This paper has three main objectives: (a) Discuss the formal analogy between some important symmetry-invariance arguments used in physics, probability and statistics. Specifically, we will focus on Noether’s theorem in physics, the maximum entropy principle in probability theory, and de Finetti-type theorems in Bayesian statistics; (b) Discuss the epistemological and ontological implications of these theorems, as they are interpreted in physics and statistics. Specifically, we will focus on the positivist (in physics) or subjective (in statistics) interpretations vs. objective interpretations that (...) are suggested by symmetry and invariance arguments; (c) Introduce the cognitive constructivism epistemological framework as a solution that overcomes the realism-subjectivism dilemma and its pitfalls. The work of the physicist and philosopher Max Born will be particularly important in our discussion. (shrink)

Nous avons choisi de faire dialoguer Hannah Arendt et quelques uns de ses contemporains: Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, Gunther Stern-Anders, Martin Buber, Paul Celan, Martin Heidegger, Max Horkheimer, Karl Jaspers, Hans Jonas, Victor Klemperer, Emmanuel Levinas, Primo Levi, George Steiner, Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin. Unanimes dans leur diagnostic d'une crise de l'occident, ces penseurs recusent la croyance dans le progres et les Lumieres: lorsque la Raison s'est muee en faculte destructrice du monde, lorsque la politique semble avoir perdu de vue (...) sa finalite, prendre soin du monde, comment resister aux forces du nihilisme? Tous illustrent la difficulte d'etre present a un monde hors de ses gonds sur lequel planait la menace d'une troisieme guerre mondiale, guerre atomique, guerre totale. Ils posent une meme question: comment repondre d'un monde habitable, amical, en avoir souci? Comment etre du monde et pas seulement au monde? (shrink)

Phänomenologische Wertlehre (Max Scheler)--Idealistische Wertlehre (Heinrich Rickert)--Idealistisch-realistische Wertlehre (Hugo Münsterberg)--Realistische Wertlehre (William Stern)--Kritische Würdigung.

The book "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" is an engaging criticism of cognitive neuroscience from the perspective of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of ordinary language. The authors' main claim is that assertions like "the brain sees" and "the left hemisphere thinks" are integral to cognitive neuroscience but that they are meaningless because they commit the mereological fallacy—ascribing to parts of humans, properties that make sense to predicate only of whole humans. The authors claim that this fallacy is at the heart of Cartesian (...) dualism, implying that current cognitive neuroscientists are Cartesian dualists. Against this claim, we argue that the fallacy cannot be committed within Cartesian dualism either, for this doctrine does not allow for an intelligible way of asserting that a soul is part of a human being. Also, the authors' Aristotelian essentialistic outlook is at odds with their Wittgensteinian stance, and we were unconvinced by their case against explanatory reductionism. Finally, although their Wittgensteinian stance is congenial with radical behaviorism, their separation between philosophy and science seems less so because it is based on a view of philosophy as a priori. The authors' emphasis on the a priori, however, does not necessarily commit them to rationalism if it is restricted to conceptual or analytical truths. (shrink)

In their contribution ‘Ethics of the algorithmic prediction of goal of care preferences’1 Ferrario et al elaborate a from theory to practice contribution concerning the realisation of artificial intelligence (AI)-based patient preference prediction (PPP) systems. Such systems are intended to help find the treatment that the patient would have chosen in clinical situations—especially in the intensive care or emergency units—where the patient is no longer capable of making that decision herself. The authors identify several challenges that complicate their effective development, (...) application and evaluation—and offer solutions to them. One of these issues is the question of who should ultimately use said systems. While it is undisputed that clinicians should use these AI systems for their decision-making process, there is an ongoing debate about whether next of kin should use them as well. The authors advocate that ‘’access should be provided to both clinicians and loved ones with due explanations and as desired’. We will disagree with this assessment and explain in our commentary why it is important that surrogates provide their own assessments with as little external (AI) influence as possible. Why do next of kin actually participate in the process of preference finding and treatment decision-making? A key reason is that clinicians usually …. (shrink)

The First International Congress for Analytical Psychology was held in Zurich from 7 to 12 August 1958. On this occasion a small group of Israeli psychologists, represented by Erich Neumann, was accepted as a charter group member of the International Association for Analytical Psychology (IAAP), which marked the foundation of the Israel Association of Analytical Psychology. The history leading up to this official birth date is mainly associated with the efforts of Erich Neumann – and rightly so; however, a number (...) of other therapists, scholars and patients have been forgotten or deleted from this historical narrative, to their detriment. While I was working on the edition of the correspondence between C. G. Jung and Erich Neumann I came across their names, which were often only casually mentioned re some episode, and I have since tried to find out their stories and what happened to them. In this article I discuss the contributions to the development of analytical psychology in British Mandate Palestine, later Israel, of two such figures, Max M. Stern (1895–1982) and Margarete Braband-Isaac (1892–1986). Both had been in personal contact with C. G. Jung and built a bridge between the isolated Jewish therapists in British Mandate Palestine and the Zurich circles. In Tel Aviv they collaborated for a while with Neumann, with whom for different reasons both fell out. The article shows the cause of these controversies with Neumann and tries to find out why those two characters were historically marginalized. (shrink)

Drawing on ten years of research on the unpublished Wittgenstein papers, Stern investigates what motivated Wittgenstein's philosophical writing and casts new light on the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. The book is an exposition of Wittgenstein's early conception of the nature of representation and how his later revision and criticism of that work led to a radically different way of looking at mind and language. It also explains how the unpublished manuscripts and typescripts were put together and why they often (...) provide better evidence of the development of his ideas than can be found in his published writing. In doing so, the book traces the development of a number of central themes in Wittgenstein's philosophy, including his conception of philosophical method, the picture theory of meaning, the limits of language, the application of language to experience, his treatment of private language, and what he called the "flow of life." Arguing that Wittgenstein's views are often much more simple (and more radical) than we have been led to believe, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language provides an overview of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy and brings to light aspects of his philosophy that have been almost universally neglected. (shrink)

In many histories of modern ethics, Kant is supposed to have ushered in an anti-realist or constructivist turn by holding that unless we ourselves 'author' or lay down moral norms and values for ourselves, our autonomy as agents will be threatened. In this book, Robert Stern challenges the cogency of this 'argument from autonomy', and claims that Kant never subscribed to it. Rather, it is not value realism but the apparent obligatoriness of morality that really poses a challenge to (...) our autonomy: how can this be accounted for without taking away our freedom? The debate the book focuses on therefore concerns whether this obligatoriness should be located in ourselves, in others or in God. Stern traces the historical dialectic that drove the development of these respective theories, and clearly and sympathetically considers their merits and disadvantages; he concludes by arguing that the choice between them remains open. (shrink)

In this new introduction to a classic philosophical text, David Stern examines Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. He gives particular attention to both the arguments of the Investigations and the way in which the work is written, and especially to the role of dialogue in the book. While he concentrates on helping the reader to arrive at his or her own interpretation of the primary text, he also provides guidance to the unusually wide range of existing interpretations, and to the reasons (...) why the Investigations have inspired such a diversity of readings. Following closely the text of the Investigations and meant to be read alongside it, this survey is accessible to readers with no previous background in philosophy. It is well-suited to university-level courses on Wittgenstein, but can also be read with profit by students in other disciplines. (shrink)

In his contribution, ‘Represent me: please! Towards an ethics of digital twins in medicine’1, Braun shows that there is a fundamental ambivalence inherent in (the interaction with) digital twins: they can either open up new freedoms for the simulated persons, or, conversely, endanger and restrict their freedom. To prevent digital twins from restricting people’s freedom, Braun suggests a strong focus on control. Braun’s focus on control is insufficient, I will argue, because his idea of control works only retroactively: it can (...) only react to restrictions of freedom that have already occurred, but it cannot prevent them, nor can it restore any lost freedom. Control is therefore insufficient to defend people’s freedom. To prove my claim, I will first use an everyday example to illustrate the fundamental ambivalence inherent in digital twins. Second, I will show that digital twins endanger people’s freedom in a hermeneutic way. Finally, I will demonstrate why controllability cannot prevent this hermeneutic endangerment. I understand digital twins, like Braun, as simulation of a person, as their dynamic and precise effigy. Simulated twins use machine-learning and artificial intelligence capabilities to make predictive analyses about the simulated person and the future development of her health. Imagine: You are eating dinner. Meanwhile, your partner lectures you about the calorie density and nutrient composition of your food, warns you that your portion size exceeds your daily calorie requirement by x calories. It calculates how your dinner will negatively impact your body mass index (BMI) and physical fitness, and predicts what the consequences will be for your overall health. Based on these data and predictions, it creates an individualised diet plan for you—and at the same time shows you by how much you could improve your vital values by sticking to that plan. This example helps to illustrate the fundamental …. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION: Capgras delusion is sometimes defined as believing that close relatives have been replaced by strangers. But such replacement beliefs also occur in response to encountering an acquaintance, or the voice of a familiar person, or a pet, or some personal possession. All five scenarios involve believing something familiar has been replaced by something unfamiliar. METHODS: We evaluate the proposal that these five kinds of delusional belief should count as subtypes of the same delusion. RESULTS: Personally familiar stimuli activate the (...) sympathetic nervous system (SNS) much more strongly than unfamiliar stimuli. In Capgras delusion, this difference is absent, prompting the delusional idea that a familiar person is actually a stranger. We suggest this absence of an effect of familiarity on SNS response will occur in all five scenarios and will prompt the idea that the familiar has been replaced by the unfamiliar. CONCLUSIONS: We propose that: (a) all five scenarios be referred to as subtypes of Capgras delusion; (b) in all five, ideas about replacement are prompted by weakness of SNS responses to familiar stimuli; (c) this is insufficient to generate delusion. For a delusional idea to become a belief, a second factor (impaired hypothesis evaluation) must also be present. (shrink)

Max Weber (1864-1920), generally known as a founder of modern social science, was concerned with political affairs throughout his life. The texts in this edition span his career and include his early inaugural lecture The Nation State and Economic Policy, Suffrage and Democracy in Germany, Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order, Socialism, The Profession and Vocation of Politics, and an excerpt from his essay The Situation of Constitutional Democracy in Russia, as well as other shorter writings. (...) Together they illustrate the development of his thinking on the fate of Germany and the nature of politics in the modern western state in an age of cultural 'disenchantment'. The introduction discusses the central themes of Weber's political thought, and a chronology, notes and an annotated bibliography place him in his political and intellectual context. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION: In accounts of the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor in this theory has been referred to only in the most general terms, as a failure in the processes of hypothesis evaluation, with no attempt to characterise those processes in any detail. Coltheart and Davies attempted such a characterisation, proposing a detailed eight-step model of how unexpected observations lead to new beliefs based on the concept of abductive inference as introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce. METHODS: In this (...) paper, we apply that model to the explanation of various forms of delusional belief. RESULTS: We provide evidence that in cases of delusion there is a specific failure of the seventh step in our model: the step at which predictions from hypotheses are considered in the light of relevant evidence. CONCLUSIONS: In the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor consists of a failure to reject hypotheses in the face of disconfirmatory evidence. (shrink)

Malgré le progrès des connaissances de leurs mécanismes étiopathogéniques et la médicalisation de leur prise en charge, les pathologies démentielles restent très invalidantes sur le plan du maintien de l’autonomie dans les actes de la vie quotidienne et des relations interpersonnelles. Le terme de « démence » reste largement utilisé dans une acception évoquant non seulement la perte des fonctions cognitives et ses conséquences fonctionnelles, mais surtout l’altération de la relation perçue comme étrange et privée de sens. L’altération de la (...) dimension intersubjective de la relation nous semble un déterminant central de ces modifications relationnelles. Elle concerne le sens de soi, la relation interpersonnelle et la difficulté pour les proches à octroyer le statut de personne morale. On tente ici de démontrer que, dans les interactions avec les personnes âgées, et plus particulièrement celles souffrant de pathologie démentielle, la modification de la relation intersubjective se situe principalement au niveau de l’altération de l’« accordage affectif » tel que décrit par Daniel N. Stern dans ses travaux sur le développement précoce et la construction du sens de soi. Ces troubles de l’accordage affectif peuvent être rapprochés des risques de perte du statut de personne morale au sens où le phénoménologue Max Scheler le définit. L’article discute également des perspectives de validation expérimentale de ces hypothèses et de leur conséquence pour la pratique clinique. (shrink)

In this powerful and wonderfully accessible meditation on psychoanalysis, hermeneutics, and social constructivism, Donnel Stern explores the relationship between two fundamental kinds of experience: explicit verbal reflection and "unformulated experience," or experience we have not yet reflected on and put into words. Stern is especially concerned with the process by which we come to formulate the unformulated. It is not an instrumental task, he holds, but one that requires openness and curiosity; the result of the process is not (...) accuracy alone, but experience that is deeply felt and fully imagined. Stern's sense of explicit verbal experience as continuously constructed and emergent leads to a central dialectic at the heart of his work: that between curiosity and imagination, on one hand, and dissociation and unthinking acceptance of the familiar on the other. The goal of psychoanalytic work, he holds, is the freedom to be curious, whereas defense signifies the denial of this freedom. We defend against our fear of what we would think, that is, if we allowed ourselves the freedom to think it. Stern also shows how the unconscious itself can be reconceptualized hermeneutically, and he goes on to explore the implications of this viewpoint on interpretation and countertransference. He is especially persuasive in showing how the interpersonal field, which is continuously in flux, limits the experience that it is possible for participants to reflect on. Thus it is that analyst and patient are together "caught in the grip of the field," often unable to see the kind of relatedness in which they are mutually involved. A brilliant demonstration of the clinical consequentiality of hermeneutic thinking, _Unformulated Experience_ bears out Stern's belief that psychoanalysis is as much about the revelation of the new in experience as it is about the discovery of the old. (shrink)

One of the pioneers of modern sociology, Max Scheler (1874- 1928) ranks with Max Weber, Edmund Husserl, and Ernst Troeltsch as being among the most brilliant minds of his generation. Yet Scheler is now known chiefly for his philosophy of religion, despite his groundbreaking work in the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of emotions, and phenomenological sociology. This volume comprises some of Scheler's most interesting work--including an analysis of the role of sentiments in social interaction, a sociology of knowledge rooted (...) in global social and cultural comparisons, and a cross-cultural theory of values--and identifies some of his important contributions to the discussion of issues at the forefront of the social sciences today. Editor Harold J. Bershady provides a richly detailed biographical portrait of Scheler, as well as an incisive analysis of how his work extends and integrates problems of theory and method addressed by Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons, among others. Harold J. Bershady, professor of sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, is the author of Ideology and Social Knowledge and the editor of Social Class and Democratic Leadership . Heritage of Sociology series. (shrink)

Reproduktion auf Grundlage der Ausgabe: Verlag von Friedrich Cohen; Bonn 1929. - Die hier gesammelten Aufsätze aus der letzten Schaffensperiode Max Schelers sind zwar unabhängig voneinander entstanden und veröffentlicht worden - Näheres sagen die Anmerkungen am Schluß des Bandes -, aber sie schließen sich doch zur Einheit zusammen durch die metaphysische Haltung, die der kurze, an die Spitze gestellte und für den Gesamttitel maßgebende Aufsatz mit großer Deutlichkeit offenbart. Er ist auch die letzte von Max Scheler selbst abgeschlossene Schrift. Die (...) wenigen an dem Text der Erstveröffentlichungen vorgenommenen inhaltlichen Änderungen gehen auf eigenhändige Notizen des Verfassers zurück. (shrink)

This paper argues first that, contrary to what one would expect, metaphorical interpretations of utterances pass two of Cappelan and Lepore's Minimalist tests for semantic context-sensitivity. I then propose how, in light of that result, one might analyze metaphors on the model of indexicals and demonstratives, expressions that (even) Minimalists agree are semantically context-dependent. This analysis builds on David Kaplan's semantics for demonstratives and refines an earlier proposal in (Stern, Metaphor in context, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000). In the course (...) of this argument, I also discuss some new examples of linguistic phenomena that motivate a semantic structure underlying metaphorical interpretation, phenomena I argue that neither Minimalists nor Contextualists can explain. (shrink)

Are there universals of reading? There are three ways of construing this question. Is the region of the brain where reading is implemented identical regardless of what writing system the reader uses? Is the mental information-processing system used for reading the same regardless of what writing system the reader uses. Do the word's writing systems share certain universal features? Dehaene offers affirmative answers to all three questions in his book. Here I suggest instead that the answers should be negative. And (...) I ask: if reading is not universal in any sense, what does this imply about Dehaene's Neuronal Recycling hypothesis for reading? (shrink)

Over the past century or more, cognitive neuropsychologists have discussed many of the issues raised in this volume. On the basis of this literature, we argue that autism is not a single homogeneous condition, and so can have no single cause. Instead, each of its symptoms has a cause, and the proper study of autism is the separate study of each of these symptoms and its cause. We also offer evidence to support the radical view advanced by Stoljar and Gold (...) in this volume, namely, that in explaining such syndromes the cognitive level of explanation has priority over the neuroscientific. (shrink)

Concepts have a central and important place in science, therefore, it is important that their meanings are always made clear. However, such clarity does not always exist, even in the case of such fundamental biological concepts as “gene” and “adaptation.” A quick look at textbooks reveals that different meanings may be attributed to the same concept, even within the same textbook, without explicitly discussing the differences of those meanings. This can be misleading, and mask important conceptual differences. Therefore, the differences (...) between the various meanings of the same concept should be discussed and explained in order for conceptual understanding to be achieved. (shrink)

A global target of stabilizing greenhouse-gas concentrations at between 450 and 550 parts per million carbon-dioxide equivalent has proven robust to recent developments in the science and economics of climate change. Retrospective analysis of the Stern Review suggests that the risks were underestimated, indicating a stabilization target closer to 450 ppm CO2e. Climate policy at the international level is now moving rapidly towards agreeing an emissions pathway, and distributing responsibilities between countries. A feasible framework can be constructed in which (...) each country takes on its own responsibilities and targets, based on a shared understanding of the risks and the need for action and collaboration on climate change. The global deal should contain six key features: a pathway to achieve the world target of 50 per cent reductions by 2050, where rich countries contribute at least 75 per cent of the reductions; global emissions trading to reduce costs; reform of the clean development mechanism to scale up emission reductions on a sectoral or benchmark level; scaling up of R&D funding for low-carbon energy; an agreement on deforestation; and adaptation finance. (shrink)

In the middle period of the century of American thought with which our symposium is concerned, there was one idea which so far overshadowed all others that we may fairly confine our attention to it. That idea was evolution.

A recent article in this journal (Patterson & Plaut, 2009) argued that cognitive neuropsychology has told us very little over the past 30 or 40 years about “how the brain accomplishes its cognitive business.” This may well be true, but it is not important, because the principal aim of cognitive neuropsychology is not to learn about the brain. Its principal aim is instead to learn about the mind, that is, to elucidate the functional architecture of cognition. I show that this (...) is so (a) via extensive quotations from leading figures in this field and (b) by analysis of the subject matter of articles in the leading journal in the field, Cognitive Neuropsychology. Recent reviews of the past 25 years of work in this field (Coltheart & Caramazza, 2006) have concluded that cognitive neuropsychology has told us much about the functional architecture of cognition in a variety of cognitive domains. Patterson and Plaut (2009) did not consider this aim of cognitive neuropsychology. Therefore, their conclusions that cognitive neuropsychology has not been successful, and that this is because the particular methods it uses are flawed, are not justified. (shrink)