SummaryOn its foundation in 1842, St Francis Xavier's College, Liverpool, was the first British manifestation of the renaissance of Jesuit day-schools throughout nineteenth-century Europe. Initially, the College developed along traditional Jesuit lines, imbibing the spirit of the Ratio Studiorum, the centuries-old educational code of the Society of Jesus.By 1875, a new era had hawned as the needs of one of the largest commercial and industrial centres in the British Empire forced the Jesuits to examine critically the type of education being (...) dispensed in their Liverpool college. The curriculum was rapidly extended away from its traditional roots in the Classics to embrace scientific and technical training. This paper seeks to show how the Jesuits in Liverpool adapted in the last quarter of the nineteenth century to changing demands both at home and from their Superior General in Rome. (shrink)

Principalement dans Procès et réalité, mais aussi dans « Le concept de nature » , dans « Le symbolisme », etc., Whitehead fait de la perception une modalité de la vie. Mais il en distingue deux genres. D'une part, c'est la perception qui, sur le mode de la causalité efficiente, assure la continuité vitale, émotionnelle, du processus de préhensions successives des entités actuelles (mais ce mode perceptif est flou, obscur, puisque ces préhensions sont « des éléments primitifs de notre (...) expérience »). Mais, d'autre part, le second mode de perception, celui de l'immédiateté de présentation, nous donne une vision claire et distincte d'une petite région de notre « monde contemporain » ; son importance tient au rôle qu'il joue dans la constitution des sciences. Mais finalement c'est le rapport symbolique qui nous fournit une perception complète, bien que sujette à l'erreur, par référence d'un mode perceptif à l'autre. Mainly in Process and Reality, but also in « The concept of nature », in « Symbolism », etc., does Whitehead turn perception into one of life's modalities. But he delineates two kinds : on the one hand, perception, in the pattern of an efficient causality, guarantees the vital, emotional continuity of the process of successive prehensions of present entities (but such a perceptive mode is blurred, obscure, since these prehensions are « primitive elements of our experience ». But on the other hand, the second perception mode, i.e. that of immediacy of presentation, grants us a clear and distinct vision of a small area of our « contemporary world » ; its importance derives from the part it plays in the constitution of sciences. But, when all is said, it is the symbolical relationship which grants the true complete perception, though liable to error, with reference from one perceptive mode to the other. (shrink)

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Daniel Charles, musicologue, esthéticien, philosophe, fut l’un des traducteurs de Procès et réalité, d’A. N. Whitehead. Dans ce procès tendant à la constitution d’un « sujet-superject », il avait décelé une « causalité à rebours » permettant de revenir à l’origine des « préhensions » à l’œuvre dans le procès du monde. Si cela était seulement possible, ce serait une incitation à remonter aux sources de son itinéraire pour s’engager avec lui dans les nombreuses voies qu’il a suivies. Au (...) moins p... (shrink)

Page Dedication ii Abbreviations iii Introduction 1 Part One The Problematic: From Galileo and Descartes to Kant Chapter I: The Mathesis of Nature 10 1. The Galilean-Cartesian Physics 10 2. Whitehead’s Criticisms of Scientific Materialism 29 3. Merleau-Ponty’s Engagement with Descartes 35 Chapter II: From a Dualism of Substances to a Two-fold Ontology 44 1. Hints for Overcoming the Bifurcation 44 2. Descartes and Malebranche 44 3. Spinoza 47 4. Leibniz 53 5. Kant 65 Part Two Overcoming the Bifurcation: (...) Phenomenology Chapter III: The Early View of Perception and the Body and its 88 Bergsonian Sources 1. Introduction 88 2. Phenomenological Descriptions of Nature 89 3. Bergson 97 Chapter IV: Husserl and Sartre 133 1. Introduction 133 2. Husserl’s Conceptions of Nature 135 3. Sartre and Nature 169 Part Three Overcoming the Bifurcation: Ontology Chapter V: The Ontological Rehabilitation of the Sensible 194 1. Introduction 194 2. The Necessity of a “New Ontology” 195 3. The “New Ontology”: Tasks and Methods 201 4. The Flesh 222 5. The Schellingian and Bergsonian Heritage 269 6. Life in Nature 305 7. Logos Endiathetos and Logos Proforikos 319 vii Page Chapter V: The Nature of Flesh, continued 8. The Whiteheadian Response 341 Conclusion 376 Bibliography 384. (shrink)

Among the reasons that Whitehead is such an interesting philosopher is that his work resonates across philosophical traditions. This collection develops connections between Whiteheadian concepts and recent European thinkers. The purpose is not simply to compare, however, but, as editor Jeremy Fackenthal suggests, to develop a Whiteheadian thinking “in tandem” with European philosophers in order to create disruptions or “dislocations” in thought that can engender creative approaches to contemporary problems.One general feature of the book deserves mention at the outset, (...) though I will return to it later in the review: although phenomenology and hermeneutics are each represented in the volume, roughly half of the essays focus on the work of Gilles Deleuze (if we group these together with essays focused on “new materialism,” which is connected with Deleuze, the proportion is more like two-thirds). This will be no surprise, since Deleuze is the European philosopher who was most appreciative of Whitehead. And yet, the result is that the conversation with “continental philosophy” is highly selective.The book is organized into three parts, each comprised of three essays. In part 1, “Technological and Systematic Dislocations,” William S. Hamrick brings Whitehead into conversation with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of “the flesh” to suggest an ecological ontology capable of overcoming the instrumentalization of nature. Hamrick's strategy is to read Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty as contributing to an “ontological foundation” for a sustainable civilization (18). Bo Eberle writes about the “quantified self” suggested in new, wearable self-monitoring technologies. Drawing on Whitehead's notion of causal efficacy, Eberle argues that devices such as Fitbit give us access to bodily states that bypasses the standard ways we are aware of ourselves (i.e., through consciousness). He goes further to argue that, like all ways of knowing, wearable technologies are selective, and that the selection reflects the interests of the manufacturers and promotes a certain kind of subjectivity (in the case of Fitbit, a subjectivity that is oriented toward “getting your steps in”). Whitehead's epistemology thus enables the critic of wearable technologies to understand how contemporary experience and self-understanding is shaped not simply by recent technological mediations but by the material interests embedded in them. J.R. Hustwit and Carl Dyke take on what they call “activist” uses of Whitehead that naively (in their judgment) suggest that a non-relational substance metaphysics is to blame for most of our social ills. They employ the theory of complex adaptive systems in conversation with Whitehead and Antonio Gramsci to show that, in fact, achieving significant social change is far more difficult and even unpredictable than mere insertion of better ideas into public discourse. Dominant hegemonies have ways of adapting and absorbing attempts to undermine them. Here Hustwit and Dyke draw on the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur to suggest that resistance to the dominant hegemony is nevertheless always possible because of the vagueness of discourse, allowing a plurality of competing interpretations and thus fractures in the dominant hegemony. However, even this kind of resistance is impossible to control and its effects incapable of being entirely predicted. To the essay's titular question, “Can Whitehead save the world?” the authors answer, “No.”In part 2, “Animal/Human Dislocations,” Jeremy Fackenthal draws on the new materialism of Rosi Braidotti (and Deleuze) along with Whitehead to argue for a “process-relational” nomadism that culminates in a “becoming-imperceptible.” His reading together of Whitehead and Braidotti creates the opportunity to recast the former's concept of objective immortality in such a way that it does not refer to death so much as to being diffused into a relational network. The satisfaction of an actual occasion may be taken as its translation into its effects among its relations. Fackenthal argues that this becoming-imperceptible makes possible a sustainable presence within a fragile network of life. Deena M. Lin uses Whitehead, Braidotti, and Judith Butler to lay out a vision of human life as precarious and deserving attention, care, and solidarity. She presses this vision as a direct moral assault on US (Trump's) policy toward Syrian refugees. Going further, she draws on Braidotti's posthuman account of zoe to argue for universal connection and solidarity with all life that should foster, as the title of her essay puts it, “Welcoming of Syrian Life.” Tano Posteraro offers an intriguing essay drawing on Jakob von Uexküll's account of animal experience. Posteraro argues that Uexküll's notion of an animal's Umwelt, shaped by its distinctive perceptual apparatus, needs to be supplemented by Whitehead's notion of prehension to account for the active dimension of animal perception. Rather than a passive registering of animal environments, Posteraro argues that the latter are constructed, and that concepts (or conceptual prehensions) should be understood as tools with which such environments are constructed.In part 3, “Time, the World, and Abstraction,” three essays probe ways that Whiteheadian and Deleuzian themes may resonate critically and constructively. Kris Klotz brings the thought of Whitehead and Deleuze together to inquire about how alternatives to present social forms are envisioned. He argues that, for Whitehead, every actual occasion involves a selection of some features of the past, and, further, that every selection is also an abstraction from the concrete welter of influences impinging on it. For Whitehead, then, to envision alternatives involves a critique of abstractions, a reinstatement of the concrete plurality of possibilities. This, for Whitehead, is what rationality does: it works at restoring the concrete, and, with it, a series of alternatives that have been eclipsed. To this Whiteheadian analysis, Klotz adds Deleuze and Guattari's critique of “opinion.” For Deleuze and Guattari, opinion is not an idiosyncrasy but a consensus to which differences of experience are subjected. Philosophy, for Deleuze and Guattari, must always struggle against opinion in order to bring alternatives to light. These conceptions of reason/philosophy, Klotz argues, represent useful ways to critique inequalities and other social wrongs that are embedded in the social forms that are routinely taken for granted. Elijah Prewitt-Davis uses a scene from Buffy the Vampire Slayer, along with philosophical innovations of Foucault, Deleuze, and Whitehead, to offer a distinctive account of power. Prewitt-Davis calls attention to Deleuze's important book on Leibniz, The Fold, and to how Whitehead's concept of prehension lies at its center. The upshot is that power is not reduced to dominance but, instead, is at work wherever any occasion of experience persists amid the onslaught of the influence of other occasions. Power, as Deleuze wrote, is the capacity to be affected—and to decide how to constitute oneself anew. Keith Robinson offers a detailed account of Whitehead's epistemology along with a reading of Deleuze's analysis of temporality to suggest that there is a common trajectory that seeks to undermine what the title of the essay describes as the “Bifurcation of Nature” (i.e., the separation of natural phenomena and human experience) within the dominant Western philosophical tradition.There is much of value in the volume as a whole. Aside from staging what Spinoza might have called good encounters between Whitehead and a number of continental philosophers, enhancing the conceptual power of each, the contributors are able to make a case that these philosophical trajectories, when read together, have much to contribute to our understanding of and response to the pressing issues of the day. In addition, readers who are interested in the relationship between Whitehead and the new materialism will find this volume to be a helpful resource, stocked with fine examples of how to sharpen new materialist thinking with Whitehead and how to read contemporary contexts through these lenses. On the other hand, this book is not a handbook nor a comprehensive reference. The organizational logic behind its division into sections is murky and the amount of attention given to particular continental philosophers as opposed to others appears somewhat arbitrary: there are recent continental philosophers who get little to no attention at (Derrida, Malabou, Žižek, Agamben, Latour, Nancy, for example), several of whom might prove to be quite interesting to read “in tandem” with Whitehead. Perhaps that is just to say that there are many more essays to be written. (shrink)

This paper investigates Alfred North Whitehead and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s attempts to develop a historical, dynamic ontology (a “process ontology”, according to the former, and an “ontology of the flesh” for the latter). The claim of the paper is that their originality lies in the methods adopted to reach such ontologies, which show strong similarities. Both authors based their research on nature, conceived of as “the leaf of Being”, and on perceptual experience, understood not as a chaos of bare, (...) punctual, sense data, but as the complex, original source of meaning that constitutes the primary field of philosophical investigation—the only source from which one can gain new understanding of both nature and logos (things, happenings, values, subjectivity, laws, etc.). After some introductory remarks on the connections between Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty, the paper is divided into three parts. The first part clarifies why and how, according to the philosophers, ontology should start from a new scrutiny of nature. The second part specifies what this new conception of nature, based on perceptual experience, is. The third part focuses on how their ontologies must be construed as historic, insofar as behaviors, actions, and practices lie at the core of their concept of being. (shrink)

In this critical assessment of postmodernism, philosopher Jerry H. Gill points out that, however insightful the critiques of the postmodernists, they did little or nothing to offer constructive approaches to overcoming the impasse that their criticism of modernism created. Gill turns to an earlier generation of twentieth-century philosophers who anticipated later postmodern trends but offered alternative approaches to the dilemmas of modernism regarding the nature of reality, knowledge, and language. In four major chapters, Gill shows how Alfred North Whitehead, (...) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Michael Polanyi reinterpreted reality, meaning, the mind-body problem, and knowledge in refreshingly new ways. Essentially, these four thinkers provide us with a deeper understanding of postmodernism by viewing the nature of reality as interactive and open-ended, meaning as contextual and functional, the role of the body as integral and axial, and knowledge as dynamic and tacit. To tie together the main themes of his study, Gill concludes with a brief analysis of the key insights offered by J. L. Austin, especially his "linguistic phenomenology.". (shrink)

Exploration of Alfred North Whitehead's influence on Maurice Merleau-Ponty's ontology of nature.

Turning to the moment when phenomenology (Maurice Merleau-Ponty) meets process philosophy (Alfred North Whitehead), this article turns around three questions: (a) How does movement produce a body? (b) What kind of subject is introduced in the thought of Merleau-Ponty and how does this subject engage with or interfere with the activity here considered as ‘body’? (c) What happens when phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty) meets process philosophy (Alfred North Whitehead)? and builds around three propositions (a) There is never a body (...) as such: what we know are edgings and contourings, forces and intensities: a body is its movement (b) Movement is not to be reduced to displacement (c) A philosophy of the body never begins with the body: it bodies. (shrink)

Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue, the first study in any language to provide a complete overview of Buber's thought, remains the definitive guide to the full range of his work and the starting point for all modern Buber scholarship. Maurice S. Friedman reveals the implications of Buber's thought for theory of knowledge, education, philosophy, myth, history and Judaic and Christian belief. This fully revised and expanded fourth edition includes a new preface by the author, an expanded bibliography incorporating (...) new Buber scholarship, and two new appendices in the form of essays on Buber's influence on Emmanuel Levinas and Mikhail Bakhtin. (shrink)

How does literature illuminate the way we live? Maurice Natanson, a prominent champion of phenomenology, draws upon this method's unique power to show how fiction can highlight aspects of experience that are normally left unexamined. By exploring the structure of the everyday world, Natanson reveals the "uncanny" that lies at the core of the ordinary. Phenomenology--which involves the questioning of that which we usually take for granted--is for Natanson the essence of philosophy. Drawing upon his philosophical predecessors Edmund Husserl, (...) Alfred Schutz, and Jean-Paul Sartre, Natanson paves his own way with stories and examples that themselves bear witness to how phenomenology occurs in literature. In considering such works as Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot, Thomas Mann's The Magic Mountain, and Franz Kafka's The Metamorphosis, Natanson shows how literature opens us to the domain of possibility and how metaphor offers philosophical power when we think about freedom and change. This book, written by one of the twentieth century's leading phenomenologists, will interest students in philosophy and in literature. They will value the work particularly for its clarification of concepts and terms that frequently emerge in the contemporary intellectual climate. (shrink)

Economical questions indisputably occupy a central place in everyday life. In order to clarify these questions, people generally turn to those who are familiar with economics. In answering such legitimate questions, economists propose explanations which rest on a few principles among which the rationality principle is by far the most fundamental. This principle assumes that people are rational, but what is meant by this has to be specified. Rationality and Explanation in Economicsclaims that only a minimal kind of rationality is (...) required to ‘animate’ economic explanations. However, such a conception of rationality faces serious objections: it is closely associated with harshly criticised methodological individualism and it is not easily disentangled from sheer irrationality. The book answers these objections and shows that the economists’ way of mobilising the concepts of maximization or of consistency for defining rationality raises more serious problems. Since the latter have encouraged various attempts to downgrade or even to dispense with the very notion of rationality, the book is largely devoted to countering arguments associated with these attempts and to show why postulating that agents are rational is still the only efficient way to explain economic phenomena as such. The author also proposes original views about the role of rationality, the meaning of methodological individualism, the relevance of the selection argument and the relation between ‘rational’ explanations of economics and explanations in natural sciences. (shrink)

Maurice Friedman's masterly anthology still stands apart decades after its original publication. It has become established as a classic - the most comprehensive collection of existentialist writing ever assembled. This edition includes a special preface by Professor Friedman surveying the developments in the field since this monumental work was first published and commenting on its relevance for present intellectual trends. The short selections from important existentialist writers and their forerunners elucidate the critical issues that exist among existentialists. The topics (...) include phenomenology and ontology, the existential subject, intersubjectivity, religion, and psychotherapy. (shrink)

Popper's short essay about the rationality principle has been the target of many criticisms which have raised serious doubts about its consistency. How could the well-known promoter of falsificationism suggest that we not reject a principle that he himself describes as false? Nonetheless, the essay can be read in a way that makes it appear much more consistent. Better sense can be made of Popper's own examples (the flustered driver, the pedestrian, etc.), by taking seriously his view that the rationality (...) principle might be "approximately true" and falsified only in very rare cases, while also giving proper attention to his four rather elliptical arguments. (shrink)

What constitutes an event? Propelled by this question, Sounding the Event encounters a variety of theories and a host of issues that have implications for not only conceptions of nature and becoming, subject and substance but also practices of time, art and photography. This book explores dialogue in its writing and as it encounters the philosophical utterances of Michel Serres, Isabelle Stengers, Alfred North Whitehead, Jean-Franbliogçois Lyotard, Maurice Blanchot, Gilles Deleuze and Fbliogelix Guattari, and Alain Badiou.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:242 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Thus Locke's mistake is not the simplistic one of bringing in a new type of perception --perception of the agreement of an idea with something which is not an idea. He attributes the certainty which is appropriate for a general verbal truth concerning archetypal ideas to a real truth concerning ectypal ideas. There is an additional difficulty in Locke's use of the distinction between adequate (...) and inadequate ectypal ideas when he uses them in his theory of self knowledge. How can we be sure that these simple ectypal ideas are adequate? We have certainty concerning the adequacy of our archetypal ideas because we have a complete knowledge of the archetype which is itself an idea. However, we are not given a complete knowledge of the archetype of simple ectypal ideas. We are assured of the adequacy of simple ectypal ideas only by assuming the truth of the causal principle. This leads to a circular argument. We can be assured of the adequacy of the causal relation considered as a product of our own construction. If the idea of the causal relation is archetypal, then the idea of this relation is adequate. However, when the causal relation is used to assure us of the adequacy of our simple ectypal ideas, the causal relation is no longer restricted to the level of archetypal ideas. In order to insure the adequacy of our simple ideas, the causal relation must be a relation between our ectypal ideas and something which is not an idea, viz., the power which causes the sensation. Archetypal ideas of relations are adequate, but this is not an archetypal idea of a relation, and thus we have no way of judging its adequacy. The only way to determine the adequacy of the causal connection is to show the adequacy of our simple ectypal ideas, but the adequacy of these simple ectypal ideas is itself predicated on the adequacy of the idea of the causal relation. Thus, the whole argument for the adequacy of simple ectypal ideas is circular. Either the real and nominal essences of simple ideas are identical as claimed in Book Three, or the real and nominal essences of simple ideas are not identical, as claimed in Book Two. If the real and nominal essences of simple ideas are identical, then these simple ideas are archetypal and adequate but they afford us no knowledge about any extra-mental thing. If the real and nominal essences of simple ideas are not identical then simple ideas are ectypal, but we cannot be assured of their adequacy because their adequacy is dependent on the causal relation whose adequacy is not assured. Thus, Locke's epistemology does not support his claim for intuitive knowledge of his own existence, but the mistakes he does make are not nearly as simplistic as they are often claimed to be. DONALD W. GOTTERBARN University of Southern California THE DISTINGUISHABLE AND THE SEPARABLE; A NOTE ON HUME AND CAUSATION In this note, I shall be concemed with only one part of Hume's doctrine of causation, and my criticism of this feature of his position will leave much of the remainder untouched. This is not to say that my point is unimportant, for I shall challenge Hume's fight to claim that there cannot in any case be a direct impression of connection, force, or power. He attempted to establish this claim by argument, and I wish to show that there is a fatal flaw in that argument. NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 243 In order that what follows shall not be misunderstood, two points must be noted. First, I would not claim that we have an impression of connection, force, or power in all cases in which we hold that events are related as cause and effect. There are many instances in which this is not true, and the number and even the varieties of these cases could be greatly expanded beyond the illustrations which Hume gave in the Treatise and the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding. I shall only argue that he did not offer adequate reasons for holding that there are no eases in which we can possibly have such... (shrink)

La linguistique saussurienne paraît avoir exercé, spécialement au cours des années 1951 à 1954, une influence assez considérable sur la pensée de Merleau-Ponty. Un travail de portée plus générale nous ayant amené à mesurer l'importance de la chose pour Pensemble de l'œuvre de ce philosophe, nous allons seulement essayer ici de prećiser un peu le rôle d'une telle influence en nous appuyant sur une analyse de l'interprétation de Saussure par Merleau-Ponty.Dans la Phénoménologie de la Perception, celui-ci avait déjà consacré un (...) chapitre à l'étude de la parole conçue comme gesticulation ou expression corporelle. Quand, en 1953–54, il abordera le Problème de la Parole, dans un cours au Collège de France, c'est à Saussure lui-même qu'il attribuera des vues assez voisines: “Le cours cherchait à illustrer et é étendre cette notion saussurienne de la parole comme fonction positive et conquérante. (shrink)

The paper proposes a distinction between ethical problems internal to the practice of a discipline and ethical problems external to it. It argues that ethical problems encountered in architecture are typically of the former kind, in contrast, for example, to bioethical problems. From this point of view, it discusses the state of other arts and surveys various 19th and 20th century positions concerning ethics in architecture. It illustrates that, where architecture is concerned, ethics is closely related to aesthetics and frequently (...) tied to a philosophy of history, a point which is explained with the help of the above-mentioned distinction. (shrink)

Ce livre ne vise pas à donner un aperçu de ce que devrait être une religion. Il ne vise pas davantage à mettre en valeur l'argumentaire de l'athéisme. Il entend plutôt montrer qu'une personne qui se dit parfaitement agnostique et adepte d'une philosophie qui valorise la rationalité avant tout peut parfaitement être croyante, voire même pratiquante, sans qu'il y ait là la moindre contradiction. Dans une telle démarche, l'armature cognitive à laquelle de nombreux croyants ont jugé approprié d'arrimer leur foi (...) risque de se voir quelque peu déboulonnée. Et nombre d'arguments qui ont fortement contribué à miner les croyances religieuses pourraient s'en trouver passablement affaiblis. Dans les deux cas, tout découlerait de la simple reconnaissance du fait que la foi n'est en rien un savoir. Croire, expose Maurice Lagueux, en un Dieu transcendant ne veut pas dire connaître quoi que ce soit à propos d'un monde transcendant qui, par définition, échappe à nos capacités cognitives et est conçu comme le lieu de mystères insondables. Croire veut dire avoir sincèrement confiance en ce qui pourrait nous réserver l'existence de ce Dieu qui, toutefois, demeure inconnaissable. On peut se reconnaître résolument croyant sans s'estimer moins agnostique pour autant. (shrink)

This reassessment of the long debate about Friedman's thesis on the pointlessness of testing assumptions in economics shows that Friedman's three famous examples, on which a large part of the credit given to this thesis is based, far from substantiating it, can be used to establish radically opposite conclusions. Furthermore, it is shown that this so-called “instrumentalist” thesis, when applied by Friedman to economics, is of a quite different nature and raises much more serious problems than the standard instrumentalist thesis (...) devised by some methodologists of physics. To disentangle these ambiguities concerning realism and instrumentalism applied to physics or to economics, this paper refers to Van Fraassen's “constructive empiricism”, which is helpful in reformulating, in a more satisfactory way, the essentials of Friedman's considerations about empiricism and anti-realism. (shrink)

Depuis la parution, en 1950, du célèbre article d'Armen Alchian, il est devenu assez fréquent d'invoquer la sélection naturelle pour appuyer certaines conclusions de l'économie néoclassique. Toute sélection n'étant toutefois pas de type « darwinien », il importe de bien distinguer les arguments qui invoquent la sélection naturelle au sens strict et les arguments crypto-téléologiques qui s'apparenteraientplutôt à un évolutionnisme de type lamarckien. A l'aide de quelques exemples fictifs, dont deux sont empruntés à un essai méthodologique de Milton Friedman de (...) 1953, il est soutenu que les économistes doivent choisir entre des explications prétendument fondées sur la sélection naturelle et des explications fondées sur le principe de rationalité. Plus généralement, il est montré en conclusion, à l'aide de deux exemples supplémentaires, que les explications reposant sur des mécanismes impersonnels et celles reposant sur des activités intentionnelles ne peuvent être invoquées concurremment.Since the publication of Alchian's famous article of 1950, it has become relatively common to invoke natural selection as a justification of various conclusions in neoclassical economics. But because selection is not always of a "Darwinian" type, it is important to distinguish clearly between arguments which invoke natural selection in the strict sense of the word from crypto-teleological arguments which are rather more closely related to a Lamarkian evolutionary approach. With the help of fictional examples, two of which have been borrowed from Milton Friedman's 1953 essay on methodology, it is argued that economists mast choose between explanations supposedly based on natural selection and ones that are based on the principle of rationality. More generally, and with the help of two further examples, it is concluded that explanations based on a anonymous mechanism and those based on intentional activities can not be invoked concurrently. (shrink)

Alfred North Whitehead was a prominent English mathematician and philosopher who co-authored the highly influential Principia Mathematica with Bertrand Russell. Religion in the Making, which originated in a series of four lectures delivered in King's Chapel, Boston, during February 1926, constitutes an exploration of the relationship between human nature and religion. In many ways a rejection of dogma, the text explores the connection between religious transformation and the transformation of knowledge. Through this approach, the reader is encouraged to develop (...) a conception of faith that is at home with the changing nature of experience. The permanent aspect of religion is regarded as the apprehension of permanent elements that are reconcilable with this form of change. This concise and fascinating study will be of value to anyone with an interest in philosophy and theology. (shrink)

This article shows buber's dialogue with taoism, Hinduism, And buddhism, How they influenced him, And how this dialogue entered into the progressive stages of his thought. Neither hinduism nor buddhism remains a central part of buber's later thought as do taoism, Hasidism, And zen, But they do play an important part in his early developmental thinking. When he reached his mature philosophy of dialogue, He transcended his early partiality for non-Dualistic vedanta. But taoism, And especially wu-Wei, Action of the whole (...) being, Remained central to the i-Thou relationship, As did buber's affinity for the other "mysticisms of the particular," zen buddhism and hasidism. (shrink)

Margaret Whitehead; Meaningful Existence, Embodiment and Physical Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 3–14, ht.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The backbone of this work is a series of lectures given to students of philosophy at St Augustine's Senior Seminary- Mabanga. ...

Modern, science-centered naturalisms can be charged with a certain moral laxity, according to S. T. Coleridge. This fault reflectsnbsp; a devitalizing, materialistic metaphysics informed by a narrow and self-serving conception of reason. Thus seeking a remedy that can bring justice to the spiritual as well as the physical aspects of experience, Coleridge envisages a lsquo;true naturalismrsquo; that will not only address the question lsquo;What is Life?rsquo; but also frame a lsquo;true realismrsquo; that includes what might be called a lsquo;true moralismrsquo;. (...) This calls, however, for a Heraclitean metaphysics capable of linking lsquo;goodnessrsquo; in both thinking and acting to a *Logos*mdash;that is, an essentially nonmodern theory of actuality that can do justice at once to the quicknesses and the uniformities of both Life and Thought. Coleridgersquo;s thus presents an outline of how one might respond to a challenge that can be best met, I argue, with the help of certain insights of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, A. N. Whitehead, Gilles Deleuze, and C. S. Peirce. By enlisting Hannah Arendtrsquo;s individual-centered conception of morality, which ties ethics to public concerns, it is also possible to sketch a metaphysically grounded response to Friedrich Nietzschersquo;s call for a lsquo;healthy moralityrsquo; capable of overturning the nihilistic values entrenched in modern thought. br /. (shrink)

The advent of the post-Stalin "thaw," particularly the period after 1956, was marked by a spectacular expansion in the publishing of translated Western writing and also, on occasion, of editions in the original languages: the virtual ban on import of Western books was, as of 1975, never relaxed. The more permissive political atmosphere favored the publication of a vastly larger variety of Western authors and titles and provision for the Soviet public of much larger quantities of such books in the (...) country's bookstores and libraries. While the improvement was very impressive in itself, abundant data attest that it was far from adequate to satisfy reader demand.1 Among the beneficiaries, books by American authors stood out the more prominently since it was these that were most discriminated against during the years immediately preceding.2 Decades of neglect, to say nothing of politically inspired selectivity, resulted in such incongruities as the first Russian translation of Melville's Moby Dick in 1961—more than a century after the novel's appearance—and the first Soviet publication of any work by Henry James in 1973. It was not until the 1960's that Russians had an opportunity to read Faulkner—but then, the same was true of Kafka. However unevenly, the range of American literature, both old and new, now made available to Soviet readers is gradually expanding. · 1. The overall problem is discussed in detail in this writer's forthcoming book, A Decade of Euphoria: Western Literature in Post-Stalin Russia, 1954-64 . · 2. For a thorough and illuminating discussion of the fate of American literature in the U.S.S.R. from the Revolution until the early post-Stalin years, see Deming Brown, Soviet Attitudes toward American Writing . Interesting statistical data on the first post-Stalin years may also be found in Melville J. Ruggles, "American Books in Soviet Publishing," Slavic Review 20, n.3 : 419-35. A useful, very brief list of selected works of American writing published by 1968, though not entirely as complete as it purports to be, may be found in M.O. Mendel'son, A.N. Nikolyukin, R.M. Samarin, eds., Problemy literature S. Sh. A. XX. veka , pp. 391-517. Unfortunately, the Soviet bibliography contains no information on press runs of the books listed. Maurice Friedberg, head of the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at the University of Illinois, is the author of numerous essays and articles on Soviet literature. Professor Friedberg's most recent book, A Decade of Euphoria: Western Literature in Post-Stalin Russia, 1954-1964, will be published this year. (shrink)

Prodelision or Inverse Elision takes place when a word ending in a long vowel or diphthong is immediately followed by another word beginning with a short vowel. Though it is very occasionally found in inscriptions and in the manuscripts of certain prose authors, particularly those of Plato—almost uniquely and its cases—it is to be considered as essentially a verse phenomenon, affecting as it does the metre of the line in which it occurs. Prodelision was unknown to Homer and Hesiod, is (...) rare in lyric, and seems only to come into real use with the dramatists of the fifth century. An examination of the practice of the three tragedians and of Aristophanes is not without interest in itself and may occasionally throw some light on points of textual criticism. (shrink)

Beginning with the similarities between Buber and Levinas-both twentieth-century Jewish philosophers, each in his own way dialogica-this essay proceeds to their differences. From there the essay discusses Levinas's critiques of Buber's philosophy, the extent to which they were based on misunderstanding, and Buber's own replies to Levinas. This foundation provides a springboard for discussion of the source of the moral ought in both Buber and Levinas-Buber's emphasis on the "between" and Levinas's emphasis on the "face"-and raises a serious ethical question (...) concerning Levinas's argument against Buber's discussion of "Samuel and Aging" from the Hebrew Bible. (shrink)

La place généreusement accordée par Sartre dans la Critique de la Raison Dialectique à l'analyse de phénomènes économiques invitait d'elle-même à une réflexion neuve sur les relations de la pensée économique et de la philosophie existentielle. A cause toutefois de l'intérêt constant suscité par des polémiques vieilles déjà d'un quart de siècle sur les rapports de l'existentialisme et du marxisme, il semble que cette question ait été laissée dans l'ombre: on s'est beaucoup plus souvent inquiété, — Raymond Aron n'étant ici (...) qu'un témoin particulièrement éloquent — de savoir si le marxisme de Sartre est ou n'est pas un « marxisme imaginaire » que de savoir quelle est au juste la portée philosophique de ces longues discussions de l'activité économique qui font l'objet d'une part importante de la Critique. Pourtant à réfléchir sur une telle question, on peut aisément reconnaître dans la problématique même de la science économique un terrain d'élection pour le développement de la philosophie sartrienne, —osons dire plus, on peut y découvrir une voie permettant de retrouver et d'éclairer quelques-unes de ses articulations les plus décisives. (shrink)

No ancient authority has left us a clear account of how the judges at the Athenian dramatic festivals operated. We can therefore never know for certain what happened. But it may be possible to improve the reconstruction normally given, which does not look as if it could ever have yielded acceptable results. One thing that is very clear is that the choice of judges was taken seriously. Not only did it involve the Council, the Prytanies, and the Treasurers, but any (...) tampering with the panel from which the judges were eventually selected seems to have been punishable with death. Even the physical arrangements were quite complicated. Names approved by the Council were deposited in ten jars, one jar for each tribe but each jar containing several names, sealed by the Prytanies, held in safe-keeping on the Acropolis, and eventually brought down to the theatre, where the archon publicly broke the seals and drew out one name from each jar. At this stage of the process there emerged ten judges, one from each tribe. Their quality had been guaranteed by the Council's prior vetting of the panel, but their actual names were unpredictable because randomly selected from it. All had been done democratically and with equal representation of tribes, in perfect accord with normal Athenian practice. But now comes the difficulty. The paroemiographers record a proverb about judgement being in the lap of five judges — ν πντε κριτν γούνασι κεται; Lysias tells us of a judge whose vote was not counted; and Lucian, who likes to disguise a very careful antiquarianism behind an apparent casualness of style, says that at festival competitions the many know how to clap and hiss but that judgement is in the hands of seven or five or however many. (shrink)