Researchers, when engaging with Māori communities, are in a process of relationship building and this process can be guided by the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, partnership, participation and protection. The main concerns for many indigenous peoples in research revolve around respect for their indigenous rights, control over research processes and reciprocity within research relationships to ensure that equitable benefits are realised within indigenous groups. Māori have identified similar issues and these concerns can be aligned with the principles of (...) the Treaty of Waitangi. The relevance of the Treaty of Waitangi to research ethics is discussed and this paper suggests a revised interpretation of the treaty principles to incorporate the range of ethical issues that Māori have expressed as important. (shrink)

Whakapapa is the foundation of traditional Māori social structure and it perpetuates a value base that locates people through their relationships to the physical and spiritual worlds. As part of a new envirogenomics research programme, researchers at the Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR) are developing a study with an iwi (tribe) to identify combinations of genetic and environmental factors that may contribute to current health status. A major objective of this study is to utilise whakapapa (genealogical information) to (...) explore patterns of genetic variation unique to the iwi and to correlate these with potential disease or ill health. Genetic testing and screening raises numerous ethical issues, particularly when indigenous peoples are the subjects. This paper will outline ESR’s strategy for addressing indigenous concerns about genetic testing and how whakapapa forms an integral part of the envirogenomics research programme. (shrink)

In his recent article, Nicolas Rasmussen (2001) is harshly critical of what he terms 'empirical philosophy of science', a philosophy that takes seriously the history of science in advancing philosophical pronouncements about science. He motivates his criticism by reflecting on recent history in microbiology involving the 'discovery' of a new bacterial organelle, the mesosome, during the 1950's and 1960's, and the subsequent retraction of this discovery by experimental microbiologists during the late 1970's and early 1980's. In particular, he argues that (...) there was a lack of constancy in the methods microbiologists used in approaching the issue of the existence of mesosomes, and that in fact a similar sort of 'methodological flux' pervades all experimental work. My goal here is to refute Rasmussen's doctrine of flux, and in turn to re-establish order in our understanding of the methods and strategies of experimenters. My strategy in achieving this goal is to re-visit the same crucial research articles in the history of the mesosome episode that Rasmussen (2001) visits; and what I find upon returning to this literature is not flux, as Rasmussen seems to find, but a constancy of method in experimental reasoning, a constancy codified by what I call 'reliable process reasoning'. (shrink)

This essay uses Garland’s framework from The Culture of Control to suggest an agenda for critical penology. This includes, as well as the analysis of choices actually made and the cultural repertoire actually available, describing and advocating other possible choices, and analysing the conditions of possibility for the adoption of other (better) policies and practices; and examining the implications for the future of choices which are currently being made. Carlen’s Women and Punishment: The Struggle for Justice and Garland’s edited collection (...) Mass Imprisonment in the USA are examples of these penologies. Another way in which penologists, social theorists and philosophers can attempt to influence policy choices is to contribute to enlargement of the available cultural repertoire. The development and promotion of restorative justice is given as one example of this; another is work by philosophers such as Duff, Matravers and Norrie which addresses questions such as the source, nature and limits of penal communities; the basis of political obligation, and the relational nature of responsibility for crime. (shrink)

Prayer, a repeated practice of paying attention to one's inner mental world, is a core behavior across many faiths and traditions, understudied by cognitive scientists. Previous research suggests that humans pray because prayer changes the way they feel or how they think. This paper makes a novel argument: that prayer changes what they feel that they perceive. Those who pray, we find, are more likely to report sensory and perceptual experiences which they take to be evidence of a god or (...) spirit. Across three studies encompassing data from thousands of participants across five different cultures, we find that the amount of time spent daily in prayer is associated with the frequency of such events—and that prayer is associated with some of these experiences more strongly than others. Time in prayer has the strongest relationship with the frequency of everyday events (like dreams or strong emotion) that are experienced as not generated by the self but by a god or spirit. Prayer is also associated with more anomalous experiences like voices and a sense of presence, but prayer has no association with more dramatic events such as possession, out‐of‐body experiences, and sleep paralysis. Our results not only suggest interesting relationships between practice and experience in a religious domain, but hint at the power of practice to shape experience more broadly. (shrink)

This Is A New Release Of The Original 1896 Edition.

The fact of evil has worried theists for a long time. The earliest clear statement of this worry is perhaps to be found in the book of Habbakuk: (i, 13). More precisely formulated, it comes to this: if God is good and omnipotent, why evil ? From his goodness it would follow necessarily that he does not will evil and from his omnipotence that he could prevent it; why then should it occur? Theists have attempted to escape from this dilemma (...) by means of an argument which turns on the claim that human beings are, to some degree at any rate, free to choose and act as they will. They are free to do good or evil; frequently they choose the latter and that is why evils, or at least many of them, occur. This human freedom, however, is a necessary condition of personality and, as such, a great good; so it is perfectly consistent with the goodness of God that he should will it. But what of his omnipotence? The point of the argument is that God has to allow those evils which result from men making evil choices, and this certainlylooks, at first blush, like a limitation of his power. But, we are assured,it is not really a limitation because all it amounts to is that God cannot do the logically impossible, viz., make beings who, at one and the same time, are both free to do what they will and pre-determined to do good.To deny that God can do the logically impossible, of course, is not to den his omnipotence; it is merely to point out that there are some things which it would not make sense to say that he had done. (shrink)

Jebb in outlining the differences between ancient and modem oratory maintains that while modern orators try to give the impression that their speeches are extempore, the Greeks polished their speeches with fastidious care and were not ashamed to admit laboured preparation. This view, which is widely held, needs considerable qualification. The purpose of this article is.

Did Wittgenstein think that language-games have presuppositions? He sometimes speaks as if he thought that they do, at other times as though he thought that they do not. For examples, in On Certainty 110, after pointing out that the business of giving grounds for what we say has to come to an end sometime, he remarks, ‘but the end is not an ungrounded presupposition’; whereas, in 115, after warning us that if we try to doubt everything we shall not get (...) as far as doubting anything, he gives as his reason ‘the game of doubting itself presupposes certainty’. It is of some importance for a correct understanding of Wittgenstein to clear up this apparent contradiction. (shrink)

There have been and continue to be disagreements about how to consider the traditional square of opposition and the traditional inferences of obversion, conversion, contraposition and inversion from the perspective of contemporary quantificational logic. Philosophers have made many different attempts to save traditional inferences that are invalid when they involve empty classes. I survey some of these attempts and argue that the only satisfactory way of saving all the traditional inferences is to make the existential assumption that both the subject (...) and predicate classes and their complement classes are non-empty for all the propositions we admit. I briefly indicate the room for continued controversy over how properly to interpret Aristotle's statements regarding these inferences, but find some plausibility in the views of Manley Thompson and A.N.Prior that Aristotle had in mind a particular arrangement of existential import unfamiliar to most contemporary logicians. (shrink)

It is now nearly twenty years since Noam Chomsky's Syntactic Structures appeared, and during these twenty years many things have changed in linguistics—not least, the interest that the rest of the world now takes in what we linguists do. The reason for this is clearly because Chomsky claimed to have discovered a window into the human mind, via the study of the structure of languages. The argument is a simple one: a linguist can write a grammar for a language, with (...) some degree of confidence that his grammar is the “ right “ one for that language, but since the language only exists in the heads of its speakers until linguists or other grammar-writers come along, the grammar that he has written must correspond in some direct sense, and in detail, to the knowledge that exists in the speaker's mind. Therefore, in order to study that particular part of our minds, all we need to do is to write grammars, making sure that they are right, of course, and then study the grammars instead. “We can also compare the grammars for radically different languages and see to what extent they are similar or different, and then draw conclusions about general properties of all human beings’ minds— and we can even speculate as to how our minds have developed that way, whether by genetic programming or by other means. It is no wonder that linguists are not the only people who think linguistics is important. (shrink)

Hud Hudson shows that apparently irreconcilable conflicts between science and religion often turn out to be misdescribed battles about negotiable philosophical assumptions. He defends an original Hypertime Hypothesis which reconciles the Christian doctrines of The Fall and Original Sin with reigning scientific orthodoxy.

Hud Hudson presents an innovative view of the metaphysics of human persons according to which human persons are material objects but not human organisms. In developing his account, he formulates and defends a unique collection of positions on parthood, persistence, vagueness, composition, identity, and various puzzles of material constitution. The author also applies his materialist metaphysics to issues in ethics and in the philosophy of religion. He examines the implications for ethics of his metaphysical views for standard arguments addressing (...) the moral permissibility of our treatment of human persons and their parts, fetuses and infants, the irreversibly comatose, and corpses. He argues that his metaphysics provides the best foundation in the philosophy of religion for the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body. Hudson addresses a broad range of metaphysical issues, but among his most strikingly original contributions are his defense of the "Partist" view and his argument for the compatibility of Christianity with a materialistic theory of human persons. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Part I: Ethnobiology as a Case Example Part II: Philosophical and Ethical Issues: Toward the Creation of ‘Ethical Space’.

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar sobre o problema do mito da Modernidade, proposto pelo filósofo da Libertação, Enrique Dussel, que inicia problematizando o conceito filosófico de ontologia como algo excludente, totalitário e opressor, impossibilitando e reduzindo o rosto ôntico do outro a um não ser. Para este propósito, foi necessário reconstruir os pilares constitutivos da mitologização da modernidade e apontar como tais conceitos se mantêm firmes como condutores da humanidade. É neste sentido de transcender que as categorizações propostas por (...) Enrique Dussel contrapõem-se a tais mitos, criados pelo pensamento desenvolvimentista e utilitarista do período moderno, possibilitando o desvelamento do outro, radicalmente outro. (shrink)

Readers of the poems of Dracontius as edited and expounded by F. Vollmer may well receive the impression that the poet was incapable of the Latin tongue and was given to turns and expressions intelligible only to himself and such painstaking students as his editor. The language of the true Drac., though often stiff and artificial, does not, however, call for superhuman powers of interpretation, and the bewilderment of his readers is occasioned largely by the faulty tradition of the text (...) and the conservatism of an editor who either refuses to recognize the corruptions which confront him, or is content with superficial corrections sufficient to restore some semblance of grammar whether or not accompanied by sense. To the text of Drac. Vollm. certainly made a valuable contribution, but his unshakable faith in the integrity of scribes led to a frequent acceptance of the false as the true; that the transmission of the text may have been left to the heedless or the ignorant is not a possibility which appears to have occurred to him. There can be no doubt that the manuscripts on which the text depends are full of corruptions, and many of these have received either inadequate attention or none at all; where convincing remedies have been proposed by previous scholars, Vollm. has shown all too often a blind indifference. The poems of Drac. deserve, indeed, more sympathetic treatment, for they are by no means without merit. The Christian works at least, written during his imprisonment, contain flashes of real poetry and are characterized by a warmth of feeling inspired by the poet's personal miseries and genuine belief in the goodness of God; that they were read and imitated in the most diverse lands of the Christian world is not surprising. The following notes represent for the most part an attempt to improve on Vollm.'s text of the De laudibus dei and the Satisfactio in certain passages where the manuscript reading appears to me to have been either improperly retained or imperfectly emended. I have already dealt with a number of other unsatisfactory passages in C.Q., vol. xxxiii, pp. 157–62, and vol. xl, pp. 92–100. The text quoted is in each case that of Vollm.'s P.L.M. edition. (shrink)

Secession and the civil war that followed are often regarded as having exclusively structural determinants, expressed in political cleavages. From this point of view, these events are explained, variously, by the rise of abolitionism in the North or sectionalism in the Union or some cultural attribute of the South. This focus gets us part of the way in understanding the events that led to secession, the creation of a Southern Confederacy, and civil war, but this interpretation says too little about (...) precisely how these events and processes played out. Secession occurred in time, sequentially and dynamically, with one state leading and other states following. This article offers a processual specification of the conditions of Southern secession and the creation of a Southern Confederacy. It does so by focusing on mobilization within the vanguard state, South Carolina, and the consequences of this activity for other Southern states. (shrink)

Hud Hudson offers a fascinating examination of philosophical reasons to believe in hyperspace. He explores non-theistic reasons in the first chapter and theistic ones towards the end; in the intervening sections he inquires into a variety of puzzles in the metaphysics of material objects that are either generated by the hypothesis of hyperspace or else informed by it, with discussions of receptacles, boundaries, contact, occupation, and superluminal motion. Anyone engaged with contemporary metaphysics, and many philosophers of religion, will find (...) much to stimulate them here. (shrink)

(2003). Intellectuals for our times. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 6, The Public Role of Intellectuals, pp. 33-50. doi: 10.1080/1369823042000241258.

I want to put forward a certain view of the logical foundation of religious belief. It is, in a sentence, the view that religious belief is constituted by the concept of god. This view will be discussed under three headings. First, I shall explain as clearly as I can what I mean by it. Secondly, I shall indicate what seem to me to be interesting parallels, both with regard to universes of discourse in general and to religious belief in particular, (...) between my idea of a constitutive concept and Wittgenstein's ideas of a fundamental proposition and a religious ‘picture’. Thirdly, I shall try to substantiate the view I take of the logical foundation of religious belief by rebutting three conceivable objections to it: namely, that it rests on an illegitimate craving for generality, that it is at variance with common usage, and that it consigns religious belief to an intellectual ghetto. (shrink)

In 1997 the Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain published a report entitledFrom Compliance to Concordance: Achieving Shared Goals in Medicine Taking. This article applies this new model—of doctors and patients working together towards a shared goal—to the prescribing of hormonal forms of contraception. It begins by critically evaluating the current dominant model of contraceptive prescribing. It claims that this model tends to stereotype all women, but particularly young, poor and black women, as unreliable and ill-informed contraceptors who need to (...) be advised and even controlled by much more knowledgeable and socially responsible family planning experts. The article then suggests how a much more egalitarian model of contraceptive prescribing might be put into practice, whilst acknowledging the existence of many serious obstacles to such a radical shift within family planning services. In conclusion, the article suggests that until contraceptive prescribers begin to take women’s experiences of, and concerns about, hormonal contraceptives seriously they will fail to develop a potentially much more effective and liberating model of family planning. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that, omissions are not events or actions, but rather fact-like entities, and that, insofar as only events and actions can be causes, omissions cannot be causes. Nevertheless, since omissions can, and often do, play a role in the explanations of events, their place in such explanations must be found; and an attempt to find such a place is made.

Canon is a concept from aesthetics that has become a regular subject of commonplace discussions. The nature of canon, especially as it is used in these commonplace discussions, has not been subject to adequate philosophical scrutiny. We attempt to remedy that by placing canon in its historical and philosophical context, exploring and rejecting several common accounts, and presenting some basics of how canon works. We reject the accounts that place control with the author or the legal property holder, which appear (...) to be the most commonly held accounts. (shrink)