The development of science has been a distinctive feature of human history in recent times, especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In light of the problems that define the philosophy of science today, James Fetzer provides a foundation for inquiry into the nature of science, the history of science, and the relationship between the two. In Philosophy of Science, Fetzer investigates the aim and methods of empirical science and examines the importance of methodological commitments to the study (...) of science and the significance of interpretations of probability for understanding laws of nature and scientific explanations. This book offers a welcome framework for investigating the most recent work and the most promising solutions to the central problems that arise within this discipline. The result is a timely introduction to an increasingly important field. -- Publisher description. (shrink)

If the decades of the forties through the sixties were dominated by discussion of Hempel's “covering law“ explication of explanation, that of the seventies was preoccupied with Salmon's “statistical relevance” conception, which emerged as the principal alternative to Hempel's enormously influential account. Readers of Wesley C. Salmon's Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, therefore, ought to find it refreshing to discover that its author has not remained content with a facile defense of his previous investigations; on the (...) contrary, Salmon offers an original account of different kinds of explications, advances additional criticisms of various alternative theories, and elaborates a novel “two-tiered“ analysis of explanation that tacitly depends upon a “two-tiered” account of homogeneity. Indeed, if the considerations that follow are correct, Salmon has not merely refined his statistical relevance account but has actually abandoned it in favor of a “causal/mechanistic“ construction. This striking development suggests that the theory of explanation is likely to remain as lively an arena of debate in the eighties as it has been in the past. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to explore three alternative frameworks for understanding the nature of language and mentality, which accent syntactical, semantical, and pragmatical aspects of the phenomena with which they are concerned, respectively. Although the computational conception currently exerts considerable appeal, its defensibility appears to hinge upon an extremely implausible theory of the relation of form to content. Similarly, while the representational approach has much to recommend it, its range is essentially restricted to those units of language that (...) can be understood in terms of undefined units. Thus, the only alternative among these three that can account for the meaning of primitive units of language is one emphasizing the basic role of skills, habits, and tendencies in relating signs and dispositions. (shrink)

The idea that human thought requires the execution of mental algorithms provides a foundation for research programs in cognitive science, which are largely based upon the computational conception of language and mentality. Consideration is given to recent work by Penrose, Searle, and Cleland, who supply various grounds for disputing computationalism. These grounds in turn qualify as reasons for preferring a non-computational, semiotic approach, which can account for them as predictable manifestations of a more adquate conception. Thinking does not ordinarily require (...) the execution of mental algorithms, which appears to be at best no more than one rather special kind of thinking. (shrink)

Taking Brian Cantwell Smith’s study, “Limits of Correctness in Computers,” as its point of departure, this article explores the role of models in computer science. Smith identifies two kinds of models that play an important role, where specifications are models of problems and programs are models of possible solutions. Both presuppose the existence of conceptualizations as ways of conceiving the world “in certain delimited ways.” But high-level programming languages also function as models of virtual (or abstract) machines, while low-level programming (...) languages function as models of causal (or physical) machines. The resulting account suggests that sets of models embedded within models are indispensable for computer programming. (shrink)

Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset and German philosopher Karl Jaspers were both born in 1883, and they both maintained the position that humans are principally historical beings. Therefore, as attested by this notion itself, there are points in which their philosophy coincides. Ortega argued that human beings have no nature, only history. His argument is that history as such is human nature; what is most natural about being human is the fact of being historical and thus always having historicity. (...) Jaspers maintained the same position that in contemplating historicity, one's focus should not be on human nature in the strictly hereditary sense, because it is one's traditions, not the genetic makeup, that most make one to be human. Jaspers emphasizes the conversion of an existential historic consciousness into a consciousness of historicity that is similar to what can be understood in Ortega as historical perspectivism imbued with pragmatism. (shrink)

Accordingto the mass media, a postfeminist era emerged in the 1990s. The first objective is to develop a definition of the postfeminist perspective. Based on an informal content analysis of popular articles, the authors identify four postfeminist claims: overall support for the women’s movement has dramatically eroded because some women are increasingly antifeminist, believe the movement is irrelevant, and have adopted a “no, but..”.version of feminism. The second objective is to determine the extent of empirical support for these claims. Usingexistingpublic (...) opinion data, the authors find little support for the four postfeminist claims. Implications of the unsubstantiated post-feminist argument are discussed. (shrink)

The notion of program verification appears to trade upon an equivocation. Algorithms, as logical structures, are appropriate subjects for deductive verification. Programs, as causal models of those structures, are not. The success of program verification as a generally applicable and completely reliable method for guaranteeing program performance is not even a theoretical possibility.

This paper argues that a principle manner in which Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset’s historicist maxim ’man has no nature, what he has is history’ can be understood is through a pragmatist basis of anti-dualism, in part inherited from American philosopher John Dewey. The thesis here is that it is not that man has no nature, per se, rather that history is his nature because the two are anti-dualistic concepts; history is our nature because it is comprised of, as (...) famously posited by Ortega, “myself and my circumstance”. Hence, neither philosopher negates that “preparedness”, or “nature”, influences our being and behavior, rather they are arguing, more importantly, that “plasticity”, or nurture, plays a greater role given that this encompasses “nature” when we relate Ortega’s application of “history” to Dewey’s use of “experience”. Our “experiences” create our history, and interpretations as to the nature of them are not only potentially infinite, but they are primarily just that - interpretations, which can also change over time. Hence what we truly are is our history. Although these two philosophers are not frequently linked, there is a clear connection in this basic, Deweyen pragmatist anti-dualism as an elder of Ortega. And even though Dewey, unlike Ortega, wrote little on specifically the discipline of history, much of it was indeed fundamentally historical. (shrink)

The theory of history is a central topic in Ortega’s writings. The American pragmatists wrote little on history. Ortega had fervent critiques of American Pragmatism. The argument presented here is that there are similarities in his theory on history with a pragmatist view, nonetheless, which can be summarized as a pragmatist perspectivism on the philosophy of history and historiography. Historical data selected for recording is largely determined by pragmatic reasoning; the historical details are useful, meaningful, relevant, and interesting –and continue (...) to be– as they help us solve problems, since a study of the past is effective in helping us better prepare for the future. There is important epistemological and metaphysical value to be found in a pragmatist perspective on history and historiography. (shrink)

Spanish Philosopher José Ortega y Gasset advanced a number of strong criticisms of American pragmatism, yet some pragmatist notions can also be detected in his own philosophy. Within Ortega’s pragmatist perspectivism one can locate the possibility of overcoming one of the principal perceived problems of pragmatism: namely, its tendency toward relativism. This paper focuses on the ways in which Ortega’s discussion of pragmatism pertains to history and historiography. Ortega’s position that history is written from a select number of perspectives is (...) congenial to pragmatist pluralism. What is recorded and continues to thrive in the annals of history is, within a pragmatist framework, whatever continues to be interesting, relevant, useful, and meaningful because it makes a difference – from and for these perspectives. The more of these perspectives we study, the closer we approach what, on Ortega’s view, constitutes the “eternal truth which every period has lived,” because materials initially gathered and framed for pragmatic reasons can later on provide important opportunities for the reflexive analysis of historical knowledge. (shrink)

This paper examines the contextual constraints and requirements of discursive action in question-answer-sequences based discourse genres (interviews, Prime Minister’s Questions, People’s Prime Minister’s Questions) in mediated political discourse. It considers the multilayeredness of participation and pluralism of discursive action on the one hand, and the delimiting frame of the dialogic discourse genres on the other. It shows that both have a decisive impact on the participants’ meaning-making processes in context: the inherently unbounded participation framework contributes to pluralism of discursive action, (...) while genre- and media constraints narrow down the scope of production and interpretation. This does not only hold for the stage at which a discursive action occurs in the discourse, but also for its degree of explicitness with regard to presuppositions and felicity conditions. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: Historical Background The Turing Test Physical Machines Symbol Systems The Chinese Room Weak AI Strong AI Folk Psychology Eliminative Materialism Processing Syntax Semantic Engines The Language of Thought Formal Systems Mental Propensities The Frame Problem Minds and Brains Semiotic Systems Critical Differences The Hermeneutic Critique Conventions and Communication Other Minds Intelligent Machines.

1. WHAT IS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE? One of the fascinating aspects of the field of artificial intelligence (AI) is that the precise nature of its subject ..

What is an Author? What’s in a name? Marnie Binder asks if it matters who’s writing, and other questions of authorship.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic appraisal of the covering law and statistical relevance theories of statistical explanation advanced by Carl G. Hempel and by Wesley C. Salmon, respectively. The analysis is intended to show that the difference between these accounts is inprinciple analogous to the distinction between truth and confirmation, where Hempel's analysis applies to what is taken to be the case and Salmon's analysis applies to what is the case. Specifically, it is argued (a) (...) that statistical explanations exhibit the nomic expectability of their explanandum events, which in some cases may be strong but in other cases will not be; (b) that the statistical relevance criterion is more fundamental than the requirement of maximal specificity and should therefore displace it; and, (c) that if statistical explanations are to be envisioned as inductive arguments at all, then only in a qualified sense since, in particular, the requirement of high inductive probability between explanans and explanandum must be abandoned. (shrink)

Explains terms and concepts related to the nature and theory of knowledge, and identifies important individuals in the field.

Carl G. Hempel exerted greater influence upon philosophers of science than any other figure during the 20th century. In this far-reaching collection, distinguished philosophers contribute valuable studies that illuminate and clarify the central problems to which Hempel was devoted. The essays enhance our understanding of the development of logical empiricism as the major intellectual influence for scientifically-oriented philosophers and philosophically-minded scientists of the 20th century.

This article posits a pragmatist philosophy of history as exemplified in the work of British Philosopher F.C.S. Schiller (1864–1937). Part of this argument for a pragma-tist philosophy of history resides on pragmatism’s key notion of “experience” be-ing presented here as both related to human forces that are operant in history, and the particularly important “temporal” nature within the term, making it also in part “historical.” The goal is to more generally broaden scholarship in pragmatism as both containing important elements of (...) a unique and coherent philosophy of history, and to bring Schiller closer into the academic circle of the history of pragmatist thought. Available for download. (shrink)

Perhaps no technological innovation has so dominated the second half of the twentieth century as has the introduction of the programmable computer. It is quite difficult if not impossible to imagine how contemporary affairs—in business and science, communications and transportation, governmental and military activities, for example—could be conducted without the use of computing machines, whose principal contribution has been to relieve us of the necessity for certain kinds of mental exertion. The computer revolution has reduced our mental labors by means (...) of these machines, just as the Industrial Revolution reduced our physical labor by means of other machines. (shrink)

Luciano Floridi (2003) offers a theory of information as a strongly semantic notion, according to which information encapsulates truth, thereby making truth a necessary condition for a sentence to qualify as information. While Floridi provides an impressive development of this position, the aspects of his approach of greatest philosophical significance are its foundations rather than its formalization. He rejects the conception of information as meaningful data, which entails at least three theses – that information can be false; that tautologies are (...) information; and, that It is true that ... is non-redundant – appear to be defensible. This inquiry offers various logical, epistemic, and ordinary-language grounds to demonstrate that an account of his kind is too narrow to be true and that its adoption would hopelessly obscure crucial differences between information, misinformation, and disinformation. (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is that extensional language alone provides an essentially inadequate foundation for the logical formalization of any lawlike statement. The arguments presented are intended to demonstrate that lawlike sentences are logically general dispositional statements requiring an essentially intensional reduction sentence formulation. By introducing a non-extensional logical operator, the 'fork', the difference between universal and statistical laws emerges in a distinction between dispositional predicates of universal strength as opposed to those of merely statistical strength. While the logical (...) form of universal and statistical laws appears to be fundamentally dissimilar on the standard account, from this point of view their syntactical structure is basically the same. (shrink)

This book examines the contributions of William James, John Dewey, F.C.S. Schiller, C.S. Peirce, George Herbert Mead, and Jane Addams to a case for a pragmatist philosophy of history. Together, they expand our understanding on how we process the past, which impacts our present and our future.

José Ortega y Gasset In the roughly 6,000 pages that Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset wrote on the humanities, he covered a wide variety of topics. This captures the kind of thinker he was: one who cannot be strictly categorized to any one school of philosophy. José Ortega y Gasset did not want … Continue reading Gasset, José Ortega y →.

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information, and data-processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine. Its scope is intended to span the full range of interest from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental powers of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and computer science. While primary emphasis will (...) be placed upon theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological aspects of these problems and domains, empirical, experimen tal, and methodological studies will also appear from time to time. The present volume reflects the kind of insights that can be obtained when research workers in philosophy, artificial intelligence, and computer science explore problems of common concern. The issues here tend to fall into two broad but varied sets, namely: those concerned with content and concepts, on the one hand, and those concerned with semantics and epistemology, on the other. The collection begins with a prologue that focuses upon the relations between connectionism and alternative conceptions of nativism and ends with an epilogue that examines the significance of alternative conceptions of the Frame Problem for artificial intelligence. Because these papers are rich and diverse, they ought to appeal to a wide and heterogeneous audience. J.H.F. (shrink)