Although it is not yet officially recognized as a clinical entity which is diagnosable, Internet Gaming Disorder (IGD) has been included in section III for further study in the DSM-5 by the American Psychiatric Association (APA, 2013). This is important because there is increasing evidence that people of all ages, in particular teens and young adults, are facing very real and sometimes very severe consequences in daily life resulting from an addictive use of online games. This article summarizes general aspects (...) of IGD including diagnostic criteria and arguments for the classification as an addictive disorder including evidence from neurobiological studies. Based on previous theoretical considerations and empirical findings, this paper examines the use of one recently proposed model, the Interaction of Person-Affect-Cognition-Execution (I-PACE) model, for inspiring future research and for developing new treatment protocols for IGD. The I-PACE model is a theoretical framework that explains symptoms of Internet addiction by looking at interactions between predisposing factors, moderators, and mediators in combination with reduced executive functioning and diminished decision making. Finally, the paper discusses how current treatment protocols focusing on Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Internet addiction (CBT-IA) fit with the processes hypothesized in the I-PACE model. (shrink)

Any intermediate propositional logic can be extended to a calculus with epsilon- and tau-operators and critical formulas. For classical logic, this results in Hilbert’s $\varepsilon $ -calculus. The first and second $\varepsilon $ -theorems for classical logic establish conservativity of the $\varepsilon $ -calculus over its classical base logic. It is well known that the second $\varepsilon $ -theorem fails for the intuitionistic $\varepsilon $ -calculus, as prenexation is impossible. The paper investigates the effect of adding critical $\varepsilon $ - (...) and $\tau $ -formulas and using the translation of quantifiers into $\varepsilon $ - and $\tau $ -terms to intermediate logics. It is shown that conservativity over the propositional base logic also holds for such intermediate ${\varepsilon \tau }$ -calculi. The “extended” first $\varepsilon $ -theorem holds if the base logic is finite-valued Gödel–Dummett logic, and fails otherwise, but holds for certain provable formulas in infinite-valued Gödel logic. The second $\varepsilon $ -theorem also holds for finite-valued first-order Gödel logics. The methods used to prove the extended first $\varepsilon $ -theorem for infinite-valued Gödel logic suggest applications to theories of arithmetic. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the claim that addressing dominating ontologies is crucial for achieving Indigenous self-determination. Consequently, the struggle for Indigenous self-determination comprises not only an engagement with political practices, structures, and institutions, but also with political ontology. I first argue that implementing Indigenous self-determination requires an engagement with political ontology. I then introduce Iris Young’s conception of self-determination as non-domination as a way to engage with diverging ontologies within the political framework of federalism. In the final section of (...) the paper, I present two constructive proposals concerning how Indigenous peoples and settler states can establish an ontology at the federal level that facilitates Indigenous self-determination. (shrink)

Some European countries legally recognise a “right to roam”—a right to freely traverse across land, even if privately owned. Political philosophers have paid little attention to the right, and have often conceptualised property rights to include strong claim-rights to exclude others. I offer an account of the right to roam, and consider whether it can be philosophically justified on a left-liberal account of property. After finding a defence in terms of the interests served by the right lacking, I suggest that (...) the most promising defence of the right to roam is that it serves as a symbolic reminder of a fundamental type of social equality. (shrink)

We introduce Gentzen calculi for intuitionistic logic extended with an existence predicate. Such a logic was first introduced by Dana Scott, who provided a proof system for it in Hilbert style. We prove that the Gentzen calculus has cut elimination in so far that all cuts can be restricted to very simple ones. Applications of this logic to Skolemization, truth value logics and linear frames are also discussed.

In this paper an alternative Skolemization method is introduced that, for a large class of formulas, is sound and complete with respect to intuitionistic logic. This class extends the class of formulas for which standard Skolemization is sound and complete and includes all formulas in which all strong quantifiers are existential. The method makes use of an existence predicate first introduced by Dana Scott.

Freges Kontextprinzip "Nur im Zusammenhange eines Satzes bedeuten die Wörter etwas" hat auch nach der von ihm vollzogenen Angleichung von Behauptungssätzen an Eigennamen Gültigkeit für die formale Sprache der "Grundgesetze". Der Bedeutungsvollständigkcitsbeweis, den er für sein Logiksystem anstrebt, schließt eine unmittelbare Anwendung dieses Prinzips nicht nur auf die unvollständigen Funktionsausdrücke, sondern auch auf die leerstellenfreien Wertverlaufsnamen ein. Wahrheitsnamen (Sätze) zeichnen sich vor anderen symbolsprachlichen Eigennamen in mehrfacher Hinsicht, insbesondere durch ihre semantische Selbständigkeit aus. Wertverlaufsnamen haben nur im Zusammenhang eines Wahrheitswertnamens (...) eine Bedeutung. Ihre Bedeutung besteht in ihrem Beitrag zur Bestimmung der Bedeutung von Wahrheitswertnamen, in denen sie vorkommen. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically discuss Frege’s philosophy of geometry with special emphasis on his position in The Foundations of Arithmetic of 1884. In Sect. 2, I argue that that what Frege calls faculty of intuition in his dissertation is probably meant to refer to a capacity of visualizing geometrical configurations structurally in a way which is essentially the same for most Western educated human beings. I further suggest that according to his Habilitationsschrift it is through spatial intuition that we (...) come to know the axioms of Euclidean geometry. In Sect. 3, I argue that Frege seems right in claiming in The Foundations, §14 that the synthetic nature of the Euclidean axioms follows from the fact that they are independent of one another and of the primitive laws of logic. If the former were dependent on the latter, they would be analytic in Frege’s sense of analyticity. But then they would not be independent of one another and due to their mutual provability would lose their status as axioms of Euclidean geometry, since according to Frege an axiom of a theory T is per definitionen unprovable in T. I further argue that only by invoking pure spatial intuition can Frege “explain” the epistemological status of the axioms of Euclidean geometry completely: their synthetic a priori nature. Finally, I argue that his view about independence in The Foundations, §14 seems to clash with his conception of independence in his mature period. In Sect. 4, I scrutinize Frege’s somewhat vague, but unduly neglected remarks in The Foundations, §26 on space, spatial intuition and the axioms of Euclidean geometry. I argue that for the sake of coherence Frege should have said unambiguously that space is objective, that it is independedent not only of our spatial intuition, but of our mental life altogether including our judgements about space, instead of encouraging the possible conjecture that in his view it contains an objective and a subjective component. I further argue that for Frege the objectivity of both space and the axioms of Euclidean geometry manifests itself in our universal and compulsory acknowledgement of the Euclidean axioms as true. I conclude Sect. 4 by arguing that there is a conflict between the subjectivity of our spatial intuitions as stressed in The Foundations, §26 and Frege’s thesis in his dissertation that the axioms of Euclidean geometry derive their validity from the nature of our faculty of intuition. To resolve this conflict, I propose that in the light of his avowed realism in The Foundations Frege could have replaced his early thesis by saying that although we come to know the axioms of Euclidean geometry through spatial intuition and are justified in acknowledging them as true on the basis of geometrical intuition, their truth is independent not only of the nature of our faculty of intuition and singular acts of intuition, but of our mental processes and activities in general, including the inner mental act of judging. In Sect. 5, I argue that Frege most likely did not adopt Kant’s method of acquiring geometrical knowledge via the ostensive construction of concepts in spatial intuition. In contrast to Kant, Frege holds that the axioms of three-dimensional Euclidean geometry express state of affairs about space obtaining independently of our spatial intuition. In Sect. 6, I conclude with a summarized assessment of Frege’s philosophy of geometry. (shrink)

Freges Kontextprinzip "Nur im Zusammenhange eines Satzes bedeuten die Wörter etwas" hat auch nach der von ihm vollzogenen Angleichung von Behauptungssätzen an Eigennamen Gültigkeit für die formale Sprache der "Grundgesetze". Der Bedeutungsvollständigkcitsbeweis, den er für sein Logiksystem anstrebt, schließt eine unmittelbare Anwendung dieses Prinzips nicht nur auf die unvollständigen Funktionsausdrücke, sondern auch auf die leerstellenfreien Wertverlaufsnamen ein. Wahrheitsnamen (Sätze) zeichnen sich vor anderen symbolsprachlichen Eigennamen in mehrfacher Hinsicht, insbesondere durch ihre semantische Selbständigkeit aus. Wertverlaufsnamen haben nur im Zusammenhang eines Wahrheitswertnamens (...) eine Bedeutung. Ihre Bedeutung besteht in ihrem Beitrag zur Bestimmung der Bedeutung von Wahrheitswertnamen, in denen sie vorkommen. (shrink)

1. Logik und Philosophie der Mathematik.--2. Logik und Sprachphilosophie.--3. Logik und Semantik.

We study cut-elimination in first-order classical logic. We construct a sequence of polynomial-length proofs having a non-elementary number of different cut-free normal forms. These normal forms are different in a strong sense: they not only represent different Herbrand-disjunctions but also differ in their propositional structure. This result illustrates that the constructive content of a proof in classical logic is not uniquely determined but rather depends on the chosen method for extracting it.

The concept of quantity (Größe) plays a key role in Frege's theory of real numbers. Typically enough, he refers to this theory as ?theory of quantity? (?Größenlehre?) in the second volume of his opus magnum Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Frege 1903). In this essay, I deal, in a critical way, with Frege's treatment of the concept of quantity and his approach to analysis from the beginning of his academic career until Frege 1903. I begin with a few introductory remarks. In Section (...) 2, I first analyze Frege's use of the term ?source of knowledge? (?Erkenntnisquelle?) with particular emphasis on the logical source of knowledge. The analysis includes a brief comparison between Frege and Kant's conceptions of logic and the logical source of knowledge. In a second step, I examine Frege's theory of quantity in Rechnungsmethoden, die sich auf eine Erweiterung des Größenbegriffes gründen (Frege 1874). Section 3 contains a couple of critical observations on Frege's comments on Hankel's theory of real numbers in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Frege 1884). In Section 4, I consider Frege's discussion of the concept of quantity in Frege 1903. Section 5 is devoted to Cantor's theory of irrational numbers and the critique deployed by Frege. In Section 6, I return to Frege's own constructive treatment of analysis in Frege 1903 and succinctly describe what I take to be the quintessence of his account. (shrink)

Scholars have struggled with identifying the exact reasoning that leads to the list of human rights in Rawls's Law of Peoples. This essay argues that the list can best be explained by a reasoning based on the value of self-determination of peoples. At the same time, it argues that this reasoning still has serious difficulties. In particular, it is necessary to clarify whether human rights may always be enforced by coercive means against states that violate them. However, once this has (...) been clarified, the balance of reasons on which Rawls’s argument rests no longer indisputably supports his conclusion. (shrink)

Wir leben in unübersichtlichen Zeiten: Sogenannte Fake News verzerren, verdrehen und leugnen Informationen mit dem Ziel umfassender Verunsicherung; Verschwörungstheoretiker unterstellen dunkle Mächte und rufen teils sehr explizit zum Aufstand auf; Covid-19 treibt uns gnadenlos vor sich her, und niemand weiß so recht, wohin das alles noch führt. Was sagen Philosophinnen und Philosophen zu all dem? Es ist dies die Frage, der im Rahmen dieses Literaturberichtes nachgegangen werden soll. Ein Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit wird dabei freilich nicht erhoben. Was aber geleistet werden (...) kann und soll, ist, eine Bestandsaufnahme zu liefern, die zumindest ein Zwischenfazit zum gegenwärtigen Stand der philosophischen Auseinandersetzung mit Fragen unserer Zeit erlaubt. (shrink)

Der Glaube an die Wirkmacht des Wortes ist ein Herzstück protestantischer Theologie, aber nicht nur dieser. Er bildet genauso das Fundament der Hermeneutik Hans-Georg Gadamers. Denn Gadamer wie auch der Protestantismus gehen von der Annahme aus, dass der Mensch nicht Herr über das Wort ist. Die Wirkung des Wortes entzieht sich der menschlichen Kontrolle - und doch ereignet sich das Wort nicht willkürlich: Im Wort tut sich Wahrheit kund. Matthias Baum untersucht die Hermeneutik Gadamers aus christlichtheologischer Perspektive. Er leistet (...) dabei ein Dreifaches: Er sens zeichnet er Gadamers Rezeption theologischer Grundgedanken nach; analysiert zweitens, wie Gadamer diese transformiert und beleuchtet drittens Strukturanalogien zwischen Gadamers Hermeneutik und christlicher Theologie." --Dust Jacket Front Inside Flap. (shrink)

German dialect geography developed, inter alia, as a means to compensate the shortcomings of the Young Grammarians' approach to language. In contrast to the latter, it was conceived of to be a sociolinguistic project, constituting thereby one link between the development of Soviet and German linguistics. The article tries to answer such questions as who initially participated in transferring ideas of German dialectology to the Soviet Union and what kind of motivations underlay those transfers. Combining biographical facts with systematic aspects, (...) the article surveys the filiations of some productive ideas with the help of archival sources, i.e. letters of the Soviet scholars Dinges (1891-1932) and Viktor Žirmunskij (1891-1971). Finally, I try to single out the elements in Žirmunskij dialect geography, which are specifically sociolinguistic. (shrink)

According to a widely shared notion, music is not only something that we can understand, but moreover something that gives us access to a specific form of cognitive reflection. This paper suggests that the first part of this notion is only plausible if musical understanding is not explained in terms of grasping the meaning of music, but in terms of experiencing its sense. Music has neither a classifiable meaning full content nor a predicative structure, both of which are necessary in (...) order for a medium of reflection. Therefore, the second part of this notion can only be defended in a rather modest way, insofar as the cognitive function of music is limited to its role merely as a means that serves our otherwise language-based reflexive competence. (shrink)

What justifies political power? Most philosophers argue that consent or democracy are important, in other words, it matters how power is exercised. But this book argues that outcomes primarily matter to justifying power.

Der Beitrag setzt die Praxis der Agitproptruppen im Deutschland der Jahre um 1930 in Beziehung zur Praxis gegenwärtiger Performancekollektive. In dieser historisierenden Perspektive wird die Heterogenität von Gruppenstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozessen deutlich, die in verschiedenen Phasen der Kunstgeschichte und des Kunstdiskurses mit dem Kollektivbegriff bezeichnet wurden. Um zu verstehen, warum sich Kollektive bisweilen straff geführt und geradezu autoritär, in anderen Fällen aber offen, demokratisch und an Gleichheitspostulaten orientiert zeigen, ist einerseits das Verhältnis der jeweiligen Kollektive zu großen, dominanten Institutionen zu betrachten. (...) Andererseits soll einem Zusammenhang zwischen der künstlerisch-ästhetischen Ausrichtung der Kollektive und ihren Entscheidungsstrukturen nachgegangen werden: Die Abwendung vom klassischen Theaterdispositiv ermöglicht es Kollektiven, die sich zu anderen Künsten und Medien öffnen, auch andere, offenere Entscheidungsstrukturen zu entwickeln, als sie etwa aus dem Stadt- und Staatstheater vertraut sind. (shrink)

In this three-part essay, I investigate Frege’s platonist and anti-creationist position in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik and to some extent also in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. In Sect. 1.1, I analyze his arithmetical and logical platonism in Grundgesetze. I argue that the reference-fixing strategy for value-range names—and indirectly also for numerical singular terms—that Frege pursues in Grundgesetze I gives rise to a conflict with the supposed mind- and language-independent existence of numbers and logical objects in general. In Sect. 1.2 and 1.3, (...) I discuss the non-creativity of Frege’s definitions in Grundgesetze and the case of what I call weakly creative definitions. In Part II of this essay, I first deal with Stolz’s and Dedekind’s (intended) creation of numbers. In what follows, I focus on Grundgesetze II, §146, where Frege considers a potential creationist charge in relation to the stipulation that he makes in Grundgesetze I, §3 with the purpose of partially fixing the references of value-range names. I place equal emphasis on the related twin stipulations that he makes in Grundgesetze I, §10. In §10, Frege identifies the truth-values with their unit classes in order to fix the references of value-range names (almost) completely. He does so in a piecemeal fashion. Although in Grundgesetze II, §146 Frege refers also to Grundgesetze I, §9 and §10 in this connection, he does not explain why he thinks that the transsortal identifications in §10 and also the stipulation that he makes in §9 regarding the value-range notation may give rise to a creationist charge in addition to or in connection with the stipulation in §3, and if so, how he would have responded to it. The two main issues that I discuss in Part II are: (a) Has Frege created value-ranges in general in Grundgesetze I, §3? (b) Has he created the unit classes of the True and the False in §10? In Part III, I discuss, inter alia, the question of whether in developing the whole wealth of objects and functions that arithmetic deals with from the primitive functions of Grundgesetze by applying the formation rules Frege creates special value-ranges and special functions. This procedure is fundamentally different from the reference-fixing strategy regarding value-range names that Frege pursues in Grundgesetze I, §3, §10–12. It is just another aspect of his anti-creationism. In Grundgesetze II, §147, Frege makes a concession to an imagined creationist opponent which might suggest that he was fully convinced neither of the defensibility of his anti-creationist position regarding the syntactic development of the subject matter of arithmetic nor of his actual defence in §146 of the non-creativity of the introduction of value-ranges via logical abstraction in Grundgesetze I, §3 and the twin stipulations in §10. I argue that not only in Grundgesetze II, §146 but also in Grundgesetze II, §147 Frege falls short of defending his anti-creationist position. I further argue that on the face of it his creationist rival gains the upper hand in the envisioned debate in more than one respect. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Millennium Jahrgang: 9 Heft: 1 Seiten: 123-144.

Der Band geht den zahlreichen Verbindungslinien von Erziehung und Philosophie in Geschichte und Gegenwart nach. Neben exemplarischen Auseinandersetzungen mit einzelnen Denker: innen von Seneca über Locke und Rousseau bis hin zu Jaspers und Foucault stehen grundlegende Aspekte möglicher Überschneidungen und Kontinuitäten zwischen Erziehungsphilosophie, philosophischer Pädagogik, Anthropologie und anderen Teil- oder Fachdisziplinen im Mittelpunkt der Beiträge. Ergänzt wird der Band durch tentative Ausblicke auf die Zukunft der Erziehungsphilosophie unter den sich verändernden Vorzeichen globaler Herausforderungen.

Abstract6‐methyladenine (6mA) is fairly abundant in nuclear DNA of basal fungi, ciliates and green algae. In these organisms, 6mA is maintained near transcription start sites in ApT context by a parental‐strand instruction dependent maintenance methyltransferase and is positively associated with transcription. In animals and plants, 6mA levels are high only in organellar DNA. The 6mA levels in nuclear DNA are very low. They are attributable to nucleotide salvage and the activity of otherwise mitochondrial METTL4, and may be considered as a (...) price that cells pay for adenine methylation in RNA and/or organellar DNA. Cells minimize this price by sanitizing dNTP pools to limit 6mA incorporation, and by converting 6mA that has been incorporated into DNA back to adenine. Hence, 6mA in nuclear DNA should be described as an epigenetic mark only in basal fungi, ciliates and green algae, but not in animals and plants. (shrink)

This paper draws out what Derrida’s work—in particular as concerns law, democracy, and intergenerational justice in the context of the European heritage—can contribute to constitutionalism and the legal relation to future people, at the national level and the supranational one of the European Union. The first section outlines some of Derrida’s contributions to legal scholarship and European identity, and then, in the following two sections, argue for two main points. First, Derrida can help us understand the much-discussed double bind of (...) the constitutional relation to future people as merely an instance of a more general aporia. The double bind consists in the fact that the constitutional promise to safeguard future freedom also limits and binds future people. I will show how this aporia results from the temporal structure of the constitutional founding of law. Accordingly, the double bind cannot be resolved, either conceptually or in constitutional practice, but only be negotiated with greater awareness. Second, the same aporia of time entails that future generations are already implicated in the founding and re-founding of law here and now. Because the present moment is constitutively related to the past and the future, the meaning of a constitutional founding can become legible only from the future. Hence, the present generation, whose unity is never given, cannot but draw an advance credit on the future whose cooperation it anticipates. As a result, the political promise of Europe depends on its relation to its geographical, but also to its temporal others. (shrink)

Dass eine Norm aus dem Naturrecht begründet ist, kann entweder bedeuten, dass sie aus einem Katalog naturrechtlicher Normen entnommen oder abgeleitet ist oder dass sie vom Urheber des Naturrechts angeordnet wurde oder dass unter Rückgriff auf das Naturrecht ihre Richtigkeit und daher auch ihre Geltung bewiesen werden kann. Diese Differenzierung korrespondiert teilweise einer stark schematisierenden Einteilung, nach der man die Naturrechtsgeschichte als Aufeinanderfolge eines Rechtes aus der Natur, eines Rechtes aus der Natur des Menschen und eines Rechtes aus der Natur (...) des Rechts zu fassen versucht. Diese Ansätze, die sich natürlich nicht genau separieren lassen und häufig ineinander greifen, waren für die Konzeption dessen, was unter Recht zu verstehen sei und wie man es bestimmen könne, zusammen mit dem römischen Recht und traditionellen Rechtsauffassungen im europäischen Raum für lange Zeit konstitutiv. (shrink)

Among the “Ernest Nagel Papers 1930–1988” at Columbia University’s Rare Book & Manuscript Library, there is a file at Box 7, entitled “The Philosophy of Science: University of Delaware 1961”. This is the edited text with some editorial comments and polishing.