The present volume is a translation of Volume 60 of the Collected Edition of Heidegger’s works, Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens, which was first published in 1995 edited by Matthias Jung, Thomas Regehly and Claudius Strube. It consists of three parts: an “approximation of the train of thought and articulation” of a course of lectures Heidegger gave in the winter semester 1920–21 entitled “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,” edited by Jung and Regehly; the actual text of his summer semester (...) 1921 course, “Augustine and Neo-Platonism”, edited by Strube; and a “fascicle,” also edited by Strube, “Phenomenology of Religious Life,” which comprises the “first notes” for “The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism,” a course scheduled for Winter Semester 1919–20 but not given. Strube suggests that the first two parts may be construed as “the high point, and at the same time the end, of [Heidegger’s] studies in the phenomenology of religion”, which, he says, “constitutes the background against which Heidegger will develop his ‘hermeneutics of facticity’”. (shrink)

This article discusses the widespread belief that secrecy in science is increasing—and that secrecy in science is ethically problematic. To what extent should we worry about this alleged development? In an introduction it is observed that there is very little hard empirical evidence supporting the belief of increasing secrecy in science. Evidence seems mostly to be of the anecdotal kind. The “purist ideology” of science, in which openness of research figures prominently as normative basis, is revealed as one-sided with respect (...) to accepted practice. Issues of commercialization of science and patenting are discussed, and it is claimed that what is ethically problematic is less related to secrecy than to more general ethical issues regarding the social consequences of scientific knowledge. On the basis of a particular case, an area of scientific research is introduced for which it is claimed that secrecy does constitute a serious problem. This area has been characterized, by Funtowicz and Ravetz, as “postnormal science!’ It is claimed that postnormal science and regulatory science necessitate new institutional mechanisms inside science to tackle ethical dilemmas. (shrink)

The Norwegian National Committee for Research Ethics inScience and Technology (NENT), collaborating with The NorwegianFisherman''s Association and The Research Council of Norway,started in 1999 a project aiming at an ethical assessment of Norwegian fisheries for the year 2020. The project was to preparethe ground for ethical debate in and of the fishery sector inview of pending important decisions on long term strategies. Thispaper has its focus on the method used for achieving these aims,rather than the substantive results concerning the fisheries. (...) Amethod was developed for this purpose, called the ethicalscenario process. This included the construction of scenarios forthe future of Norwegian fisheries, using an ethical matrix for evaluating strategies, and organizing a ``value workshop'''' whereparticipants from different stakeholder groups came together todo ethical evaluations. The positive achievements and theshortcomings of this method are discussed in this paper. The useof an ethical matrix was meant to combine a participatory approachwith insights from theoretical ethics. The project revealedinherent tensions between these two objectives. Possible ways ofdealing with this tension are indicated, but in general a goodgrasp of the socio-political context might be the best guardianagainst the possible pitfalls involved in such an approach. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

English summary: Ordinary, unmethodical experience forms our lives. It accumulates when we interact with our environment as living beings, and combines cognitive, affective and volitional elements. In it, questions of meaning and value and issues of knowledge become strongly interdependent. In a normative sense, modern culture has tremendously upgraded the status of ordinary people's experience. However, at the same time, our world is increasingly determined by the methodological experience of the (natural) sciences and by the technology they have made possible. (...) Will scientific experience now replace ordinary experience, or will it complement and regulate it? How do facts and values relate to one another and what does this mean for our understanding of democracy? Matthias Jung starts by developing an integrated approach to ordinary experience, taking into account insights from areas including hermeneutics, phenomenology, pragmatism and cognitive science. As a result, three main areas of discussion emerge: knowledge, values and ideology, all of which are covered in their respective individual chapters. German description: Gewohnliche, unmethodische Erfahrung formt unser Leben. Sie vollzieht sich, wenn wir als lebendige Wesen mit unserer Umwelt interagieren, und verbindet jeweils kognitive, affektive und willentliche Dimensionen. Fragen nach Sinn und Wert und Wissensfragen sind in ihr eng aufeinander bezogen. Normativ hat die Kultur der Moderne die Erfahrung gewohnlicher Menschen enorm aufgewertet, doch gleichzeitig wird unsere Welt immer starker von der methodischen Erfahrung der (Natur-)Wissenschaften und der von ihr ermoglichten Technik bestimmt. Ersetzt nun wissenschaftliche die gewohnliche Erfahrung oder erganzt und korrigiert sie diese? Wie verhalten sich Fakten und Werte zueinander und was ergibt sich daraus fur unser Verstandnis von Demokratie? Matthias Jung entwickelt zunachst ein integriertes Konzept gewohnlicher Erfahrung und nimmt dabei Einsichten u.a. aus Hermeneutik, Phanomenologie, Pragmatismus und Kognitionswissenschaften auf. Daraus ergeben sich drei exemplarische Problemfelder: Wissen, Werte und Weltanschauung. Ihnen sind jeweils eigene Kapitel gewidmet. (shrink)

This paper seeks to address research governance by highlighting the notion of public accountability as a complementary tool for the establishment of an ethical resonance space for emerging technologies. Public accountability can render development and design process of emerging technologies transparent through practices of holding those in charge of research accountable for their actions, thereby fostering ethical engagement with their potential negative consequences or side-effects. Through practices such as parliamentary questions, audits, and open letters emerging technologies could be effectively rendered (...) transparent and opened up to broader levels of scrutiny and debate, thereby contributing to a greater adherence of emerging technologies to ethics and moral consensus. Fundamental democratic practices could thus not only lead to better informed choices in design and development processes, but also contribute to more morally substantive outcomes. (shrink)

This article considers the evolution of Feigl's attempt at establishing a stable form of scientific realism. I will argue that Feigl's work in that area should be appreciated for two reasons: it represents a telling case against the view of there being an unbridgeable ‘analytic-continental divide’ in the context of twentieth-century philosophy; it contradicts the idea that scientific realism is at odds with logical empiricism. It will be shown that Feigl developed his scientific realist position from within the logical empiricists’ (...) Vienna Circle. This, in turn, necessitates a fresh approach toward the contemporary scientific realism debate. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 110 Heft: 1 Seiten: 74-125.

This book considers Robert Brandom's philosophy and presents an original and exciting analysis of the semantic argument in legal argumentation.

Tradition is a complex phenomenon of which we can find a multiplicity of conceptualizations in the philosophical, sociological, anthropological, and economic literature. In this paper, I offer both a critical and a constructive contribution to answering the question of how tradition should be conceptualized. In the critical part, I argue against attempts to construct a unified conception of tradition. In the constructive part, I discuss three taxonomies proposed in the literature and then develop an analytical grid for conceptions of tradition (...) as an alternative. This analytical grid is based on a sample of 28 accounts of tradition sourced from the contemporary scholarly literature, and makes use of seven dimensions to distinguish among these conceptions. (shrink)

In her political philosophy, Martha C. Nussbaum defends liberal political principles on the basis of an objective conception of the good of human beings. This paper examines whether her argument succeeds. It identifies three methods to which Nussbaum refers in order to select the central human capabilities, whose exercise is seen as constituting the human good. It asks whether these methods – the interpretation of actual ways of human self-understanding, the search for necessary anthropological features, and the idea of an (...) overlapping consensus – can yield liberal political principles. The paper concludes that it is doubtful that the first two methods will lead to this result. As to the third method, it may yield liberal principles only insofar as it relies on the notion of human dignity which is interpreted in a way that contains a strong view of equality of all human beings. In this way, universal liberal principles are not primarily based on considerations of the human good, but on a genuine moral standpoint. (shrink)

In his action theory, John Dewey makes use of the concept of capability to highlight the way human capacities depend on the environment and the character of an agent. In his capability approach, Amartya Sen likewise refers to the environment by discussing the role of conversion factors. Yet, he abstains from a discussion of character development, presumably in order to allow for a variety of conceptions of the good and ways in which characters can develop. In this paper, I develop (...) the outlines of a pragmatist capability theory by enriching the core concepts of Sen’s capability approach with the Deweyan notions of habit and character. In this way, the role of the environment in the capability approach can be reaffirmed and supplemented by a notion of character development. Subsequently, I explore the implications of this framework for Sen’s notions of impartiality and freedom. The result is a pragmatist capability theory which builds on Sen’s conceptual framework and puts additional emphasis on character development and sensitivity to one’s environment. (shrink)

Fathom is a sound installation by Jane Grant and John Matthias, which was commissioned by the River Tamar Project and was premiered at the Factory Cooperage Building in Royal William Yard, Plymouth, UK in September 2013. Visitors entering the installation were able to hear live and edited sound recorded underwater in Plymouth Sound, a large estuarine body of water from which the Plym, Tamar and Hamaoze Rivers flow into the sea. Six-step ladders in the centre of the installation space (...) surrounded by several additional speakers enabled visitors to climb out of the underwater sonic environment, above the fathom, and hear live acoustic sound relayed by microphones above the water. The artists worked with a team including production manager, Simon Honywill and Martin Audio to create a sonic ‘surface’ 6ft above the ground to enable this to happen. This article will describe how Fathom was created and, in particular, will focus on how the creation of the sonic surface affected the way in which the visiting public interacted with the work. (shrink)

Should we only believe what science can prove? Robert Almeder analyzes "naturalized epistemology," which holds that the only valid claims that can be made about the world must be proven by the natural sciences and that all philosophical questions are ultimately answered by science. The author examines and refutes different forms of naturalized epistemology before settling on "harmless naturalism," a compromise which implies that certain questions about the world are answerable and have been answered, without appealing to science. (publisher).

I would like to know who of mycontemporaries should be more competent inKantian philosophy than me.(Schopenhauer in a letter to Rosenkranz and Schubert, 18371)In this paper the attempt is made to show how Schopenhauer's critique of Kant leads from initial disagreements to a fundamental modification, even a new formation, of the Kantian concepts of understanding, reason, imagination, perception, idea and thing-in-itself. The starting point and the core of his critique is the demand for the appreciation of intuitive knowledge which is (...) apart from and independent of reason. The intuitive knowledge goes back to images and its highest form is aesthetic contemplation. Without a participation of concepts it is sufficient to explain objective reality. Particularly on the basis of Schopenhauer's critical examination of Kant's schematism it can be shown that his alternative conception of an image-based objectivity of experience is to be taken seriously, even if the way he presents it sometimes gives the impression of a mere misunderstanding of Kant's theory of cognition. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Pure Subject of Cognition The Artist as Pure Subject of Cognition Notes References Further Reading.

In the academic world, Joseph Margolis is best known as the proponent of a particular combination of radical historicism and robust relativism. In his publications, he argues that “humankind is the measure of all things” with regard to aesthetics, history, natural and social sciences, and philosophy. In doing so, he effortlessly interacts with authors from the continental, pragmatist, and analytic traditions. His book Three Paradoxes of Personhood is a collection of the three Venetian lecture...

In discussions of early-modern notions of passion and virtue, the humanist movement has played only a minor role. However, it has its own characteristics and approaches to the problem of passion and virtue. The moral philosophy of the Neapolitan humanist Giovanni Pontano is a case in point. Pontano pronounces himself against the Stoic doctrine of the eradication of the passions. Although his moral psychology follows traditional conceptions of the passions as subjected to the rule of reason, it rather illustrates the (...) complex structures into which reason and virtue have to be implemented. The notion of arduousness is helpful to illuminate these structures. Falling back on Aquinas' distinction between a 'concupiscible' and an 'irascible' appetite, Pontano puts a special emphasis on the latter, necessary to deal with the difficulties and hardships that are typical of any process of learning. As he argues, the way to human perfection is full of hardship, and the higher the perfection aims, the greater the hardship will be. This concept implies the need for passionate responses to overcome hardship.Moreover, it suggests the picture of a ruler unimpressed by difficulties and obstacles, vehement and forceful. (shrink)

The great Pontano -- The storms of life -- The haven of philosophy -- Rewriting moral philosophy -- Learned authority -- Latin philosophy -- Virtue, inside out -- The rule of reason -- Beyond the veil -- Chronology of Pontano's works -- Chronology of Pontano's life -- Moral virtues in Aristotle and Pontano.

Christian Lotz’s book, The Capitalist Schema: Time, Money, and the Culture of Abstraction, seeks to reconcile Marx’s logic of conceptual determination with Kant’s logic of constitution. It is in this context that Lotz reconfigures Kant’s transcendental schema as money and understands money as an a priori determination that makes the world accessible and meaningful to individuals. Furthermore the book’s point of departure is Adorno’s Kant interpretation, and in foregrounding money Lotz also wishes to ‘reconnect Adorno’s Critical Theory to Marx’. The (...) review engages with both endeavours, discusses the, so to speak, temporal impossibility of such a reconciliation project and revisits a previous attempt to bring Kant and Marx together: Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s theory of real abstraction. (shrink)

Figurative elements in language have their own particularities, including words that deviate from their generally accepted definition to amplify our language or to paraphrase an issue. It is still...

This essay consists of two parts. In the first part, I focus my attention on the remarks that Frege makes on consistency when he sets about criticizing the method of creating new numbers through definition or abstraction. This gives me the opportunity to comment also a little on H. Hankel, J. Thomae—Frege’s main targets when he comes to criticize “formal theories of arithmetic” in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) and the second volume of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1903)—G. Cantor, L. E. (...) J. Brouwer and D. Hilbert (1899). Part 2 is mainly devoted to Hilbert’s proof theory of the 1920s (1922–1931). I begin with an account of his early attempt to prove directly, and thus not by reduction or by constructing a model, the consistency of (a fragment of) arithmetic. In subsequent sections, I give a kind of overview of Hilbert’s metamathematics of the 1920s and try to shed light on a number of difficulties to which it gives rise. One serious difficulty that I discuss is the fact, widely ignored in the pertinent literature on Hilbert’s programme, that his language of finitist metamathematics fails to supply the conceptual resources for formulating a consistency statement qua unbounded quantification. Along the way, I shall comment on W. W. Tait’s objection to an interpretation of Hilbert’s finitism by Niebergall and Schirn, on G. Gentzen’s allegedly finitist consistency proof for Peano Arithmetic as well as his ideas on the provability and unprovability of initial cases of transfinite induction in pure number theory. Another topic I deal with is what has come to be known as partial realizations of Hilbert’s programme, chiefly advocated by S. G. Simpson. Towards the end of this essay, I take a critical look at Wittgenstein’s views about (in)consistency and consistency proofs in the period 1929–1933. I argue that both his insouciant attitude towards the emergence of a contradiction in a calculus and his outright repudiation of metamathematical consistency proofs are unwarranted. In particular, I argue that Wittgenstein falls short of making a convincing case against Hilbert’s programme. I conclude with some philosophical remarks on consistency proofs and soundness and raise a question concerning the consistency of analysis. (shrink)

Das Denken Martin Heideggers ist von der Auseinandersetzung mit der antiken Philosophie geprägt. Die klassischen Texte werden jedoch nicht bloß als historische Dokumente aus einer fernen Zeit verstanden, sondern vielmehr als Grundtexte, die dem heutigen Philosophieren etwas zu sagen haben. Gerade dem Anfang der Geschichte gilt es laut Heidegger nachzuspüren, um die Ausprägung der ontologischen Grundbegriffe deutlich zu machen und sich von dort her Alternativen für ein zukünftiges Denken aufgeben zu lassen. Dieser Band versammelt unterschiedliche Bezugnahmen auf Heideggers Lektüre der (...) Antike von Heraklit über Platon und Aristoteles bis hin zu Augustinus, die den Verlauf seiner Gespräche durchleuchten und hinterfragen, ja im besten Fall in eigenständiger Weise fortzuführen im Stande sind. (shrink)