzkiej kondycji, które później stanie się częścią „hermeneutyki siebie”.

The problem of evaluating philosophical texts is not only an institutional problem for philosophers. It transcends our own discipline. In a globalized word, English seems to be the lingua franca of all the sciences, much more than Latin ever was. But if we do not appreciate the systematic differences between articulating the ‚results‘ in the ‚natural‘ sciences on the one hand and normative and philosophical disputes about reasonable developments of forms of articulation and understanding in the ‚Geisteswissenschaften‘ on (...) the other, there is a great danger of transnational regionalism — especially if we limit philosophical thinking and research to one language. Instead, we should treasure the diverse traditions and experiences as they are manifested in different languages. In consequence, the policy of evaluating international visibility of philosophic journals, as proposed by the European Science Foundation , must be changed. (shrink)

The philosophical problem of knowledge of other minds is rational justifiction. this paper covers n malcolm, h h price, j mill, strawson, hamshire, l wittgenstein and a j ayer's controversial thought. philosophical scepticism holds that it is logically impossible to know mental experiences. "i know, i have a pain." how do i know that other people also can have similar pain? it provides as ideal knowledge of mental events. when i say, "i have a pain," i can have certain (...) knowledge of this because i have conclusive individual evidence for it. (shrink)

Addressing such issues as the claims of critics that the application of psychoanalysis to literature, philosophy, the arts, and history results in interpretations that are speculative, externally imposed, reductionistic, and subjective, Hanly (philosophy, U. of Toronto; training analyst, Toronto Psychoanalytic Institute) searches for objectivity in the epistemological foundations and methods of applied psychoanalysis. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.