In this event-related potential study a masking technique that prevents conscious perception of words and non-words through attentional distraction was used to reveal the temporal dynamics of word processing under non-conscious and conscious conditions. In the non-conscious condition, ERP responses differed between masked words and non-words from 112 to 160 ms after stimulus-onset over posterior brain areas. The early onset of the word–non-word differences was compatible with previous studies that reported non-conscious access to orthographic information within this time period. Moreover, (...) source localisations provided evidence for automatic activation of prelexical phonological information, whereas no evidence for non-conscious semantic processing was found. When subjects were informed about the masking technique, lexical differences occurred at later time intervals, suggesting conscious access to additional word related information. These results indicate that early visual word processing does not depend entirely on attentional resources, but that non-conscious processing probably is restricted to rather lower-level linguistic information. (shrink)

Homonyms, i.e. ambiguous words like ‘score’, have different meanings in different contexts. Previous research indicates that all potential meanings of a homonym are first accessed in parallel before one of the meanings is selected in a competitive race. If these processes are automatic, these processes of selection should even be observed when homonyms are shown subliminally. This study measured the time course of subliminal and supraliminal priming by homonyms with a frequent and a rare meaning in a neutral context, using (...) a lexical decision task. In the subliminal condition, priming across prime-target asynchronies ranging from 100 ms to 1.5 s indicated that the dominant meaning of homonyms was facilitated and the subordinate meaning was inhibited. This indicates that selection of meaning was much faster with subliminal presentation than with supraliminal presentation. Awareness of a prime might decelerate an otherwise rapid selection process. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the rejection of doxastic voluntarism is not as straightforward as its opponents take it to be. I begin with a critical examination of William Alston's defense of involuntarism and then focus on the question of whether belief is intentional.

In this paper, I examine Alston's arguments for doxastic involuntarism. Alston fails to distinguish (i) between volitional and executional lack of control, and (ii) between compatibilist and libertarian control. As a result, he fails to notice that, if one endorses a compatibilist notion of voluntary control, the outcome is a straightforward and compelling case for doxastic voluntarism. Advocates of involuntarism have recently argued that the compatibilist case for doxastic voluntarism can be blocked by pointing out that belief is never intentional. (...) In response to this strategy, I distinguish between two types of intentionality and argue that belief is no less intentional than action is. (shrink)

Consciousness scientists have not reached consensus on two of the most central questions in their field: first, on whether consciousness overflows reportability; second, on the physical basis of consciousness. I review the scientific literature of the 19th century to provide evidence that disagreement on these questions has been a feature of the scientific study of consciousness for a long time. Based on this historical review, I hypothesize that a unifying explanation of disagreement on these questions, up to this day, is (...) that scientific theories of consciousness are underdetermined by the evidence, namely, that they can be preserved “come what may” in front of (seemingly) disconfirming evidence. Consciousness scientists may have to find a way of solving the persistent underdetermination of theories of consciousness to make further progress. (shrink)

Über Jahrhunderte hatten Ärzte die Aufgabe, Krankheiten zu verhindern und zu behandeln. Nun stehen sie immer häufiger im Dienst der Selbstverwirklichung und Lebensplanung gesunder Menschen, besonders in der Fortpflanzungsmedizin und der ästhetischen Chirurgie. Welche Konsequenzen hat dies für die Zukunft der Medizin? Die Autoren beleuchten diesen Wandel von der krankheitsbekämpfenden zur wunscherfüllenden Medizin unter ärztlichen, rechtlichen und ethischen Aspekten.

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

The core feature that distinguishes moods from emotions is that moods, in contrast to emotions, are diffuse and global. This article outlines a dispositional theory of moods (DTM) that accounts for this and other features of mood experience. DTM holds that moods are temporary dispositions to have or to generate particular kinds of emotion-relevant appraisals. Furthermore, DTM assumes that the cognitions and appraisals one is disposed to have in a given mood partly constitute the experience of mood. This article outlines (...) a number of implications of DTM (e.g., regarding the noncognitive causation and rationality of moods) and summarizes empirical results supporting the theory. (shrink)

According to a standard criticism, Robert Brandom's “normative pragmatics”, i.e. his attempt to explain normative statuses in terms of practical attitudes, faces a dilemma. If practical attitudes and their interactions are specified in purely non-normative terms, then they underdetermine normative statuses; but if normative terms are allowed into the account, then the account becomes viciously circular. This paper argues that there is no dilemma, because the feared circularity is not vicious. While normative claims do exhibit their respective authors' practical attitudes (...) and thereby contribute towards establishing the normative statuses they are about, this circularity is not a mark of Brandom's explanatory strategy but a feature of social practice of which we theorists partake. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the new Tweety puzzle. The original Tweety puzzle was addressed by approaches in non-monotonic logic, which aim to adequately represent the Tweety case, namely that Tweety is a penguin and, thus, an exceptional bird, which cannot fly, although in general birds can fly. The new Tweety puzzle is intended as a challenge for probabilistic theories of epistemic states. In the first part of the paper we argue against monistic Bayesians, who assume that epistemic states can (...) at any given time be adequately described by a single subjective probability function. We show that monistic Bayesians cannot provide an adequate solution to the new Tweety puzzle, because this requires one to refer to a frequency-based probability function. We conclude that monistic Bayesianism cannot be a fully adequate theory of epistemic states. In the second part we describe an empirical study, which provides support for the thesis that monistic Bayesianism is also inadequate as a descriptive theory of cognitive states. In the final part of the paper we criticize Bayesian approaches in cognitive science, insofar as their monistic tendency cannot adequately address the new Tweety puzzle. We, further, argue against monistic Bayesianism in cognitive science by means of a case study. In this case study we show that Oaksford and Chater’s (2007, 2008) model of conditional inference—contrary to the authors’ theoretical position—has to refer also to a frequency-based probability function. (shrink)

We investigate a lattice of conditional logics described by a Kripke type semantics, which was suggested by Chellas and Segerberg – Chellas–Segerberg (CS) semantics – plus 30 further principles. We (i) present a non-trivial frame-based completeness result, (ii) a translation procedure which gives one corresponding trivial frame conditions for arbitrary formula schemata, and (iii) non-trivial frame conditions in CS semantics which correspond to the 30 principles.

"Die Grenzen des Revisionismus" befasst sich mit den erkenntnis- und wissenschafttheoretischen Positionen des frühen Moritz Schlick und des frühen Ernst Cassirer.

Is it possible to argue that one’s memory is reliable without using one’s memory? I argue that it is not. Since it is not, it is impossible to defend the reliability of one’s memory without employing reasoning that is epistemically circular. Hence, if epistemic circularity is vicious, it is impossible to succeed in producing a cogent argument for the reliability of one’s memory. The same applies to any other one of one’s cognitive faculties. I further argue that, if epistemic circularity (...) is vicious, it is impossible to produce a cogent argument for the reliability of anything. For example, if epistemic circularity were vicious, a cogent argument for the reliability of one’s car would not be possible. The seeming viciousness of epistemic circularity even threatens, I propose, the possibility of justification and knowledge. Much, therefore, hangs one the question of whether epistemic circularity is indeed bad. I argue that epistemic circularity, or bootstrapping, need not be bad. When we use a crystal ball—a source perspicuously guilty of unreliability—to confirm its own reliability, bootstrapping is foolish. When we attribute reliability to a witness solely because the witness says he is reliable, bootstrapping is dogmatic. Foolish and dogmatic bootstrapping are bad. However, when a witness provides a rich body of testimony, using that testimony to gauge the witness’s reliability need not be a vicious form of circularity. When done critically, I argue, such reasoning exemplifies a form of bootstrapping that is benign. (shrink)

In this book review, I summarize the main argument of Tilo Wesche's book "Die Rechte der Natur: Vom nachhaltigen Eigentum" (The rights of Nature: On sustainable ownership) and conclude with a critical appraisal.

Eino Kaila's thought occupies a curious position within the logical empiricist movement. Along with Hans Reichenbach, Herbert Feigl, and the early Moritz Schlick, Kaila advocates a realist approach towards science and the project of a “scientific world conception”. This realist approach was chiefly directed at both Kantianism and Poincaréan conventionalism. The case in point was the theory of measurement. According to Kaila, the foundations of physical reality are characterized by the existence of invariant systems of relations, which he called structures. (...) In a certain sense, these invariant structures, he maintained, are constituted in the act of measuring. By “constitution”, however, Kaila meant neither the dependency of the objects of measurement on a priori concepts (or Kantian categories) nor their being effected by conventional stipulations in a Poincaréan sense. He held that invariant structures are, quite literally, real: they exist prior to and independently of our theoretical capacity. By executing measurements, invariant structures are detected and objectively determinable by laws of nature. (shrink)

This article considers the evolution of Feigl's attempt at establishing a stable form of scientific realism. I will argue that Feigl's work in that area should be appreciated for two reasons: it represents a telling case against the view of there being an unbridgeable ‘analytic-continental divide’ in the context of twentieth-century philosophy; it contradicts the idea that scientific realism is at odds with logical empiricism. It will be shown that Feigl developed his scientific realist position from within the logical empiricists’ (...) Vienna Circle. This, in turn, necessitates a fresh approach toward the contemporary scientific realism debate. (shrink)

Setting out the 'state of the art' in proportionality doctrine, this book combines theoretical reconstruction with case-law examples, defending and developing the dominant model of proportionality.

The aim of this paper is to show that the French philosopher and historian of science Abel Rey played a more influential role in the formative phase of the Vienna Circle than hitherto supposed. On the whole, it will be argued that Rey's contribution had political impact. His interpretation of "modern physics" in 1907 in the face of the alleged "bankruptcy of science" should be appreciated as a masterpiece of applied enlightenment thought. As such, it was especially paradigmatic for Philipp (...) Frank's "positivist" defense of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics against the irrationalist tendencies of the 1920s and 1930s. (shrink)

Helmholtz's theory of space had significant impact on Schlick's early ?critical realist? point of view. However, it will be argued in this paper that Schlick's appropriation of Helmholtz's ideas eventually lead to a rather radical transformation of the original Helmholtzian position.

Tradition is a complex phenomenon of which we can find a multiplicity of conceptualizations in the philosophical, sociological, anthropological, and economic literature. In this paper, I offer both a critical and a constructive contribution to answering the question of how tradition should be conceptualized. In the critical part, I argue against attempts to construct a unified conception of tradition. In the constructive part, I discuss three taxonomies proposed in the literature and then develop an analytical grid for conceptions of tradition (...) as an alternative. This analytical grid is based on a sample of 28 accounts of tradition sourced from the contemporary scholarly literature, and makes use of seven dimensions to distinguish among these conceptions. (shrink)

Critical realism is a frequently mentioned, but not very well-known, late nineteenth-/early twentieth-century philosophical tradition. Having its roots in Kantian epistemology, critical realism is best characterized as a revisionist approach toward the original Kantian doctrine. Its most outstanding thesis is the idea that Kantian things-in-themselves are knowable. This idea was—at least implicitly—suggested by thinkers such as Alois Riehl, Wilhelm Wundt, and Oswald Külpe. Interestingly enough, the philosophical position of the early Moritz Schlick stands in the critical realist tradition as well. (...) As will be outlined in the course of this paper, both Schlick’s magnum opus General Theory of Knowledge (1918) and his seminal Space and Time in Contemporary Physics (1917) are based on the assumption that the objects of science are relations and that relations have the status of Kantian things-in-themselves. By way of conclusion, I shall point out that this— more or less directly—leads to the current debate over ‘structural’ realism. (shrink)

In his action theory, John Dewey makes use of the concept of capability to highlight the way human capacities depend on the environment and the character of an agent. In his capability approach, Amartya Sen likewise refers to the environment by discussing the role of conversion factors. Yet, he abstains from a discussion of character development, presumably in order to allow for a variety of conceptions of the good and ways in which characters can develop. In this paper, I develop (...) the outlines of a pragmatist capability theory by enriching the core concepts of Sen’s capability approach with the Deweyan notions of habit and character. In this way, the role of the environment in the capability approach can be reaffirmed and supplemented by a notion of character development. Subsequently, I explore the implications of this framework for Sen’s notions of impartiality and freedom. The result is a pragmatist capability theory which builds on Sen’s conceptual framework and puts additional emphasis on character development and sensitivity to one’s environment. (shrink)

In her political philosophy, Martha C. Nussbaum defends liberal political principles on the basis of an objective conception of the good of human beings. This paper examines whether her argument succeeds. It identifies three methods to which Nussbaum refers in order to select the central human capabilities, whose exercise is seen as constituting the human good. It asks whether these methods – the interpretation of actual ways of human self-understanding, the search for necessary anthropological features, and the idea of an (...) overlapping consensus – can yield liberal political principles. The paper concludes that it is doubtful that the first two methods will lead to this result. As to the third method, it may yield liberal principles only insofar as it relies on the notion of human dignity which is interpreted in a way that contains a strong view of equality of all human beings. In this way, universal liberal principles are not primarily based on considerations of the human good, but on a genuine moral standpoint. (shrink)

The article raises objections to some fundamental assumptions of ?normative naturalism? as put forth by Larry Laudan. It contests the view that matters of rationality are strictly to be separated from matters of (normative) methodology and progress of knowledge. Thus a modified version of what Laudan calls the ?historicist's meta?methodology thesis? is suggested. In particular, it is argued that methodological rules should not initially be taken as elliptical for hypothetical means?end relations. Assuming that they are taken as such, it is (...) argued that naturalized methodology becomes untestable, since methodological rules (norms) turn out to be either vacuous or not lawlike. It is suggested that methodological norms have a status which has much in common with social norms. Instead of starting with methodological instrumentalities, a view of methodology is sketched in which the traditional idea of rational reconstruction is utilized. Yet the history of science may still serve as a major warrant for normative methodological claims. This becomes possible once we accept John Rawls's justificationary strategy of a ?reflective equilibrium?. Finally, it is claimed that Laudan's misconception of methodology is in part due to an inadequate notion of (scientific) progress. (shrink)

Alois Riehl was one of the few Kantian-inspired philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century who argued for a realist approach to Kant’s original doctrine. He therefore rejected prevailing idealist reconstructions and attempted to establish a view of Kant as an important forerunner of what he programmatically called ‘critical realism.’ In the present paper it will be shown what this exactly meant for the interpretation of Kant’s and especially Riehl’s own critique of idealism as a systematic position. In (...) particular, it is stated that anti-idealism in Riehlian terms amounts to a ‘realistic rehabilitation’ of Kantian things-in-themselves. Furthermore, some connections are drawn to early-twentieth century American realism. (shrink)

Zoos attract millions of visitors every year, many of whom are schoolchildren. For this reason, zoos are important institutions for the environmental education of future generations. Empirical studies on the educational impact of environmental education programs in zoos are still rare. To address this issue, we conducted two studies: In study 1, we investigated students’ interests in different biological topics, including zoos ( n = 1,587). Data analysis of individual topics revealed large differences of interest, with advanced students showing less (...) interest in zoos. In study 2, we invited school classes of this age group to visit different guided tours at the zoo and tested connection to nature before and after each educational intervention ( n = 608). The results showed that the guided tours are an effective tool to raise students’ connection to nature. Add-on components have the potential to further promote connection to nature. The education programs are most effective with students with a low initial nature connection. (shrink)

Definition of the Problem: One of the main ethical arguments against the therapeutic transplantation of fetal tissue in severe cases of Parkinson’s disease is the allegation that the relationship between the abortion and the transplantation is a (bad)-means-to-a-(good)-end-relation.Arguments: This paper differentiates between the actual experimental single-case treatment and a potential mass treatment. In the former case, ethical guidelines seem to guarantee that abortion and transplantation are two distinct actions and therefore abortion is not a means to the end transplantation on (...) principle. However, in the latter case – the potential mass treatment of patients with more severe cases of Parkinson’s disease – there seem to be several technical, logistical and psychological reasons for the impossibility to distinguish between abortion and transplantation.Conclusion: Although abortion is not a means to the end transplantation as a matter of principle the ethical problems of a mass treatment would be immense. (shrink)

During my preparations for this lecture, I realized that the German Coordinating Group had already sponsored a lecture with the title “On the struggle against Anti-Semitism today” in 1962.1 At that time they invited a more prominent speaker—a person whom I esteem and admire, Theodor W. Adorno. Adorno's suggestions for combating anti-Semitism remain relevant today, a point to which I will return later. Anti-Semitism itself, however, which at that time Adorno attributed to an “excessive nationalism,” has changed its form of (...) appearance. First of all, hostility against Jews today is directed less against the Jewish minority in Europe and more…. (shrink)

Schopenhauer gilt als Vorreiter oder erster Vertreter der Lebensphilosophie, wie sie später von Dilthey, Nietzsche, Bergson und anderen entfaltet wurde. Im Unterschied zur klassischen Lebensphilosophie und zu den an sie anknüpfenden ethischen Entwürfen wird das Leben bei Schopenhauer aber nicht als Zweck betrachtet, sondern als Mittel zu einem anderen Zweck, nämlich für die Ethik, die in der Verneinung des Willens zum Leben gipfelt. Schon in den frühesten handschriftlichen Aufzeichnungen verwendet Schopenhauer verschiedene Metaphern, um das Leben als Medium der ethischen Erkenntnis (...) zu charakterisieren. Besonders häufig tritt dabei das Bild vom Leben als Spiegel auf, in dem der Mensch sein eigenes Wesen und damit auch das Wesen der Welt erblickt. Im Hauptwerk wird dann dieses Bild vom Begriff der Objektivation des Willens abgelöst. Insofern die höchste und deutlichste Objektivation des Willens der Lebenslauf des menschlichen Individuums darstellt, ist Schopenhauers Lebensbegriff eng mit seiner Charakterlehre verknüpft. In dem Beitrag wird das verwickelte Verhältnis von Leben, Erkennen und Ethik vor dem Hintergrund der proto-hermeneutischen Metaphysikkonzeption Schopenhauers anhand der Entwicklung der Spiegelmetapher betrachtet. Schopenhauer is said to be precursor or first exponent of the philosophy of life as it has been developed later on by Dilthey, Nietzsche, Bergson and others. However, in contrast to classical philosophy of life and to the ethical conceptions going back to it, in Schopenhauer life is not viewed as an end but as a means to another end, namely to the ethics which culminates in the denial of the will-to-live. Already in the earliest hand-written manuscripts Schopenhauer uses different metaphors in order to characterize life as a medium of ethical knowledge. In particular the image of life as a mirror in which a human being sees his own nature and thus realizes the essence of the world often occurs. In the mature work this image is replaced by the concept of objectivation of will. As far as the highest and clearest objectivation of will is the life story of a human individual Schopenhauer’s concept of life is bound up with his theory of character. In my essay I consider the complicated relationship between life, knowledge and ethics in Schopenhauer on the background of his proto-hermeneutic metaphysics by following the development of his use of the mirror-metaphor. (shrink)

Mit dem Problem des Verhaltnisses von Wissenschaft und Ethik ist die Frage nach dem Zusammenhang von Wissen und Handeln wieder akut geworden. Auf der Interpretation zweier Philosophen aufbauend, die zu Beginn des technischen Zeitalters die Frage nach dem Verhaltnis von Wissen und Handeln scheinbar in entgegengesetzter Weise beantwortet haben, wird in dieser Untersuchung der Begriff der ethischen Erfahrung entwickelt. Dabei stellt sich heraus, dass die immer als Gegensatze aufgefassten Philosophien Hegels und Schopenhauers sich in der Sache nur um eine Nuance (...) unterscheiden. In diesem Spannungsfeld aber wird die Bedeutung des ethischen Erfahrungsbegriffs offenbar, der eine Grundlage zur Erfassung und Beurteilung des Zusammenhangs von Wissen und Moralitat bietet.". (shrink)

In this paper, we trace the conceptual history of the term ?metamathematics? in the nineteenth century. It is well known that Hilbert introduced the term for his proof-theoretic enterprise in about 1922. But he was verifiably inspired by an earlier usage of the phrase in the 1870s. After outlining Hilbert's understanding of the term, we will explore the lines of inducement and elucidate the different meanings of ?metamathematics? in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Finally, we will investigate the (...) earlier occurrences and come to the conclusion that the conceptual prehistory of the Hilbertian notion of metamathematics dates back to 1870, whereas the history of the word starts in 1799 at the latest. What is this: metamathematics? It is something amazing everybody, [?] since it makes the mind dizzy and withdraws thinking its sole fulcrum.1 1 Brunner 1898, p. 832: ?Was ist das: Metamathematik? Es ist etwas, was einen Jeden in das äusserste Staunen versetzt, [?] was das Gehirn schwindlig macht und dem Denken seinen einzigen Stütz- und Angelpunkt zu entziehen droht? (shrink)

It is commonly thought that the prevalence of moral dissent poses a problem for the moral cognitivist, forcing her to diagnose either a lot of misunderstanding, or a lot of unexplained observational error. Since mere misunderstanding can be ruled out in most cases of moral dissent, and since the diagnosis of widespread unexplained error is interpretively unstable, prevalent dissent has pushed many philosophers towards non-cognitivism. In this essay, I argue that once a diachronic, pragmatist theory of language along the lines (...) of the latest Wittgenstein is employed, a third interpretive option becomes available to the cognitivist. Besides the diagnostic options of misunderstanding and factual disagreement, she can argue that a given case of moral dissent is an instance of grammatical tension. This interpretation not only saves moral cognitivism, it also has some attractive theoretical implications. Among other things, it yields an elegant way of solving the current debate around moral particularism. (shrink)

In 2.14 Propertius promises rich donations to Venus, to be attached to a „columna“ (v. 25). This column is often thought to be part of a temple, but such an interpretation raises problems. One reading is that columna means a single votive column, well-known in Roman (and Greek) religious praxis and in visual arts. With such a reading „columna“ gains in sacral importance. Then again, single columns have been used as Roman victory monuments: With that in mind the „columna“ can (...) equally be understood in the semantics of a military success, which is essential for the whole elegy. Propertius’ „columna“ is much more than only a place to attach „magna dona“ (v. 25). (shrink)