In this study, we examine the influence of senior leadership on firms’ corporate social responsibility. We integrate upper echelons research that has investigated either the influence of the CEO or the top management team on CSR. We contend that functional experience complementarity between CEOs and TMTs in formulating and implementing CSR strategy may underlie differentiated strategies in CSR. We find that when CEOs who have predominant experience in output functions are complemented by TMTs with a lower proportion of members who (...) have experience in output functions, there is a pronounced effect on the community, product, and diversity dimensions of CSR. In turn, when output-oriented CEOs are complemented by output-oriented TMTs, we observe an effect on the employee relations dimension of CSR. Interestingly, we find no influence of CEO-TMT complementarity on the environment dimension of CSR. In general, our empirical results support the relevance of the interaction between CEOs and their TMTs in defining their firms’ CSR profile. (shrink)

In this study, we examine the influence of senior leadership on firms’ corporate social responsibility. We integrate upper echelons research that has investigated either the influence of the CEO or the top management team on CSR. We contend that functional experience complementarity between CEOs and TMTs in formulating and implementing CSR strategy may underlie differentiated strategies in CSR. We find that when CEOs who have predominant experience in output functions are complemented by TMTs with a lower proportion of members who (...) have experience in output functions, there is a pronounced effect on the community, product, and diversity dimensions of CSR. In turn, when output-oriented CEOs are complemented by output-oriented TMTs, we observe an effect on the employee relations dimension of CSR. Interestingly, we find no influence of CEO-TMT complementarity on the environment dimension of CSR. In general, our empirical results support the relevance of the interaction between CEOs and their TMTs in defining their firms’ CSR profile. (shrink)

In this new book, Marko Zlomislić argues that Slavoj Žižek's work does not contain any sort of radical emancipatory project, especially as it passes through the ideology of communism and Lacanian psychoanalysis. The evidence for the failure of communism is vast and includes the more than six hundred mass graves recently located in Žižek's homeland of Slovenia. Zlomislić demonstrates that the way out of the capitalist dilemma is not a repetition of communism but a return to the late medieval (...) notion of haecceity or "individual thisness" that was rejected by modernity. Haecceity, or the indescribable and indefinite here and now of the person, shows that the late medieval Franciscans were already "postmodernists." It is no wonder that the totalitarianism of the modernist Hegel is embraced by thinkers such as Žižek, Badiou, Hardt, Negri, and Laclau and was already rejected by Leibnitz, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Levinas, Deleuze, and Derrida. This important book shows that Žižek's work must be rejected because it does not uphold the dignity, worth, and uniqueness of the person. (shrink)

In his paper ‘Words on Play’, Bernard Suits famously defines play as an autotelic activity. Some philosophers like Stephen E. Schmid argue against Suits’s position by pointing out that the concept of autotelicity in Suits’s work is too unclear to serve as a defining feature for play. Due to that fact, Schmid dismisses autotelicity in favor of a definition of play in terms of the player’s engagement in an activity for intrinsic reasons. The purpose of this paper is to defend (...) Suits’s claim by clarifying the concept of autotelicity in the context of play and by arguing against some typical misconceptions about autotelicity in Schmid’s work and in the work of others. First, I define autotelic activities as activities that are engaged in for their own sake. Then, I argue that the engagement in an activity for its own sake is neither in conflict with the activity’s potential internal instrumental structure nor with the existence of certain intrinsic rea-sons (such as pleasure). (shrink)

Regress arguments have convinced many that reasoning cannot require beliefs about what follows from what. In this paper I argue that this is a mistake. Regress arguments rest on dubious (although deeply entrenched) assumptions about the nature of reasoning — most prominently, the assumption that believing p by reasoning is simply a matter of having a belief in p with the right causal ancestry. I propose an alternative account, according to which beliefs about what follows from what play a constitutive (...) role in reasoning. (shrink)

In this paper the author discusses some problems concerning the relationship between contemporary tendencies in Marxism and theology of liberation.

: One of the outcomes from low self-confidence of basketball is aggressive behavior. Helpless feeling caused by low self-confidence could turn an athlete using aggressive behavior as alternate behavior in the interaction with the opponent during a game. The level of the aggression can be seen in the injury rate in that particular sport. This research objective is to find out the relation between self-confidence and the appearance of the aggressive behavior in basketball player. It involves 64 athletes in West (...) Jakarta between 17 to 28 years old. Data that was measured by questionnaires has shown there is a negative association between self-confidence and aggressive behavior in basketball athlete.  . (shrink)

The philosophical literature on reasoning is dominated by the assumption that reasoning is essentially a matter of following rules. This paper challenges this view, by arguing that it misrepresents the nature of reasoning as a personal level activity. Reasoning must reflect the reasoner’s take on her evidence. The rule-following model seems ill-suited to accommodate this fact. Accordingly, this paper suggests replacing the rule-following model with a different, semantic approach to reasoning.

MIRJAM HORN, POSTMODERN PLAGIARISMS: CULTURAL AGENDA AND AESTHETIC STRATEGIES OF APPROPRIATION IN US-AMERICAN LITERATURE, WALTER DE GRUYTER, BERLIN/BOSTON, 2015.Marko Bogunović.

In his essay ‘Transparency, Belief, Intention’, Alex Byrne (2011) argues that transparency—our ability to form beliefs about some of our intentional mental states by considering their subject matter, rather than on the basis of special psychological evidence—involves inferring ‘from world to mind’. In this reply I argue that this cannot be correct. I articulate an intuitive necessary condition for a pattern of belief to count as a rule of inference, and I show that the pattern involved in transparency does not (...) meet that condition. As a result, I conclude that transparency does not involve inference. (shrink)

Despite many authors in psychiatry endorsing a naturalist view of the mind, many still consider that mental dysfunctions cannot be reduced to brain dysfunctions. This paper investigates the main reasons for this view. Some arguments rely on the analogy that the mind is like software while the brain is like hardware. The analogy suggests that just as software can malfunction independently of hardware malfunctions, similarly the mind can malfunction independently of any brain malfunction. This view has been critically examined in (...) recent literature. However, other less discussed reasons suggest that mental dysfunctions cannot be reduced to brain dysfunctions because mental dysfunctions are appropri- ately ascribed at the level of intentional mental states, while brain dysfunctions are solely related to abnormalities in anatomy and physiological processes. This paper questions why such a view would be upheld. The discussion is framed within the interface problem in the philosophy of cognitive science, which concerns the relationship between personal and subpersonal levels of explanation. The paper examines the view that an autonomist perspective on the personal/ subpersonal distinction could justify the separation of mental dysfunctions, described in intentional terms, from brain dysfunctions, described in anatomical or physiological terms. Ultimately, the paper argues that the autonomist view cannot be upheld in psychiatry and, consequently, does not provide a principled justification for rejecting the reduction of mental dysfunctions to brain dysfunctions. (shrink)

I develop an account of our capacity to know what we consciously believe, which is based on an account of the phenomenology of conscious belief. While other recent authors have suggested that phenomenally conscious states play a role in the epistemology of self-ascriptions of belief, they have failed to give a satisfying account of how exactly the phenomenology is supposed to help with the epistemology — i.e., an account of the way “what it is like” for the subject of a (...) conscious belief makes it rational, for her, to self-ascribe that belief. I argue that an account according to which the phenomenology of belief is transparent — i.e., such that in having a conscious belief one is aware of the world as being a certain way, rather than of anything distinctively mental — is adequate to this task. (shrink)

According to the so-called ‘Taking Condition’ (a label due to Boghossian 2014) on inference, for a response R in circumstances C to count as an instance of reasoning or inferring, it must be the case that the agent’s taking it that R is warranted or justified in C plays (the right sort of) explanatory role in her R-ing. The Taking Condition has come under much criticism in the theory of reasoning. While I believe that these criticisms can be answered, my (...) aim in this paper is to build a positive case for the Taking Condition. More specifically, I argue that views based on the Taking Condition do a much better job accounting for crucial features of reasoning—especially once we recognize the pervasiveness and significance of defeasibility in our reasoning. (shrink)

Além dos cinco sentidos externos tradicionais, Tomás de Aquino cataloga como potências sensíveis uma variedade de sentidos internos. Dentre os sentidos internos, o sentido comum apresenta um interesse especial, na medida em que sua operação parece ser indissociável do sentir em geral. As operações típicas do sentido comum são perceber que se sente e discriminar objetos sensíveis de sentidos externos diferentes. Em virtude dessas duas operações, ele é fonte de consciência sensível e integra numa mesma unidade as informações advindas de (...) sentidos externos irredutivelmente distintos. Ao longo deste artigo, justificaremos a introdução do sentido comum como potência sensível distinta dos sentidos externos, explicando porque o primeiro é uma condição de possibilidade dos últimos. (shrink)

In this paper, the possibility of private language argument in Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus is analyzed. The concept of ‘language that only I could understand” is connected to solipsism, or the impossibility to understand other people’s way of seeing the world. But all members of the same community are able to communicate using the same language, so this language is a general language, and there is no private language, just a private perception of the world. Contemporary linguistic theories of Chomsky and (...) de Saussure are close to this interpretation of private language. (shrink)

In §24 of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant remarks that his account of the capacity of the understanding to spontaneously determine sensibility explains how empirical self-knowledge is possible through inner-sense. Although most commentators consider Kant's conception of empirical self-knowledge through inner sense to be either a failure or at least drastically under-developed, I argue that (just as Kant claims) his account of the capacity of the understanding to determine sensibility - the "productive imagination" - can ground an attractive account of self-knowledge. (...) The account of inner sense I propose, however, may seem to conflict with some of Kant's views on time. I close the paper by arguing that the apparent conflict is not a fault specific to my account of inner sense, but rather indicative of a deeper tension, internal to Kant's views on time. (shrink)

According to current orthodoxy in the philosophy of action, intentional actions consist in intrinsically mindless bodily movements that stand in causal relations to appropriate mental states. This paper challenges this approach to intentional action, by arguing that there are not enough appropriate mental states around to ‘animate’ all of the bodily movements we intuitively count as intentional actions. In the alternative picture I suggest, the bodily movements that constitute our intentional actions are themselves to be thought of as cognitive events, (...) embodying our grasp of ways of acting. (shrink)

Does rationality require us to take the means to our ends? Intuitively, it seems clear that it does. And yet it has proven difficult to explain why this should be so: after all, if one is pursuing an end that one has decisive reason not to pursue, the balance of reasons will presumably speak against one's taking the means necessary to bring that end about. In this paper I propose a novel account of the instrumental requirement which addresses this problem. (...) On the view I develop, the instrumental requirement is normative not because agents have reasons to comply with it, but because it is a normative standard intrinsic to intentional action—i.e., it is a standard that partly spells out what it is to exercise one's agency well. (shrink)

Dieser Band behandelt umfassend und systematisch die Frage des Patientenwillens: die historischen und philosophischen Grundlagen des Willensbegriffs, die Beziehung von Autonomie und Wille und praktische Fragen der Bioethik und des Biorechts. Die Herausgeber: PD Dr. Marko Fuchs lehrt Philosophie an der Universität Bamberg. Dr. Martin Hähnel lehrt Philosophie an der Universität Bremen und ist Koordinator des BMBF-Verbundvorhabens "Verantwortungsvoller Umgang mit Künstlicher Intelligenz in der Medizin" (VUKIM) Dr. Danaë Simmermacher lehrt Philosophie an der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg.

In ‘Reasoning and Regress’ I argued that inferring a conclusion from a set of propositions may simply consist in taking it that the conclusion follows from these propositions—thereby defusing familiar regress arguments. Sinan Dogramaci challenges the generality of this view, on the grounds that sometimes you may draw conclusions from no premisses that you believe. I respond by clarifying a distinction between the premisses of an argument from the reasons your conclusion is based upon. While suppositional reasoning may involve no (...) premisses in the former sense, it does not follow that it does not involve concluding something on the basis of reasons. This allows the view defended in ‘Reasoning and Regress’ to extend to suppositional reasoning. (shrink)

In “Normative Reasons from a Naturalistic Point of View”, Marko Jurjako explores the foundational concept of normative reasons through the lens of methodological naturalism. Departing from traditional analytic or purely conceptual approaches, this philosophical inquiry navigates the terrain of reasons, rationality, and normativity—concepts with a long philosophical pedigree—within a framework rooted in our understanding of the natural and social world. By aligning the exploration with scientifically based theorizing, the book seeks a synoptic view that bridges the gap between relatively (...) isolated philosophical discussions of the nature of normative reasons and their grounding in human intrapersonal and interpersonal interactions that can be understood and explained by an array of scientifically inspired models. (shrink)

This paper examines the social theory of Lester Frank Ward, one of the most significant representatives of early American social theory, with particular attention to his conception of the state, which can be described as Hegelian. The first part of the paper gives a brief overview of early American social theory: its basic features, the issues that were the focus of attention during this period in the development of sociology in the US, and its most significant representatives. The basic features (...) of Ward’s social theory are then presented and examined in more detail. It is pointed out that it is: conceptual and essentially based on the natural sciences; based on the distinction between pure and applied sociology; systematic; supportive of progressive and pro-social reforms. It was directed against the individualist tradition. His theory was based on the belief that the human mind can direct social progress and that the order based on social inequalities, which is a product of the laissez-faire doctrine, cannot guarantee freedom and prosperity. The fundamental institution capable of doing so is the state. Therefore, the central part of this paper is devoted to his conception of the state and makes a comparison with Hegel’s theory of the ethical state contained in Hegel’s philosophy of objective spirit – philosophy of law and philosophy of history. It concludes by pointing out that Ward’s theory indicated the general direction of development of social circumstances towards the era of collectivism, and was also atypical of American social theory in some of its features. (shrink)

Which epistemic value is the standard according to which we ought to compare, assess and design institutional arrangements in terms of their epistemic properties? Two main options are agent development and attainment of truth. The options are presented through two authoritative contemporary accounts-agent development by Robert Talisse’s understanding in Democracy and Moral Conflict and attainment of truth by David Estlund’s treatment, most prominently in Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework. Both options are shown to be unsatisfactory because they are subject to (...) problematic risk of suboptimal epistemic state lock-in. The ability of the social epistemic system to revise suboptimal epistemic states is argued to be the best option for a comparative standard in institutional epistemology. (shrink)

Reconciling theories of intelligent institutional systems in experimentalist open democracy and pluralist liberalism, Institutional Epistemology and Extreme Inequality argues that protecting freedom from poverty and limiting private wealth are the necessary conditions for reliable social learning and problem-solving.

This daily diary study examined the within-person coupling between four emotion regulation strategies and both subjective well-being and perceived stress in daily life of geriatric nurses. Participants ( N = 89) described how they regulated their emotions in terms of cognitive reappraisal and suppression. They also indicated their subjective well-being and level of perceived stress each day over 3 weeks. At the within-person level, cognitive reappraisal intended to increase positive emotions was positively associated with higher subjective well-being and negatively associated (...) with perceived stress. Suppression of the expression of positive emotions was negatively associated with subjective well-being and positively associated with perceived stress. However, cognitive reappraisal intended to down-regulate negative emotions and suppression as a strategy to inhibit the expression of negative emotions were not associated with daily well-being or perceived stress. Off-days were rated as days with higher subjective well-being and lower perceived stress in contrast to working days. At the between-person level, individuals who reported more daily negative affect reported increased suppression of positive emotions, corroborating the within-person findings. Moreover, findings indicated that nurses with more years of experience in the job reported higher subjective well-being and less perceived stress. These results provide insights into important daily emotional processes of geriatric nurses, both at workdays and in their leisure time. (shrink)

Almost everything that we do, we do by doing other things. Even actions we perform without deliberation or conscious planning are composed of ‘smaller’, subsidiary actions. But how should we think of such subsidiary actions? Are they fully-fledged intentional actions (in the sense of things that we do for reasons) in their own right? In this paper I defend an affirmative answer to this question, against a recently influential form of scepticism. Drawing on a distinctive kind of ‘action-demonstrative’ representation, I (...) show that the sceptic's arguments do not go through. (shrink)

What exactly is reasoning? While debate on this question is ongoing, most philosophers seem to agree on at least the following: reasoning is a mental process operating on contents, which consists in adopting or revising some of your attitudes in light of others. In this paper, I argue that this characterisation is mistaken: there is no single mental phenomenon that satisfies both of these conditions. Instead, I characterise two distinct mental phenomena, which I call ‘deducing’, on the one hand, and (...) ‘reasoning’ or ‘inference’ on the other, to play each of these roles. Recognising this division of labour is essential to developing a better understanding of our rational economy. (shrink)

Patients with psychosis often have poor insight into their illness. Poor insight into illness is, at least among patients with psychosis, a good predictor of treatment non-adherence. This is no mystery, for as Xavier Amador asks, "Who would want to take medicine for an illness they did not believe they had?" What is curious is that some patients with psychosis do adhere to treatment despite a lack of insight. Why do these patients adhere to treatment, given that they do not (...) believe they are ill to begin with? In this paper, I attempt to answer this question. I do so by first considering cases of non-psychotic patients who adhere to treatment despite a lack of insight. I point out that these sorts of cases are commonplace, and attempt to explain why they arise. The explanation is given in terms of anticipated treatment benefits. However, these benefits are not conceptualized by the patient in terms of pathology. The patient does not, in other words, think of such benefits in terms of illness, symptoms, treatment, and so forth. I then argue that the proposed explanation can be extended to account for why psychotic patients without insight sometimes adhere to treatment. I conclude by drawing out some of the practical implications of the proposed view. I first argue, on practical as well as ethical grounds, that improving insight for purposes of treatment adherence is misguided. I then suggest that such adherence might be increased simply by explaining treatment benefits in language that does not presuppose that the patient is, in any sense, "ill," "diseased," "sick," "unwell," and so on. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reflections on InsightDilemmas, Paradoxes, and PuzzlesMarga Reimer (bio)Keywordsinsight, psychosis, treatment adherence, medical model, autonomy, open placebos, rationalityThe Practitioner's DilemmaThe psychiatrist aware of the potential intractability of what Jennifer Radden calls "insightlessness," faces a dilemma. Should she encourage her patient to embrace a medical model of his "troubles," a model whose adoption is likely to motivate treatment adherence? She might then be trying to do the impossible; she might (...) also alienate her patient in the process. Should she instead encourage her insightless patient to embrace his own non-medical model, according to which treatment adherence makes no medical sense whatsoever? She might then see herself as encouraging a kind of uninformed consent: Her insightless patient might be taking powerful, potentially harmful, medication for reasons (such as sound sleep and "peace of mind") that would never medically justify adherence.In my original paper, I suggested that the way out of this dilemma might be to embrace the latter option, while characterizing the very real (and medically based) benefits of treatment adherence in non-medical terms. I now realize that my proposed resolution reflects an oversimplified understanding of what might be called the "practitioner's dilemma." As Michaela Amering (2010) makes clear, the situation for those with mental illness is improving dramatically. With "recovery orientation" as the "guiding principle of mental health policy," the emphasis is on "health promotion, individual strengths, and resilience." The question becomes: Can the practitioner encourage her insightless patient to partake in this "recovery" movement if she does not simultaneously encourage him to embrace a medicalized understanding of his "troubles"?Not obviously. For although a "recovery" model might eschew notions like illness1 and disease, pathology and dysfunction, and even schizophrenia, it will inevitably involve some medical notions. The patient who partakes in the "recovery movement" described by Amering, would seem to have no choice but to accept a model that is essentially medical. Consider the language used by Amering in characterizing that movement. She talks of mental health problems, therapeutic relations, patient self-determination, diagnosis and, of course, recovery. The concepts underlying such language are intrinsic to the patient-oriented movement Amering describes. The question becomes:How can the insightless patient rationally partake in such a movement without embracing some version of the medical model of mental illness? [End Page 85]This question suggests the importance of promoting some kind of insight, even if not insight "into psychosis." At the close of these comments, I consider briefly what such "revisionary" insight might involve.Paradoxes of Conditional and Relinquished AutonomyAutonomy among patients with psychosis presupposes the sort of clear-headedness that arguably comes only with treatment adherence. This may provide some justification for the "coercive treatments" that Anthony (2006) finds so offensive. For patients with psychosis, genuine autonomy is conditional, requiring some degree of insight: Recognition that their "troubles" are at least amenable to medical treatment. Once the patient recognizes this, he can choose freely to decline such treatment (regardless of whether that choice is ultimately respected). Call this the "paradox of conditional autonomy." The conditional nature of autonomy is a familiar point in philosophical discussions regarding free will. There is no genuine freedom without the sort of knowledge required for informed choices. What distinguishes the patient with psychosis from persons more generally is that his autonomy is further conditioned: The knowledge required for autonomous decision making arguably requires some degree of treatment adherence.However, the mentally ill patient has the right, as do all patients, to relinquish autonomy. He may opt for deference to, and dependency on, the relevant experts: Mental health care professionals (Campbell 1994). We are led once again to paradox. To respect the patient's autonomy, the mental health care professional must respect his right to forego autonomy in favor of deference and dependency. This paradoxical situation, involving a kind of deferred autonomy, is not unique to psychiatry but applies to medicine across the board. Indeed, it applies to the human service industry more generally where, as McGorry (1992) suggests, there is an implicit assumption that the service user is to defer to the expertise of the service provider.This assumption is rightly challenged. Suppose Justin and... (shrink)

Risk decisions often appear unsatisfactory after a calamity has taken place. This holds even when they are products of systematic risk analysis. Yet, if relevant considerations available to be known pre-accident were adequately taken into account and safety measures implemented accordingly, nobody seems morally blameworthy. In this paper, I advance a two-way argument. Firstly, I show how analysis of post-accident apologizing sheds new light on vexed tensions in ethical assessment of risk impositions. This amounts to exposing conflicting moral intuitions in (...) risk decisions, discussing problematic tenets in risk analysis as well as outlining three lines of arguments that destabilize the very notion of correct risk analysis. The analysis indicates that bringing different discussions of moral blameworthiness together facilitates resolving the tensions. It also calls for further and early-on collaboration between risk theorists and ethicists in order to carry these insights to risk analysis. Secondly, I argue that analysis of risk decisions, in part, reveals a discrepancy between the definitional work done on apology and what is required by ethics. Virtually every suggestion for the gold standard for apology involves moral blameworthiness as a necessary condition. I highlight different kinds of cases in which nobody is culpable, but an apology can be morally fitting or required. It would be nonsensical to say that, in these cases, one ought to apologize, but in a disingenuous manner. (shrink)

Political extremism remains relatively insufficiently explored due to the fact that the phenomenon is controversial and hard to define. Its ambiguity and variability depending on time and spatial point of view further complicates its definition. Its structure is amorphous and eclectic as it often includes elements from different ideologies and connects incompatible ideas. A multidimensional conceptualization and an interdisciplinary approach - sociological, social, psychological and historical, are the Author’s tools in explaining the phenomenon of political extremism in Serbia, hopefully contributing (...) to its clarification and laying a foundation for its further explanatory theoretical studies. (shrink)