We find problems with Vaesen's treatment of the primatological research, in particular his analysis of foresight, function representation, and social intelligence. We argue that his criticism of research on foresight in great apes is misguided. His claim that primates do not attach functions to particular objects is also problematic. Finally, his analysis of theory of mind neglects many distinctions.

This article examines the effects of globalization on changing notions of the ‘savage’. We compare discussions taking place in different contexts in the late 18th century concerning two Swedish scholars and travellers to Africa: Anders Sparrman (1748–1820), a naturalist and Linnaean disciple, and Carl Bernhard Wadström (1746–99), an engineer and economist. Both moved in Swedish Swedenborgian circles, and both became involved in the British abolitionist movement. Nevertheless, their images of African ‘Others’ diverged in crucial respects, reflecting differences in their ideological (...) outlooks, institutional affiliations, and understandings of how the world was changing. More specifically, we argue that the perception of global change brought about by a new economic framework of production and consumption provides a key for reading and comparing Wadström’s and Sparrman’s texts. Comparing their divergent uses of ‘savagery’, the article also highlights the versatility of the savage as a tool for presenting distant parts of the world to a domestic audience. (shrink)

Models not only represent but may also influence their targets in important ways. While models’ abilities to influence outcomes has been studied in the context of economic models, often under the label ‘performativity’, we argue that this phenomenon also pertains to epidemiological models, such as those used for forecasting the trajectory of the Covid-19 pandemic. After identifying three ways in which a model by the Covid-19 Response Team at Imperial College London may have influenced scientific advice, policy, and individual responses, (...) we consider the implications of epidemiological models’ performative capacities. We argue, first, that performativity may impair models’ ability to successfully predict the course of an epidemic; but second, that it may provide an additional sense in which these models can be successful, namely by changing the course of an epidemic. (shrink)

We invite systematic consideration of the metaphors of cycles and circulation as a long-term theme in the history of the life and environmental sciences and medicine. Ubiquitous in ancient religious and philosophical traditions, especially in representing the seasons and the motions of celestial bodies, circles once symbolized perfection. Over the centuries cyclic images in western medicine, natural philosophy, natural history and eventually biology gained independence from cosmology and theology and came to depend less on strictly circular forms. As potent ‘canonical (...) icons’, cycles also interacted with representations of linear and irreversible change, including arrows, arcs, scales, series and trees, as in theories of the Earth and of evolution. In modern times life cycles and reproductive cycles have often been held to characterize life, in some cases especially female life, while human efforts selectively to foster and disrupt these cycles have harnessed their productivity in medicine and agriculture. But strong cyclic metaphors have continued to link physiology and climatology, medicine and economics, and biology and manufacturing, notably through the relations between land, food and population. From the grand nineteenth-century transformations of matter to systems ecology, the circulation of molecules through organic and inorganic compartments has posed the problem of maintaining identity in the face of flux and highlights the seductive ability of cyclic schemes to imply closure where no original state was in fact restored. More concerted attention to cycles and circulation will enrich analyses of the power of metaphors to naturalize understandings of life and their shaping by practical interests and political imaginations. (shrink)

Many philosophers think that if you're morally responsible for a state of affairs, you must be a cause of it. Ingmar Persson argues that this strand of common sense morality is asymmetrical, in that it features the act-omission doctrine, according to which there are stronger reasons against performing some harmful actions than in favour of performing any beneficial actions. He analyses the act-omission doctrine as consisting in a theory of negative rights, according to which there are rights not to (...) have one's life, body, and property interfered with, and a conception of responsibility as being based on causality. This conception of responsibility is also found to be involved in the doctrine of double effect. The outcome of Persson's critical examination of these ideas is that reasons of rights are replaced by reasons of beneficence, and we are made responsible for what is under the influence of our practical reasons. The argument gives rise to a symmetrical, consequentialist morality which is more demanding but less authoritative than common sense morality, because reasons of beneficence are weaker than reasons of rights. It is also argued that there are no non-naturalist external practical reasons, and all practical reasons are desire-dependent: so practical reasons cannot be universally binding. The question is whether such a morality possesses enough authority to command our compliance. This seems necessary in order for us to cope with the greatest moral problems of our time, such as aid to developing countries and anthropogenic climate change. (shrink)

As models of living beings acting in a real world biorobots undergo an accelerated “philogenic” complexification. The first efficient robots performed simple animal behaviours (e.g., those of ants, crickets) and later on isolated elementary behaviours of complex beings. The increasing complexity of the tasks robots are dedicated to is matched by an increasing complexity and versatility of the architectures now supporting conditioning or even elementary planning.

Both brand ethicality and brand authenticity focus on the moral behavior of a brand, yet the link between these two constructs is only poorly understood. Building on and integrating findings from prior research, this article suggests that authentic brand ethicality (ABE), defined as the degree to which consumers perceive a brand’s moral behavior as genuine, real, or true, represents an important extension of extant brand ethicality scales available. Using a multistep scale development procedure, this study provides a robust 12-item full (...) scale and a 7-item parsimonious scale of ABE that are sound in their psychometric properties and show predictive and known-group validity. Furthermore, placing ABE into a broad theory-based nomological network reveals its mediating role between important brand-, customer-, and employee-related antecedents and outcomes as well as its function in moderating relationships. Overall, this research yields a deeper understanding of ABE’s conceptualization, measurement, drivers, consequences, and role in mediating and moderating relationships and provides managerially relevant outcomes. (shrink)

Both brand ethicality and brand authenticity focus on the moral behavior of a brand, yet the link between these two constructs is only poorly understood. Building on and integrating findings from prior research, this article suggests that _authentic brand ethicality_ (ABE), defined as the degree to which consumers perceive a brand’s moral behavior as genuine, real, or true, represents an important extension of extant brand ethicality scales available. Using a multistep scale development procedure, this study provides a robust 12-item full (...) scale and a 7-item parsimonious scale of ABE that are sound in their psychometric properties and show predictive and known-group validity. Furthermore, placing ABE into a broad theory-based nomological network reveals its mediating role between important brand-, customer-, and employee-related antecedents and outcomes as well as its function in moderating relationships. Overall, this research yields a deeper understanding of ABE’s conceptualization, measurement, drivers, consequences, and role in mediating and moderating relationships and provides managerially relevant outcomes. (shrink)

Recent arguments claim that behavioral science has focused – to its detriment – on the individual over the system when construing behavioral interventions. In this commentary, we argue that tackling economic inequality using both framings in tandem is invaluable. By studying individuals who have overcome inequality, “positive deviants,” and the system limitations they navigate, we offer potentially greater policy solutions.

PurposeChildhood onset speech fluency disorder is possibly related to dopaminergic dysfunction. Mesencephalic hyperechogenicity detected by transcranial ultrasound might be seen as an indirect marker of dopaminergic dysfunction. We here determined whether adults who stutter since childhood show ME.MethodsWe performed TCS in ten AWS and ten matched adults who never stuttered. We also assessed motor performance in finger tapping and in the 25 Foot Walking test.ResultsCompared to controls, AWS showed enlarged ME on either side. Finger tapping was slower in AWS. Walking (...) cadence, i.e., the ratio of number of steps by time, tended to be higher in AWS than in control participants.DiscussionThe results demonstrate a motor deficit in AWS linked to dopaminergic dysfunction and extending beyond speech. Since iron deposits evolve in childhood and shrink thereafter, ME might serve as an easily quantifiable biomarker helping to predict the risk of persistency in children who stutter. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 4, Page 374-380, May 2022.

Reuse of elements from existing ontologies in the construction of new ontologies is a foundational principle in ontological design. It offers the benefits, among others, of consistency and interoperability between such knowledge structures as well as sharing resources. Reuse is widely found within important collections of established ontologies, such as BioPortal and the OBO Foundry. However, reuse comes with its own potential problems involving ontological commitment, granularity, and ambiguity. Guidelines are proposed to aid ontology developers and curators in their prospective (...) reuse of content. These guidelines have been gleaned over years of practice in the ontology field. The guidelines are couched in experiential reports on designing and curating particular ontologies (e.g., EXACT and EXACT2) and using generally accepted approaches (e.g., MIREOT) in doing so. Various software tools to assist in ontology reuse are surveyed and discussed. (shrink)

abstract As history shows, some human beings are capable of acting very immorally. 1 Technological advance and consequent exponential growth in cognitive power means that even rare evil individuals can act with catastrophic effect. The advance of science makes biological, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction easier and easier to fabricate and, thus, increases the probability that they will come into the hands of small terrorist groups and deranged individuals. Cognitive enhancement by means of drugs, implants and biological (including (...) genetic) interventions could thus accelerate the advance of science, or its application, and so increase the risk of the development or misuse of weapons of mass destruction. We argue that this is a reason which speaks against the desirability of cognitive enhancement, and the consequent speedier growth of knowledge, if it is not accompanied by an extensive moral enhancement of humankind. We review the possibilities for moral enhancement by biomedical and genetic means and conclude that, though it should be possible in principle, it is in practice probably distant. There is thus a reason not to support cognitive enhancement in the foreseeable future. However, we grant that there are also reasons in its favour, but we do not attempt to settle the balance between these reasons for and against. Rather, we conclude that if research into cognitive enhancement continues, as it is likely to, it must be accompanied by research into moral enhancement. (shrink)

The Retreat of Reason brings back to philosophy the ambition of offering a broad vision of the human condition. One of the main original aims of philosophy was to give people guidance about how to live their lives. Ingmar Persson resumes this practical project, which has been largely neglected in contemporary philosophy, but his conclusions are very different from those of the ancient Greeks. They typically argued that a life led in accordance with reason, a rational life, would also (...) be the happiest or most fulfilling. By exploring the irrationality of our attitudes to time, identity, and responsibility, Persson shows that the aim of living rationally conflicts not only with the aim of leading the most fulfilling life, but also with the moral aim of promoting the maximization and just distribution of fulfilment for all. The Retreat of Reason challenges some of our most fundamental ideas about ourselves. (shrink)

This is a reply to Jesse Prinz and Paul Bloom’s skepticism about the moral importance of empathy. It concedes that empathy is spontaneously biased to individuals who are spatio-temporally close, as well as discriminatory in other ways, and incapable of accommodating large numbers of individuals. But it is argued that we could partly correct these shortcomings of empathy by a guidance of reason because empathy for others consists in imagining what they feel, and, importantly, such acts of imagination can be (...) voluntary – and, thus, under the influence of reflection – as well as automatic. Since empathizing with others motivates concern for their welfare, a reflectively justified empathy will lead to a likewise justified altruistic concern. In addition, we argue that such concern supports another central moral attitude, namely a sense of justice or fairness. (shrink)

Unfit for the Future argues that the future of our species depends on radical enhancement of the moral aspects of our nature. Population growth and technological advances are threatening to undermine the conditions of worthwhile life on earth forever. We need to modify the biological bases of human motivation to deal with this challenge.

Mathias Frisch provides the first sustained philosophical discussion of conceptual problems in classical particle-field theories. Part of the book focuses on the problem of a satisfactory equation of motion for charged particles interacting with electromagnetic fields. As Frisch shows, the standard equation of motion results in a mathematically inconsistent theory, yet there is no fully consistent and conceptually unproblematic alternative theory. Frisch describes in detail how the search for a fundamental equation of motion is partly driven by pragmatic considerations (...) (like simplicity and mathematical tractability) that can override the aim for full consistency. The book also offers a comprehensive review and criticism of both the physical and philosophical literature on the temporal asymmetry exhibited by electromagnetic radiation fields, including Einstein's discussion of the asymmetry and Wheeler and Feynman's influential absorber theory of radiation. Frisch argues that attempts to derive the asymmetry from thermodynamic or cosmological considerations fail and proposes that we should understand the asymmetry as due to a fundamental causal constraint. The book's overarching philosophical thesis is that standard philosophical accounts that strictly identify scientific theories with a mathematical formalism and a mapping function specifying the theory's ontology are inadequate, since they permit neither inconsistent yet genuinely successful theories nor thick causal notions to be part of fundamental physics. (shrink)

G. E. Moore raised the question of whether consequentialists ought to maximize actual rather than expected value, and came down in favour of the former alternative. But rather recently Frank Jackson has presented an example which has been widely thought to clinch the case in favour of the alternative view. This article argues for a sort of compromise between these rival views, namely that while we ought to do what maximizes actual value, we ought to try to do what maximizes (...) expected value. It is claimed that consequentialists could consistently adopt this view, though in Jackson's case they are certain that, if they try to maximize expected value, they shall most likely not maximize actual value. (shrink)

Deepfakes are a new form of synthetic media that broke upon the world in 2017. Bringing photoshopping to video, deepfakes replace people in existing videos with someone else’s likeness. Currently most of their reach is limited to pornography, and they are also used to discredit people. However, deepfake technology has many epistemic promises and perils, which concern how we fare as knowers. Our goal is to help set an agenda around these matters, to make sure this technology can help realize (...) epistemic rights and epistemic justice and unleash human creativity, rather than inflict epistemic wrongs of any sort. Our project is exploratory in nature, and we do not aim to offer conclusive answers at this early stage. There is a need to remain vigilant to make sure the downsides do not outweigh the upsides, and that will be a tall order. (shrink)

In its basic sense, the term "human" is a term of biological classification: an individual is human just in case it is a member of the species Homo sapiens . Its opposite is "nonhuman": nonhuman animals being animals that belong to other species than H. sapiens . In another sense of human, its opposite is "inhuman," that is cruel and heartless (cf. "humane" and "inhumane"); being human in this sense is having morally good qualities. This paper argues that biomedical research (...) and therapy should make humans in the biological sense more human in the moral sense, even if they cease to be human in the biological sense. This serves valuable biomedical ends like the promotion of health and well-being, for if humans do not become more moral, civilization is threatened. It is unimportant that humans remain biologically human, since they do not have moral value in virtue of belonging to H. sapiens. (shrink)

This paper provides a survey of several philosophical issues arising in classical electrodynamics arguing that there is a philosophically rich set of problems in theories of classical physics that have not yet received the attention by philosophers that they deserve. One issue, which is connected to the philosophy of causation, concerns the temporal asymmetry exhibited by radiation fields in the presence of wave sources. Physicists and philosophers disagree on whether this asymmetry reflects a fundamental causal asymmetry or is due to (...) statistical or thermodynamic considerations. I suggest that an explanation appealing to the asymmetry of causation is more promising. Another issue concerns the conceptual structure of the theory. Despite its empirical success, classical electrodynamics faces serious foundational problems. Models of charged particles involve what by the theory's own lights are idealizations, I maintain, and this is a feature that is not readily captured by traditional philosophical accounts of scientific theories. Other issues I discuss concern (i) the relation between Lorentz's theory of the electron and Einstein's Theory of Special Relativity; (ii) the notion of the domain of a theory, the question of theory reduction, and the relation between classical and more fundamental quantum theories; and (iii) the role of locality constraints, their relation to the concept of causation; and the status of locality conditions in the semi-classical theory of the Aharanov-Bohm effect. (shrink)

1. Let me begin by distinguishing two conceptions of guilt. The first conceives of guilt as an experience of reprehensible failure in response to specific actions. I feel guilty if I break a promise for reasons that cannot justify this transgression. This conception of guilt as a responsive attitude, which I call locally- reactive guilt, captures a tension in one’s agency that arises from a local failure. The second conception understands guilt as a condition that shapes one’s whole existence. Guilt, (...) on this view, is a persistent feeling of imperfection. Such guilt, existential guilt, presupposes a reference point vis-à-vis which one’s life is so experienced. This reference is most plausibly a shared understanding of moral perfection within a community that is so demanding as to make it hard or impossible to live up to its standards. While the adoption of the Christian God offers one explanation for the emergence of such a shared understanding, other explanations of existential guilt are possible (see section 5 below). Existential guilt manifests itself especially in locally-reactive guilt, but there can be locallyreactive guilt without existential guilt. I submit that Nietzsche is not particularly interested in locally-reactive guilt, and that his vision of the future of humanity can accommodate such guilt. That conception of guilt, at any rate, is not tied to the Christian sittliche Weltordnung that Nietzsche attacks, or to other thick metaphysical or ethical views. Locallyreactive guilt merely presupposes that some set of expectations is in place and perceived as binding. What Nietzsche is interested in is existential guilt. As far as the Genealogy is concerned, this is to some extent a hermeneutical preconception based on my understanding of the German-speaking or otherwise European culture in which Nietzsche operated—a culture in which religious diversity generally amounted merely to the joint presence of Catholics and Lutherans (or, in some places, other Protestants) in the same area, interspersed with relatively small groups of Jews, and in which the Christian legacy was prevalent across all sections of culture.. (shrink)

This chapter identifies the problems created by the misfit between a limited human moral nature and globalized, highly advanced technology. It highlights the several ways of addressing the potential catastrophic consequences of this mismatch. The chapter discusses the development of a globally responsible liberalism, with the restriction of traditional liberal neutrality, inculcation of values and “moral education” to achieve restraint, promote cooperation, respect for equality, and other values now necessary for our survival as a global community. It also discusses some (...) consequences of the intuitive endorsement of the act‐omission doctrine. Environmental problems probably provide the most worrying example of the limitations of our cooperative dispositions in the contemporary world. In the world of today, when scientific progress has vastly increased our powers of action, societies need to inculcate norms that are conducive to the good of the world community of which these societies are an integral part. (shrink)

Volume 52, Issue 6, June - July 2020, Page 602-612.

The grounds of justice -- "Un pouvoir ordinaire": shared membership in a state as a ground of -- Justice -- Internationalism versus statism and globalism: contemporary debates -- What follows from our common humanity? : the institutional stance, human rights, and nonrelationism -- Hugo Grotius revisited : collective ownership of the Earth and global public reason -- "Our sole habitation" : a contemporary approach to collective ownership of the earth -- Toward a contingent derivation of human rights -- Proportionate use (...) : immigration and original ownership of the Earth -- "But the earth abideth for ever" : obligations to future generations -- Climate change and ownership of the atmosphere -- Human rights as membership rights in the global order -- Arguing for human rights : essential pharmaceuticals -- Arguing for human rights : labor rights as human rights -- Justice and trade -- The way we live now -- "Imagine there's no countries" : a reply to John Lennon -- Justice and accountability : the state -- Justice and accountability : the World Trade Organization. (shrink)

We respond to a number of objections raised by John Harris in this journal to our argument that we should pursue genetic and other biological means of morally enhancing human beings (moral bioenhancement). We claim that human beings now have at their disposal means of wiping out life on Earth and that traditional methods of moral education are probably insufficient to achieve the moral enhancement required to ensure that this will not happen. Hence, we argue, moral bioenhancement should be sought (...) and applied. We argue that cognitive enhancement and technological progress raise acute problems because it is easier to harm than to benefit. We address objections to this argument. We also respond to objections that moral bioenhancement: (1) interferes with freedom; (2) cannot be made to target immoral dispositions precisely; (3) is redundant, since cognitive enhancement by itself suffices. (shrink)

This article objects to two arguments that William MacAskill gives in What We Owe the Future in support of optimism about the prospects of longtermism, that is, the prospects of positively influencing the longterm future. First, it grants that he is right that, whereas humans sometimes benefit others as an end, they rarely harm them as an end, but argues that this bias towards positive motivation is counteracted by the fact that it is practically easier to harm than to benefit. (...) For this greater easiness makes it likely both that accidental effects will be harmful rather than beneficial and that the means or side‐effects of the actions people perform with the aim of benefiting themselves and those close to them will tend to be harmful to others. Secondly, while our article agrees with him that values could lock‐in, it contends that the value of longtermism is unlikely to lock in as long as human beings have not been morally enhanced but remain partial in favor of themselves and those near and dear. (shrink)

Ingmar Persson offers an original view of the processes of human action: deliberating on the basis of reasons for and against actions, making a decision about what to do, and implementing the decision in action in a way that makes the action intentional.

Much has been written on the role of causal notions and causal reasoning in the so-called 'special sciences' and in common sense. But does causal reasoning also play a role in physics? Mathias Frisch argues that, contrary to what influential philosophical arguments purport to show, the answer is yes. Time-asymmetric causal structures are as integral a part of the representational toolkit of physics as a theory's dynamical equations. Frisch develops his argument partly through a critique of anti-causal arguments and (...) partly through a detailed examination of actual examples of causal notions in physics, including causal principles invoked in linear response theory and in representations of radiation phenomena. Offering a new perspective on the nature of scientific theories and causal reasoning, this book will be of interest to professional philosophers, graduate students, and anyone interested in the role of causal thinking in science. (shrink)

ALTHOUGH majority rule finds ready acceptance whenever groups make decisions, there are surprisingly few philosophically interesting arguments in support of it.1 Jeremy Waldron’s The Dignity of Legislation contains the most interesting recent defense of majority rule. Waldron combines his own argument from respect with May’s influential characterization of majority rule, tying both to a reinterpretation of a well-known passage from Locke’s Second Treatise (“the body moves into the direction determined by the majority of forces”). Despite its impressive resourcefulness, Waldron’s defense (...) is deficient, and one goal of this essay is to show how. Yet our main concern is not to criticize Waldron, but to demonstrate general deficiencies of arguments for majority rule and to suggest a strategy for a more adequate and more complete defense. Such arguments tend to have one of two weaknesses: Either they assume that collective decisionmaking is done in terms of ranking options and thus neglect both aggregation methods using more information than the relative standing of options in rankings (such as so-called positional methods) and rules that are not aggregation methods at all (such as fair-division procedures); or they also constitute arguments for other decision rules. In the first case, the argument is too narrow, in the second it is too broad. The narrowness problem is bigger than stated so far because arguments for majority rule tend to assume not only that decisions are made by ranking options, but also that only two options are to be ranked. Both problems arise for Waldron’s defense and leave it incomplete. Yet such incompleteness also characterizes the state of the art in arguing for majority rule. So in addition to.. (shrink)

von Lothar Brock Wer dieses Buch zur Hand nimmt, sollte sich einen Autor vorstellen, der einer Gruppe hartgesottener Geschäftsleute aus der Wüste von New Mexico morgens um sieben mit charmanter Leichtigkeit und spärlichen, aber Verbindung stiftenden Gesten einen Vortrag über die EU als einer vorgestellten Gemeinschaft hält und dafür überschwenglich gefeiert wird. Oder einen Theoretiker mit verblüffend praktischen Kenntnissen über Höhenmedizin und der unter bestimmten Umständen lebensrettenden Fähigkeit, panischen Berggefährten den Anblick der Tiefe erträglich zu machen. Oder den lead-Sänger einer (...) ziemlich professionellen Musikgruppe, die sich die öffentliche Pflege des Liedgutes der Rolling Stones zur Aufgabe gemacht hat und als Meister der Reproduktion die Bewunderer des Originals in Taumel versetzt - von Stockholm bis OfIenbach. Auf keinen Fall aber sollte man sich einen Autor vorstellen wie man ihn sich vorstellt, wenn man dieses Buch zur Hand nimmt. Oder doch? Doch! Es könnte ja sein, daß jemand dieses Buch nicht nur als lohnende Strapaze erlebt, sondern auch als Vergnügen, wenn er erst einmal über den Untertitel hinweggekommen ist. Zur Sache:,,Fallen der Welt-Ordnung" - die Fallen oder das Fallen? Das Thema verrät es nicht; denn zwischen Moderne und Postmoderne ist ein weites Feld, auf dem alles mögliche passieren kann. Worum also geht es? Mathias Albert versteht das Arbeitsgebiet der Internationalen Beziehungen (also der Lehre und Forschung über diesen Gegenstandsbereich) als jenen Teilbereich der Sozialwissenschaften, der sich mit der Weltordnung befaßt. (shrink)

In Frisch 2004 and 2005 I showed that the standard ways of modeling particle-field interactions in classical electrodynamics, which exclude the interactions of a particle with its own field, results in a formal inconsistency, and I argued that attempts to include the self-field lead to numerous conceptual problems. In this paper I respond to criticism of my account in Belot 2007 and Muller 2007. I concede that this inconsistency in itself is less telling than I suggested earlier but argue that (...) existing solutions to the theory's foundational problems do not support the kind of traditional philosophical conception of scientific theorizing defended by Muller and Belot. *Received January 2007; revised October 2007. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, Skinner Building, College Park, MD 20742; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

I shall here raise and attempt to answer -- given the constraints of space, rather dogmatically -- some fundamental questions as regards the fertile and far-reaching doctrine Ted Honderich has in the past called Consciousness as Existence.

Working in Z + KP, we give a new proof that the class of hereditarily finite sets cannot be proved to be a set in Zermelo set theory, extend the method to establish other failures of replacement, and exhibit a formula Φ(λ, a) such that for any sequence $\langle A_{\lambda} \mid \lambda \text{a limit ordinal} \rangle$ where for each $\lambda, A_{\lambda} \subseteq ^{\lambda}2$ , there is a supertransitive inner model of Zermelo containing all ordinals in which for every λ A (...) λ = {α ∣Φ(λ, a)}. (shrink)

According to a view widely held among philosophers of science, the notion of cause has no legitimate role to play in mature theories of physics. In this paper I investigate the role of what physicists themselves identify as causal principles in the derivation of dispersion relations. I argue that this case study constitutes a counterexample to the popular view and that causal principles can function as genuine factual constraints. 1. Introduction2. Causality and Dispersion Relations3. Norton's Skepticism4. Conclusion.

English summary: The present work demonstrates the important influence of Heidegger on the philosophical thought of Walter Benjamin, on his philosophy of history, as well as his philosophy of art and language. Concentrating on the formative periods for both philosophers, the work examines their early education, as well as the interlacing of the philosophy of art and history in their concept of art. The final section treats works by both philosophers on the philosophy of art from their early years. French (...) description: L'objectif principal de ce livre est de demontrer de quelle maniere la lecture de certains textes de jeunesse de Heidegger marqua profondement la pensee philosophique de Benjamin. Celui-ci aurait subi l'influence heideggerienne aussi bien au niveau de sa propre philosophie de l'histoire que de sa philosophie du langage et de sa philosophie de l'art. Le fondement theorique est l'approche de la periode de formation, encore peu etudiee, des deux philosophes. La philosophie neokantienne est le principal courant philosophique a l'epoque dans toutes les universites allemandes. C'est pourquoi le point de depart de la recherche, notamment pour la premiere et la deuxieme partie (histoire et langage), se centre sur la formation des jeunes Benjamin et Heidegger aupres de maitres tels que Heinrich Rickert, Edmund Husserl et Emil Lask. L'entrecroisement de philosophie de l'histoire et de philosophie du langage aura une projection decisive dans le debat concernant le concept d'art chez les deux philosophes. Le troisieme axe d'etude porte quant a lui sur la philosophie de l'art. Il traite du livre de Heidegger date de 1929 sur Kant et le probleme de la metaphysique, et du texte de jeunesse de Benjamin intitule L'arc-en-ciel. Entretien sur l'imagination (1915). (shrink)