Harmless naturalism: The limits of science and the nature of philosophy

Philosophical Review 109 (3):462-465 (2000)
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Abstract

Should we only believe what science can prove? Robert Almeder analyzes "naturalized epistemology," which holds that the only valid claims that can be made about the world must be proven by the natural sciences and that all philosophical questions are ultimately answered by science. The author examines and refutes different forms of naturalized epistemology before settling on "harmless naturalism," a compromise which implies that certain questions about the world are answerable and have been answered, without appealing to science. (publisher)

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Matthias Steup
University of Colorado, Boulder

Citations of this work

Almeder's implicit scientims.J. M. Fritzman - 2005 - Philosophia 33 (1-4):275-296.

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