An examination of the physical and sexual abuse perpetrated by Ashtanga yoga leader Pattabhi Jois and the culture, structures, and mythos that enabled it, grounded in investigative research and real survivor stories.

I defend a novel pragmatist account of truth that I call ‘truth from the agent point of view’ or ‘agential truth’, drawing on insights from Hilary Putnam. According to the agential view, as inquirers, when we take something to be truth-apt, we are taking ourselves and all other thinkers to be accountable to getting right a shared target that is independent of any individual's or community's view of that target. That we have this relationship to truth is what enables our (...) practices of disagreement and agreement, even when subject to the glare of self-conscious reflection, and represents a crucial ingredient in our capacity for rational thought. The resulting account shares elements with Huw Price's and Cheryl Misak's views, but also has important advantages over both. It also yields a surprising conclusion—that our best pragmatist account of truth may well be a version of the correspondence theory of truth. (shrink)

Although there is disagreement about the details, John Pollock’s framework for defeat is now part of the received wisdom in analytic epistemology. Recently, however, cracks have appeared in the consensus, particularly on the understanding of undercutting defeat. While not questioning the existence of undercutting defeat, Scott Sturgeon argues that undercutting defeat operates differently from rebutting. Unlike the latter, undercutting defeat, Sturgeon claims, occurs only in conjunction with certain higher-order contributions, i.e., with beliefs about the basis on which one does or (...) would believe. Sturgeon concludes that Pollock misconceives undercutting defeat. I argue that in the case of defeat of inferential justification, undercutting defeat is a genuine phenomenon and takes roughly the shape Pollock suggests, not needing help from higher-order beliefs or justifications. However, I agree with Sturgeon that for noninferential justification the Pollockian account is in trouble. I try to explain why there should be this difference. This difference in defeaters has important implications for epistemology. In a final section, I use the defeat-related difference between inferential and noninferential justification to argue that there is less noninferential perceptual or testimonial justification than is commonly thought. (shrink)

This article argues that blacks should reject integration on self-protective and solidarity grounds. It distinguishes two aspects of black devaluation: a ‘stigmatization’ aspect that has to do with the fact that blacks are subject to various forms of discrimination, and an aesthetic aspect (‘phenotypic devaluation’) that concerns the aesthetic devaluation of characteristically black phenotypic traits. It identifies four self-worth harms that integration may inflict, and suggests that these may outweigh the benefits of integration. Further, it argues that, while the integrating (...) process may reduce stigmatization, there is less reason to think that it can do the same for phenotypic devaluation. (shrink)

Analytic philosophers increasingly make reference to the concept of ideology to think about how representational structures can lead to oppression, and argue that the distinctively pernicious functioning of things like propaganda and generic generalizations need to be explained in terms of ideology. The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, it aims to serve as an introduction to (some of) the best contemporary work on ideology in the analytic tradition. Second, it proposes a novel challenge for any such theory. The (...) challenge turns on the nature of intersectionality: it is hard to see how to render consistent the claims that ideology creates or sustains oppression with the claim that oppression is intersectional, without making substantial modifications to extant theories. The conclusion will be that certain projects in contemporary philosophy of language need to further develop their theories of ideology. (shrink)

Dembroff and Wodak (2018, 2021) argue that we have a duty to use gender-neutral pronouns, but do not extend this argument to all other aspects of our language. We evaluate the extent to which gender neutral language is desirable in the context of parental leave schemes, taking as a case study the parental leave schemes found at a Higher Education Institution in the UK. We argue that the considerations Dembroff and Wodak (2018, 2021) take to speak against gender specific pronouns (...) and some other gender specific aspects of language also strongly speak against gender specific language in the context of parental leave policies. As a project in non-ideal theory, we argue against the framing of existing policies which refer to ‘maternity’ and ‘paternity’ leave, and for moving to the language of ‘parental’ or ‘family’ leave. The fact that the majority of those giving birth are women does not provide decisive reasons for framing policies in gender-specific terms. Moreover, we argue that given the welcome move to facilitate shared parental leave, any concerns for gender equity, and equity for carers, are better served by requesting demographic information for monitoring purposes, rather than by policies that refer to gender specific parenting roles. -/- . (shrink)

"This edited volume explores conceptual and practical challenges in measuring well-being. Given the bewildering array of measures available, and ambiguity regarding when and how to measure particular aspects of well-being, knowledge in the field can be difficult to reconcile. Representing numerous disciplines including psychology, economics, sociology, statistics, public health, theology, and philosophy, contributors consider the philosophical and theological traditions on happiness, well-being and the good life, as well as recent empirical research on well-being and its measurement. Leveraging insights across diverse (...) disciplines, they explore how research can help make sense of the proliferation of different measures and concepts, while also proposing new ideas to advance the field. Some chapters engage with philosophical and theological traditions on happiness, well-being and the good life, some evaluate recent empirical research on well-being and consider how measurement requirements may vary by context and purpose, and others more explicitly integrate methods and synthesize knowledge across disciplines. The final section offers a lively dialogue about a set of recommendations for measuring well-being derived from a consensus of the contributors. Collectively, the chapters provide insight into how scholars might engage beyond disciplinary boundaries and contribute to advances in conceptualizing and measuring well-being. Bringing together work from across often siloed disciplines will provide important insight regarding how people can transcend unhealthy patterns of both individual behavior and social organization in order to pursue the good life and build better societies"--. (shrink)

This dissertation argues that the capacity to “take ownership” is a fundamental feature of human life to which people may be well or poorly disposed. Although we commonly exhort others to “take ownership” in their work, education, or other projects, there has been very little conceptual or philosophical analysis of the concept. To my knowledge, no one has conceived of it as a virtue. This dissertation offers a full conceptual account of what the virtue is, its related vices, and how (...) the virtue is related to neighboring concepts like responsibility and stewardship. It also offers some practical ethical guidance for people who wish to cultivate the virtue in themselves. Chapter Two offers an account of the psychology of “taking ownership.” I argue that taking ownership is best understood as a species of psychological attachment, whereby one conceives of a project under the aspect of “mine” or “ours.” Chapter Three extends this account by developing it further into an account of my proposed virtue – “taking-ownership.” This virtue is a character trait that disposes one well to forming these psychological attachments. I argue that the virtue is also situated between a set of related vices, those of “over-investment” and “over-possessiveness” on the one hand, and a “lack of ownership” on the other. This chapter also provides rich descriptions of the characteristic feelings and actions that constitute being well and poorly disposed to taking ownership. Although Chapter three illuminates many of the good-making feature of taking-ownership, chapter four takes up the issue in more explicit fashion. There I provide further justification for the claim that the character trait is good, why the character trait is good, and I address the worry that people may take ownership in bad or evil projects. Chapter five responds to three other possible objections for considering this character trait a virtue. Chapter six concludes the dissertation by considering the ways in which one might attempt to cultivate the virtue of taking-ownership personally. There I emphasize the role that habits of “attention” might play in the development of the virtue. I also provide some idea for directions on future research. (shrink)

Brief overview of theories of meaning in life for 1000-Word Philosophy.

Romantic music aesthetics has often been reduced to tired clichés of ineffable feeling and art for art's sake. This book instead explores the groundbreaking philosophical insights and radical politics that Romantic thinkers applied to music - both popular and classical - and the emotions it inspires.

This chapter contains sections titled: Kant's Logocentrism Kant's Justification for Our Duties (with Regard) to Nonrational Animals Implications of Kant's View for Our Treatment of Animals Kantians Revising Kant: Wood and Korsgaard Problems with Wood and Korsgaard Kant's Response to Wolff: The Difference between Animal Choice and Moral Agency Evaluating Pain and Pleasure Kant's Practical Appeal Final Thoughts for the Nonanthropocentrist.

The ticking bomb case is meant to challenge absolute prohibitions on the use of torture. In “Imaginary Cases,” Michael Davis attempts to show that such cases can only be legitimately employed within certain limited parameters. In this paper, I explain how the ticking bomb case, suitably revised, does not run afoul of Davis’s prohibition on impossible content. The fact that torture could elicit the necessary information is enough; we need not stipulate a guaranteed result. I also defend philosophers’ use of (...) the case to identify our moral intuitions and to evaluate our theoretical assumptions. Although our responses to actual events are better at mapping our actual commitments, imaginary events can also reveal our pre-theoretic intuitions. Ultimately, however, I reject the use of the ticking bomb case on practical grounds, because the imaginary case distorts our moral reasoning in actual cases and leads to our acceptance of torture more generally. (shrink)

A defective word is defined by paradigm as incomplete compared with the major class it belongs to. Defectiveness signifies the unwanted intrusion of morphological idiosyncrasy into syntax. Although this phenomenon has been a constant subject of studies, it has been ill incorporated into the theories of language. This present volume brings together scholars from various theoretical schools for an overdue typological view of defectiveness. It concentrates on some samples of idiosyncratic gaps which are assumed as indicative of the phenomenon of (...) defectiveness. Before delving into the specified topics of each chapter, this introductory chapter presents a typology of defective paradigms. It discusses terms used to describe defectiveness in synchronotic terms, and the possible diachrony of defective paradigms. (shrink)

Once we accept anyone's postulates he becomes our professor and our god: for his foundations he will grab territory so ample and so easy that, if he so wishes, he will drag us up to the clouds. Montaigne During the last fifteen years, the community of philosophers interested in religion has evinced a waxing concern with the justificatory value of religious experiences for theism. Two parallel but largely discrete debates have appeared in the literature.

The jumping off point for this paper is a metaphysical puzzle for this view and for any relational theory of autonomy. Most of the time, our relationships with others are reciprocal in the sense that they involve activity and passivity, acting on others and being acted on by them. Consequently, claiming that our relationships with others are constitutive of our autonomy implies that being passively affected is also constitutive of our autonomy. But this seems problematic, perhaps even contradictory, because autonomy (...) is equivalent to self-determination, which is a kind of activity: how can being passively affected be constitutive of our self-determination and activity? In Spinoza, the difficulty arises in his theory of striving. Spinoza’s view that relationships are constitutive of our freedom and autonomy implies that our relationships—and being passively affected in these relationships—are constitutive of our striving, in which our freedom and autonomy consist. But how can passivity be constitutive of our striving, which is a kind of activity? -/- To resolve the apparent paradox, I look to the Aristotelian notion that the natures of things make them subject or susceptible to undergoing certain kinds of change. For instance, water, because of its nature, is susceptible to boiling, rather than burning. This implies that a passive or exogenous change—for instance, fire causing the water to boil—is brought about partly from the nature and activity of the patient: the water is active in the sense of determining it to boil, rather than burn. This way of thinking implies that changes arise cooperatively from both internal and external sources, which eliminates the apparent contradiction in claiming that change can be both active and passive. The paper shows that Spinoza’s theory of striving shares the gist of this Aristotelian commitment by claiming that our nature is active in determining us to certain effects, even when the effects originate externally. Consequently, like Aristotle, Spinoza does not see passivity and activity as mutually exclusive, which eliminates the apparent paradox. The paper concludes by considering how this more Aristotelian conception of activity is amenable to relational theories of autonomy. (shrink)

This study examines thirteenth to twentieth century Tibetan and Mongolian monastic memorializations of the bodily violence enacted upon Köten Ejen at the center of the “Buddhist conversion of the Mongols.” Koten Ejen (Tib. Lha sras go tan rgyal po, 1206–1251) was Chinggis Khan’s grandson and a military leader involved in Mongol campaigns against the Song Dynasty and against Buddhist monasteries in eastern Tibet. In 1240, Koten famously summoned the Central Tibetan Buddhist polymath Sakya Pandita, by then already an old man, (...) to his court at Liangzhou. Examining Tibetan and Mongolian accounts about their meeting from the last seven centuries, this study shows that it was neither compelling philosophy nor some turn of faith that converted the Mongols. It was, rather, Sakya Pandita’s violent therapeutic intervention into the space of Koten’s ill body that wrenched the Mongol body politic into the Dharmic fold. (shrink)

For the Ancient Greek thinkers Plato and Aristotle, questions about philosophy concerned the fundamental nature of reality. This introduction is based on their views, boiling philosophy down to nine essential questions and using them to reveal how we think about the major topics of metaphysics and epistemology. It is a fast-paced tour of the Western philosophical tradition, walking you through age-old questions about God, free will, skepticism, truth and perception and introducing you to distinctive features and methods. By unpacking and (...) exploring each of the nine questions in turn, you find out what it really means to do philosophy. (shrink)

Why did Rousseau fail-often so ridiculously or grotesquely-to live up to his own principles? In one of the most notorious cases of hypocrisy in intellectual history, this champion of the joys of domestic life immediately rid himself of each of his five children, placing them in an orphanage. Some less famous cases are comparably discrediting. He advocated profound devotion to republican civic life, and yet he habitually dodged opportunities for political engagement. This study is by no means meant to eliminate (...) the gaps between Rousseau's normative teachings and his conduct. Even at his most aspirational, we will see several weaknesses and failures, some of them bizarre. As a whole, his life is a profoundly mixed affair, while his thought both emerged from it and radically transcended it. By pursuing the dialectic between his principles and his life, this book provides a kind of moral biography in view of his most controversial behaviors, as well as a preamble to future discussions of the spirit of his thought. (shrink)

This post-colonial and feminist reading of the Enlightenment explores the proto-postmodernist practice of examining one's conclusions through the eyes of the Other. Self-estrangement to gain critical distance from one's taken-for-granted assumptions was central to the Enlightenment and remains vital for critical sociopolitical thinking today.

Focuses on the work of Frantz Fanon and the relationship between colonialism and the body. Each chapter has Fanon walking with another thinker.

Reference guide to Paul Grice and the literature arising from his work, particularly in philosophy of language and mind.

The language of morality and legality infuses every aspect of the Middle East conflict. From repeated assertions by officials that Israel has “the most moral army in the world” to justifications for specific military tactics and operations by reference to self-defense and proportionality, the public rhetoric is one of legal right and moral obligation. Less often heard are the voices of those on the ground whose daily experience is lived within the legal quagmire portrayed by their leaders in such uncompromising (...) terms. This Article explores the opaque normative boundaries surrounding the actions of a specific group within the Israeli military, soldiers returning from duty in Hebron in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. By examining interviews with these soldiers by an Israeli NGO, it identifies different narratives of legality and illegality which inform their conduct, contrasting their failure to adhere to conventional legal discourses with the broader “legalization” of military activities. Seeking an explanation for this disjunction, it explores the ways in which the soldiers’ stories nonetheless reflect attempts to negotiate various normative and legal realities. It places these within the legal landscape of the Occupied Palestinian Territories which has been normatively re-imagined by various forces in Israeli society, from the judicially-endorsed discourse of deterrence manifested in the day-today practices of brutality, intimidation and “demonstrating power,” to the growing influence of nationalist-religious interpretations of self-defense and the misuse of post-modernist theory by the military establishment to “smooth out” the moral and legal urban architectures of occupation. The Article concludes by considering the hope for change evident in the very act of soldiers telling ethically-oriented stories about their selves, and in the existence of a movement willing to provide the space for such reflections in an attempt to confront Israeli society with the day-to-day experiences of the soldier in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. (shrink)

Bounded Meaning develops a new theory of how and why semantic interpretation depends not just on global information, but also on local information. Mandelkern provides criticisms of the dominant theory, dynamic semantics, and proposes a new theory of bounds as limits on admissible interpretations of an expression.

This chapter argues that the moral/ethical system of early Buddhism is best understood as being both naturalistic and irrealist/antirealist. It is naturalistic because it excludes all supernatural forces and explains morality/ethics in terms of natural facts. It is irrealist/antirealist because it consists of hypothetical imperatives rather than categorical imperatives. The chapter examines both primary texts and contemporary scholarship. It then argues that the Buddhist theory of ethics is very similar to the immanence/immanentist theory of William Connolly, and that such theories (...) may be uniquely helpful in creating stable political cooperation in pluralistic societies. (shrink)

Mostly the culture of literacy has taken shape within a realm of freedom, seemingly distant from the needs of the body and the demands of sustenance. At the same time, the world represented within so much of the world’s narrative, both truth and fiction, has been saturated in struggle and deprivation. This article tries to make some sense of this juxtaposition, freedom on one side and necessity on the other: in particular, the pull of past or residual forms of unfreedom (...) in the sphere of literary representation, within and against new or emerging expressions of emancipation, themselves accompanied or countered in modern times by ever-novel styles of exploitation. (shrink)

El artículo trata de la apropiación que hace san Agustín de la doctrina de san Cipriano, en las controversias donatista y pelagiana. Da una visión de conjunto del uso que san Agustín hace del pensamiento de san Cipriano en estas controversias y presenta a la vez los puntos en que se hace clara referencia a Cipriano.

TRAGICALLY, ETHNIC CONFLICTS HAVE BECOME ONE OF THE HALLMARKS of the post-Cold War era. In response to this, two distinct traditions appear to be emerging.The first continues the classical just war tradition while the second represents a new "reconciliation tradition," built largely around questions of restorative justice in areas of social division. Our goal in this essay is to begin a rapprochement of these divergent traditions by asking the question, what does a restorative justice perspective offer to the just war (...) tradition? We proceed in three stages: first, we survey the current state of the just war tradition; second, we introduce the reconciliation tradition, drawing on both reconciliation thinkers and the practical experience of experiments in social reconciliation in South Africa and Rwanda; and third, we draw these two traditions together with a series of constructive proposals for how the reconciliation tradition can enrich the just war tradition. (shrink)

This article examines the use of political metaphors and analogies in ancient discussions of Epicurean atomism, ranging from the philosophical dialogues of Cicero in the 1st century BC to Claudian’s epic invective In Rufinum in the 390s AD. Building on earlier scholarship that traces the emergence of monarchical and imperial analogies for the Greco-Roman pantheon in Post-Hellenistic philosophy, I argue that ancient critics of atomism shared a common tendency to depict Epicurean physics as the conceptual opposite of a well-ordered state. (...) In particular, depictions of Epicurean theology as a form of divine ‘banishment’ and of atomic cosmology as a form of cosmic ‘democracy’ or ‘anarchy’ appear in texts by a wide range of Greek and Roman authors, revealing the great extent to which philosophical disagreements over atomic physics were influenced by political and social ideas. (shrink)