This paper discusses the notion of the ‘phenomenological world’ and the problems it generates in the ‘hard’ paradigm of Husserl’s phenomenology, such as the lack of universality and intersubjectivity of this world, its closure and privacy, and its being only the personal world of a subject. Also, an attempt was made to show some of the sources of this problematic situation and the impossibility of solving it in a fundamentalist paradigm. It is only in the last period of the development (...) of Husserl’s phenomenology (the so-called period of the Crisis) that these problems find their satisfactory solution. (shrink)

The paper presents Husserl’s conception of the relation between science and the living world, i.e. the world of everyday experience and communication. In Husserl view, science, or, more precisely, its basic aprioric structure is founded on the primal, essential core of the living world from which it obtains its sense. Science modifies, idealizes, and mathematizes the primal aprioric Lebenswelt. Due to those operations scientific theories can represent empirical reality.

Odczyt wygłoszony podczas 517. posiedzenia Oddziału Toruńskiego Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego w dniu 13 stycznia 2022 roku.